Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107852
Youssef Souissi, S. Guilley, S. Bhasin, J. Danger
Modern embedded systems rely on cryptographic co-processors to ensure security. These cryptographic coprocessors are theoretically secure but their physical implementations are vulnerable against Side-Channel Attacks (SCA). This paper puts forward a methodology to evaluate the robustness of embedded systems against such attacks and therefore enhance user trust. We propose an evaluation framework composed of five distinct phases which are characterization, simulation, acquisition, pre-processing and analysis. The paper will also highlight common pitfalls made by evaluators and their solutions.
{"title":"Common framework to evaluate modern embedded systems against side-channel attacks","authors":"Youssef Souissi, S. Guilley, S. Bhasin, J. Danger","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107852","url":null,"abstract":"Modern embedded systems rely on cryptographic co-processors to ensure security. These cryptographic coprocessors are theoretically secure but their physical implementations are vulnerable against Side-Channel Attacks (SCA). This paper puts forward a methodology to evaluate the robustness of embedded systems against such attacks and therefore enhance user trust. We propose an evaluation framework composed of five distinct phases which are characterization, simulation, acquisition, pre-processing and analysis. The paper will also highlight common pitfalls made by evaluators and their solutions.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"735 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125256196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107868
Patricia W. Payne, D. Koch
Since 2009, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been involved in a project sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate aimed at improving preparedness against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) at large sporting events. Led by the University of Southern Mississippi (USM) as part of the Southeast Region Research Initiative, the project partners have been developing tools and methodologies for use by security personnel and first responders at sports stadiums. ORNL's contribution has been to develop an automated process to gather and organize disparate data that is usually part of an organization's security plan. The organized data informs a table-top exercise (TTX) conducted by USM using additional tools developed by them and their subcontractors. After participating in several pilot TTXs, patterns are beginning to emerge that would enable improvements to be formulated to increase the level of counter-IED preparedness. This paper focuses on the data collection and analysis process and shares insights gained to date.
{"title":"A counter-IED preparedness methodology for large event planning","authors":"Patricia W. Payne, D. Koch","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107868","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2009, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been involved in a project sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate aimed at improving preparedness against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) at large sporting events. Led by the University of Southern Mississippi (USM) as part of the Southeast Region Research Initiative, the project partners have been developing tools and methodologies for use by security personnel and first responders at sports stadiums. ORNL's contribution has been to develop an automated process to gather and organize disparate data that is usually part of an organization's security plan. The organized data informs a table-top exercise (TTX) conducted by USM using additional tools developed by them and their subcontractors. After participating in several pilot TTXs, patterns are beginning to emerge that would enable improvements to be formulated to increase the level of counter-IED preparedness. This paper focuses on the data collection and analysis process and shares insights gained to date.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116608968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107873
Lawrence Cassenti, P.E. Peter Leed
Criterra is a software suite that automatically determines optimum locations and heights in seconds/minutes for security system sensors, and locations for infrastructure and response forces based on dominant mosaic, line-of-sight, time-and-space, Doppler, propagation and other algorithms, executed on a terabyte size 3D geospatial and object database. Inputs include specifications of sensor systems, barriers, and response forces. Criterra is based on a methodology that integrates intelligence and scientific processes to quickly and automatically determine optimum locations that are NOT trial-and error. Criterra Automatically calculates: 1) threat paths and predicted locations, 2) the optimal locations for the minimum number of minimum height sensor towers, mobile sensors, and/or unattended ground sensors, and communication repeater towers to meet detection, surveillance and reconnaissance requirements considering predicted threat locations/levels within area use constraints, and 3) placements for fences, infrastructure and response forces within constraints to accomplish protection and interception with high degrees of confidence. The results are displayed on a visually rich and geospatially accurate 3D map which the user can navigate or use for computational model modifications, redefinition of constraints, and further analysis and planning. Criterra can be used now to support land and maritime border security threat, sensor, infrastructure, and response analysis and geospatial planning; physical security analysis and geospatial planning for protection of airports, seaports, military bases and other critical infrastructure; attack and disaster preparation, recovery, and response planning; and force management and collaboration using 3D maps with results of Criterra analyses as embedded mission data. Criterra performs geospatial analysis to predict threat location at specific times, and provides area use data for CONOPs and risk analysis. Criterra is used in requirements definitions, installations, training, operations, experimentation, and test and evaluation. Criterra can support analysis of small and extremely large areas and catastrophic events. Criterra is a predictive technique for pre-placing mobile or fixed resources; and locating and tasking first responders. It supports situational understanding, information management and data visualization on a 3D geospatially accurate laptop display. Users can use Criterra for information sharing, collaborative decision making and integrated/interoperable decision support where all users are referencing and plotting data on a shared 3D geospatial map. It can support decontamination and restoration strategies, approaches, and sensor placements following WMD events. Facilities, monuments, airports, seaports, transportation infrastructure, land and coastal borders, and ports of entry are all areas where Criterra computational models and Criterra analysis algorithms can be used to determine optimum locati
{"title":"Criterra automatic location planning","authors":"Lawrence Cassenti, P.E. Peter Leed","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107873","url":null,"abstract":"Criterra is a software suite that automatically determines optimum locations and heights in seconds/minutes for security system sensors, and locations for infrastructure and response forces based on dominant mosaic, line-of-sight, time-and-space, Doppler, propagation and other algorithms, executed on a terabyte size 3D geospatial and object database. Inputs include specifications of sensor systems, barriers, and response forces. Criterra is based on a methodology that integrates intelligence and scientific processes to quickly and automatically determine optimum locations that are NOT trial-and error. Criterra Automatically calculates: 1) threat paths and predicted locations, 2) the optimal locations for the minimum number of minimum height sensor towers, mobile sensors, and/or unattended ground sensors, and communication repeater towers to meet detection, surveillance and reconnaissance requirements considering predicted threat locations/levels within area use constraints, and 3) placements for fences, infrastructure and response forces within constraints to accomplish protection and interception with high degrees of confidence. The results are displayed on a visually rich and geospatially accurate 3D map which the user can navigate or use for computational model modifications, redefinition of constraints, and further analysis and planning. Criterra can be used now to support land and maritime border security threat, sensor, infrastructure, and response analysis and geospatial planning; physical security analysis and geospatial planning for protection of airports, seaports, military bases and other critical infrastructure; attack and disaster preparation, recovery, and response planning; and force management and collaboration using 3D maps with results of Criterra analyses as embedded mission data. Criterra performs geospatial analysis to predict threat location at specific times, and provides area use data for CONOPs and risk analysis. Criterra is used in requirements definitions, installations, training, operations, experimentation, and test and evaluation. Criterra can support analysis of small and extremely large areas and catastrophic events. Criterra is a predictive technique for pre-placing mobile or fixed resources; and locating and tasking first responders. It supports situational understanding, information management and data visualization on a 3D geospatially accurate laptop display. Users can use Criterra for information sharing, collaborative decision making and integrated/interoperable decision support where all users are referencing and plotting data on a shared 3D geospatial map. It can support decontamination and restoration strategies, approaches, and sensor placements following WMD events. Facilities, monuments, airports, seaports, transportation infrastructure, land and coastal borders, and ports of entry are all areas where Criterra computational models and Criterra analysis algorithms can be used to determine optimum locati","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117005003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107904
A. Ganz, Xunyi Yu, James M. Schafer, Graydon Lord
DIORAMA system assists the incident commander in the management of a mass casualty incident. This system is a mobile, scalable tool that can be deployed at a disaster scene to enable an offsite commander to visualize the location and condition of the casualties, the location and condition of available resources, to aid the evacuator on site to retrieve and evacuate the patients accordingly to their triage level. Our experimental results conducted with human subjects in a simulated disaster site show that the DIORAMA system can significantly reduce the evacuation time (up to 43%) when compared to paper based evacuation. This fact attests to the DIORAMA effectiveness in reducing the patients' mortality.
{"title":"Real-time scalable resource tracking framework (DIORAMA): System description and experimentation","authors":"A. Ganz, Xunyi Yu, James M. Schafer, Graydon Lord","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107904","url":null,"abstract":"DIORAMA system assists the incident commander in the management of a mass casualty incident. This system is a mobile, scalable tool that can be deployed at a disaster scene to enable an offsite commander to visualize the location and condition of the casualties, the location and condition of available resources, to aid the evacuator on site to retrieve and evacuate the patients accordingly to their triage level. Our experimental results conducted with human subjects in a simulated disaster site show that the DIORAMA system can significantly reduce the evacuation time (up to 43%) when compared to paper based evacuation. This fact attests to the DIORAMA effectiveness in reducing the patients' mortality.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117270715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107888
S. Tolba, L. Fiondella, R. Ammar, N. Lownes, S. Rajasekaran, J. Ivan, Qixing Wang
An important challenge for homeland security agencies is to properly understand the interaction between terrorists and the methods to protect and deter attacks on the transportation network. Examining the nature of these interactions can greatly assist the enhancement of existing technologies and guide the development of new ones. This interaction is complex, possessing numerous variables that affect potential outcomes. This paper presents the Perception Square Interaction Cube Model (P2I3-Model) to describe these interactions using the system dynamics approach. This model incorporates three participants: the homeland security agency, the attacker, and the real world. The HS-Agency-perception, Attacker-perception, and Real-world submodels respectively characterize these participants. These three interacting sub-models combine to form the system governing the participants' perceptions, behaviors, and actions. The model accepts a set of measurable inputs from the HS agency and produces quantitative outputs to guide the HS agency's protection planning, deployment, and strategic policy revision activities. Simulation results suggest that the probability of attack success from the perspectives of the HS agency and attacker can differ significantly. System uncertainties and intelligence efforts are the central factors influencing these probabilities.
{"title":"Modeling attacker-technology system interaction in transportation networks: P2I3-model","authors":"S. Tolba, L. Fiondella, R. Ammar, N. Lownes, S. Rajasekaran, J. Ivan, Qixing Wang","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107888","url":null,"abstract":"An important challenge for homeland security agencies is to properly understand the interaction between terrorists and the methods to protect and deter attacks on the transportation network. Examining the nature of these interactions can greatly assist the enhancement of existing technologies and guide the development of new ones. This interaction is complex, possessing numerous variables that affect potential outcomes. This paper presents the Perception Square Interaction Cube Model (P2I3-Model) to describe these interactions using the system dynamics approach. This model incorporates three participants: the homeland security agency, the attacker, and the real world. The HS-Agency-perception, Attacker-perception, and Real-world submodels respectively characterize these participants. These three interacting sub-models combine to form the system governing the participants' perceptions, behaviors, and actions. The model accepts a set of measurable inputs from the HS agency and produces quantitative outputs to guide the HS agency's protection planning, deployment, and strategic policy revision activities. Simulation results suggest that the probability of attack success from the perspectives of the HS agency and attacker can differ significantly. System uncertainties and intelligence efforts are the central factors influencing these probabilities.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123236357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107882
S. Veitch, R. Fratantonio, P. Egli, A. Hanson, A. Kusterbeck, P. Charles, J. Deschamps, André A. Adams
One of the most difficult aspects of maintaining port and maritime security is the detection, localization, and classification of submerged explosive devices, biochemical agents, and contraband including narcotics. The Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) community has expressed the need for improved methods of detection to augment current capabilities. SubChem Systems Inc. and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) has been working to transition displacement-based immunosensing technology to a commercial system with application towards submerged munitions and contraband detection, classification, and localization. Immunosensing is based upon antibody specificity for a desired target. Funded by the Office of Naval Research, the partners have demonstrated using this technology as a means of chemical detection onboard a custom designed payload for an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). The NAVY Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program enabled SubChem Systems to provide a concept adaptation of the AUV payload to a diver held version for use in high clutter, low visibility, environments that present an added danger to EOD divers.
维护港口和海上安全最困难的方面之一是水下爆炸装置、生化制剂和包括麻醉品在内的违禁品的探测、定位和分类。爆炸物处理(EOD)界已经表示需要改进探测方法以增强现有能力。SubChem系统公司和美国海军研究实验室(NRL)一直致力于将基于位移的免疫传感技术转化为商业系统，应用于水下弹药和违禁品的探测、分类和定位。免疫感应是基于抗体特异性的期望目标。在美国海军研究办公室(Office of Naval Research)的资助下，合作伙伴展示了将该技术作为一种化学检测手段，搭载在一艘自主水下航行器(AUV)的定制有效载荷上。美国海军小企业创新研究(SBIR)项目使SubChem Systems公司能够将AUV有效载荷的概念调整为潜水员携带的版本，用于高杂波、低能见度、对EOD潜水员构成额外危险的环境。
{"title":"Submerged explosives detection platforms using immunosensing technology","authors":"S. Veitch, R. Fratantonio, P. Egli, A. Hanson, A. Kusterbeck, P. Charles, J. Deschamps, André A. Adams","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107882","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most difficult aspects of maintaining port and maritime security is the detection, localization, and classification of submerged explosive devices, biochemical agents, and contraband including narcotics. The Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) community has expressed the need for improved methods of detection to augment current capabilities. SubChem Systems Inc. and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) has been working to transition displacement-based immunosensing technology to a commercial system with application towards submerged munitions and contraband detection, classification, and localization. Immunosensing is based upon antibody specificity for a desired target. Funded by the Office of Naval Research, the partners have demonstrated using this technology as a means of chemical detection onboard a custom designed payload for an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). The NAVY Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program enabled SubChem Systems to provide a concept adaptation of the AUV payload to a diver held version for use in high clutter, low visibility, environments that present an added danger to EOD divers.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123482780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107858
J. Widder, James Rascoe, Christopher A. Perhala
Few non-lethal systems are point accurate beyond 30 meters and also small, lightweight, and logistically simple to maintain in the field. Inaccuracy is principally due to the use of smooth bore launchers and aerodynamically unstable projectiles. Moreover, smokeless powder munitions require the use of manually operated weapons, which result in low rates of fire. To achieve higher rates of fire, pneumatic systems have been developed. However, their use is complicated as they require electric, gas, or diesel powered air compressors to refill the empty air bottles generated from use, or the storage and distribution of pre-filled bottles of gas. The weapon systems described here solve these problems. They use a novel solid propellant propulsion system to fire projectiles from rifled barrels. The design of the propulsion system results in far greater accuracy than the current state-of-the-art, consistent terminal effects, and enables semi automatic fires from a mechanically simple and lightweight launcher.
{"title":"Non-lethal ballistic system with point accuracy for facility and border security","authors":"J. Widder, James Rascoe, Christopher A. Perhala","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107858","url":null,"abstract":"Few non-lethal systems are point accurate beyond 30 meters and also small, lightweight, and logistically simple to maintain in the field. Inaccuracy is principally due to the use of smooth bore launchers and aerodynamically unstable projectiles. Moreover, smokeless powder munitions require the use of manually operated weapons, which result in low rates of fire. To achieve higher rates of fire, pneumatic systems have been developed. However, their use is complicated as they require electric, gas, or diesel powered air compressors to refill the empty air bottles generated from use, or the storage and distribution of pre-filled bottles of gas. The weapon systems described here solve these problems. They use a novel solid propellant propulsion system to fire projectiles from rifled barrels. The design of the propulsion system results in far greater accuracy than the current state-of-the-art, consistent terminal effects, and enables semi automatic fires from a mechanically simple and lightweight launcher.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124796812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107864
Jean-Francois Cloutier, David G. Kamien, R. Desourdis
In order to manage security and disaster risk, government agencies and their partners need to share information. Having the tools and networks needed to transmit and receive information is vital, but even with these systems in place, information doesn't spontaneously flow as needed between people and/or systems. To achieve the required information sharing, the flow of information needs to be planned ahead of a critical incident and analyzed in order to reduce the risk of a communication breakdown. This paper will explain the role of CHANNELS, developed by Mind-Alliance Systems, information sharing planning (ISP) software to achieve enhanced operability and interoperability. CHANNELS supports information-sharing planning, capability assessment and training processes. CHANNELS (i) automatically generates information flow maps derived from profiling the information needs and sharing flows associated with tasks, (ii) detects/reports improperly defined elements, information flow gaps, and identifies weaknesses. It generates guidance to responders at all levels.
{"title":"CHANNELS: An information flow modeling system to support planning and interoperability","authors":"Jean-Francois Cloutier, David G. Kamien, R. Desourdis","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107864","url":null,"abstract":"In order to manage security and disaster risk, government agencies and their partners need to share information. Having the tools and networks needed to transmit and receive information is vital, but even with these systems in place, information doesn't spontaneously flow as needed between people and/or systems. To achieve the required information sharing, the flow of information needs to be planned ahead of a critical incident and analyzed in order to reduce the risk of a communication breakdown. This paper will explain the role of CHANNELS, developed by Mind-Alliance Systems, information sharing planning (ISP) software to achieve enhanced operability and interoperability. CHANNELS supports information-sharing planning, capability assessment and training processes. CHANNELS (i) automatically generates information flow maps derived from profiling the information needs and sharing flows associated with tasks, (ii) detects/reports improperly defined elements, information flow gaps, and identifies weaknesses. It generates guidance to responders at all levels.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123708747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107879
J. Risser, M. Saxon
The ability to design effective detection systems is critical to the development of systems to protect against and respond to chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) attacks. Unfortunately, there are numerous examples of CBR detection systems being designed “in a vacuum,” without full consideration of threat and vulnerability assessments, or the proposed protection strategy and response plans that the detection system must support. The potential negative effects of this approach include systems that are excessively costly in the best case, and systems that fail to deliver the required detection performance while providing a false sense of security in the worst case. The solution to this problem is the application of systems engineering principles. As with any system, the critical foundation for the system design is requirements development. Requirements for CBR detection systems include, but are not limited to, the spectrum of threats to be detected, the required sensitivity and speed of detection for each threat, the allowable false alarm and false negative rates, and operations and maintenance (O&M) needs. The requirements form the basis of system architecture and component selection, and allow trade studies that support an optimal system design. The process continues through detailed system design and integration, and culminates with system commissioning, verification and validation, and O&M planning. This paper presents Battelle's systems engineering approach to CBR detection system design and discusses several aspects of detection systems including: • Similarities and differences between chemical, biological, and radiological detection systems • Difference in requirements for “detect to warn”, “detect to protect”, and “detect to treat” strategies • Detector selection options • Architecture options such as sampling systems to cost-effectively increase coverage or response speed, and use of “orthogonal” detectors or trigger and confirmatory detectors for false alarm reduction Also discussed are the role of modeling in requirements development and system design, as well as the importance of commissioning and testing to effective detection system performance.
{"title":"Systems engineering approach to chemical biological and radiological detection system design","authors":"J. Risser, M. Saxon","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107879","url":null,"abstract":"The ability to design effective detection systems is critical to the development of systems to protect against and respond to chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) attacks. Unfortunately, there are numerous examples of CBR detection systems being designed “in a vacuum,” without full consideration of threat and vulnerability assessments, or the proposed protection strategy and response plans that the detection system must support. The potential negative effects of this approach include systems that are excessively costly in the best case, and systems that fail to deliver the required detection performance while providing a false sense of security in the worst case. The solution to this problem is the application of systems engineering principles. As with any system, the critical foundation for the system design is requirements development. Requirements for CBR detection systems include, but are not limited to, the spectrum of threats to be detected, the required sensitivity and speed of detection for each threat, the allowable false alarm and false negative rates, and operations and maintenance (O&M) needs. The requirements form the basis of system architecture and component selection, and allow trade studies that support an optimal system design. The process continues through detailed system design and integration, and culminates with system commissioning, verification and validation, and O&M planning. This paper presents Battelle's systems engineering approach to CBR detection system design and discusses several aspects of detection systems including: • Similarities and differences between chemical, biological, and radiological detection systems • Difference in requirements for “detect to warn”, “detect to protect”, and “detect to treat” strategies • Detector selection options • Architecture options such as sampling systems to cost-effectively increase coverage or response speed, and use of “orthogonal” detectors or trigger and confirmatory detectors for false alarm reduction Also discussed are the role of modeling in requirements development and system design, as well as the importance of commissioning and testing to effective detection system performance.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122010283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-19DOI: 10.1109/THS.2011.6107872
S. Leibholz, Michael J. Maston
We report the development and successful testing at TRL-5 of a persistent (no-batteries) Surreptitious tagging and tracking system for vehicles, containers and personnel which can be applied and monitored at a distance, requiring no batteries in the target transponder. The system employs a metamaterial consisting of quantities of a novel nanotechnical device (size depending on frequency) in random configuration, with tunable electrodynamic and aerodynamic properties, the latter providing correct geometry and intermolecular (van der Waals) adherence of the transponders to a target. The transponder cluster appears as a smudge of dirt to the naked eye and acts to retroreflect a properly-tuned interrogating laser narrowly to its source, with a brightness measured to exceed a sheet of white paper (a perfect Lambertian reflector) by about 10 dB. Unique ID of the target is feasible using a “bar code” in the wavelength or frequency domain and a multi-wavelength interrogation. CSharp is considered ready for engineering and low-rate initial production (LRIP). Present and future applications include homeland security, intelligence and counterintelligence, counterterrorism and law enforcement, as well as defense. Other applications that have been studied but not tested include “smart chaff” with controlled peek-through and aerodynamic dispersion properties, and application to signaling clouds of frequency-selective obscurants.
{"title":"CSharp: Surreptitious standoff tagging and tracking system using passive nanotechnical transponders: A spiral research, development, test, engineering (RDTE) and production program","authors":"S. Leibholz, Michael J. Maston","doi":"10.1109/THS.2011.6107872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2011.6107872","url":null,"abstract":"We report the development and successful testing at TRL-5 of a persistent (no-batteries) Surreptitious tagging and tracking system for vehicles, containers and personnel which can be applied and monitored at a distance, requiring no batteries in the target transponder. The system employs a metamaterial consisting of quantities of a novel nanotechnical device (size depending on frequency) in random configuration, with tunable electrodynamic and aerodynamic properties, the latter providing correct geometry and intermolecular (van der Waals) adherence of the transponders to a target. The transponder cluster appears as a smudge of dirt to the naked eye and acts to retroreflect a properly-tuned interrogating laser narrowly to its source, with a brightness measured to exceed a sheet of white paper (a perfect Lambertian reflector) by about 10 dB. Unique ID of the target is feasible using a “bar code” in the wavelength or frequency domain and a multi-wavelength interrogation. CSharp is considered ready for engineering and low-rate initial production (LRIP). Present and future applications include homeland security, intelligence and counterintelligence, counterterrorism and law enforcement, as well as defense. Other applications that have been studied but not tested include “smart chaff” with controlled peek-through and aerodynamic dispersion properties, and application to signaling clouds of frequency-selective obscurants.","PeriodicalId":228322,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128008413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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