Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.1525/9780520940642-004
{"title":"Part 3. Sunbelt Protests against Discrimination","authors":"","doi":"10.1525/9780520940642-004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520940642-004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":272848,"journal":{"name":"Against the Law","volume":"382 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122987645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.1525/9780520940642-009
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.1525/9780520940642-009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520940642-009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":272848,"journal":{"name":"Against the Law","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116743829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-08-01DOI: 10.1215/9780822396055-005
S. Smith
{"title":"Nonsense and Natural Law","authors":"S. Smith","doi":"10.1215/9780822396055-005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822396055-005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":272848,"journal":{"name":"Against the Law","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124085226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Clerks in the Maze","authors":"Pierre Schlag","doi":"10.2307/1289723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1289723","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":272848,"journal":{"name":"Against the Law","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1993-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115204366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation","authors":"S. Smith","doi":"10.2307/1073449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1073449","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":272848,"journal":{"name":"Against the Law","volume":"2007 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1993-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123807996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ion of and indistinguishable from the operations and practices of bureaucracy. There is no stable referent behind the bureaucratic practices' own self-representation and self-effectuation in normative thought. Normative legal thought haLs thus had the effect of retarding our understanding of our social situation within the academy. Normative legal thought, of course, is also a mode of social control-both within and without the legal academy. As I've argued throughout this article, the rhetoric of normative legal thought establishes the identity and polices the bounds of legitimate legal thought. As this article itself demonstrates-constatively and performatively-normative legal thought is breaking down, is losing its appeal. This is what enables me to think and write this article, and what enables you to read and understand it. There are enough dislocations, disruptions within normative legal thought and within ouir social order that we can actually begin to re-cognize (that is, to cognize again and differently) that normative legal thought is not as it represents itself to be; that its main significance lies in the rehearsal and the inscription of a false social aesthetic; that its politics are seriously out of date; that its contributions to the construction of social and legal reality are ambivalent at best, noxious at worst. But what should we do? This question arrives on this scene predictably enough, but really much too late at this point. It's already being done. We've been doing it since the beginning of this article, and even before. We've been trying to show a whole series of routine normative agendas, questions, and frameworks the way off the jurisprudential stage. They are not helpful anymore. More accurately, more mildly: their dominance is not helpful anymore. Needless to say, this article is not a glowing report of the enterprise of normative legal thought. Still, it is not meant as criticism. It is more in the nature of an attempt to help destabilize normative legal thought. What is happening here and elsewhere is that a whole way of thinking about the law is being troubled and displaced. For those who want to continue to live in the old ways, this process is not pleasant. Indeed, it's rarely pleasant to inhabit a social practice that is being changed without your consultation. But don't let that distract you. It happens all the time. It's happening now. With and without this article. It's the law.
{"title":"Normativity and the Politics of Form","authors":"Pierre Schlag","doi":"10.2307/3312375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3312375","url":null,"abstract":"ion of and indistinguishable from the operations and practices of bureaucracy. There is no stable referent behind the bureaucratic practices' own self-representation and self-effectuation in normative thought. Normative legal thought haLs thus had the effect of retarding our understanding of our social situation within the academy. Normative legal thought, of course, is also a mode of social control-both within and without the legal academy. As I've argued throughout this article, the rhetoric of normative legal thought establishes the identity and polices the bounds of legitimate legal thought. As this article itself demonstrates-constatively and performatively-normative legal thought is breaking down, is losing its appeal. This is what enables me to think and write this article, and what enables you to read and understand it. There are enough dislocations, disruptions within normative legal thought and within ouir social order that we can actually begin to re-cognize (that is, to cognize again and differently) that normative legal thought is not as it represents itself to be; that its main significance lies in the rehearsal and the inscription of a false social aesthetic; that its politics are seriously out of date; that its contributions to the construction of social and legal reality are ambivalent at best, noxious at worst. But what should we do? This question arrives on this scene predictably enough, but really much too late at this point. It's already being done. We've been doing it since the beginning of this article, and even before. We've been trying to show a whole series of routine normative agendas, questions, and frameworks the way off the jurisprudential stage. They are not helpful anymore. More accurately, more mildly: their dominance is not helpful anymore. Needless to say, this article is not a glowing report of the enterprise of normative legal thought. Still, it is not meant as criticism. It is more in the nature of an attempt to help destabilize normative legal thought. What is happening here and elsewhere is that a whole way of thinking about the law is being troubled and displaced. For those who want to continue to live in the old ways, this process is not pleasant. Indeed, it's rarely pleasant to inhabit a social practice that is being changed without your consultation. But don't let that distract you. It happens all the time. It's happening now. With and without this article. It's the law.","PeriodicalId":272848,"journal":{"name":"Against the Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1991-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123415521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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