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The Future of Homeland Security 国土安全的未来
Q3 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2016-12-08 DOI: 10.4135/9781506367385
C. Nemeth
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引用次数: 0
Merging the HSC and NSC: Stronger Together 合并HSC和NSC:共同强大
Q3 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2009-01-01 DOI: 10.21236/ada494429
C. Wormuth, Jeremy White
At the federal level, homeland security is inherently and fundamentally an interagency undertaking. The quality of interagency relationships and processes is central to the success or failure of federal - and national - homeland security activities. Short of giving a single Cabinet secretary directive authority over other Cabinet secretaries during major domestic incidents (which is unlikely given traditional forms of American government) the only way to ensure effective unity of effort at the federal level is to exercise strong leadership from the White House. This kind of leadership is needed not just during an actual catastrophe but also when the government is engaged in the day-to-day activities of working to prevent, protect against, and prepare for such catastrophes. In recent years the White House has not played this role, in large part because of the bifurcation of national security issues into a National Security Council and a Homeland Security Council. One of the most important and most necessary changes the new administration should make is to merge these organizations into a single council with a largely shared professional staff. This newly merged Council should exercise forceful leadership on behalf of the president of the United States in developing homeland security strategy and policy and should closely oversee its implementation.Why a Merger is NeededThere are three main reasons that the existing Homeland Security Council (HSC) and its staff have not been particularly effective. The first, and perhaps most important, is structural: by establishing a separate council and associated staff to address homeland issues, the White House artificially bifurcated its approach to national security issues, although the issues themselves frequently have both domestic and international aspects that are interrelated. For example, effectively combating terrorism involves targeting terrorists and their support networks overseas, but also addressing the potential for radicalization of individuals inside the United States. Effectively addressing 21st century security challenges requires an integrated approach that considers both sides of a given problem - but such an approach is very difficult to achieve when two different organizations inside the White House are involved. Both council staffs work in the Old Executive Office Building, but they share little more than a mailing address. Each council has a different organizational structure, each staff reports to a different adviser to the president, and each has its own executive secretariat, with separate systems for convening meetings and designating lead directorates on specific issues. The two council staffs don't even work on the same e-mail system: while the NSC staff does most of its work on the classified e-mail system, the HSC staff works mostly on the "low side," or the unclassified network. Some coordination between the two staffs does take place, but it occurs largely through the initiat
在联邦一级,国土安全本质上是一项跨部门的工作。机构间关系和过程的质量对联邦和国家国土安全活动的成败至关重要。在重大国内事件中,由于没有赋予内阁部长对其他内阁部长的指令权(鉴于美国政府的传统形式,这是不太可能的),确保联邦一级有效统一努力的唯一途径是由白宫行使强有力的领导。这种领导能力不仅在实际发生灾难时需要,而且在政府从事预防、防范和准备此类灾难的日常工作时也需要。近年来,白宫没有发挥这一作用,很大程度上是因为国家安全问题分为国家安全委员会(national security Council)和国土安全委员会(Homeland security Council)。新政府应该作出的最重要和最必要的改变之一是将这些组织合并为一个单一的理事会,其专业人员基本上是共用的。这个新合并的委员会应代表美国总统在制定国土安全战略和政策方面发挥强有力的领导作用,并应密切监督其执行情况。为什么需要合并现有的国土安全委员会(HSC)及其工作人员没有特别有效,主要有三个原因。第一个,也许也是最重要的一个,是结构性的:通过建立一个独立的委员会和相关的工作人员来处理国土问题,白宫人为地将其处理国家安全问题的方法一分为二,尽管这些问题本身往往既有国内方面,也有相互关联的国际方面。例如,有效打击恐怖主义包括打击恐怖分子及其海外支持网络,但也要解决美国境内个人激进化的可能性。有效地应对21世纪的安全挑战需要一种综合的方法,考虑到给定问题的两个方面——但是,当白宫内部涉及两个不同的组织时,这种方法很难实现。两个委员会的工作人员都在老行政办公大楼工作,但他们除了一个邮寄地址外几乎没有什么共同之处。每个理事会都有不同的组织结构,每个工作人员向总统的不同顾问报告,每个理事会都有自己的执行秘书处,有单独的系统来召集会议和指定具体问题的领导理事会。这两个委员会的工作人员甚至不在同一个电子邮件系统上工作:国家安全委员会的工作人员在机密电子邮件系统上做大部分工作,而HSC的工作人员主要在“低级”或非机密网络上工作。这两个工作人员之间确实进行了一些协调,但这主要是通过个别工作人员的主动行动来实现的,他们必须克服分岔结构所造成的障碍。HSC在许多问题上无效的第二个主要原因是组织:它相对较弱,特别是与NSC相比。许多干巴巴的技术人员和预算问题是造成这一问题的主要原因。与国家安全保障委员会及其工作人员不同,安全保障委员会及其工作人员不是总统办公厅内的单独机构;因此,HSC人员的数量与白宫工作人员的总体人员上限不符,因此存在最小化HSC组织规模的压力。NSC有240多名工作人员,而HSC平均只有45名。此外,由于HSC在总统办公室内的行政地位,该委员会没有自己的预算,这给工作人员设置了严格的工资上限。尽管HSC的工作人员责任重大,工作时间极长,但即使是薪酬最高的人,其收入也低于政府其他部门的GS-15级高级公务员。…
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引用次数: 1
Paramilitary Terrorism: A Neglected Threat 准军事恐怖主义:一个被忽视的威胁
Q3 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2008-06-01 DOI: 10.21236/ada476741
Bill Tallen
At 0830 on an otherwise normal autumn morning, a wave of violence erupts without warning at locations across the American heartland, targeting schools and schoolchildren. Improvised explosives detonate in sidewalk trash bins; school buses are bombed; lone snipers target campuses and first responders in hit and run attacks. As confusion and panic spread from local venues to the national consciousness via the twenty-four-hour news media, a band of armed terrorists take over an elementary school in a small Midwestern city. City and county SWAT officers respond to the scene before the scope of the event is clear; trained to respond to a Columbine-like active-shooter incident, they stage a hasty assault which is bloodily repulsed.Executing a score of adult hostages as evidence of their resolve, the terrorists then herd hundreds of schoolchildren and staff into the school gymnasium, which they prepare with explosives. They upload images of their action onto the Internet. Their postings identify the perpetrators as al Qa'ida-affiliated jihadists. Intelligence from the police perimeter indicates thirty or more fighters, with military small arms, explosives, and heavy weapons, rapidly improving their defenses.The terrorists announce their intention to execute their hostages, and their willingness to accept 'martyrdom,' in the event of another assault or if the U.S. government does not take immediate steps to meet their single, non-negotiable demand: withdrawal of all American forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the House of Islam.The scenario above is loosely based on the seizure of Beslan School #1 in the Russian republic of North Ossetia in 2004, where over a thousand hostages were taken, and hundreds of schoolchildren and other innocents were ultimately killed by Chechen terrorists. 1 This attack was conducted by terrorists using conventional weapons and tactics, and required technical expertise less challenging and far more common than the piloting skills that guided commercial jets into American buildings on September 11, 2001.The Beslan siege lasted three days before ending in massive bloodshed during an assault by government forces - very unlike the instantaneous effects and protracted aftermath that characterize suicide terrorism. The attackers took physical control of high value assets (for what assets are more valuable, in both real and symbolic terms, than our children?), exploited their act for propaganda value, assaulted and murdered hostages throughout the siege, and threatened yet worse consequences if their impossible demands were not met by the Russian government. Although we can only speculate regarding their ultimate intent, which was pre-empted by the government forces' emergency assault, the final outcome in Beslan was terrible enough.Related scenarios in a U.S. setting are not difficult to construct, applying similar means of attack against a range of soft targets of great iconic, political, or economic value
在一个原本正常的秋日早晨8点30分,一波暴力在美国中心地带毫无预兆地爆发,袭击目标是学校和学生。简易炸药在人行道的垃圾桶里引爆;校车被炸;在打了就跑的袭击中,孤独的狙击手瞄准校园和急救人员。当混乱和恐慌通过24小时不间断的新闻媒体从当地传播到全国意识时,一群武装恐怖分子占领了中西部一个小城市的一所小学。市和县的特警在事件的范围还不清楚的时候就赶到了现场;他们接受过应对类似科伦拜恩枪击案的训练,他们发动了一次仓促的袭击,但被血腥地击退了。为了证明他们的决心,恐怖分子处决了20名成年人质,然后将数百名学生和教职员工赶到学校体育馆,并在那里准备了爆炸物。他们把自己行动的照片上传到互联网上。他们的帖子指出,肇事者是与基地组织有关联的圣战分子。来自警方周边的情报显示,有30多名武装分子,他们拥有军用小型武器、爆炸物和重型武器,正在迅速提高他们的防御能力。恐怖分子宣布,如果发生另一次袭击,或者美国政府不立即采取措施满足他们唯一的、不可谈判的要求:从伊拉克、阿富汗、沙特阿拉伯和伊斯兰之家的其他地区撤出所有美军,他们打算处决人质,并愿意接受“殉难”。上面的场景大致是基于2004年俄罗斯北奥塞梯共和国别斯兰第一学校的占领事件,当时有一千多名人质被劫持,数百名学童和其他无辜者最终被车臣恐怖分子杀害。这次袭击是由恐怖分子使用常规武器和战术进行的,与2001年9月11日引导商用飞机撞向美国大楼的飞行员技能相比,他们所需要的技术专长不那么具有挑战性,而且要普遍得多。别斯兰的围攻持续了三天,在政府军的攻击中以大规模流血告终,这与自杀性恐怖主义的瞬间效果和长期后果截然不同。袭击者实际控制了高价值资产(有什么资产比我们的孩子更有价值呢?),利用他们的行为来达到宣传价值,在整个围攻过程中袭击和杀害人质,并威胁说,如果俄罗斯政府不满足他们不可能实现的要求,后果会更糟。虽然我们只能推测他们的最终意图,他们被政府军的紧急袭击所先发制人,但别斯兰的最终结果已经足够可怕了。类似的场景在美国并不难构建,用类似的手段攻击一系列具有重大标志性、政治或经济价值的软目标。一般认为,攻击保护较好的目标,如核电站、核材料运输或政府大楼的可能性较小,尽管监视和侦察是已知的,而且其中一些较难的目标实际上可能更容易被准军事部队占领和利用,而不是自杀式恐怖主义。从准备和反应计划的角度来看,这种情况与引起我们如此多国家关注的大规模毁灭性武器(WMD)情况几乎没有相似之处。武装团体利用简易爆炸装置(IED)作为辅助手段或力量倍增剂,而不是主要的攻击机制,发动袭击,是世界各地恐怖分子和叛乱分子常用的战术。相比之下,有效的大规模杀伤性武器攻击,无论理论上对恐怖分子多么有吸引力,其潜在后果多么极端,到目前为止仍然是虚构的东西。…
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引用次数: 3
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism: An Assessment 反恐战争国家军事战略计划:评估
Q3 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2006-06-30 DOI: 10.21236/ada443609
N. Morag
The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (hereinafter referred to as the NMSP or Plan), released by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on February 1, 2006, sets out the Pentagon's broad strategy for executing, and presumably winning, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The NMSP can be viewed as an elaboration of part of the larger and more holistic set of policies spelled out by the Department of Defense (DoD) in its June 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support envisions a layered approach towards homeland defense and security based on a distinction between: Forward Regions, Approaches to the U.S., the U.S. Homeland and the Global Commons (space and cyberspace). 1 Although the NMSP does not specifically position itself within the rubric of the larger June 2005 strategy paper, its focus on attacking terrorist networks abroad, strengthening international governance and creating a global environment inhospitable to terrorists suggest that it should be viewed as a DoD articulation of the "Forward Regions" component of the overall strategy.This article will focus on the Pentagon's "Forward Regions" strategy through analysis of the NMSP. The Department of Defense, of course, recognizes that combating the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies requires an approach that differs in many critical ways from the approaches needed in order to effectively carry out conventional warfare and even counterinsurgency warfare. An effective homeland security strategy, first and foremost, requires the military to "team-up" with civilian intelligence, law-enforcement, and, for specific missions, with emergency service and public health agencies as well. With the exception of the National Guard, much of the military is largely unaccustomed to this effectively unprecedented role in which the Pentagon must "share power" with civilian entities. The Department of Defense has attempted to cope with this quandary by supporting the distinction between "homeland defense" and "homeland security." A cynic might maintain that this distinction has been created in order to enable the Pentagon to retain "ownership" of a major part of the overall effort at securing the American homeland from terrorist threats and, at the same time, to enable it to play an important role under certain circumstances as the lead agency and under others as a supporting agency in domestic security and response activities. Of course, the DoD must also comply with U.S. law (which limits the military's domestic role) and, equally importantly, avoid irritating public and congressional sensibilities with respect to the power and influence, real or perceived, exercised by the military.Potential motives aside, it is doubtful that many would argue that protecting the United States from terrorism should not require a holistic approach in which the firefighter trained to deal with a possible chemical at
2006年2月1日,参谋长联席会议(CJCS)主席发布了《反恐战争国家军事战略计划》(以下简称NMSP或计划),列出了五角大楼执行并可能赢得全球反恐战争(GWOT)的广泛战略。新战略计划可以被看作是国防部在2005年6月的《国土防御和民事支持战略》中阐述的更大、更全面的一整套政策的一部分。《国土防御和民事支持战略》设想了一种分层的国土防御和安全方法,该方法基于以下区分:前沿地区、美国方法、美国国土和全球公域(空间和网络空间)。尽管《新战略战略计划》并未明确将自己置于2005年6月的更大的战略文件的标题中,但其对海外恐怖主义网络的攻击、加强国际治理和创造对恐怖分子不利的全球环境的关注表明,它应被视为国防部对整体战略中“前沿地区”组成部分的阐述。本文将通过对NMSP的分析,重点关注五角大楼的“前沿地区”战略。当然,国防部认识到,打击恐怖主义对美国及其盟国的威胁,需要一种在许多关键方面不同于有效开展常规战争甚至反叛乱战争所需的方法。一项有效的国土安全战略首先要求军方与民间情报部门、执法部门“合作”,在执行特定任务时,还需要与应急服务和公共卫生机构合作。除了国民警卫队外,大部分军队基本上不习惯五角大楼必须与民间实体“分享权力”这一实际上前所未有的角色。国防部试图通过支持区分“国土防御”和“国土安全”来解决这一困境。愤世嫉俗的人可能会认为,建立这种区别是为了使五角大楼能够保留对保护美国本土免受恐怖主义威胁的整体努力的主要部分的“所有权”,同时使其能够在某些情况下作为领导机构发挥重要作用,在其他情况下作为国内安全和响应活动的支持机构。当然,国防部也必须遵守美国法律(它限制了军方在国内的角色),同样重要的是,避免激怒公众和国会对军方行使的权力和影响的敏感,无论是实际的还是想象的。抛开潜在的动机不谈,很多人会认为,保护美国不受恐怖主义侵害不应该需要一种整体的方法,即把训练有素的消防员用于应对美国城市可能发生的化学袭击,和训练有素的特种部队士兵用于袭击全球某个偏远角落的恐怖分子藏身处,视为同一项整体任务的一部分,这一点值得怀疑。《国家国土安全战略》承认了这一连续性,强调预防、减少确实发生的攻击的脆弱性以及从攻击中迅速恢复。因此,国土防御和国土安全不应被视为不同的战略,而应被视为从国际舞台到北美大陆(及相关近海地区)再到国内舞台的连续统一体的不同末端。然而,如果我们试图在某种程度上人为地将国土防御与国土安全分开,我们仍然面临着军队必须发挥的确切作用缺乏明确性的问题。国防部的《国土防御和民事支持战略》将军队置于“保卫通往美国的海上和空中通道并保护U. ...”的主导地位
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引用次数: 13
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Homeland Security Affairs
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