Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1109/eCrime54498.2021.9738790
Maria Bada, Y. Chua
Understanding the reasons and the pathways of people becoming involved in cybercrime has been an important topic for research within different disciplines. Studies have explored the pathways of skilled hackers into deviant behaviour with a focus on online gaming, however little research has been conducted around understanding risk perception of cybercrime. This study investigates both surface and dark web forums, focusing on a variety of topics from hacking to gaming. The aim of this study is to a) investigate the ways cybercrime is perceived among different members of underground forums; b) identify whether there is an emotional construct of cybercrime; and c) identify the level of knowledge around behaviours which are considered as cybercrime and are criminalised. The novelty of this study lies in the methodological approach taken to conduct qualitative and quantitative research on large text datasets. Our findings identified hacking as one of the main deviant behaviours. Our analysis shows a general optimistic bias influencing the perception of risk associated with cybercrime as well as a number of risk avoidance strategies.
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Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1109/eCrime54498.2021.9738746
Aunshul Rege, Rachel Bleiman
Social engineering (SE) is an essential, yet often over-looked, field within cybersecurity, particularly in the context of education, training, and awareness. While there are investments in cybersecurity education programs, they tend to have a primarily technical focus, including within classroom curricula and Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions. Because the current technical CTFs do not emphasize the relevance of the human-socio-psychological aspects of cyberattacks and cybersecurity, the researchers organized and hosted a Collegiate SECTF grounded in the social sciences, which offered a timely and unique platform for students to learn about social engineering topics, such as OSINT, phishing, and vishing, in a hands-on, engaging, and ethical manner. This paper details the planning and logistics of the virtual SECTF event which took place October 2020 at Temple University and hosted 6 teams of undergraduate students from across the world. Students’ experiences while participating in this event are described in detail, with insight on teams’ preparations, group formation and dynamics, strategies and adaptations, learning benefits, and thoughts on each individual flag. The success and positive student responses from the inaugural SECTF provide a proof of concept, demonstrating that experiential learning can be used to teach students about SE.
{"title":"Collegiate Social Engineering Capture the Flag Competition","authors":"Aunshul Rege, Rachel Bleiman","doi":"10.1109/eCrime54498.2021.9738746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/eCrime54498.2021.9738746","url":null,"abstract":"Social engineering (SE) is an essential, yet often over-looked, field within cybersecurity, particularly in the context of education, training, and awareness. While there are investments in cybersecurity education programs, they tend to have a primarily technical focus, including within classroom curricula and Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions. Because the current technical CTFs do not emphasize the relevance of the human-socio-psychological aspects of cyberattacks and cybersecurity, the researchers organized and hosted a Collegiate SECTF grounded in the social sciences, which offered a timely and unique platform for students to learn about social engineering topics, such as OSINT, phishing, and vishing, in a hands-on, engaging, and ethical manner. This paper details the planning and logistics of the virtual SECTF event which took place October 2020 at Temple University and hosted 6 teams of undergraduate students from across the world. Students’ experiences while participating in this event are described in detail, with insight on teams’ preparations, group formation and dynamics, strategies and adaptations, learning benefits, and thoughts on each individual flag. The success and positive student responses from the inaugural SECTF provide a proof of concept, demonstrating that experiential learning can be used to teach students about SE.","PeriodicalId":228129,"journal":{"name":"2021 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124996872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-13DOI: 10.1109/eCrime54498.2021.9738786
S. Roy, Unique Karanjit, Shirin Nilizadeh
Phishing attacks are an increasingly potent web-based threat, with nearly 1.5 million such websites being created on a monthly basis. In this work, we present the first study towards identifying phishing attacks through reports shared by security conscious users on Twitter. We evaluated over 16.4k such reports posted by 701 Twitter accounts between June to August 2021, which contained 11.1k unique URLs, and analyzed their effectiveness using various quantitative and qualitative measures. Our findings indicate that not only these reports share a high volume of legitimate phishing URLs, but they also contain more information regarding the phishing websites (which can expedite the process of identifying and removing these threats), when compared to two popular open-source phishing feeds: PhishTank and OpenPhish. We also noticed that the URLs in the Twitter reports had very little overlap with the URLs found on PhishTank and OpenPhish, and also remained active for longer periods of time. However, despite having these attributes, we found that these reports have very low interaction from other users on Twitter, especially from the domains and organizations which were targeted by the reported URLs. Moreover, nearly 31% of these URLs were still active even after a week of them being reported while also being detected by very few anti-phishing tools. This suggests that a large majority of these reports remain undiscovered and underutilized. Thus, this work highlights the utility of phishing reports shared on Twitter, and the benefits of using them as an open source knowledge base for identifying new phishing websites.
{"title":"Evaluating the Effectiveness of Phishing Reports on Twitter","authors":"S. Roy, Unique Karanjit, Shirin Nilizadeh","doi":"10.1109/eCrime54498.2021.9738786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/eCrime54498.2021.9738786","url":null,"abstract":"Phishing attacks are an increasingly potent web-based threat, with nearly 1.5 million such websites being created on a monthly basis. In this work, we present the first study towards identifying phishing attacks through reports shared by security conscious users on Twitter. We evaluated over 16.4k such reports posted by 701 Twitter accounts between June to August 2021, which contained 11.1k unique URLs, and analyzed their effectiveness using various quantitative and qualitative measures. Our findings indicate that not only these reports share a high volume of legitimate phishing URLs, but they also contain more information regarding the phishing websites (which can expedite the process of identifying and removing these threats), when compared to two popular open-source phishing feeds: PhishTank and OpenPhish. We also noticed that the URLs in the Twitter reports had very little overlap with the URLs found on PhishTank and OpenPhish, and also remained active for longer periods of time. However, despite having these attributes, we found that these reports have very low interaction from other users on Twitter, especially from the domains and organizations which were targeted by the reported URLs. Moreover, nearly 31% of these URLs were still active even after a week of them being reported while also being detected by very few anti-phishing tools. This suggests that a large majority of these reports remain undiscovered and underutilized. Thus, this work highlights the utility of phishing reports shared on Twitter, and the benefits of using them as an open source knowledge base for identifying new phishing websites.","PeriodicalId":228129,"journal":{"name":"2021 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128213547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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