Pub Date : 2018-10-01DOI: 10.1504/IJMDM.2019.10017995
Tom Downen, Z. Furner, Bryan Cataldi
Anchoring has been shown to influence judgements in a wide variety of contexts, often in a dysfunctional manner (particularly when anchors are deemed unreliable). Identifying methods for mitigating the effects of anchors is important. Our experimental study utilises three abstract settings and arbitrary anchor values. We find strong anchoring effects in initial judgements. Providing disconfirming evidence of moderate helpfulness does, however, reduce the anchoring effects. Specifically, providing one or two items of disconfirming information is shown to have significant incremental benefits in reducing or even eliminating anchoring effects. However, surprisingly, providing three items of disconfirming information, in our setting, did not further reduce anchoring, suggesting some diminishing effect of additional evidence. This is consistent with prior research suggesting that individuals adjust until they are 'close enough', and then stop considering additional information. Our results have implications for a wide variety of judgement contexts, and the results are encouraging in suggesting that a relatively small quantity of disconfirming evidence could be sufficient for overcoming anchoring.
{"title":"The Effects on Anchoring of Increasing Quantities of Disconfirming Evidence","authors":"Tom Downen, Z. Furner, Bryan Cataldi","doi":"10.1504/IJMDM.2019.10017995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJMDM.2019.10017995","url":null,"abstract":"Anchoring has been shown to influence judgements in a wide variety of contexts, often in a dysfunctional manner (particularly when anchors are deemed unreliable). Identifying methods for mitigating the effects of anchors is important. Our experimental study utilises three abstract settings and arbitrary anchor values. We find strong anchoring effects in initial judgements. Providing disconfirming evidence of moderate helpfulness does, however, reduce the anchoring effects. Specifically, providing one or two items of disconfirming information is shown to have significant incremental benefits in reducing or even eliminating anchoring effects. However, surprisingly, providing three items of disconfirming information, in our setting, did not further reduce anchoring, suggesting some diminishing effect of additional evidence. This is consistent with prior research suggesting that individuals adjust until they are 'close enough', and then stop considering additional information. Our results have implications for a wide variety of judgement contexts, and the results are encouraging in suggesting that a relatively small quantity of disconfirming evidence could be sufficient for overcoming anchoring.","PeriodicalId":281397,"journal":{"name":"PRN: Practical Reasoning (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130970350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Utility theories—both Expected Utility (EU) and non-Expected Utility (non-EU) theories—offer numericalized representations of classical principles meant for the regulation of choice under conditions of risk—a type of formal representation that reduces the representation of risk to a single number. I shall refer to these as risk-numericalizing theories of decision . I shall argue that risk--numericalizing theories (referring both to the representations and to the underlying axioms that render numericalization possible) are not satisfactory answers to the question: “How do I take the (best) means to my ends?” In other words, they are inadequate or incomplete as instrumental theories. They are inadequate because they are poor answers to the question of what it is for an option to be instrumental towards an end. To say it another way, they do not offer a sufficiently rich account of what it is for something to be a means (an instrument) toward an end.
{"title":"Expectational v. Instrumental Reasoning: What Statistics Contributes to Practical Reasoning","authors":"M. Thalos","doi":"10.13153/DIAM.53.0.1104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13153/DIAM.53.0.1104","url":null,"abstract":"Utility theories—both Expected Utility (EU) and non-Expected Utility (non-EU) theories—offer numericalized representations of classical principles meant for the regulation of choice under conditions of risk—a type of formal representation that reduces the representation of risk to a single number. I shall refer to these as risk-numericalizing theories of decision . I shall argue that risk--numericalizing theories (referring both to the representations and to the underlying axioms that render numericalization possible) are not satisfactory answers to the question: “How do I take the (best) means to my ends?” In other words, they are inadequate or incomplete as instrumental theories. They are inadequate because they are poor answers to the question of what it is for an option to be instrumental towards an end. To say it another way, they do not offer a sufficiently rich account of what it is for something to be a means (an instrument) toward an end.","PeriodicalId":281397,"journal":{"name":"PRN: Practical Reasoning (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128889559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the tradition stemming from Aristotle through Aquinas, rational decision making is seen as a complex structure of distinct phases in which reasoning and will are interconnected. Intention, deliberation, and decision are regarded as the fundamental steps of the decision-making process, in which an end is chosen, the means are specified, and a decision to act is made. Based on this Aristotelian theoretical background, we show how the decision-making process can be modeled as a net of several patterns of reasoning, involving the classification of an action or state of affairs, its evaluation, the deliberation about the means to carry it out, and the decision. It is shown how argumentation theory can contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms involved by formalizing the steps of reasoning using argumentation schemes, and setting out the value-based criteria underlying the evaluation of an action. Representing each phase of the decision-making process as a separate scheme allows one to identify implicit premises and bring the roots of ethical dilemma to light along with the means to resolve them. In particular, we will show the role of framing and classification in triggering value-based reasoning, and how argumentation theory can be used to represent and uproot the grounds of possible manipulations.
{"title":"Practical Reasoning and the Act of Naming Reality","authors":"Fabrizio Macagno, D. Walton","doi":"10.3917/rip.286.0393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.286.0393","url":null,"abstract":"In the tradition stemming from Aristotle through Aquinas, rational decision making is seen as a\u0000complex structure of distinct phases in which reasoning and will are interconnected. Intention,\u0000deliberation, and decision are regarded as the fundamental steps of the decision-making process, in\u0000which an end is chosen, the means are specified, and a decision to act is made. Based on this\u0000Aristotelian theoretical background, we show how the decision-making process can be modeled as a\u0000net of several patterns of reasoning, involving the classification of an action or state of affairs, its\u0000evaluation, the deliberation about the means to carry it out, and the decision. It is shown how\u0000argumentation theory can contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms involved by formalizing\u0000the steps of reasoning using argumentation schemes, and setting out the value-based criteria underlying\u0000the evaluation of an action. Representing each phase of the decision-making process as a separate\u0000scheme allows one to identify implicit premises and bring the roots of ethical dilemma to light along\u0000with the means to resolve them. In particular, we will show the role of framing and classification in\u0000triggering value-based reasoning, and how argumentation theory can be used to represent and uproot\u0000the grounds of possible manipulations.","PeriodicalId":281397,"journal":{"name":"PRN: Practical Reasoning (Topic)","volume":"292 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123455256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods.
{"title":"Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness","authors":"Toby Handfield","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2331864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331864","url":null,"abstract":"If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods.","PeriodicalId":281397,"journal":{"name":"PRN: Practical Reasoning (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117350187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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