Pub Date : 2019-08-29DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.009
J. Callender
{"title":"Causality and Responsibility in Mentally Disordered Offenders","authors":"J. Callender","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132035431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-29DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.008
M. Corrado
{"title":"Fichte and Psychopathy: Criminal Justice Turned Upside Down","authors":"M. Corrado","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122621565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-29DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.004
B. Waller
{"title":"Beyond the Retributive System","authors":"B. Waller","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131586883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-29DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.002
Saul Smilansky
{"title":"Free Will Denial and Deontological Constraints","authors":"Saul Smilansky","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"127 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132905298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-29DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.006
Benjamin Vilhauer
Chapter 6: Deontology and Deterrence for Free Will Deniers Benjamin Vilhauer In this paper I outline what I take to be a solution to a problem about free will denial and the justification of punishment pointed out by Saul Smilansky (2011). Smilansky argues that free will deniers must acknowledge that some institution of punishment is necessary to maintain law and order, but since criminals do not deserve to be punished, it is unjust to punish them, and we therefore have a duty to compensate them. Since this is a great injustice, we must compensate them very heavily—in fact so heavily that the institution of punishment will cease to deter, and will instead become an incentive to commit crime. Previous responses to Smilansky’s “practical reductio” argument by Neil Levy (2012) and Derk Pereboom (2014) have emphasized consequentialist moral reasons. I advocate a deontological social contract approach to punishment which draws on Kantian and Rawlsian notions of treating criminals as ends by respecting their rational consent to punishment (Vilhauer 2013). In the course of explaining how my approach provides a response to Smilansky’s challenge, I will also respond to some objections to it from Pereboom.
{"title":"Deontology and Deterrence for Free Will Deniers","authors":"Benjamin Vilhauer","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.006","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 6: Deontology and Deterrence for Free Will Deniers Benjamin Vilhauer In this paper I outline what I take to be a solution to a problem about free will denial and the justification of punishment pointed out by Saul Smilansky (2011). Smilansky argues that free will deniers must acknowledge that some institution of punishment is necessary to maintain law and order, but since criminals do not deserve to be punished, it is unjust to punish them, and we therefore have a duty to compensate them. Since this is a great injustice, we must compensate them very heavily—in fact so heavily that the institution of punishment will cease to deter, and will instead become an incentive to commit crime. Previous responses to Smilansky’s “practical reductio” argument by Neil Levy (2012) and Derk Pereboom (2014) have emphasized consequentialist moral reasons. I advocate a deontological social contract approach to punishment which draws on Kantian and Rawlsian notions of treating criminals as ends by respecting their rational consent to punishment (Vilhauer 2013). In the course of explaining how my approach provides a response to Smilansky’s challenge, I will also respond to some objections to it from Pereboom.","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129277614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-29DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.012
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127761833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-29DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.005
Derk Pereboom
{"title":"Free Will Skepticism and Prevention of Crime","authors":"Derk Pereboom","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133394190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.001
Gregg D. Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom
Free will skepticism refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action – i.e., the free will – required for moral responsibility in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is de fi ned in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward (see, e.g., Pereboom , ; Levy ; Caruso and Morris ). For agents to be morally responsible for their actions in this sense is for the actions to be theirs in such a way that they would deserve to be blamed if they understood that it was morally wrong, and they would deserve to be praised if they understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agents would deserve to be blamed or praised just because they have performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations (Pereboom : ). Accordingly, here we will understand free will as the control in action required for basic desert moral responsibility, and free will skepticism as doubt or denial that we have this sort of control.
{"title":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: An Overview","authors":"Gregg D. Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.001","url":null,"abstract":"Free will skepticism refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action – i.e., the free will – required for moral responsibility in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is de fi ned in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward (see, e.g., Pereboom , ; Levy ; Caruso and Morris ). For agents to be morally responsible for their actions in this sense is for the actions to be theirs in such a way that they would deserve to be blamed if they understood that it was morally wrong, and they would deserve to be praised if they understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agents would deserve to be blamed or praised just because they have performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations (Pereboom : ). Accordingly, here we will understand free will as the control in action required for basic desert moral responsibility, and free will skepticism as doubt or denial that we have this sort of control.","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131368248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.1017/9781108655583.007
K. Murtagh
{"title":"Free Will Skepticism, General Deterrence, and the “Use” Objection","authors":"K. Murtagh","doi":"10.1017/9781108655583.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121069165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Would the consequences of giving up the belief in free will cause nihilism and despair as some maintain, or would it rather have a humanizing effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of free will belief? If it turns out that belief in free will, rather than being a good thing, actually has a dark side, then this would help remove one of the major obstacles in the way of accepting free will skepticism (e.g., concerns over its negative consequences). It would also support disillusionism over illusionism as the proper course of action for free will skeptics. In section I, I discuss two common concerns people have with relinquishing the belief in free will and argue that they are unfounded. In section II, I make the case for the “dark side” of free will by discussing recent findings in moral and political psychology which reveal interesting, and potentially troubling, correlations between people’s free will beliefs and their other moral, religious, and political beliefs.
{"title":"Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism","authors":"Gregg D. Caruso","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2758311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2758311","url":null,"abstract":"Would the consequences of giving up the belief in free will cause nihilism and despair as some maintain, or would it rather have a humanizing effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of free will belief? If it turns out that belief in free will, rather than being a good thing, actually has a dark side, then this would help remove one of the major obstacles in the way of accepting free will skepticism (e.g., concerns over its negative consequences). It would also support disillusionism over illusionism as the proper course of action for free will skeptics. In section I, I discuss two common concerns people have with relinquishing the belief in free will and argue that they are unfounded. In section II, I make the case for the “dark side” of free will by discussing recent findings in moral and political psychology which reveal interesting, and potentially troubling, correlations between people’s free will beliefs and their other moral, religious, and political beliefs.","PeriodicalId":296320,"journal":{"name":"Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125214489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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