Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4337/9781781006047.00068
Albert R. Teare
{"title":"Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights","authors":"Albert R. Teare","doi":"10.4337/9781781006047.00068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781006047.00068","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":258683,"journal":{"name":"The Cleveland State Law Review","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121812518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On March 7, 1927, Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote his younger brother Horace Taft, “I am going to deliver an opinion this morning in a very important alcohol prohibition act matter in Ohio.” Taft went on to explain that the Supreme Court’s decision did not address whether the so-called Volstead Act, which implemented the Eighteenth Amendment, was constitutional, but rather it addressed how Ohio’s system of prohibition enforcement violated due process. Ohio’s legislature had enacted a prohibition statute as an analog to the Volstead Act. Known as the “Crabbe Act,” Ohio’s law barred the possession of “intoxicating liquor.” After mailing his letter to his brother, Taft walked to the Supreme Court and assembled the Justices to announce the decision. Reported in newspapers across the country, the decision, captioned as Tumey v. Ohio, determined that Ohio’s downward delegation of prohibition enforcement to municipal courts failed to ensure due process. One day before writing to Horace, Taft wrote to his son Charles Phelps Taft II that the Court had unanimously determined that the Crabbe Act was “invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment” and then stressed that the Justices found the Ohio law repugnant to fundamental rights. Tumey has become a benchmark for assessing judicial impartiality, but the legal history of the decision, including how it was shaped, has hardly been written about. Professor Robert Post, in an article titled “Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era,” placed Tumey as part of the Court’s authoritative – or “national” – expansion over the United States. Yet unlike decisions upholding Prohibition, Tumey placed restraints against its enforcement. Professor Post was not in error in analyzing Tumey in the context of Prohibition or the Court’s authoritative expansion, but to exclusively do so results in an incomplete historic analysis of the judicial intent underlying the decision. For instance, Tumey arose during Taft’s efforts to limit congressional attempts to govern the judiciary. The case was also decided at a time when Taft had been attacked as being beholden to corporate interests and therefore overly partial to wealthy litigants. Most importantly, Tumey was part of a line of cases and extrajudicial actions that Taft used to shape judicial ethics. A legal history centering on Taft’s conception of the duties and independence of judges, as well as constraints on judicial power, amplifies how he led a largely conservative, yet jurisprudentially diverse, Court to unanimously intervene in a state’s municipal court construct. While it may be correct, as legal historian Melvin Urofsky has pointed out, that during the period Taft sat as Chief Justice the justices limited their dissents in an effort to fend off Congressional efforts to narrow federal court jurisdiction, the justices did dissent in several appeals, particularly decisions involving criminal prose
1927年3月7日，首席大法官威廉·霍华德·塔夫脱写信给他的弟弟贺拉斯·塔夫脱说:“今天早上，我要就俄亥俄州一项非常重要的禁酒法案发表意见。”塔夫脱接着解释说，最高法院的裁决并没有涉及执行第十八修正案的所谓沃尔斯特德法案是否符合宪法，而是涉及俄亥俄州的禁令执行制度如何违反了正当程序。俄亥俄州的立法机关颁布了一项禁酒令，类似于《沃尔斯特德法案》。俄亥俄州的法律被称为“克拉布法案”，禁止拥有“令人陶醉的酒”。在把信寄给哥哥之后，塔夫脱走到最高法院，召集法官宣布了这一决定。全国各地的报纸都报道了这一判决，标题为“图米诉俄亥俄州案”(Tumey v. Ohio)，裁定俄亥俄州将禁酒令执行向下授权给市法院的做法未能确保正当程序。在给贺拉斯写信的前一天，塔夫脱写信给他的儿子查尔斯·费尔普斯·塔夫脱二世说，最高法院一致裁定《克拉布法案》“根据第十四修正案无效”，然后强调法官们认为俄亥俄州的法律违背了基本权利。图米案已成为评估司法公正的基准，但这一判决的法律历史，包括它是如何形成的，几乎没有人写过。罗伯特·波斯特(Robert Post)教授在一篇名为《联邦制、实在法和美国行政国家的出现:塔夫脱法院时代的禁酒令》的文章中，将图米列为最高法院在美国的权威扩张或“国家”扩张的一部分。然而，与支持禁酒令的决定不同，图米对禁酒令的执行施加了限制。波斯特教授在禁酒令或最高法院权威扩张的背景下分析图米案并没有错，但如果只这样做，就会导致对该决定背后的司法意图进行不完整的历史分析。例如，在塔夫脱试图限制国会管理司法的努力中，Tumey出现了。该案判决之时，塔夫脱也曾被抨击为对企业利益感恩戴德，因此过分偏袒富有的诉讼当事人。最重要的是，图米是塔夫脱用来塑造司法道德的一系列案件和法外行为的一部分。以塔夫脱关于法官职责和独立性以及司法权约束的概念为中心的法律史，放大了他如何领导一个基本上保守但法理多样的法院一致干预一个州的市政法院结构。正如法律历史学家梅尔文·乌洛夫斯基(Melvin Urofsky)指出的那样，在塔夫脱担任首席大法官期间，法官们限制了他们的不同意见，以抵御国会缩小联邦法院管辖权的努力，这可能是正确的，但法官们确实在几起上诉中持不同意见，特别是涉及刑事起诉的决定。从这个角度来看，图米背后的一致意见也是分析塔夫脱意图的一个值得注意的因素。
{"title":"Chief Justice William Howard Taft's Conception of Judicial Integrity: The Legal History of Tumey v. Ohio","authors":"Joshua E. Kastenberg","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2959072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2959072","url":null,"abstract":"On March 7, 1927, Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote his younger brother Horace Taft, “I am going to deliver an opinion this morning in a very important alcohol prohibition act matter in Ohio.” Taft went on to explain that the Supreme Court’s decision did not address whether the so-called Volstead Act, which implemented the Eighteenth Amendment, was constitutional, but rather it addressed how Ohio’s system of prohibition enforcement violated due process. Ohio’s legislature had enacted a prohibition statute as an analog to the Volstead Act. Known as the “Crabbe Act,” Ohio’s law barred the possession of “intoxicating liquor.” After mailing his letter to his brother, Taft walked to the Supreme Court and assembled the Justices to announce the decision. Reported in newspapers across the country, the decision, captioned as Tumey v. Ohio, determined that Ohio’s downward delegation of prohibition enforcement to municipal courts failed to ensure due process. One day before writing to Horace, Taft wrote to his son Charles Phelps Taft II that the Court had unanimously determined that the Crabbe Act was “invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment” and then stressed that the Justices found the Ohio law repugnant to fundamental rights. \u0000Tumey has become a benchmark for assessing judicial impartiality, but the legal history of the decision, including how it was shaped, has hardly been written about. Professor Robert Post, in an article titled “Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era,” placed Tumey as part of the Court’s authoritative – or “national” – expansion over the United States. Yet unlike decisions upholding Prohibition, Tumey placed restraints against its enforcement. Professor Post was not in error in analyzing Tumey in the context of Prohibition or the Court’s authoritative expansion, but to exclusively do so results in an incomplete historic analysis of the judicial intent underlying the decision. For instance, Tumey arose during Taft’s efforts to limit congressional attempts to govern the judiciary. The case was also decided at a time when Taft had been attacked as being beholden to corporate interests and therefore overly partial to wealthy litigants. Most importantly, Tumey was part of a line of cases and extrajudicial actions that Taft used to shape judicial ethics. A legal history centering on Taft’s conception of the duties and independence of judges, as well as constraints on judicial power, amplifies how he led a largely conservative, yet jurisprudentially diverse, Court to unanimously intervene in a state’s municipal court construct. While it may be correct, as legal historian Melvin Urofsky has pointed out, that during the period Taft sat as Chief Justice the justices limited their dissents in an effort to fend off Congressional efforts to narrow federal court jurisdiction, the justices did dissent in several appeals, particularly decisions involving criminal prose","PeriodicalId":258683,"journal":{"name":"The Cleveland State Law Review","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131379139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Sentencing Problem: How Far Is a Fall from Grace","authors":"H. Cooper","doi":"10.1037/e452852008-059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/e452852008-059","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":258683,"journal":{"name":"The Cleveland State Law Review","volume":"2 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130821668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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