Pub Date : 2019-02-05DOI: 10.1093/law/9780198793731.003.0007
Dickson Brice
This chapter begins by considering the arms trial in the early 1970s and outlines the gist of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 before considering the challenge to that Agreement dealt with by the Supreme Court in the Boland case. There follows an examination of the Court’s views on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland in McGimpsey v Ireland, decided in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and on the constitutionality of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in the Riordan case. There is an analysis of Law Enforcement Commission’s report and of the Court’s views on resulting Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill 1975. The focus next moves to the shifting views of the Supreme Court on when it is appropriate to extradite suspected terrorists to Northern Ireland. Cases concerning Dominic McGlinchey, Séamus Shannon, Robert Russell, Dermot Finucane and Owen Carron are examined, as is the state of extradition law today.
{"title":"7 The Supreme Court and Northern Ireland","authors":"Dickson Brice","doi":"10.1093/law/9780198793731.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198793731.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter begins by considering the arms trial in the early 1970s and outlines the gist of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 before considering the challenge to that Agreement dealt with by the Supreme Court in the Boland case. There follows an examination of the Court’s views on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland in McGimpsey v Ireland, decided in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and on the constitutionality of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in the Riordan case. There is an analysis of Law Enforcement Commission’s report and of the Court’s views on resulting Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill 1975. The focus next moves to the shifting views of the Supreme Court on when it is appropriate to extradite suspected terrorists to Northern Ireland. Cases concerning Dominic McGlinchey, Séamus Shannon, Robert Russell, Dermot Finucane and Owen Carron are examined, as is the state of extradition law today.","PeriodicalId":251482,"journal":{"name":"The Irish Supreme Court","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114868322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-05DOI: 10.1093/law/9780198793731.003.0004
Dickson Brice
This chapter focuses on explaining the kinds of cases which Ireland’s Supreme Court is authorised to deal with and how it has had very little choice over which cases are brought to it. It analyses relevant legislative provisions, some of which date back to 1924. The relationship between the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal is covered, as are the reasons for the rise in the Supreme Court’s workload since the 1990s. The history of reform proposals is set out and the impact of the new Court of Appeal is considered. The chapter also examines the point that pre-1922 legislation is presumed to continue to apply in Ireland unless Parliament has changed it and shows how the Supreme Court has been careful to ensure that people other than judges do not exercise what is in effect a judicial function. The ‘non-justiciable’ principle is also considered.
{"title":"4 The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court","authors":"Dickson Brice","doi":"10.1093/law/9780198793731.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198793731.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on explaining the kinds of cases which Ireland’s Supreme Court is authorised to deal with and how it has had very little choice over which cases are brought to it. It analyses relevant legislative provisions, some of which date back to 1924. The relationship between the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal is covered, as are the reasons for the rise in the Supreme Court’s workload since the 1990s. The history of reform proposals is set out and the impact of the new Court of Appeal is considered. The chapter also examines the point that pre-1922 legislation is presumed to continue to apply in Ireland unless Parliament has changed it and shows how the Supreme Court has been careful to ensure that people other than judges do not exercise what is in effect a judicial function. The ‘non-justiciable’ principle is also considered.","PeriodicalId":251482,"journal":{"name":"The Irish Supreme Court","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123523423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-05DOI: 10.1093/LAW/9780198793731.003.0010
Dickson Brice
This chapter analyses the way in which the Supreme Court has handled a range of controversial issues affecting personal and family life. It explains the centrality of the family unit within the Irish Constitution and shows how the Court was for many years extremely conservative in its handling of cases involving adoption and illegitimacy. Its more flexible approach to ‘the family’ in the immigration context is then considered. The leading case on contraception (McGee) is closely examined before detailed treatment is given to the Court’s handling of legal questions relating to abortion (especially the X case in 1992). Its position on matrimonial property law and on the vexed issue of the right to assisted suicide are also suveyed. Throughout the chapter attention is focused on how the Supreme Court has been constrained by its perception of the views of the majority of Irish people.
{"title":"10 Family and Personal Life","authors":"Dickson Brice","doi":"10.1093/LAW/9780198793731.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/LAW/9780198793731.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyses the way in which the Supreme Court has handled a range of controversial issues affecting personal and family life. It explains the centrality of the family unit within the Irish Constitution and shows how the Court was for many years extremely conservative in its handling of cases involving adoption and illegitimacy. Its more flexible approach to ‘the family’ in the immigration context is then considered. The leading case on contraception (McGee) is closely examined before detailed treatment is given to the Court’s handling of legal questions relating to abortion (especially the X case in 1992). Its position on matrimonial property law and on the vexed issue of the right to assisted suicide are also suveyed. Throughout the chapter attention is focused on how the Supreme Court has been constrained by its perception of the views of the majority of Irish people.","PeriodicalId":251482,"journal":{"name":"The Irish Supreme Court","volume":"296 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134091356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}