Etude de la critique de la conception commune du je developpee par G. E. M. Anscombe a partir d'une double attaque de l'approche indexicale et de l'approche referentielle du je. Examinant le defi d'Anscombe concernant l'autoreference et l'argument du reservoir defendant la notion d'ego cartesien, l'A. montre que l'analyse d'Anscombe, fondee sur l'analogie entre la syntaxe et la reference, d'une part, et sur l'introduction de biconditionnels, d'autre part, ne parvient a refuter la referentialite du je
G. E. M. Anscombe对“我”共同概念的批判研究，基于对“我”指数化方法和“我”参考方法的双重攻击。他研究了anscombe关于自我参照的挑战和为笛卡尔自我概念辩护的水库论点，anscombe的分析，一方面是基于语法和指称之间的类比，另一方面是基于双条件句的引入，并没有成功地反驳指称性
{"title":"Anscombe on ‘I’","authors":"B. Garrett, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin","doi":"10.1111/1467-9213.00075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00075","url":null,"abstract":"Etude de la critique de la conception commune du je developpee par G. E. M. Anscombe a partir d'une double attaque de l'approche indexicale et de l'approche referentielle du je. Examinant le defi d'Anscombe concernant l'autoreference et l'argument du reservoir defendant la notion d'ego cartesien, l'A. montre que l'analyse d'Anscombe, fondee sur l'analogie entre la syntaxe et la reference, d'une part, et sur l'introduction de biconditionnels, d'autre part, ne parvient a refuter la referentialite du je","PeriodicalId":297414,"journal":{"name":"Time, Identity and the Self: Essays on Metaphysics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126674324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I want to argue-with certain qualifications-that there cannot be any vague identities, and to outline reasons for scepticism about the view that the world contains vague objects. I also argue that, even if there were vague identities, this would lend no support to the vague-objects view. 1. What would constitute a defence of the vague-identity thesis? It would be an example in which a sentence of numerical identity is indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false), where the indeterminacy is due to vagueness. (Thus we are not concerned with identity sentences whose indeterminacy is due, e.g., to referencefailure or to cross-category identification.) It seems clear that there are such examples: where the vagueness of an identity is a consequence of the vagueness of one or both of its singular terms. For example, the singular term 'the world's greatest ruler' is vague because of the vagueness of the predicate '. . . great ruler'. This predicate is vague, not because it lacks sharp boundaries, but because of its multi-criterial application conditions. Many different factors contribute to the greatness of a ruler-wisdom, fortitude, diplomacy, prudence, etc.,-and the rules of our language do not fix in advance what weight to assign to each factor. Because of this vagueness, the singular term 'the world's greatest ruler' has no determinate reference: it is vague which person it singles out. (Though, as Wiggins has emphasised, from the fact that it is vague which object a term singles out, it does not follow that it singles out something vague.)' Consequently, an utterance of, e.g., 'the world's greatest ruler was the world's wisest ruler' is a plausible example of a vague identity.2
{"title":"Vague Identity and Vague Objects","authors":"B. Garrett, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin","doi":"10.2307/2215507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2215507","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I want to argue-with certain qualifications-that there cannot be any vague identities, and to outline reasons for scepticism about the view that the world contains vague objects. I also argue that, even if there were vague identities, this would lend no support to the vague-objects view. 1. What would constitute a defence of the vague-identity thesis? It would be an example in which a sentence of numerical identity is indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false), where the indeterminacy is due to vagueness. (Thus we are not concerned with identity sentences whose indeterminacy is due, e.g., to referencefailure or to cross-category identification.) It seems clear that there are such examples: where the vagueness of an identity is a consequence of the vagueness of one or both of its singular terms. For example, the singular term 'the world's greatest ruler' is vague because of the vagueness of the predicate '. . . great ruler'. This predicate is vague, not because it lacks sharp boundaries, but because of its multi-criterial application conditions. Many different factors contribute to the greatness of a ruler-wisdom, fortitude, diplomacy, prudence, etc.,-and the rules of our language do not fix in advance what weight to assign to each factor. Because of this vagueness, the singular term 'the world's greatest ruler' has no determinate reference: it is vague which person it singles out. (Though, as Wiggins has emphasised, from the fact that it is vague which object a term singles out, it does not follow that it singles out something vague.)' Consequently, an utterance of, e.g., 'the world's greatest ruler was the world's wisest ruler' is a plausible example of a vague identity.2","PeriodicalId":297414,"journal":{"name":"Time, Identity and the Self: Essays on Metaphysics","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1991-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126752032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1. Suppose (as many philosophers anyway believe) that the Cartesian conception of persons is false: persons are not immaterial (i.e., non-spatial) substances. Suppose, further, that we accept the plausible view that the identity of a person over time admits of analysis in terms of relations of physical and/or psychological continuity (the Continuity Theory).' One instance of the Continuity Theory is the Psychological Criterion according to which person A at time t1 is identical to person B at time t2 iff A and B stand to each other in the relation of (non-branching) psychological continuity. (Competing versions of the Psychological Criterion differ over whether the cause of the psychological continuity, if it is to be identity-preserving, must be normal-i.e., the continued existence of the brain and central nervous system-as opposed, e.g., to the operation of a Star Trek Teletransporter.) Another instance of the Continuity Theory is the Physical Criterion according to which the identity of a person over time is analysable exclusively in terms of relations of physical continuity (in particular, spatiotemporal continuity of the body and/or brain) which hold between persons at different times. Yet other-Mixed--Criteria assign varying degrees of importance to both physical and psychological continuity.2
{"title":"Personal Identity and Reductionism","authors":"B. Garrett, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin","doi":"10.2307/2108132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2108132","url":null,"abstract":"1. Suppose (as many philosophers anyway believe) that the Cartesian conception of persons is false: persons are not immaterial (i.e., non-spatial) substances. Suppose, further, that we accept the plausible view that the identity of a person over time admits of analysis in terms of relations of physical and/or psychological continuity (the Continuity Theory).' One instance of the Continuity Theory is the Psychological Criterion according to which person A at time t1 is identical to person B at time t2 iff A and B stand to each other in the relation of (non-branching) psychological continuity. (Competing versions of the Psychological Criterion differ over whether the cause of the psychological continuity, if it is to be identity-preserving, must be normal-i.e., the continued existence of the brain and central nervous system-as opposed, e.g., to the operation of a Star Trek Teletransporter.) Another instance of the Continuity Theory is the Physical Criterion according to which the identity of a person over time is analysable exclusively in terms of relations of physical continuity (in particular, spatiotemporal continuity of the body and/or brain) which hold between persons at different times. Yet other-Mixed--Criteria assign varying degrees of importance to both physical and psychological continuity.2","PeriodicalId":297414,"journal":{"name":"Time, Identity and the Self: Essays on Metaphysics","volume":"66 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1991-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130695366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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