{"title":"Abbreviations and Acronyms","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128729953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Activities Are Not Enough!","authors":"Jeremy C. Kress, P. McCoy, D. Schwarcz","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121705431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Clearing Houses and Systemic Risk","authors":"Paolo Saguato, G. Ferrarini","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133772461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Toward a Better Bail-in Tool:","authors":"Tobias H.Tröger","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114547751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Back Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.21","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129050548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank Resolution a Decade after the Global Financial Crisis:","authors":"Aimilios Avgouleas, C. Goodhart","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132098394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are two standard explanations of the cause of the 2007-09 crisis. The first is greed, greed that overtook the banks, then the mortgage brokers, then the rating agencies, then the bondholders, and then the borrowers. One can see these forces at work in the movie The Big Short. A second explanation is that a panic exploded in 2008 and 2009, causing a run on banks, on money markets, and on collateral. According to the second theory, the only way to stem the panic was to restore confidence, as former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke explained in his book The Courage to Act, and as Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner argued in his book Stress Test. Greed and panic cannot be legislated away, or prevented by macroprudential policy. At the World Econometric Sociey Congress of 2000, long before the crisis of 200709, I proposed another theory of booms and crashes: the leverage cycle, caused by a build-up of too much leverage and then a faster de-leveraging.1 Rising leverage leads to rising asset prices, making the economy progressively more vulnerable, so that eventually a little bit of "scary bad news’can trigger a great crash. If the asset prices end up far enough below the debts, then a failure to partially forgive underwater debtors can create more losses.2 Between 2000 and the 20007-09 crisis, leverage did indeed rise in the banks and in households, and so did housing and mortgage backed securities prices. Then leverage and asset prices collapsed. Eventually leverage and asset prices recovered. The failure to forgive a nonnegligible amount of mortgage debt did delay the recovery, and stirred resentment that lingers today. Unlike greed and panics, the leverage cycle crash can be prevented by wise public policy. The conventional view in macroeconomics had long been that cycles are caused by fluctuations in aggregate demand. These can be smoothed over by raising the interest rate when demand is too high, and lowering the interest rate when demand is too low. The trouble with this interest rate centric view of macroeconomics is
对于2007-09年危机的起因，有两种标准的解释。首先是贪婪，贪婪吞噬了银行，然后是抵押贷款经纪人，然后是评级机构，然后是债券持有人，然后是借款人。人们可以在电影《大空头》中看到这些力量在起作用。第二种解释是，恐慌在2008年和2009年爆发，导致银行、货币市场和抵押品出现挤兑。根据第二种理论，遏制恐慌的唯一方法是恢复信心，正如美联储前主席贝南克(Ben Bernanke)在其著作《行动的勇气》(the Courage to Act)中所解释的，以及财政部长盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)在其著作《压力测试》(Stress Test)中所主张的那样。贪婪和恐慌无法通过立法消除，也无法通过宏观审慎政策加以预防。在2000年的世界计量经济学会(World Econometric society)大会上，早在2007年至2009年的危机之前，我就提出了另一种繁荣与崩溃的理论:杠杆周期，由过高的杠杆积累和随后更快的去杠杆化造成杠杆率上升导致资产价格上涨，使经济逐渐变得更加脆弱，因此最终一点点“可怕的坏消息”就可能引发一场大崩溃。如果资产价格最终远远低于债务，那么不能部分免除资不抵债的债务人可能会造成更多损失在2000年至2007 -09年危机期间，银行和家庭的杠杆率确实上升了，住房和抵押贷款支持证券的价格也上涨了。随后，杠杆和资产价格暴跌。最终，杠杆和资产价格回升。未能免除一笔不可忽略的抵押贷款债务确实推迟了复苏，并激起了至今仍在持续的怨恨。与贪婪和恐慌不同，明智的公共政策可以防止杠杆周期崩溃。长期以来，宏观经济学的传统观点认为，周期是由总需求的波动引起的。这些问题可以通过在需求过高时提高利率，在需求过低时降低利率来解决。这种以利率为中心的宏观经济学观点的问题在于
{"title":"Leverage Caused the 2007-2009 Crisis","authors":"J. Geanakoplos","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.18","url":null,"abstract":"There are two standard explanations of the cause of the 2007-09 crisis. The first is greed, greed that overtook the banks, then the mortgage brokers, then the rating agencies, then the bondholders, and then the borrowers. One can see these forces at work in the movie The Big Short. A second explanation is that a panic exploded in 2008 and 2009, causing a run on banks, on money markets, and on collateral. According to the second theory, the only way to stem the panic was to restore confidence, as former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke explained in his book The Courage to Act, and as Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner argued in his book Stress Test. Greed and panic cannot be legislated away, or prevented by macroprudential policy. At the World Econometric Sociey Congress of 2000, long before the crisis of 200709, I proposed another theory of booms and crashes: the leverage cycle, caused by a build-up of too much leverage and then a faster de-leveraging.1 Rising leverage leads to rising asset prices, making the economy progressively more vulnerable, so that eventually a little bit of \"scary bad news’can trigger a great crash. If the asset prices end up far enough below the debts, then a failure to partially forgive underwater debtors can create more losses.2 Between 2000 and the 20007-09 crisis, leverage did indeed rise in the banks and in households, and so did housing and mortgage backed securities prices. Then leverage and asset prices collapsed. Eventually leverage and asset prices recovered. The failure to forgive a nonnegligible amount of mortgage debt did delay the recovery, and stirred resentment that lingers today. Unlike greed and panics, the leverage cycle crash can be prevented by wise public policy. The conventional view in macroeconomics had long been that cycles are caused by fluctuations in aggregate demand. These can be smoothed over by raising the interest rate when demand is too high, and lowering the interest rate when demand is too low. The trouble with this interest rate centric view of macroeconomics is","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130420112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tackling Systemic Risk for Banks and Countries:","authors":"Ron J. Feldman, P. Hiebert","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"27 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132546821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three Major Financial Crises:","authors":"Ross P. Buckley, E. Avgouleas, D. Arner","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121922191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank Leverage, Welfare and Regulation","authors":"Anat R. Admati, M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqmp0vn.17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":277046,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123327205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：