Pub Date : 2004-06-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1530-9134.2004.00014.X
R. Wallace
In many markets, firms are able to conduct discriminatory strategies based on whether a customer prefers a competitors' product or their own. This article considers the impact of such discrimination in duopoly models in which firms set prices and conduct precontract-customization efforts for some customers. We identify two effects: (1) The ability to conduct preference-based discrimination increases equilibrium profit as long as long as precontract customization is at least modestly important in competitive dynamics; and (2) The ability to conduct preference-based discrimination enhances social welfare if any precontract customization is done. Copyright 2004 Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK..
在许多市场中，公司能够根据顾客是喜欢竞争对手的产品还是自己的产品来实施歧视性策略。本文考虑了这种歧视在双寡头模式下的影响，在双寡头模式下，企业为一些客户设定价格并进行合同前定制努力。我们确定了两种影响:(1)只要合同前定制在竞争动态中至少适度重要，进行基于偏好的歧视的能力就会增加均衡利润;(2)如果进行了任何合同前定制，则进行基于偏好的歧视的能力可以提高社会福利。版权2004 Blackwell出版，350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA，和9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK..
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We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited.
{"title":"Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense","authors":"V. Denicoló, L. Franzoni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.265745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.265745","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited.","PeriodicalId":248832,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115777451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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