Pub Date : 2011-02-16DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2010.00717.x
S. Thorgren, J. Wincent
This conceptual paper extends research on the downsides of developing trust to partners in interorganizational relationships. The idea developed captures that, although interorganizational trust generates benefits, a parallel process also produces undesired rigidities. Firms' flexibility in meeting a changing environment may thus be hampered rather than enabled by the created interorganizational relationship. First, we theorize on the micro-processes of how and why such rigidities develop already at low levels of trust and accumulate in parallel to the positive trust effects as trust builds stronger over time. Second, we propose that the trust dysfunctions can be distinguished and moderated separately from trust benefits. In doing so, we identify and discuss the moderating potential of a set of handling tactics when trust develops rigidities in the relationship: competing, accommodating, avoiding, collaborating and compromising tactics. We discuss implications in relation to research on trust, inertia and interorganizational governance.
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The aim of this paper is to provide a uniform representation of functional concepts used in the field of payment and securities settlement systems. The framework developed here is encompassing the whole field while using as few elements as possible. It provides a basic functional model for analyzing and tracing the life cycle of the financial legs of a transaction. In line with the network properties of the field the model is based on formal graphs. The visualization of these graphs can be considered as a symbolic language. It is shown on the basis of a number of examples that the framework is capable of representing basic notions of payment and securities settlement systems.
{"title":"Toward a Uniform Functional Model of Payment and Securities Settlement Systems","authors":"R. Berndsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1947271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1947271","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to provide a uniform representation of functional concepts used in the field of payment and securities settlement systems. The framework developed here is encompassing the whole field while using as few elements as possible. It provides a basic functional model for analyzing and tracing the life cycle of the financial legs of a transaction. In line with the network properties of the field the model is based on formal graphs. The visualization of these graphs can be considered as a symbolic language. It is shown on the basis of a number of examples that the framework is capable of representing basic notions of payment and securities settlement systems.","PeriodicalId":293078,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Interorganizational Networks (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115775243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public-private partnerships have emerged, in the last couple of decades, as a new institutional arrangement through which to deal with a variety of key societal concerns, such as environmental improvement, regional and urban economic development, and educational reforms. Despite the rapid growth in their number, scope, and influence, there is still a need for considerable theoretical and empirical work exploring the nature of these multi-sectoral collaborative arrangements. One area of inquiry in which little scholarly work has been conducted is the topic of accountability mechanisms in public-private partnerships. As the focus of this paper, we explore this topic by first identifying some of the basic properties of these partnerships as they differ from traditional hierarchical organizations. We then analyze five different accountability mechanisms that have been used to historically to enhance the accountability of public as well as private organizations. These mechanisms include bureaucratic, political, professional, legal, and market approaches to accountability. Our analysis summarizes the basic characteristics of these five approaches to accountability and examines the potential relevance of each for accountability in the context of public-private partnerships. In light of the various weaknesses of these traditional approaches, we then propose a number of guidelines regarding three alternative approaches to accountability that are more consistent with the basic nature and purpose of public-private partnerships. We conclude the paper with some brief comments regarding possible future directions for research on accountability in public-private partnerships.
{"title":"Concentrated Hopes, Diffused Responsibilities: Accountability in Public-Private Partnerships","authors":"P. Robertson, M. Acar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1992176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1992176","url":null,"abstract":"Public-private partnerships have emerged, in the last couple of decades, as a new institutional arrangement through which to deal with a variety of key societal concerns, such as environmental improvement, regional and urban economic development, and educational reforms. Despite the rapid growth in their number, scope, and influence, there is still a need for considerable theoretical and empirical work exploring the nature of these multi-sectoral collaborative arrangements. One area of inquiry in which little scholarly work has been conducted is the topic of accountability mechanisms in public-private partnerships. As the focus of this paper, we explore this topic by first identifying some of the basic properties of these partnerships as they differ from traditional hierarchical organizations. We then analyze five different accountability mechanisms that have been used to historically to enhance the accountability of public as well as private organizations. These mechanisms include bureaucratic, political, professional, legal, and market approaches to accountability. Our analysis summarizes the basic characteristics of these five approaches to accountability and examines the potential relevance of each for accountability in the context of public-private partnerships. In light of the various weaknesses of these traditional approaches, we then propose a number of guidelines regarding three alternative approaches to accountability that are more consistent with the basic nature and purpose of public-private partnerships. We conclude the paper with some brief comments regarding possible future directions for research on accountability in public-private partnerships.","PeriodicalId":293078,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Interorganizational Networks (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132116933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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