Despite concerns about gender bias in general and jurors’ gender in particular, little is known about the effect of jurors’ gender on conviction rates. We identify the effect of own-gender jurors by exploiting random variation in the assignment to and ordering of jury pools in two large Florida counties. Results indicate that own-gender jurors are significantly less likely to convict on drug charges, though we find no evidence of effects for other charges. Estimates indicate that adding one own-gender juror (∼1.6 standard deviations) results in a 30-percentage-point reduction in conviction rates on drug charges, which is highly significant even after adjusting for multiple comparisons. These findings highlight how drawing an opposite-gender jury can impose significant costs on defendants and demonstrate that own-gender bias can occur even in settings where the importance of being impartial is actively pressed on participants.
{"title":"The Effect of Own-Gender Jurors on Conviction Rates","authors":"Mark Hoekstra, Brittany Street","doi":"10.1086/714149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714149","url":null,"abstract":"Despite concerns about gender bias in general and jurors’ gender in particular, little is known about the effect of jurors’ gender on conviction rates. We identify the effect of own-gender jurors by exploiting random variation in the assignment to and ordering of jury pools in two large Florida counties. Results indicate that own-gender jurors are significantly less likely to convict on drug charges, though we find no evidence of effects for other charges. Estimates indicate that adding one own-gender juror (∼1.6 standard deviations) results in a 30-percentage-point reduction in conviction rates on drug charges, which is highly significant even after adjusting for multiple comparisons. These findings highlight how drawing an opposite-gender jury can impose significant costs on defendants and demonstrate that own-gender bias can occur even in settings where the importance of being impartial is actively pressed on participants.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"121 1","pages":"513 - 537"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77738203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conventional wisdom confers iconic status on the clause of England’s Act of Settlement (1701) mandating secure tenure for judges. This paper uses new databases of judges’ biographies and citations to estimate how the move to secure tenure affected the number of citations to judges’ decisions, a measure of the quality of decisions. Several strategies facilitate identification of the effect of secure tenure. A court-year panel permits use of a difference-in-differences framework. Controls capture judges’ human capital and amount of litigation. Historical evidence, tests of sensitivity to omitted-variable bias, and instrumental variables estimates support the findings on the effects of tenure arrangements derived from ordinary least squares estimates. Secure tenure had a strong deleterious effect on associate judges’ decisions and a smaller positive effect on chief judges’ decisions. The effect of all judges having secure tenure is negative, large, and statistically significant. The act had an effect opposite of that universally assumed. According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices during good behavior…. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. (Hamilton [1788] 1981, pp. 226–27) In one sense you could say that Judge [Roy] Bean was independent. He did whatever he liked. (O’Connor 2009, p. 47) According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices during good behavior…. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. (Hamilton [1788] 1981, pp. 226–27) In one sense you could say that Judge [Roy] Bean was independent. He did whatever he liked. (O’Connor 2009, p. 47)
传统观点认为，1701年英国《殖民地法》(Act of Settlement)中规定法官终身任职的条款具有标志性的地位。本文使用法官传记和引用的新数据库来估计确保任期的举措如何影响法官判决的引用次数，这是衡量判决质量的一个指标。若干战略有助于确定安全使用权的影响。法庭年度专家组允许使用差异中的差异框架。控制捕获法官的人力资本和诉讼数量。历史证据、对遗漏变量偏差的敏感性测试和工具变量估计都支持由普通最小二乘估计得出的关于权属安排影响的结论。固定任期对副法官的决定有强烈的有害影响，对首席法官的决定有较小的积极影响。所有法官有固定任期的影响都是负面的，很大的，在统计上是显著的。这一行为产生的效果与人们普遍认为的相反。根据大会的计划，所有可能由美国任命的法官都将在行为良好期间任职....司法执法官的良好行为标准，无疑是现代政府实践中最有价值的改进之一。(Hamilton [1788] 1981, pp. 226-27)在某种意义上，你可以说法官[Roy] Bean是独立的。他喜欢干什么就干什么。(O’connor 2009, p. 47)根据公约的计划，美国可能任命的所有法官都将在行为良好期间任职....司法执法官的良好行为标准，无疑是现代政府实践中最有价值的改进之一。(Hamilton [1788] 1981, pp. 226-27)在某种意义上，你可以说法官[Roy] Bean是独立的。他喜欢干什么就干什么。(奥康纳2009，第47页)
{"title":"Did the Independence of Judges Reduce Legal Development in England, 1600–1800?","authors":"Peter Murrell","doi":"10.1086/713250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/713250","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom confers iconic status on the clause of England’s Act of Settlement (1701) mandating secure tenure for judges. This paper uses new databases of judges’ biographies and citations to estimate how the move to secure tenure affected the number of citations to judges’ decisions, a measure of the quality of decisions. Several strategies facilitate identification of the effect of secure tenure. A court-year panel permits use of a difference-in-differences framework. Controls capture judges’ human capital and amount of litigation. Historical evidence, tests of sensitivity to omitted-variable bias, and instrumental variables estimates support the findings on the effects of tenure arrangements derived from ordinary least squares estimates. Secure tenure had a strong deleterious effect on associate judges’ decisions and a smaller positive effect on chief judges’ decisions. The effect of all judges having secure tenure is negative, large, and statistically significant. The act had an effect opposite of that universally assumed. According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices during good behavior…. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. (Hamilton [1788] 1981, pp. 226–27) In one sense you could say that Judge [Roy] Bean was independent. He did whatever he liked. (O’Connor 2009, p. 47) According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices during good behavior…. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. (Hamilton [1788] 1981, pp. 226–27) In one sense you could say that Judge [Roy] Bean was independent. He did whatever he liked. (O’Connor 2009, p. 47)","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"84 1","pages":"539 - 565"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74993672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Disclosure-based nudges are increasingly utilized by governments around the world to achieve policy goals related to health, safety, employment, environmental protection, retirement savings, debt, and more. Yet a critical aspect of these nudge-type policy interventions—the mode of communication—remains unexplored. We study the effects of the communication medium on debt collection procedures, using a policy experiment conducted in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Justice. Debtors often lack adequate information about the debt, the judgment, and the enforcement and collection procedures. As a result, the process of debt collection is often harmful to the debtor and ineffective in securing repayment. We manipulate the choice of medium—telephone, regular mail, text message, and video message—holding fixed the content of the communication. We find that digital communication strategies, in particular, communicating via text message, were the most cost-effective, significantly improving outcomes for both debtors and creditors.
{"title":"How to Communicate the Nudge: A Real-World Policy Experiment","authors":"O. Bar‐Gill, Alma Cohen","doi":"10.1086/718856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718856","url":null,"abstract":"Disclosure-based nudges are increasingly utilized by governments around the world to achieve policy goals related to health, safety, employment, environmental protection, retirement savings, debt, and more. Yet a critical aspect of these nudge-type policy interventions—the mode of communication—remains unexplored. We study the effects of the communication medium on debt collection procedures, using a policy experiment conducted in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Justice. Debtors often lack adequate information about the debt, the judgment, and the enforcement and collection procedures. As a result, the process of debt collection is often harmful to the debtor and ineffective in securing repayment. We manipulate the choice of medium—telephone, regular mail, text message, and video message—holding fixed the content of the communication. We find that digital communication strategies, in particular, communicating via text message, were the most cost-effective, significantly improving outcomes for both debtors and creditors.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"89 1","pages":"607 - 633"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83882763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a land-titling reform implemented as a randomized control trial to isolate its effects on litigation. The reform consisted of demarcating land parcels, registering existing customary rights, and granting additional legal protection to right holders. Ten years after implementation, the reform doubled the likelihood of households experiencing land-related litigation, but disputes did not escalate into more frequent violent episodes. We suggest that this increase in litigation reflects the complementarity of land titling by registration and by judicial procedures aimed at further clarifying property rights, as the reform registered titles to all parcels but left many titles subject to adverse claims. This raised the demand for complementary litigation aimed at perfecting titles for low-value parcels that, under the customary system, were optimal to keep unclarified. Consistent with this explanation, we find that the increase in litigation took place among households that plausibly own land of lower value.
{"title":"Land Titling and Litigation","authors":"Benito Arruñada, M. Fabbri, M. Faure","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3885586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3885586","url":null,"abstract":"We study a land-titling reform implemented as a randomized control trial to isolate its effects on litigation. The reform consisted of demarcating land parcels, registering existing customary rights, and granting additional legal protection to right holders. Ten years after implementation, the reform doubled the likelihood of households experiencing land-related litigation, but disputes did not escalate into more frequent violent episodes. We suggest that this increase in litigation reflects the complementarity of land titling by registration and by judicial procedures aimed at further clarifying property rights, as the reform registered titles to all parcels but left many titles subject to adverse claims. This raised the demand for complementary litigation aimed at perfecting titles for low-value parcels that, under the customary system, were optimal to keep unclarified. Consistent with this explanation, we find that the increase in litigation took place among households that plausibly own land of lower value.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"131 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73467153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Simeon Djankov, E. Glaeser, V. Perotti, Andrei Shleifer
How do the different elements in the standard bundle of property rights, including those of possession and transfer, influence the shape of cities? This paper incorporates insecure property rights into a standard model of urban land prices and density and makes predictions about investment in land and property, informality, and the efficiency of land use. Our empirical analysis links data on institutions for land titling and transfer with multiple urban outcomes in 190 countries. The evidence is generally consistent with the model’s predictions and more broadly with Harold Demsetz’s approach to property rights institutions in “Towards a Theory of Property Rights.” Indeed, we document worldwide improvements in the quality of institutions facilitating property transfer over time.
标准产权束中的不同要素，包括占有和转让，是如何影响城市形态的?本文将不安全产权纳入城市土地价格和密度的标准模型，并对土地和财产投资、非正式性和土地利用效率进行了预测。我们的实证分析将190个国家的土地所有权和转让制度数据与多种城市成果联系起来。这些证据总体上与模型的预测一致，更广泛地与哈罗德·德姆塞茨(Harold Demsetz)在《走向产权理论》(Towards a Theory of property rights)中对产权制度的研究方法一致。事实上，随着时间的推移，我们记录了世界范围内促进财产转移的机构质量的改善。
{"title":"Property Rights and Urban Form","authors":"Simeon Djankov, E. Glaeser, V. Perotti, Andrei Shleifer","doi":"10.1086/718854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718854","url":null,"abstract":"How do the different elements in the standard bundle of property rights, including those of possession and transfer, influence the shape of cities? This paper incorporates insecure property rights into a standard model of urban land prices and density and makes predictions about investment in land and property, informality, and the efficiency of land use. Our empirical analysis links data on institutions for land titling and transfer with multiple urban outcomes in 190 countries. The evidence is generally consistent with the model’s predictions and more broadly with Harold Demsetz’s approach to property rights institutions in “Towards a Theory of Property Rights.” Indeed, we document worldwide improvements in the quality of institutions facilitating property transfer over time.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":"S35 - S64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74160570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We filmed videos of criminal trials using three-dimensional virtual reality (VR) technology, prosecuted by actual prosecutors and defended by actual defense attorneys in a real courtroom. This is the first paper that utilizes VR technology in a non-computer-animated setting. We alter only the race of the defendants, holding all activity in the courtroom constant, to create arguably perfect counterfactuals. Law students and economics students made conviction and sentencing decisions in these trials that differed only in defendants’ race. White evaluators are harsher toward minority defendants in both conviction and sentencing. Minority evaluators are harsher toward minorities in conviction but more lenient in assigning prison terms. This pattern of behavior leads to significant bias against minorities at all stages—conviction, prison sentence, and fine—which is partly a reflection of the numerical majority of the evaluators being white. The same racial bias is observed in the decisions of practicing attorneys.
{"title":"Racial Bias and In-Group Bias in Virtual Reality Courtrooms","authors":"S. Bielen, W. Marneffe, N. Mocan","doi":"10.1086/712421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/712421","url":null,"abstract":"We filmed videos of criminal trials using three-dimensional virtual reality (VR) technology, prosecuted by actual prosecutors and defended by actual defense attorneys in a real courtroom. This is the first paper that utilizes VR technology in a non-computer-animated setting. We alter only the race of the defendants, holding all activity in the courtroom constant, to create arguably perfect counterfactuals. Law students and economics students made conviction and sentencing decisions in these trials that differed only in defendants’ race. White evaluators are harsher toward minority defendants in both conviction and sentencing. Minority evaluators are harsher toward minorities in conviction but more lenient in assigning prison terms. This pattern of behavior leads to significant bias against minorities at all stages—conviction, prison sentence, and fine—which is partly a reflection of the numerical majority of the evaluators being white. The same racial bias is observed in the decisions of practicing attorneys.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"269 - 300"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78509080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We estimate how US state courts impact firm value by exploiting a US Supreme Court ruling that exogenously changed firms’ exposure to different courts. We find that increased exposure to more business-friendly courts is associated with positive announcement returns. We find no such association for objective court quality. Consistent with the ruling impacting firm value through the legal environment channel, we find that effects are stronger for firms with high litigation exposure. We find that the ruling led to a shift in both the geographic distribution of lawsuits and operations of firms.
{"title":"Do Courts Matter for Firm Value? Evidence from the US Court System","authors":"Stefano Colonnello, Christoph Herpfer","doi":"10.1086/711593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/711593","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate how US state courts impact firm value by exploiting a US Supreme Court ruling that exogenously changed firms’ exposure to different courts. We find that increased exposure to more business-friendly courts is associated with positive announcement returns. We find no such association for objective court quality. Consistent with the ruling impacting firm value through the legal environment channel, we find that effects are stronger for firms with high litigation exposure. We find that the ruling led to a shift in both the geographic distribution of lawsuits and operations of firms.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"30 1","pages":"403 - 438"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81228887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze third-party takeovers of listed firms in which private-equity sponsors retained substantial post-initial-public-offering block holdings. Targets obtain large gains in shareholder wealth that are shared pro rata between sponsors and other shareholders, even though Delaware law allows differential premiums for block holders. Targets’ gains are positively related to the size of sponsors’ holdings and negatively affected by having a special committee that excludes private-equity directors. After Delaware courts evinced concern about a liquidity conflict associated with large block holders, private-equity-controlled target firms became more sensitive to the risk of litigation, as indicated by an increase in the likelihood of a special committee and a go-shop clause as sponsors’ block size increases. Our evidence is not consistent with plaintiffs’ arguments that even when equal compensation is paid in third-party takeovers, private equity engenders a liquidity conflict with other shareholders that calls for heightened legal scrutiny.
{"title":"Post-Initial-Public-Offering Takeovers of Firms Controlled by Private Equity: Is There Evidence of a Liquidity Conflict?","authors":"M. Slovin, M. Sushka, Qingma Dong","doi":"10.1086/713357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/713357","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze third-party takeovers of listed firms in which private-equity sponsors retained substantial post-initial-public-offering block holdings. Targets obtain large gains in shareholder wealth that are shared pro rata between sponsors and other shareholders, even though Delaware law allows differential premiums for block holders. Targets’ gains are positively related to the size of sponsors’ holdings and negatively affected by having a special committee that excludes private-equity directors. After Delaware courts evinced concern about a liquidity conflict associated with large block holders, private-equity-controlled target firms became more sensitive to the risk of litigation, as indicated by an increase in the likelihood of a special committee and a go-shop clause as sponsors’ block size increases. Our evidence is not consistent with plaintiffs’ arguments that even when equal compensation is paid in third-party takeovers, private equity engenders a liquidity conflict with other shareholders that calls for heightened legal scrutiny.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"13 1","pages":"367 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75204958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use a novel panel data set of corporate inventors matched with their employers in Japan to examine the effects of output-based financial incentives on corporate inventors’ performance. We exploit heterogeneous industry responses to Japanese court decisions that forced Japanese firms to introduce stronger incentives. We show, first, that only industries facing a high risk of employee-inventor lawsuits adopted or significantly strengthened financial incentives based on the commercial success of inventions in response to the court decisions. Our estimations reveal that stronger financial incentives in such industries reduced the number of highly cited patents and significantly decreased the incidence of science-based patents after technology-specific year effects are controlled for. These results show that the compulsion to remunerate employee-inventors on the basis of the commercial success of their inventions could distort the efficiency of corporate research and development and illustrate the importance of contracting freedom.
{"title":"How Do Inventors Respond to Financial Incentives? Evidence from Unanticipated Court Decisions on Employees’ Inventions in Japan","authors":"Koichiro Onishi, Hideo Owan, Sadao Nagaoka","doi":"10.1086/712657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/712657","url":null,"abstract":"We use a novel panel data set of corporate inventors matched with their employers in Japan to examine the effects of output-based financial incentives on corporate inventors’ performance. We exploit heterogeneous industry responses to Japanese court decisions that forced Japanese firms to introduce stronger incentives. We show, first, that only industries facing a high risk of employee-inventor lawsuits adopted or significantly strengthened financial incentives based on the commercial success of inventions in response to the court decisions. Our estimations reveal that stronger financial incentives in such industries reduced the number of highly cited patents and significantly decreased the incidence of science-based patents after technology-specific year effects are controlled for. These results show that the compulsion to remunerate employee-inventors on the basis of the commercial success of their inventions could distort the efficiency of corporate research and development and illustrate the importance of contracting freedom.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"258 1","pages":"301 - 339"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77941480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the incidence and impact of occupational licensing on immigrants using two sources of data: the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We find that immigrants are significantly less likely to have a license than similar natives and that this gap is largest for men, workers in the highest education level, and nonnaturalized immigrants. The licensing rate increases with years since migration and shows large variation by immigrants’ region of origin. A lack of English proficiency reduces the probability that an immigrant has a license. The wage premium from having a license is much larger for immigrants than natives, though this may in part reflect licensing status proxying for English-language ability.
{"title":"Occupational Licensing and Immigrants","authors":"Hugh Cassidy, Tennecia Dacass","doi":"10.1086/709834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/709834","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the incidence and impact of occupational licensing on immigrants using two sources of data: the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We find that immigrants are significantly less likely to have a license than similar natives and that this gap is largest for men, workers in the highest education level, and nonnaturalized immigrants. The licensing rate increases with years since migration and shows large variation by immigrants’ region of origin. A lack of English proficiency reduces the probability that an immigrant has a license. The wage premium from having a license is much larger for immigrants than natives, though this may in part reflect licensing status proxying for English-language ability.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":"1 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75140562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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