Pub Date : 2020-11-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0016
Risa A. Brooks
The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"Risa A. Brooks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.","PeriodicalId":228977,"journal":{"name":"Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133326226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0008
Heidi A. Urben, J. Golby
After nearly two decades of war, public confidence in the US military remains high, even though our wars remain inconclusive. There is no shortage of public discourse on the perceived failures of civilians overseeing these wars. Yet this chapter asks: Is the uniformed military increasingly resistant to civilian oversight? Are members of the military making it tougher for political leaders to do their jobs? High public confidence in the military is neither the best measure of the health of civil-military relations nor the same thing as the military’s being trustworthy. This chapter argues that military leaders will best serve the public by focusing on ways they can exhibit appropriate behavior in their dealings with the public and civilian leaders. The trust required for healthy civil-military relations and effective civilian oversight is a two-way street, and those in uniform must recognize their responsibility for introspection, self-policing, and holding themselves to account. This chapter assesses what it might take for the armed forces to “screw up” their relationship with the American people, discussing five potential pitfalls that members of the profession of arms must avoid in order to be worthy of the public’s trust.
{"title":"A Matter of Trust","authors":"Heidi A. Urben, J. Golby","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"After nearly two decades of war, public confidence in the US military remains high, even though our wars remain inconclusive. There is no shortage of public discourse on the perceived failures of civilians overseeing these wars. Yet this chapter asks: Is the uniformed military increasingly resistant to civilian oversight? Are members of the military making it tougher for political leaders to do their jobs? High public confidence in the military is neither the best measure of the health of civil-military relations nor the same thing as the military’s being trustworthy. This chapter argues that military leaders will best serve the public by focusing on ways they can exhibit appropriate behavior in their dealings with the public and civilian leaders. The trust required for healthy civil-military relations and effective civilian oversight is a two-way street, and those in uniform must recognize their responsibility for introspection, self-policing, and holding themselves to account. This chapter assesses what it might take for the armed forces to “screw up” their relationship with the American people, discussing five potential pitfalls that members of the profession of arms must avoid in order to be worthy of the public’s trust.","PeriodicalId":228977,"journal":{"name":"Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations","volume":"3 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127685368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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