Pub Date : 2020-03-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501747182.003.0004
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres
This chapter details how, despite the seemingly favorable situation for the Chilean government, in 1967 things would begin to go in a very different direction. After the first two successful years of the Frei administration, the attitude of the opposition stiffened noticeably, and even within the Christian Democratic Party some leaders began to voice their disagreement with the character and the pace of some of the reforms implemented by the government. Eduardo Frei himself was still a popular figure, a condition he would continue to enjoy for most of his tenure and beyond. In addition, his positive international standing reinforced his image in Chile. However, his own personal popularity would not translate into a continuation of the success of the first two years of his administration. The changing winds of Chilean politics and the declining fortunes of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration would get in the way, and it was, in fact, a situation connected to the close relationship between the Frei administration and the United States that marked the beginning of the end of the Revolution in Liberty.
这一章详细说明，尽管表面上对智利政府有利，但在1967年，事情将开始朝着一个非常不同的方向发展。在弗雷政府成功执政的头两年之后，反对派的态度明显变得强硬起来，甚至在基督教民主党内部，一些领导人也开始表达他们对政府实施的一些改革的性质和步伐的不同意见。爱德华多·弗雷本人仍然是一个受欢迎的人物，在他任期的大部分时间里，他将继续享受这种状态。此外，他在国际上的积极地位加强了他在智利的形象。然而，他个人的声望并不能使他延续执政头两年的成功。智利政治风向的变化和林登·b·约翰逊(Lyndon B. Johnson)政府的衰落将成为阻碍，事实上，这种情况与弗雷政府与美国之间的密切关系有关，标志着自由革命的结束。
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Pub Date : 2020-03-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501747205-009
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres
This chapter addresses the congressional election of 1969, which took place in a landscape substantially different from that of 1965. Most political forces had endured transformative changes that led to the birth of new organizations, further internal polarization, or outright fragmentation. The Christian Democratic Party had suffered a predictable decrease in its popularity after four and a half years in government, during which many promises had been delivered on but no truly revolutionary change had been implemented. As shown by the internal fights of 1967–1968 and the attitude of its most likely presidential candidate for 1970, Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic Party had lost the unity of purpose that had accounted for so much of its electoral success a few years earlier. Nevertheless, Eduardo Frei's personal popularity and the party's electoral following still allowed the Christian Democratic Party to stand as the strongest party in Chilean politics. The Radical Party had also been weakened by internal divisions; since 1967, the party had moved decisively, although not without conflict, to the left. Meanwhile, one of the most important Socialist leaders, Raúl Ampuero, created a new political movement in 1968, the Popular Socialist Union (USOPO), generously funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The only party that had not endured any transformative crisis or substantial change in the years after the election of 1964 was the best organized and most united of all, the Communist Party.
{"title":"The United States and the Last Two Years of the Frei Administration","authors":"Sebastián Hurtado-Torres","doi":"10.7591/9781501747205-009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501747205-009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the congressional election of 1969, which took place in a landscape substantially different from that of 1965. Most political forces had endured transformative changes that led to the birth of new organizations, further internal polarization, or outright fragmentation. The Christian Democratic Party had suffered a predictable decrease in its popularity after four and a half years in government, during which many promises had been delivered on but no truly revolutionary change had been implemented. As shown by the internal fights of 1967–1968 and the attitude of its most likely presidential candidate for 1970, Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic Party had lost the unity of purpose that had accounted for so much of its electoral success a few years earlier. Nevertheless, Eduardo Frei's personal popularity and the party's electoral following still allowed the Christian Democratic Party to stand as the strongest party in Chilean politics. The Radical Party had also been weakened by internal divisions; since 1967, the party had moved decisively, although not without conflict, to the left. Meanwhile, one of the most important Socialist leaders, Raúl Ampuero, created a new political movement in 1968, the Popular Socialist Union (USOPO), generously funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The only party that had not endured any transformative crisis or substantial change in the years after the election of 1964 was the best organized and most united of all, the Communist Party.","PeriodicalId":251080,"journal":{"name":"The Gathering Storm","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132528123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501747182.003.0006
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres
This chapter assesses the presidential candidacy of Radomiro Tomic. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Eduardo Frei Montalva appointed his old friend and fellow Christian Democratic leader Radomiro Tomic to the ambassadorship in Washington. The decision, apparently made after consulting with the appointee, clearly looked toward the 1970 presidential election. Tomic, as it was widely known, was second only to Frei in the Christian Democratic leadership, and his nomination as the candidate of the party for the next presidential election was all but preordained. As the country's representative in the most important center of power in the Western Hemisphere, Tomic's image and standing in Chile would be shielded from the potentially negative consequences of being actively involved in domestic politics. At the same time, Tomic would be able to forge links with the Washington establishment, a more than precious asset for someone whose main political goal was to become president of Chile. Ultimately, Tomic was one of the historic leaders of the Christian Democratic Party. Besides his left-leaning political position, what identified Tomic and distinguished him from most politicians of his generation was his charisma.
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Pub Date : 2020-03-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501747182.003.0005
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres
This chapter focuses on the role of copper policies in the relations between the United States and Chile during the Frei administration, especially as they relate to the developmental efforts of the Christian Democratic project. During the Frei administration, the political debate on copper policies reached a climax. Since U.S. capitals were among the most significant actors in the story, the discussions around the issue of copper converged with the ideological visions of the United States and the Cold War held by the different Chilean political parties. As the Frei administration tried to introduce the most comprehensive and consistent reform around the structure of the property of the Gran Minería del Cobre, the forces in competition in the arena of Chilean politics stood by their ideological convictions, regarding both copper and the United States, in their opposition or grudging support for the policies proposed by the Christian Democratic government. Moreover, the U.S. government became deeply involved in the matter of copper in Chile, first by pressuring the Chilean government into rolling back a price increase in 1965 and then, mostly through the personal efforts of Ambassador Edward Korry, by mediating in the negotiation between the Frei administration and Anaconda on the nationalization of the U.S. company's largest mine, Chuquicamata, in 1969.
本章的重点是铜政策在弗雷执政期间美国和智利关系中的作用，特别是因为它们与基督教民主党项目的发展努力有关。在弗雷执政期间，有关铜政策的政治辩论达到了高潮。由于美国首都是这个故事中最重要的角色之一，围绕铜问题的讨论与智利不同政党对美国和冷战的意识形态看法融合在一起。当弗雷政府试图对Gran Minería del Cobre的财产结构进行最全面和最一致的改革时，智利政治舞台上的竞争力量坚持自己的意识形态信念，无论是对铜还是对美国，他们都反对或勉强支持基督教民主政府提出的政策。此外，美国政府深入介入智利的铜事务，首先是在1965年向智利政府施压，迫使其收回铜价上涨，然后主要是通过大使爱德华·科里(Edward Korry)的个人努力，在弗雷政府与阿纳康达(Anaconda)之间的谈判中进行斡旋，1969年将美国公司最大的铜矿Chuquicamata收归国有。
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Pub Date : 2020-03-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501747205-005
{"title":"2. Time of Hope, 1964–1967","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501747205-005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501747205-005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":251080,"journal":{"name":"The Gathering Storm","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133015438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501747205-012
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres
This concluding chapter reflects on the influence of the United States in Chilean politics. Since the dynamics of Chilean politics replicated very closely the ideological divide of the global Cold War, the overarching goal of the U.S. strategy toward Chile between 1964 and 1970 was to keep the Marxist Left from taking power. Arguably, the most important part of that strategy was the considerable support provided to the reformist political project of the Christian Democratic Party, as it constituted a viable alternative to the growing appeal of the revolutionary Left and offered a path toward economic and social modernization that coincided with the ideological outlook of the Johnson administration's foreign policy. Despite an imbalance of power, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus did not determine the motivations or intentions of the Chilean political actors with which it established relationships, nor did it shape the political debates on which the U.S. interests in Chile could be at stake. The United States established itself as a relevant and even powerful informal actor in Chilean politics but only as an ally of forces whose interests and goals, though convergent with U.S. interests, were independent.
{"title":"The Influence of the United States in Chilean Politics","authors":"Sebastián Hurtado-Torres","doi":"10.7591/9781501747205-012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501747205-012","url":null,"abstract":"This concluding chapter reflects on the influence of the United States in Chilean politics. Since the dynamics of Chilean politics replicated very closely the ideological divide of the global Cold War, the overarching goal of the U.S. strategy toward Chile between 1964 and 1970 was to keep the Marxist Left from taking power. Arguably, the most important part of that strategy was the considerable support provided to the reformist political project of the Christian Democratic Party, as it constituted a viable alternative to the growing appeal of the revolutionary Left and offered a path toward economic and social modernization that coincided with the ideological outlook of the Johnson administration's foreign policy. Despite an imbalance of power, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus did not determine the motivations or intentions of the Chilean political actors with which it established relationships, nor did it shape the political debates on which the U.S. interests in Chile could be at stake. The United States established itself as a relevant and even powerful informal actor in Chilean politics but only as an ally of forces whose interests and goals, though convergent with U.S. interests, were independent.","PeriodicalId":251080,"journal":{"name":"The Gathering Storm","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114251248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501747205-011
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres
This chapter describes the efforts by the United States and Eduardo Frei to prevent Salvador Allende from attaining the presidency. The Nixon administration, after choosing not to involve itself in the 1970 presidential race to the extent the Johnson administration had in the 1964 election, reacted with great alacrity to Allende's victory in the popular election. Richard Nixon himself instructed CIA director Richard Helms to conduct covert operations in Chile, behind Ambassador Korry's back. In addition, Chilean politicians, particularly Christian Democrats of the Frei line, tried or at least explored ways of averting an Allende victory and sought for that purpose the support of the U.S. embassy in Santiago. Though many of the documents that tell this part of the story have been available to researchers since at least the early 2000s, only one scholarly work has treated these attempts by Chilean politicians, especially Eduardo Frei, in depth. The tendency of scholars of U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War to assume rather uncritically that the only decisions that mattered were taken in Washington has narrowed the perspectives from which the history of Cold War Chilean politics has been studied and interpreted.
{"title":"8. Eduardo Frei, the U.S. Embassy, and the Election of Salvador Allende","authors":"Sebastián Hurtado-Torres","doi":"10.7591/9781501747205-011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501747205-011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes the efforts by the United States and Eduardo Frei to prevent Salvador Allende from attaining the presidency. The Nixon administration, after choosing not to involve itself in the 1970 presidential race to the extent the Johnson administration had in the 1964 election, reacted with great alacrity to Allende's victory in the popular election. Richard Nixon himself instructed CIA director Richard Helms to conduct covert operations in Chile, behind Ambassador Korry's back. In addition, Chilean politicians, particularly Christian Democrats of the Frei line, tried or at least explored ways of averting an Allende victory and sought for that purpose the support of the U.S. embassy in Santiago. Though many of the documents that tell this part of the story have been available to researchers since at least the early 2000s, only one scholarly work has treated these attempts by Chilean politicians, especially Eduardo Frei, in depth. The tendency of scholars of U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War to assume rather uncritically that the only decisions that mattered were taken in Washington has narrowed the perspectives from which the history of Cold War Chilean politics has been studied and interpreted.","PeriodicalId":251080,"journal":{"name":"The Gathering Storm","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129425367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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