Social networks and methods for their analysis have attracted considerable interest in various research areas. One type of social networks that has been the subject of extensive analysis, especially in the corporate governance literature, is networks between company directors and firms, between directors and between firms (board interlock). The purpose of this paper is to discuss social network metrics for such types of networks and examine their interpretation and correlations from a domain-specific viewpoint. This work will help position, review and compare previous literature, especially in finance/corporate governance area that examines such types of networks.For the purposes of this paper, the BoardEx dataset is used to define the social networks between directors and firms and their corresponding metrics. This dataset keeps information about individuals, mainly from USA and Europe, who work in publicly quoted firms and major private firms at board and executive management levels. The information includes in-depth profiles such as academic qualifications, current and past job positions, membership to professional and other bodies, peer esteem indicators such as awards and honorary positions, etc.In addition to a detailed description of the dataset, the different types of networks that could be created are defined based on network theory. Furthermore, five node level metrics have been chosen to be analysed, namely degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector and clustering coefficient. These metrics are defined theoretically based on the network theory literature and their application and interpretation is elaborated. Finally, the correlations between these metrics is discussed theoretically and exemplified through the case study.
{"title":"Social Network Metrics: The Boardex Case Study","authors":"A. Shahgholian, B. Theodoulidis, D. Diaz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2613156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613156","url":null,"abstract":"Social networks and methods for their analysis have attracted considerable interest in various research areas. One type of social networks that has been the subject of extensive analysis, especially in the corporate governance literature, is networks between company directors and firms, between directors and between firms (board interlock). The purpose of this paper is to discuss social network metrics for such types of networks and examine their interpretation and correlations from a domain-specific viewpoint. This work will help position, review and compare previous literature, especially in finance/corporate governance area that examines such types of networks.For the purposes of this paper, the BoardEx dataset is used to define the social networks between directors and firms and their corresponding metrics. This dataset keeps information about individuals, mainly from USA and Europe, who work in publicly quoted firms and major private firms at board and executive management levels. The information includes in-depth profiles such as academic qualifications, current and past job positions, membership to professional and other bodies, peer esteem indicators such as awards and honorary positions, etc.In addition to a detailed description of the dataset, the different types of networks that could be created are defined based on network theory. Furthermore, five node level metrics have been chosen to be analysed, namely degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector and clustering coefficient. These metrics are defined theoretically based on the network theory literature and their application and interpretation is elaborated. Finally, the correlations between these metrics is discussed theoretically and exemplified through the case study.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130243973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Practices of corporate boards are the focus of researchers in the last decade. The dynamics of external environment determined necessity of reforms in corporate governance. Institutional pressure and new requirements of stakeholders to practices of boards have changed traditions and evolution to convergence and revolution.
{"title":"Corporate Boards: Practices and Tendencies for Bulgaria","authors":"Miroslav Nedelchev","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2610052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2610052","url":null,"abstract":"Practices of corporate boards are the focus of researchers in the last decade. The dynamics of external environment determined necessity of reforms in corporate governance. Institutional pressure and new requirements of stakeholders to practices of boards have changed traditions and evolution to convergence and revolution.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"235 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126805613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the link between board independence and the quality of community disclosures in annual reports. Using content analysis and a panel dataset from the UK FTSE 350 companies, the results show a statistically significant relationship between board independence, measured by proportion of non-executive directors and the quality of community disclosures, while other corporate governance and firm specific variables are held constant. The study indicates that companies with more non-executive directors are likely to disclose higher quality information of their community activities than others. This offers important insight to policy makers who are interested in achieving optimal board composition and on interaction of the firm with its corporate and extended environment through high quality disclosures. The originality of this paper is in the fact that it is the first to specifically examine the relationship between outside directors and community disclosures in annual reports. The paper contributes both to the corporate governance and community disclosure literature.
{"title":"Impact of Board Independence on Community Disclosures Quality","authors":"K. Yekini, I. Adelopo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2481002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2481002","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the link between board independence and the quality of community disclosures in annual reports. Using content analysis and a panel dataset from the UK FTSE 350 companies, the results show a statistically significant relationship between board independence, measured by proportion of non-executive directors and the quality of community disclosures, while other corporate governance and firm specific variables are held constant. The study indicates that companies with more non-executive directors are likely to disclose higher quality information of their community activities than others. This offers important insight to policy makers who are interested in achieving optimal board composition and on interaction of the firm with its corporate and extended environment through high quality disclosures. The originality of this paper is in the fact that it is the first to specifically examine the relationship between outside directors and community disclosures in annual reports. The paper contributes both to the corporate governance and community disclosure literature.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"C-25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126481194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
type="main"> Using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated changes in listing standards as a natural experiment, we find that while board independence decreases the cost of debt when credit conditions are strong or leverage is low, it increases the cost of debt when credit conditions are poor or leverage is high. We also document that independent directors set corporate policies that increase firm risk. These results suggest that independent directors act in the interests of shareholders and are increasingly costly to bondholders with the intensification of the agency conflict between these two stakeholder groups.
{"title":"Does Board Independence Reduce the Cost of Debt?","authors":"M. Bradley, Dong Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2390750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2390750","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\"> Using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated changes in listing standards as a natural experiment, we find that while board independence decreases the cost of debt when credit conditions are strong or leverage is low, it increases the cost of debt when credit conditions are poor or leverage is high. We also document that independent directors set corporate policies that increase firm risk. These results suggest that independent directors act in the interests of shareholders and are increasingly costly to bondholders with the intensification of the agency conflict between these two stakeholder groups.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114536453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present study empirically analyses the association between board of directors’ composition and capital structure. Particularly, the fraction of independent directors on the board, the fraction of female directors, the board size, and whether the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the chairman of the board are analysed. Consistent with the pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) the results provide strong evidence that firms with a larger fraction of independent directors on the board have a capital structure composed with more external capital when compared with retained earnings; have more short term debt in relation with retained earnings; have more long term debt compared with short term debt; and have more external equity than long term debt. The results also provide some evidence that a more gender diversified board of directors and where the chairman is non-executive (i.e. the CEO is a different person from that of the chairman) can improve the board of directors’ independence and efficiency and therefore lead the firm to have a capital structure composed with more long term sources of financing.
本文对董事会组成与资本结构的关系进行了实证分析。具体分析了独立董事比例、女性董事比例、董事会规模、首席执行官(CEO)是否兼任董事长等。与Myers(1984)和Myers and Majluf(1984)的啄啄顺序理论相一致，研究结果有力地证明，与留存盈余相比，董事会中独立董事比例较大的公司，其资本结构由更多的外部资本组成;与留存收益相关的短期债务较多;长期债务多于短期债务;并且拥有比长期债务更多的外部权益。研究结果还提供了一些证据，表明董事会性别更加多元化，董事长是非执行董事(即CEO与董事长是不同的人)可以提高董事会的独立性和效率，从而导致公司拥有由更多长期融资来源组成的资本结构。
{"title":"Board of Directors’ Composition and Capital Structure","authors":"Paulo F. Pereira Alves, E. Couto, Paulo Francisco","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2379743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2379743","url":null,"abstract":"The present study empirically analyses the association between board of directors’ composition and capital structure. Particularly, the fraction of independent directors on the board, the fraction of female directors, the board size, and whether the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the chairman of the board are analysed. Consistent with the pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) the results provide strong evidence that firms with a larger fraction of independent directors on the board have a capital structure composed with more external capital when compared with retained earnings; have more short term debt in relation with retained earnings; have more long term debt compared with short term debt; and have more external equity than long term debt. The results also provide some evidence that a more gender diversified board of directors and where the chairman is non-executive (i.e. the CEO is a different person from that of the chairman) can improve the board of directors’ independence and efficiency and therefore lead the firm to have a capital structure composed with more long term sources of financing.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115241465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Board composition and role have been under close scrutiny both in the academic and "civil" worlds. Independence has been advocated as a way to reinforce the board’s power over the managers. However, the empirical literature does not find convincing results to support this view. This paper offers a rapid review of these results and offers a survey of two other strings of the literature that could be used to solve this contradiction. On the one hand, it presents findings on how social connections can affect corporate governance and on the other hand, it outlines the main results of information aggregation and conformity effects in committees. Those have a part to play in boards and how they work.
{"title":"Networks on Boards: A Survey of the Literature","authors":"Mathilde Ravanel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2690762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690762","url":null,"abstract":"Board composition and role have been under close scrutiny both in the academic and \"civil\" worlds. Independence has been advocated as a way to reinforce the board’s power over the managers. However, the empirical literature does not find convincing results to support this view. This paper offers a rapid review of these results and offers a survey of two other strings of the literature that could be used to solve this contradiction. On the one hand, it presents findings on how social connections can affect corporate governance and on the other hand, it outlines the main results of information aggregation and conformity effects in committees. Those have a part to play in boards and how they work.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129558994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study focuses on the role of the corporate board of directors and the relationship between the dynamics of board structure and the financial performance of listed South African companies. The research results found that the proportion of independent non-executive directors had a significant positive effect on firm performance as measured by earnings per share and enterprise value, but had no significant effect on Tobin's Q ratio. Board ownership had a significant negative correlation with firm performance as measured by earnings per share, enterprise value and Tobin's Q ratio. The number of directors serving on the corporate board had a significant positive impact on firm performance as measured by earnings per share, enterprise value and Tobin's Q ratio. The study suggests that greater independent non-executive director representation, lower board share-ownership and larger board sizes should be encouraged to enhance firm performance.
{"title":"The Impact of Board Structure on the Financial Performance of Listed South African Companies","authors":"Erik Meyer, Johannes de Wet","doi":"10.22495/CBV9I3ART2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/CBV9I3ART2","url":null,"abstract":"This study focuses on the role of the corporate board of directors and the relationship between the dynamics of board structure and the financial performance of listed South African companies. The research results found that the proportion of independent non-executive directors had a significant positive effect on firm performance as measured by earnings per share and enterprise value, but had no significant effect on Tobin's Q ratio. Board ownership had a significant negative correlation with firm performance as measured by earnings per share, enterprise value and Tobin's Q ratio. The number of directors serving on the corporate board had a significant positive impact on firm performance as measured by earnings per share, enterprise value and Tobin's Q ratio. The study suggests that greater independent non-executive director representation, lower board share-ownership and larger board sizes should be encouraged to enhance firm performance.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128619072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With expanding U.S. business operations around the globe, the potential for significant exposure to international corruption increases along with the increased risks associated with anti-bribery laws. Companies who employ citizens of the United Kingdom, maintain an office in the United Kingdom, or are service providers to any United Kingdom organizations are subject to the U.K. Bribery Act and may be held liable for unlimited fines and jail terms which increase to ten years. Regardless of their countries of origin, multinational companies will inevitability be impacted by the U.K. and U.S. anti-bribery statutes. The SEC and the U.K.’s SFO [Serious Frauds Office] and FSA [Financial Services Authority] are increasing their coordination to work together in the areas of common regulatory interest, including cross-border enforcement cases. Any attempt to assess corporate risk for a U.K. Bribery Act violation requires an understanding of how the statute operates and is enforced. The U.K. Bribery Act replaces a patchwork of statutory and common law offenses dating back to 1889 and is designed to modernize and simplify the current anti-bribery restrictions in the United Kingdom. At its core, the U.K. Bribery Act creates four distinct categories of offenses: (1) bribing another person; (2) taking bribes; (3) bribing foreign public officials; and (4) the failure of a commercial organization to prevent bribery. We begin with a brief discussion of the international bribery problem. Next, because the U.K. Bribery Act is relatively new, we provide an explanation and analysis of the Act, along with a description of the SFO’s revised policies published on October 9, 2012. An analysis of many of the key differences between the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and U.K. Bribery Act is then presented. Now that more than two years has past since implementation, an assessment of this law’s impact is presented. As the world continues to grow smaller and commerce increases, corporate officers and directors must necessarily become familiar with the provisions of the U.K. Bribery Act.
{"title":"Lawyers, Guns and Money – The Bribery Problem and U.K. Bribery Act","authors":"L. Trautman, Kara Altenbaumer-Price","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2276738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2276738","url":null,"abstract":"With expanding U.S. business operations around the globe, the potential for significant exposure to international corruption increases along with the increased risks associated with anti-bribery laws. Companies who employ citizens of the United Kingdom, maintain an office in the United Kingdom, or are service providers to any United Kingdom organizations are subject to the U.K. Bribery Act and may be held liable for unlimited fines and jail terms which increase to ten years. Regardless of their countries of origin, multinational companies will inevitability be impacted by the U.K. and U.S. anti-bribery statutes. The SEC and the U.K.’s SFO [Serious Frauds Office] and FSA [Financial Services Authority] are increasing their coordination to work together in the areas of common regulatory interest, including cross-border enforcement cases. Any attempt to assess corporate risk for a U.K. Bribery Act violation requires an understanding of how the statute operates and is enforced. The U.K. Bribery Act replaces a patchwork of statutory and common law offenses dating back to 1889 and is designed to modernize and simplify the current anti-bribery restrictions in the United Kingdom. At its core, the U.K. Bribery Act creates four distinct categories of offenses: (1) bribing another person; (2) taking bribes; (3) bribing foreign public officials; and (4) the failure of a commercial organization to prevent bribery. We begin with a brief discussion of the international bribery problem. Next, because the U.K. Bribery Act is relatively new, we provide an explanation and analysis of the Act, along with a description of the SFO’s revised policies published on October 9, 2012. An analysis of many of the key differences between the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and U.K. Bribery Act is then presented. Now that more than two years has past since implementation, an assessment of this law’s impact is presented. As the world continues to grow smaller and commerce increases, corporate officers and directors must necessarily become familiar with the provisions of the U.K. Bribery Act.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"200 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132652740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-18DOI: 10.17811/EBL.1.1.2012.35-45
C. Ntim
We examine the crucial policy question of whether the South African (SA) stock market values a dual board leadership structure (DBLS) using a sample of 169 listed firms from 2002 to 2007. We find a significant positive link between DBLS and market valuation, but only in firms with independent chairpersons, implying that the market values firms with independent DBLS more highly. Our results are robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of market valuation proxies and endogeneity problems. Our findings offer empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that independent DBLS increases the capacity of the board to effectively advise, monitor and discipline top management, and thereby improving market valuation.
{"title":"Does the South African Stock Market Values Independent Dual Board Leadership Structure?","authors":"C. Ntim","doi":"10.17811/EBL.1.1.2012.35-45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17811/EBL.1.1.2012.35-45","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the crucial policy question of whether the South African (SA) stock market values a dual board leadership structure (DBLS) using a sample of 169 listed firms from 2002 to 2007. We find a significant positive link between DBLS and market valuation, but only in firms with independent chairpersons, implying that the market values firms with independent DBLS more highly. Our results are robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of market valuation proxies and endogeneity problems. Our findings offer empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that independent DBLS increases the capacity of the board to effectively advise, monitor and discipline top management, and thereby improving market valuation.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132550929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the link between female board directors and company financial performance and agency costs in Sri Lanka’s publicly listed companies. A well-balanced board is critical to the effective strategic direction and running of any company, especially in countries where external corporate governance mechanisms are less developed. In order to investigate the impact of board gender diversity on firm financial performance, dynamic panel GMM estimation is applied, using Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance. Three variables are used as proxies for gender diversity of the board on the board of directors, namely the percentage of women on the board, a dichotomotons dummy, and the Blau index. A Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used to investigate the impact of female board members on agency cost, using growth opportunities as a measure of agency cost. After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance measures, this study finds a significant negative relationship between the proportion of women on boards and firm value while increasing company agency cost. This evidence provides insights for governments and academic institutions in their efforts for provide resource that may help enhance women leadership skills.
{"title":"Women on Board, Firm Financial Performance and Agency Costs","authors":"Nirosha Hewa Wellalage","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1904072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1904072","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the link between female board directors and company financial performance and agency costs in Sri Lanka’s publicly listed companies. A well-balanced board is critical to the effective strategic direction and running of any company, especially in countries where external corporate governance mechanisms are less developed. In order to investigate the impact of board gender diversity on firm financial performance, dynamic panel GMM estimation is applied, using Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance. Three variables are used as proxies for gender diversity of the board on the board of directors, namely the percentage of women on the board, a dichotomotons dummy, and the Blau index. A Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used to investigate the impact of female board members on agency cost, using growth opportunities as a measure of agency cost. After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance measures, this study finds a significant negative relationship between the proportion of women on boards and firm value while increasing company agency cost. This evidence provides insights for governments and academic institutions in their efforts for provide resource that may help enhance women leadership skills.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"130 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124282587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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