For much of the last seventy-plus years, healthcare providers in the United States have been paid under the fee-for-service system, where providers are reimbursed for procedures performed, not outcomes obtained. The result has been a system that combines exploding costs without concomitant increases in quality. Healthcare economists and policymakers have reacted by proposing a number of policies designed to rein in costs without sacrificing quality. One approach is to focus on health outcomes, reconfiguring incentives and structures to deliver healthcare in ways that are both efficacious and efficient. Under a pay-for-performance strategy, providers are paid to improve health by whatever medically-appropriate methods they choose. This means providers are no longer paid for simply doing a given “something” but, rather, are paid for doing “something effective.” In this Article, I argue that the criminal justice system is marked by many of the same distorted individual and organizational incentives that have plagued health care. Most significantly, in all but a handful of jurisdictions, states wholly subsidize commitments to prison — the fee-for-service model of doing “something” — without tying any of these subsidies to outcomes obtained in prison. This means prison is paid for even if it is neither effective nor efficient. These similarities with the healthcare system suggest that an outcome-oriented, pay-for-performance framework borrowed from healthcare economics might, if applied to criminal justice, improve its efficacy and efficiency. I envision this Article as the first of several applying healthcare economics to criminal justice. It will focus on the similarities of the two systems, the ways in which an outcome orientation might provide a useful framework for controlling costs without making quality subservient, and the suggestion that we begin considering sentencing choices within that framework.
{"title":"Pay-for-Performance in Prison: Using Healthcare Economics to Improve Criminal Justice","authors":"W. Ball","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2765599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2765599","url":null,"abstract":"For much of the last seventy-plus years, healthcare providers in the United States have been paid under the fee-for-service system, where providers are reimbursed for procedures performed, not outcomes obtained. The result has been a system that combines exploding costs without concomitant increases in quality. Healthcare economists and policymakers have reacted by proposing a number of policies designed to rein in costs without sacrificing quality. One approach is to focus on health outcomes, reconfiguring incentives and structures to deliver healthcare in ways that are both efficacious and efficient. Under a pay-for-performance strategy, providers are paid to improve health by whatever medically-appropriate methods they choose. This means providers are no longer paid for simply doing a given “something” but, rather, are paid for doing “something effective.” In this Article, I argue that the criminal justice system is marked by many of the same distorted individual and organizational incentives that have plagued health care. Most significantly, in all but a handful of jurisdictions, states wholly subsidize commitments to prison — the fee-for-service model of doing “something” — without tying any of these subsidies to outcomes obtained in prison. This means prison is paid for even if it is neither effective nor efficient. These similarities with the healthcare system suggest that an outcome-oriented, pay-for-performance framework borrowed from healthcare economics might, if applied to criminal justice, improve its efficacy and efficiency. I envision this Article as the first of several applying healthcare economics to criminal justice. It will focus on the similarities of the two systems, the ways in which an outcome orientation might provide a useful framework for controlling costs without making quality subservient, and the suggestion that we begin considering sentencing choices within that framework.","PeriodicalId":268118,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Procedure (Criminal Procedure) (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116832650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study revisits classic theoretical arguments regarding the broad effects of civilian demeanor on policing and extends associated findings. Our theoretical framework draws on the literatures on police culture, the group engagement model and fairness heuristic theory. We argue that demeanor should be conceptualized as the degree of procedural justice exhibited by civilians. Theoretically, procedurally just cooperation should influence officers’ adherence to police culture by affecting their social identification and assessments of civilians’ motives and moral deservingness. An analysis of data from a sample of police officers reveals that officers who perceive greater procedurally just cooperation feel less threatened by the public, are more willing to use procedural justice themselves, and are less supportive of a “tough cop” policing style.
{"title":"Reconceptualizing Demeanor: The Implications of Civilian Procedurally Just Cooperation for Police Culture","authors":"Justin T. Pickett, Justin Nix","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2953661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2953661","url":null,"abstract":"This study revisits classic theoretical arguments regarding the broad effects of civilian demeanor on policing and extends associated findings. Our theoretical framework draws on the literatures on police culture, the group engagement model and fairness heuristic theory. We argue that demeanor should be conceptualized as the degree of procedural justice exhibited by civilians. Theoretically, procedurally just cooperation should influence officers’ adherence to police culture by affecting their social identification and assessments of civilians’ motives and moral deservingness. An analysis of data from a sample of police officers reveals that officers who perceive greater procedurally just cooperation feel less threatened by the public, are more willing to use procedural justice themselves, and are less supportive of a “tough cop” policing style.","PeriodicalId":268118,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Procedure (Criminal Procedure) (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131623876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In August 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of United States v. Vilar denied extraterritorial application of the criminal law antifraud provisions contained in the Securities and Exchange Act. The specific object of this paper is to criticize this decision and negate its premises. After delving in depth into the notion of extraterritoriality, the paper offers a dynamic interpretation of the 1922 Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Bowman, which is still the governing precedent on extraterritorial application of criminal laws. Furthermore, the paper criticizes the application of the 2010 Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank to criminal cases, and explains the Dodd-Frank Act’s failed attempt to overrule it. The paper undertakes a detailed analysis of each of U.S. v. Vilar’s supporting arguments, using the German criminal law model to identify some of this decision’s significant shortcomings. It begins with discussion of the extent and significance of the U.S. v. Bowman exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality in light of the need to protect the integrity of a delocalized capital market. Next, the paper interprets section 32(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act in accordance with modern developments of criminal law theory. Consequently, the paper analyzes the significant distinctions between criminal law and civil law, in contrast with their equation by the Vilar court. The discussion ultimately leads to a justification of the Act’s extraterritorial enforcement through a contextual and dynamic interpretation of section 32(a), taking into consideration the transnational nature of market integrity and public wealth values protected by this provision.
{"title":"Extraterritorial Criminal Enforcement of Securities Frauds Regulations after U.S. v. Vilar","authors":"Edgardo Rotman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2610804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2610804","url":null,"abstract":"In August 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of United States v. Vilar denied extraterritorial application of the criminal law antifraud provisions contained in the Securities and Exchange Act. The specific object of this paper is to criticize this decision and negate its premises. After delving in depth into the notion of extraterritoriality, the paper offers a dynamic interpretation of the 1922 Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Bowman, which is still the governing precedent on extraterritorial application of criminal laws. Furthermore, the paper criticizes the application of the 2010 Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank to criminal cases, and explains the Dodd-Frank Act’s failed attempt to overrule it. The paper undertakes a detailed analysis of each of U.S. v. Vilar’s supporting arguments, using the German criminal law model to identify some of this decision’s significant shortcomings. It begins with discussion of the extent and significance of the U.S. v. Bowman exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality in light of the need to protect the integrity of a delocalized capital market. Next, the paper interprets section 32(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act in accordance with modern developments of criminal law theory. Consequently, the paper analyzes the significant distinctions between criminal law and civil law, in contrast with their equation by the Vilar court. The discussion ultimately leads to a justification of the Act’s extraterritorial enforcement through a contextual and dynamic interpretation of section 32(a), taking into consideration the transnational nature of market integrity and public wealth values protected by this provision.","PeriodicalId":268118,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Procedure (Criminal Procedure) (Topic)","volume":"159 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127521720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper critically discusses the effect that the new double criminality test has on Nominated Officers and MLRO's in the Regulated Sector. It looks at the difficulties the new double criminality test is likely to create for the Nominated Officers, addressing issues like 'when to report and not to report' and 'risk posed by changes to laws/regulations'. It then looks at the difficulties the new double criminality test is likely to create for the MLRO's as regards the execution of their duties. It does this by addressing the issue of 'difficulty in training staffs.'
{"title":"A Critical Analysis of the Effect of the Double Criminality Test on Nominated Officers and Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLRO) in the Regulated Sector","authors":"Ehi Eric Esoimeme","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2462952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2462952","url":null,"abstract":"This paper critically discusses the effect that the new double criminality test has on Nominated Officers and MLRO's in the Regulated Sector. It looks at the difficulties the new double criminality test is likely to create for the Nominated Officers, addressing issues like 'when to report and not to report' and 'risk posed by changes to laws/regulations'. It then looks at the difficulties the new double criminality test is likely to create for the MLRO's as regards the execution of their duties. It does this by addressing the issue of 'difficulty in training staffs.'","PeriodicalId":268118,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Procedure (Criminal Procedure) (Topic)","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132019843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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