We discuss the potential for significant reduction in size and complexity of verification tasks for input-handling software when such software is constructed according to Lang Sec principles, i.e., Is designed as a recognizer for a particular language of valid inputs and is compiled for a suitably limited computational model no stronger than needed for the recognition task. We introduce Crema, a programming language and restricted execution environment of sub-Turing power, and conduct a case study to estimate and compare the respective sizes of verification tasks for the qmail SMTP parsing code fragments when executed natively vs in Crema -- using LLVM and KLEE. We also study the application of the same principles to the verification of reference monitors.
{"title":"Verification State-Space Reduction through Restricted Parsing Environments","authors":"Jacob I. Torrey, Mark P. Bridgman","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.30","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss the potential for significant reduction in size and complexity of verification tasks for input-handling software when such software is constructed according to Lang Sec principles, i.e., Is designed as a recognizer for a particular language of valid inputs and is compiled for a suitably limited computational model no stronger than needed for the recognition task. We introduce Crema, a programming language and restricted execution environment of sub-Turing power, and conduct a case study to estimate and compare the respective sizes of verification tasks for the qmail SMTP parsing code fragments when executed natively vs in Crema -- using LLVM and KLEE. We also study the application of the same principles to the verification of reference monitors.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125312198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Six protection goals provide a common scheme for addressing the legal, technical, economic, and societal dimensions of privacy and data protection in complex IT systems. In this paper, each of these is analyzed for state of the art in implementation, existing techniques and technologies, and future research indications.
{"title":"Protection Goals for Privacy Engineering","authors":"M. Hansen, Meiko Jensen, M. Rost","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.13","url":null,"abstract":"Six protection goals provide a common scheme for addressing the legal, technical, economic, and societal dimensions of privacy and data protection in complex IT systems. In this paper, each of these is analyzed for state of the art in implementation, existing techniques and technologies, and future research indications.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132176423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ludovic Barman, Mohammed Taha Elgraini, J. Raisaro, J. Hubaux, Erman Ayday
Recently, several solutions have been proposed to address the complex challenge of protecting individuals' genetic data during personalized medicine tests. In this short paper, we analyze different privacy threats and propose simple countermeasures for the generic architecture mainly used in the literature. In particular, we present and evaluate a new practical solution against a critical attack of a malicious medical center trying to actively infer raw genetic information of patients.
{"title":"Privacy Threats and Practical Solutions for Genetic Risk Tests","authors":"Ludovic Barman, Mohammed Taha Elgraini, J. Raisaro, J. Hubaux, Erman Ayday","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.12","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, several solutions have been proposed to address the complex challenge of protecting individuals' genetic data during personalized medicine tests. In this short paper, we analyze different privacy threats and propose simple countermeasures for the generic architecture mainly used in the literature. In particular, we present and evaluate a new practical solution against a critical attack of a malicious medical center trying to actively infer raw genetic information of patients.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122670835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The functionality of the Internet and the World Wide Web is determined in large part by the standards that allow for interoperable implementations, as a result, the privacy of our online interactions depends on the work done within standard-setting organizations. But how do the organizational structure and processes of these multistake holder groups affect the engineering of values such as privacy? This paper reviews the history of considerations for security and privacy in Internet and Web standard-setting, the impact of Snowden surveillance revelations and reactions to them, and some trends in how we review for privacy in Internet and Web standards.
{"title":"Reviewing for Privacy in Internet and Web Standard-Setting","authors":"Nick Doty","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.18","url":null,"abstract":"The functionality of the Internet and the World Wide Web is determined in large part by the standards that allow for interoperable implementations, as a result, the privacy of our online interactions depends on the work done within standard-setting organizations. But how do the organizational structure and processes of these multistake holder groups affect the engineering of values such as privacy? This paper reviews the history of considerations for security and privacy in Internet and Web standard-setting, the impact of Snowden surveillance revelations and reactions to them, and some trends in how we review for privacy in Internet and Web standards.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"181 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128037898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Input languages, which describe the set of valid inputs an application has to handle, play a central role in language-theoretic security, in recognition of the fact that overly complex, sloppily specified, or incorrectly implemented input languages are the root cause of many security vulnerabilities. Often an input language not only involves a language of individual messages, but also some protocol with a notion of a session, i.e. A sequence of messages that makes up a dialogue between two parties. This paper takes a closer look at languages for such sessions, when it comes to specification, implementation, and testing - and as a source of insecurity. We show that these 'session' languages are often poorly specified and that errors in implementing them can cause security problems. As a way to improve this situation, we discuss the possibility to automatically infer formal specifications of such languages, in the form of protocol state machines, from implementations by black box testing.
{"title":"Protocol State Machines and Session Languages: Specification, implementation, and Security Flaws","authors":"E. Poll, Joeri de Ruiter, Aleksy Schubert","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.32","url":null,"abstract":"Input languages, which describe the set of valid inputs an application has to handle, play a central role in language-theoretic security, in recognition of the fact that overly complex, sloppily specified, or incorrectly implemented input languages are the root cause of many security vulnerabilities. Often an input language not only involves a language of individual messages, but also some protocol with a notion of a session, i.e. A sequence of messages that makes up a dialogue between two parties. This paper takes a closer look at languages for such sessions, when it comes to specification, implementation, and testing - and as a source of insecurity. We show that these 'session' languages are often poorly specified and that errors in implementing them can cause security problems. As a way to improve this situation, we discuss the possibility to automatically infer formal specifications of such languages, in the form of protocol state machines, from implementations by black box testing.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127850378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The human genome uniquely identifies, and contains highly sensitive information about, individuals. This creates a high potential for misuse of genomic data (e.g., Genetic discrimination). This paper investigates how genomic privacy can be measured in scenarios where an adversary aims to infer a person's genome by constructing probability distributions on the values of genetic variations. Specifically, we investigate 22 privacy metrics using adversaries of different strengths, and uncover problems with several metrics that have previously been used for genomic privacy. We then give suggestions on metric selection, and illustrate the process with a case study on Alzheimer's disease.
{"title":"Genomic Privacy Metrics: A Systematic Comparison","authors":"Isabel Wagner","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.15","url":null,"abstract":"The human genome uniquely identifies, and contains highly sensitive information about, individuals. This creates a high potential for misuse of genomic data (e.g., Genetic discrimination). This paper investigates how genomic privacy can be measured in scenarios where an adversary aims to infer a person's genome by constructing probability distributions on the values of genetic variations. Specifically, we investigate 22 privacy metrics using adversaries of different strengths, and uncover problems with several metrics that have previously been used for genomic privacy. We then give suggestions on metric selection, and illustrate the process with a case study on Alzheimer's disease.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114933849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gina Fisk, Calvin Ardi, Neale Pickett, J. Heidemann, M. Fisk, C. Papadopoulos
Sharing cyber security data across organizational boundaries brings both privacy risks in the exposure of personal information and data, and organizational risk in disclosing internal information. These risks occur as information leaks in network traffic or logs, and also in queries made across organizations. They are also complicated by the trade-offs in privacy preservation and utility present in anonymization to manage disclosure. In this paper, we define three principles that guide sharing security information across organizations: Least Disclosure, Qualitative Evaluation, and Forward Progress. We then discuss engineering approaches that apply these principles to a distributed security system. Application of these principles can reduce the risk of data exposure and help manage trust requirements for data sharing, helping to meet our goal of balancing privacy, organizational risk, and the ability to better respond to security with shared information.
{"title":"Privacy Principles for Sharing Cyber Security Data","authors":"Gina Fisk, Calvin Ardi, Neale Pickett, J. Heidemann, M. Fisk, C. Papadopoulos","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.23","url":null,"abstract":"Sharing cyber security data across organizational boundaries brings both privacy risks in the exposure of personal information and data, and organizational risk in disclosing internal information. These risks occur as information leaks in network traffic or logs, and also in queries made across organizations. They are also complicated by the trade-offs in privacy preservation and utility present in anonymization to manage disclosure. In this paper, we define three principles that guide sharing security information across organizations: Least Disclosure, Qualitative Evaluation, and Forward Progress. We then discuss engineering approaches that apply these principles to a distributed security system. Application of these principles can reduce the risk of data exposure and help manage trust requirements for data sharing, helping to meet our goal of balancing privacy, organizational risk, and the ability to better respond to security with shared information.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127367201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The inherent weaknesses of existing notice-and-consent paradigms of data privacy are becoming clear, not just to privacy practitioners but to ordinary online users as well. The corporate privacy function is a maturing discipline, but greater maturity often equates just to greater regulatory compliance. At a time when many users are disturbed by the status quo, new trends in web security and data sharing are demonstrating useful new consent paradigms. Benefiting from these trends, the emerging standard User-Managed Access (UMA) allows apps to extend the power of consent. UMA corrects a power imbalance that favors companies over individuals, enabling privacy solutions that move beyond compliance.
{"title":"Extending the Power of Consent with User-Managed Access: A Standard Architecture for Asynchronous, Centralizable, Internet-Scalable Consent","authors":"Eve Maler","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.34","url":null,"abstract":"The inherent weaknesses of existing notice-and-consent paradigms of data privacy are becoming clear, not just to privacy practitioners but to ordinary online users as well. The corporate privacy function is a maturing discipline, but greater maturity often equates just to greater regulatory compliance. At a time when many users are disturbed by the status quo, new trends in web security and data sharing are demonstrating useful new consent paradigms. Benefiting from these trends, the emerging standard User-Managed Access (UMA) allows apps to extend the power of consent. UMA corrects a power imbalance that favors companies over individuals, enabling privacy solutions that move beyond compliance.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132885498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sahel Shariati Samani, Zhicong Huang, Erman Ayday, M. Elliot, J. Fellay, J. Hubaux, Z. Kutalik
As genomic data becomes widely used, the problem of genomic data privacy becomes a hot interdisciplinary research topic among geneticists, bioinformaticians and security and privacy experts. Practical attacks have been identified on genomic data, and thus break the privacy expectations of individuals who contribute their genomic data to medical research, or simply share their data online. Frustrating as it is, the problem could become even worse. Existing genomic privacy breaches rely on low-order SNV (Single Nucleotide Variant) correlations. Our work shows that far more powerful attacks can be designed if high-order correlations are utilized. We corroborate this concern by making use of different SNV correlations based on various genomic data models and applying them to an inference attack on individuals' genotype data with hidden SNVs. We also show that low-order models behave very differently from real genomic data and therefore should not be relied upon for privacy-preserving solutions.
{"title":"Quantifying Genomic Privacy via Inference Attack with High-Order SNV Correlations","authors":"Sahel Shariati Samani, Zhicong Huang, Erman Ayday, M. Elliot, J. Fellay, J. Hubaux, Z. Kutalik","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.21","url":null,"abstract":"As genomic data becomes widely used, the problem of genomic data privacy becomes a hot interdisciplinary research topic among geneticists, bioinformaticians and security and privacy experts. Practical attacks have been identified on genomic data, and thus break the privacy expectations of individuals who contribute their genomic data to medical research, or simply share their data online. Frustrating as it is, the problem could become even worse. Existing genomic privacy breaches rely on low-order SNV (Single Nucleotide Variant) correlations. Our work shows that far more powerful attacks can be designed if high-order correlations are utilized. We corroborate this concern by making use of different SNV correlations based on various genomic data models and applying them to an inference attack on individuals' genotype data with hidden SNVs. We also show that low-order models behave very differently from real genomic data and therefore should not be relied upon for privacy-preserving solutions.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"61 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129605421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nicolás Notario, A. Crespo, Y. Martín, J. D. Álamo, D. Métayer, Thibaud Antignac, A. Kung, I. Kroener, David Wright
Data protection authorities worldwide have agreed on the value of considering privacy-by-design principles when developing privacy-friendly systems and software. However, on the technical plane, a profusion of privacy-oriented guidelines and approaches coexists, which provides partial solutions to the overall problem and aids engineers during different stages of the system development lifecycle. As a result, engineers find difficult to understand what they should do to make their systems abide by privacy by design, thus hindering the adoption of privacy engineering practices. This paper reviews existing best practices in the analysis and design stages of the system development lifecycle, introduces a systematic methodology for privacy engineering that merges and integrates them, leveraging their best features whilst addressing their weak points, and describes its alignment with current standardization efforts.
{"title":"PRIPARE: Integrating Privacy Best Practices into a Privacy Engineering Methodology","authors":"Nicolás Notario, A. Crespo, Y. Martín, J. D. Álamo, D. Métayer, Thibaud Antignac, A. Kung, I. Kroener, David Wright","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2015.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.22","url":null,"abstract":"Data protection authorities worldwide have agreed on the value of considering privacy-by-design principles when developing privacy-friendly systems and software. However, on the technical plane, a profusion of privacy-oriented guidelines and approaches coexists, which provides partial solutions to the overall problem and aids engineers during different stages of the system development lifecycle. As a result, engineers find difficult to understand what they should do to make their systems abide by privacy by design, thus hindering the adoption of privacy engineering practices. This paper reviews existing best practices in the analysis and design stages of the system development lifecycle, introduces a systematic methodology for privacy engineering that merges and integrates them, leveraging their best features whilst addressing their weak points, and describes its alignment with current standardization efforts.","PeriodicalId":301535,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129558622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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