Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-551
Edouard Fromageau
After years of criticism toward its mode of operation,1 the World Bank is now engaged in a major and drastic institutional reform aimed at enhancing its transparency and accountability through access to information. In July 2010, the World Bank Access to Information Policy (the AI Policy) was launched as one initiative to provide better access to information for the public.2 A “landmark disclosure policy”3 for the World Bank, a “welcome step”,4 or a “clear sign of the development of procedural norms that apply to global institutions”5 for others, the AI Policy is nonetheless a major reform of the Bank's disclosure policy as it represents a “paradigm shift in the Bank's approach to disclosure”.6 It has indeed redefined the way the I.
{"title":"Quasi-Judicial Bodies as Procedural Innovations: The World Bank Access to Information Appeals Procedure","authors":"Edouard Fromageau","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-551","url":null,"abstract":"After years of criticism toward its mode of operation,1 the World Bank is now engaged in a major and drastic institutional reform aimed at enhancing its transparency and accountability through access to information. In July 2010, the World Bank Access to Information Policy (the AI Policy) was launched as one initiative to provide better access to information for the public.2 A “landmark disclosure policy”3 for the World Bank, a “welcome step”,4 or a “clear sign of the development of procedural norms that apply to global institutions”5 for others, the AI Policy is nonetheless a major reform of the Bank's disclosure policy as it represents a “paradigm shift in the Bank's approach to disclosure”.6 It has indeed redefined the way the I.","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"217 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124278658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-205
M. Erpelding
* Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law. A more detailed account of the issues examined in this chapter can be found in: M. Erpelding, Le droit international antiesclavagiste des “nations civilisées” (1815-1945) (2017). 1 See in particular J. Allain, The Nineteenth Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of the Slave Trade, 58 BYIL (2007), 1, 342-388. Reprinted in: J. Allain, The Law and Slavery: Prohibiting Human Exploitation (2015), 46-100. 2 H. H. Wilson, Some principal aspects of British efforts to crush the African slave trade, 1807-1929, 44 AJIL (1950), 1, 505-506. 3 “L’achat et l’exportation d’esclaves destinés à être transportés dans des colonies où l’esclavage existe, où ils doivent devenir la propriété des colons, avec toutes les conséquences du droit de possession”. Quoted by: C. Flory, De l’esclavage à la liberté force: Histoire des travailleurs africains dans la Caraïbe française au XIXe siècle (2015), 46.
= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，该镇的土地面积为。关于本章讨论的问题的更详细的描述可以在M. Erpelding的《文明国家的国际反奴隶制法》(1815-1945)(2017)中找到。1具体见J. Allain，《十九世纪海法与英国废除奴隶贸易》，58 BYIL(2007)， 1,342 -388。再版:J. Allain，《法律与奴隶制:禁止人类剥削》(2015)，46-100。2 H. H. Wilson，《英国粉碎非洲奴隶贸易的主要方面》，1807-1929,44 AJIL(1950)， 1,505 -506。“购买和出口奴隶，以便运输到存在奴隶制的殖民地，在那里他们必须成为殖民者的财产，以及所有的所有权后果。”引用:C. Flory，《从奴隶制到自由力量:19世纪法属加勒比非洲工人的历史》(2015)，46。
{"title":"Evidence Requirements before 19th Century Anti-Slave Trade Jurisdictions and Slavery as a Standard of Treatment","authors":"M. Erpelding","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-205","url":null,"abstract":"* Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law. A more detailed account of the issues examined in this chapter can be found in: M. Erpelding, Le droit international antiesclavagiste des “nations civilisées” (1815-1945) (2017). 1 See in particular J. Allain, The Nineteenth Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of the Slave Trade, 58 BYIL (2007), 1, 342-388. Reprinted in: J. Allain, The Law and Slavery: Prohibiting Human Exploitation (2015), 46-100. 2 H. H. Wilson, Some principal aspects of British efforts to crush the African slave trade, 1807-1929, 44 AJIL (1950), 1, 505-506. 3 “L’achat et l’exportation d’esclaves destinés à être transportés dans des colonies où l’esclavage existe, où ils doivent devenir la propriété des colons, avec toutes les conséquences du droit de possession”. Quoted by: C. Flory, De l’esclavage à la liberté force: Histoire des travailleurs africains dans la Caraïbe française au XIXe siècle (2015), 46.","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121479283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-65
Tamar Meshel
Of the total amount of water on Earth, only 2.5% is fresh water and only around 30% of this water is available for human use.1 The rising demand for this finite resource, fuelled by population growth, industrial development, and increasing scarcity, may well result in a global water crisis. Moreover, competing transboundary fresh water demands may lead to interstate disputes over ownership, allocation, and quality of fresh water.2 This is particularly so because transboundary fresh water has “[c]haracteristics that make [its] conservation and management particularly challenging, the most notable of which is the tendency for regional politics to regularly exacerbate the already difficult task of understanding and managing complex natural systems.”3 I.
{"title":"The Dual Role of Procedure in International Water Law","authors":"Tamar Meshel","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-65","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-65","url":null,"abstract":"Of the total amount of water on Earth, only 2.5% is fresh water and only around 30% of this water is available for human use.1 The rising demand for this finite resource, fuelled by population growth, industrial development, and increasing scarcity, may well result in a global water crisis. Moreover, competing transboundary fresh water demands may lead to interstate disputes over ownership, allocation, and quality of fresh water.2 This is particularly so because transboundary fresh water has “[c]haracteristics that make [its] conservation and management particularly challenging, the most notable of which is the tendency for regional politics to regularly exacerbate the already difficult task of understanding and managing complex natural systems.”3 I.","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127845284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-695
Dalia Palombo
This article investigates whether, after Opinion 2/13,1 victims have effective means of redress at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when the European Union (EU) violates their fundamental rights. In Opinion 2/13, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed the Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Draft Agreement),2 which was the product of more than four years of negotiations between the European Commission (EC) and the Council of Europe. A number of human rights and EU scholars have already analysed the detrimental consequences that Opinion 2/13 may have on the institutional relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe.3 What receives less attention is that the Draft Agreement, if effective, would have entitled victims of human rights abuses to file complaints against the EU at the ECtHR. This article analyses what avenues Opinion 2/13 left for perspective I.
{"title":"The Lack of Effective Remedies at the European Court of Human Rights after Opinion 2/13","authors":"Dalia Palombo","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-695","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates whether, after Opinion 2/13,1 victims have effective means of redress at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when the European Union (EU) violates their fundamental rights. In Opinion 2/13, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed the Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Draft Agreement),2 which was the product of more than four years of negotiations between the European Commission (EC) and the Council of Europe. A number of human rights and EU scholars have already analysed the detrimental consequences that Opinion 2/13 may have on the institutional relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe.3 What receives less attention is that the Draft Agreement, if effective, would have entitled victims of human rights abuses to file complaints against the EU at the ECtHR. This article analyses what avenues Opinion 2/13 left for perspective I.","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"386 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131935420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-603
A. Rosas
In view of the considerable diversity of international courts and other dispute settlement bodies,1 generalizations should be made with great care. Each judicial system has its own institutional and procedural setting and the substantive applicable rules often present their own specificities. This, of course, is not to deny that there may be common threads which call for at least partly similar solutions, such as the question of the independence and impartiality of judges and the rules of evidence.2 This article will deal with the judicial system of the European Union (EU) and more specifically, the two-layered system consisting of the joint involvement of the national courts of the EU Member States and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)3 in a mechanism known as the preliminary ruling procedure. The aim is to elucidate the interaction between national courts and the ECJ in dealing with preliminary rulings and to highlight some institutional and procedural challenges stemming from the parallel existence of two players, the national court and the ECJ, which are based on sets of rules of different origin. The national legal orders not only preI.
{"title":"The Interaction Between the European Court of Justice and National Courts in Preliminary Ruling Proceedings: Some Institutional and Procedural Observations","authors":"A. Rosas","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-603","url":null,"abstract":"In view of the considerable diversity of international courts and other dispute settlement bodies,1 generalizations should be made with great care. Each judicial system has its own institutional and procedural setting and the substantive applicable rules often present their own specificities. This, of course, is not to deny that there may be common threads which call for at least partly similar solutions, such as the question of the independence and impartiality of judges and the rules of evidence.2 This article will deal with the judicial system of the European Union (EU) and more specifically, the two-layered system consisting of the joint involvement of the national courts of the EU Member States and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)3 in a mechanism known as the preliminary ruling procedure. The aim is to elucidate the interaction between national courts and the ECJ in dealing with preliminary rulings and to highlight some institutional and procedural challenges stemming from the parallel existence of two players, the national court and the ECJ, which are based on sets of rules of different origin. The national legal orders not only preI.","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124084787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis","authors":"","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"268 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132814940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-91
Y. Daudet
Strictly speaking and also commonly well-understood, the function of the International Court of Justice is to “decide such disputes as are submitted to it” and to give decisions that, according to Article 59 of its Statute, are binding only upon the parties to the dispute. On several occasions, the Court has recalled that its role must be strictly limited to this purpose and, in this respect, it has declined to exercise any law-making power. For example, in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court said that:
{"title":"Brief Remarks on the Effect of Judgments on International Law","authors":"Y. Daudet","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-91","url":null,"abstract":"Strictly speaking and also commonly well-understood, the function of the International Court of Justice is to “decide such disputes as are submitted to it” and to give decisions that, according to Article 59 of its Statute, are binding only upon the parties to the dispute. On several occasions, the Court has recalled that its role must be strictly limited to this purpose and, in this respect, it has declined to exercise any law-making power. For example, in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court said that:","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122260230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-625
A. Ganesh
Rules of procedure, such as those concerning standing to bring suit, lie at the very heart of what it means to be a legal subject empowered with rights. This contribution demonstrates this in the context of the recent Polisario cases before the EU courts, the latest instalment in the decades-long legal struggle over the Western Sahara between Morocco and the national liberation movement known as the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía-elHamra y Río de Oro (Front Polisario).1 In particular, it considers the ways in which the various courts of the EU interpreted the rules of EU law on standing to bring judicial review, with a view to assessing whether it is true that the EU legal order offers all possible claimants a “complete system of remedies”.2 It concludes that this claim is untrue, and that a gap presents itself where the EU enters into a treaty with another entity with sovereign powers (‘state’ , for convenience) which disposes of the territory, natural resources, and consequently also people of a third state. We term such people ‘distant strangers’ because they are neither citizens of EU Member States nor are they present on Member State territory. Both the third state and its people have valid grievances against the EU. Nevertheless, they are barred from seeking appropriate judicial review of EU acts. The first item of interest is the December 2015 judgment of the General Court of the European Union (General Court), which partially annulled a I.
程序规则，例如关于诉讼资格的规则，是被赋予权利的法律主体的核心。这一贡献在最近欧盟法院审理的波利萨里奥阵线案件的背景下证明了这一点，这是摩洛哥与民族解放运动Liberación de Saguía-elHamra y Río de Oro(波利萨里奥阵线)之间长达数十年的西撒哈拉法律斗争的最新部分特别是，它考虑了欧盟各法院解释欧盟法律规则的方式，以进行司法审查，以评估欧盟法律秩序是否真的为所有可能的索赔人提供了“完整的补救制度”它的结论是，这种说法是不真实的，当欧盟与另一个拥有主权权力的实体(“国家”，为方便起见)签订条约时，鸿沟就出现了，这个条约处理了第三国的领土、自然资源，因此也处理了第三国的人民。我们称这些人为“遥远的陌生人”，因为他们既不是欧盟成员国的公民，也不在欧盟成员国的领土上。第三国及其人民对欧盟都有正当的不满。然而，他们被禁止寻求对欧盟行为进行适当的司法审查。第一个感兴趣的项目是2015年12月欧盟普通法院(General Court of European Union)的判决，该判决部分废除了一项I。
{"title":"Distant Strangers and Standing in Polisario","authors":"A. Ganesh","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-625","url":null,"abstract":"Rules of procedure, such as those concerning standing to bring suit, lie at the very heart of what it means to be a legal subject empowered with rights. This contribution demonstrates this in the context of the recent Polisario cases before the EU courts, the latest instalment in the decades-long legal struggle over the Western Sahara between Morocco and the national liberation movement known as the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía-elHamra y Río de Oro (Front Polisario).1 In particular, it considers the ways in which the various courts of the EU interpreted the rules of EU law on standing to bring judicial review, with a view to assessing whether it is true that the EU legal order offers all possible claimants a “complete system of remedies”.2 It concludes that this claim is untrue, and that a gap presents itself where the EU enters into a treaty with another entity with sovereign powers (‘state’ , for convenience) which disposes of the territory, natural resources, and consequently also people of a third state. We term such people ‘distant strangers’ because they are neither citizens of EU Member States nor are they present on Member State territory. Both the third state and its people have valid grievances against the EU. Nevertheless, they are barred from seeking appropriate judicial review of EU acts. The first item of interest is the December 2015 judgment of the General Court of the European Union (General Court), which partially annulled a I.","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"52 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130497749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-513
G. Marceau, Clément Marquet
{"title":"Practices and Ways of Doing Things in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Law","authors":"G. Marceau, Clément Marquet","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-513","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126128326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/9783845299051-19
jean-marc sorel
« Justice must not only be done, but it must also be seen to be done. » Cet adage bien connu sous plusieurs versions (et plusieurs traductions) serait en quelque sorte le creuset de la procéduralisation, ou un de ses aspects. Si la justice est rendue, elle doit l’être dans une apparence de justice, la question centrale étant sans doute lorsque l’apparence supplante le rendu de la justice elle-même, autrement dit lorsque le respect de la forme permet d’oublier l’éventuelle vacuité ou la pauvreté du fond. Il est néanmoins évident que la grande majorité des décisions rendues aujourd’hui par les juridictions internationales allient l’apparence et le rendu d’une décision justifiée au fond. Notre propos n’est donc pas de remettre en cause cette évidence, mais de s’interroger sur une balance qui tend de plus en plus à privilégier le respect de la forme, sans forcément amoindrir le fond, mais, pour le moins, à créer des contraintes qui satisfont l’apparence sans forcément satisfaire toujours la justice. L’arme de la procédure est devenue un enjeu à part entière (et, de plus en plus, un objet d’étude1), gagner un procès sur des arguments de procédure n’est plus une victoire à la Pyrrhus. A cet égard, et pour reprendre l’interrogation centrale de ce panel, on est en droit de s’interroger sur l’importance prise par la procédure – et jusqu’où – dans le règlement des difféI.
{"title":"Procéduralisation et transformation de l’idée de justice","authors":"jean-marc sorel","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-19","url":null,"abstract":"« Justice must not only be done, but it must also be seen to be done. » Cet adage bien connu sous plusieurs versions (et plusieurs traductions) serait en quelque sorte le creuset de la procéduralisation, ou un de ses aspects. Si la justice est rendue, elle doit l’être dans une apparence de justice, la question centrale étant sans doute lorsque l’apparence supplante le rendu de la justice elle-même, autrement dit lorsque le respect de la forme permet d’oublier l’éventuelle vacuité ou la pauvreté du fond. Il est néanmoins évident que la grande majorité des décisions rendues aujourd’hui par les juridictions internationales allient l’apparence et le rendu d’une décision justifiée au fond. Notre propos n’est donc pas de remettre en cause cette évidence, mais de s’interroger sur une balance qui tend de plus en plus à privilégier le respect de la forme, sans forcément amoindrir le fond, mais, pour le moins, à créer des contraintes qui satisfont l’apparence sans forcément satisfaire toujours la justice. L’arme de la procédure est devenue un enjeu à part entière (et, de plus en plus, un objet d’étude1), gagner un procès sur des arguments de procédure n’est plus une victoire à la Pyrrhus. A cet égard, et pour reprendre l’interrogation centrale de ce panel, on est en droit de s’interroger sur l’importance prise par la procédure – et jusqu’où – dans le règlement des difféI.","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"327 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133471479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：