Jonathan Shahen, Jianwei Niu, Mahesh V. Tripunitara
Safety analysis is recognized as a fundamental problem in access control. It has been studied for various access control schemes in the literature. Recent work has proposed an administrative model for Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) policies called Administrative TRBAC (ATRBAC). We address ATRBAC-safety. We first identify that the problem is PSPACE-Complete. This is a much tighter identification of the computational complexity of the problem than prior work, which shows only that the problem is decidable. With this result as the basis, we propose an approach that leverages an existing open-source software tool called Mohawk to address ATRBAC-safety. Our approach is to efficiently reduce ATRBAC-safety to ARBAC-safety, and then use Mohawk. We have conducted a thorough empirical assessment. In the course of our assessment, we came up with a "reduction toolkit," which allows us to reduce Mohawk+T input instances to instances that existing tools support. Our results suggest that there are some input classes for which Mohawk+T outperforms existing tools, and others for which existing tools outperform Mohawk+T. The source code for Mohawk+T is available for public download.
{"title":"Mohawk+T: Efficient Analysis of Administrative Temporal Role-Based Access Control (ATRBAC) Policies","authors":"Jonathan Shahen, Jianwei Niu, Mahesh V. Tripunitara","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752966","url":null,"abstract":"Safety analysis is recognized as a fundamental problem in access control. It has been studied for various access control schemes in the literature. Recent work has proposed an administrative model for Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) policies called Administrative TRBAC (ATRBAC). We address ATRBAC-safety. We first identify that the problem is PSPACE-Complete. This is a much tighter identification of the computational complexity of the problem than prior work, which shows only that the problem is decidable. With this result as the basis, we propose an approach that leverages an existing open-source software tool called Mohawk to address ATRBAC-safety. Our approach is to efficiently reduce ATRBAC-safety to ARBAC-safety, and then use Mohawk. We have conducted a thorough empirical assessment. In the course of our assessment, we came up with a \"reduction toolkit,\" which allows us to reduce Mohawk+T input instances to instances that existing tools support. Our results suggest that there are some input classes for which Mohawk+T outperforms existing tools, and others for which existing tools outperform Mohawk+T. The source code for Mohawk+T is available for public download.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128004562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In June 2013 Edward Snowden leaked a large collection of documents that describe the capabilities and technologies of the NSA and its allies. Even to security experts the scale, nature and impact of some of the techniques revealed was surprising. A major consequence is the increased awareness of the public at large of the existence of highly intrusive mass surveillance techniques. There has also been some impact in the business world, including a growing interest in companies that (claim to) develop end-to-end secure solutions. There is no doubt that large nation states and organized crime have carefully studied the techniques and are exploring which ones they can use for their own benefit. But after two years, there is little progress in legal or governance measures to address some of the excesses by increasing accountability. Moreover, the security research community seems to have been slow to respond to the new threat landscape. In this lecture we analyze these threats and speculate how they could be countered.
{"title":"Post-Snowden Threat Models","authors":"B. Preneel","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752978","url":null,"abstract":"In June 2013 Edward Snowden leaked a large collection of documents that describe the capabilities and technologies of the NSA and its allies. Even to security experts the scale, nature and impact of some of the techniques revealed was surprising. A major consequence is the increased awareness of the public at large of the existence of highly intrusive mass surveillance techniques. There has also been some impact in the business world, including a growing interest in companies that (claim to) develop end-to-end secure solutions. There is no doubt that large nation states and organized crime have carefully studied the techniques and are exploring which ones they can use for their own benefit. But after two years, there is little progress in legal or governance measures to address some of the excesses by increasing accountability. Moreover, the security research community seems to have been slow to respond to the new threat landscape. In this lecture we analyze these threats and speculate how they could be countered.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117285401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A major concern in the adoption of cloud infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) arises from multi-tenancy, where multiple tenants share the underlying physical infrastructure operated by a cloud service provider. A tenant could be an enterprise in the context of a public cloud or a department within an enterprise in the context of a private cloud. Enabled by virtualization technology, the service provider is able to minimize cost by providing virtualized hardware resources such as virtual machines, virtual storage and virtual networks, as a service to multiple tenants where, for instance, a tenant's virtual machine may be hosted in the same physical server as that of many other tenants. It is well-known that separation of execution environment provided by the hypervisors that enable virtualization technology has many limitations. In addition to inadvertent misconfigurations, a number of attacks have been demonstrated that allow unauthorized information flow between virtual machines hosted by a hypervisor on a given physical server. In this paper, we present attribute-based constraints specification and enforcement as a mechanism to mitigate such multi-tenancy risks that arise in cloud IaaS. We represent relevant properties of virtual resources (e.g., virtual machines, virtual networks, etc.) as their attributes. Conflicting attribute values are specified by the tenant or by the cloud IaaS system as appropriate. The goal is to schedule virtual resources on physical resources in a conflict-free manner. The general problem is shown to be NP-complete. We explore practical conflict specifications that can be efficiently enforced. We have implemented a prototype for virtual machine scheduling in OpenStack, a widely-used open-source cloud IaaS software, and evaluated its performance overhead, resource requirements to satisfy conflicts, and resource utilization.
{"title":"Mitigating Multi-Tenancy Risks in IaaS Cloud Through Constraints-Driven Virtual Resource Scheduling","authors":"K. Bijon, R. Krishnan, R. Sandhu","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752964","url":null,"abstract":"A major concern in the adoption of cloud infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) arises from multi-tenancy, where multiple tenants share the underlying physical infrastructure operated by a cloud service provider. A tenant could be an enterprise in the context of a public cloud or a department within an enterprise in the context of a private cloud. Enabled by virtualization technology, the service provider is able to minimize cost by providing virtualized hardware resources such as virtual machines, virtual storage and virtual networks, as a service to multiple tenants where, for instance, a tenant's virtual machine may be hosted in the same physical server as that of many other tenants. It is well-known that separation of execution environment provided by the hypervisors that enable virtualization technology has many limitations. In addition to inadvertent misconfigurations, a number of attacks have been demonstrated that allow unauthorized information flow between virtual machines hosted by a hypervisor on a given physical server. In this paper, we present attribute-based constraints specification and enforcement as a mechanism to mitigate such multi-tenancy risks that arise in cloud IaaS. We represent relevant properties of virtual resources (e.g., virtual machines, virtual networks, etc.) as their attributes. Conflicting attribute values are specified by the tenant or by the cloud IaaS system as appropriate. The goal is to schedule virtual resources on physical resources in a conflict-free manner. The general problem is shown to be NP-complete. We explore practical conflict specifications that can be efficiently enforced. We have implemented a prototype for virtual machine scheduling in OpenStack, a widely-used open-source cloud IaaS software, and evaluated its performance overhead, resource requirements to satisfy conflicts, and resource utilization.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123345291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Privacy issues are increasingly becoming important for many domains and applications. Many of such issues arise from the constant streaming of personal and sensitive data made available from lay users online, and also from the emerging widespread of highly ubiquitous and content-rich, personalized applications. Further, strong regulatory frameworks are now in place to ensure that users’ data is properly managed and protected. For instance, the responsible management of sensitive data is explicitly being mandated through laws such as the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Accordingly, data and user privacy have received substantial research attention over the past years. Several technical challenges have been tackled, including how to balance utility with the need to preserve privacy of individual data, and how to protect data from unwanted and unauthorized parties [5, 1, 6, 2]. In parallel, in response to several privacy outcries, many companies and organizations involved with users’ data collection and management (particularly online) have also made an effort toward introducing stronger privacy and access control solutions. Yet these efforts have been shown to be inadequate or insufficient [7]. Among the various methods and mechanisms to ensure users’ privacy, access control techniques are a well-established building block to protect users’ data. Historically, the mechanism for access control was considered only a support provided by database systems for sensitive structured data. Such a model of authorization is intuitive to application developers and users of the database system, but it only
{"title":"Privacy and Access Control: How are These Two concepts Related?","authors":"A. Squicciarini, Ting Yu","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752980","url":null,"abstract":"Privacy issues are increasingly becoming important for many domains and applications. Many of such issues arise from the constant streaming of personal and sensitive data made available from lay users online, and also from the emerging widespread of highly ubiquitous and content-rich, personalized applications. Further, strong regulatory frameworks are now in place to ensure that users’ data is properly managed and protected. For instance, the responsible management of sensitive data is explicitly being mandated through laws such as the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Accordingly, data and user privacy have received substantial research attention over the past years. Several technical challenges have been tackled, including how to balance utility with the need to preserve privacy of individual data, and how to protect data from unwanted and unauthorized parties [5, 1, 6, 2]. In parallel, in response to several privacy outcries, many companies and organizations involved with users’ data collection and management (particularly online) have also made an effort toward introducing stronger privacy and access control solutions. Yet these efforts have been shown to be inadequate or insufficient [7]. Among the various methods and mechanisms to ensure users’ privacy, access control techniques are a well-established building block to protect users’ data. Historically, the mechanism for access control was considered only a support provided by database systems for sensitive structured data. Such a model of authorization is intuitive to application developers and users of the database system, but it only","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115758953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We address the generation and analysis of hard instances for verification problems in access control that are NP-hard. Given the customary assumption that P ≠ NP, we know that such classes exist. We focus on a particular problem, the user-authorization query problem (UAQ) in Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). We show how to systematically generate hard instances for it. We then analyze what we call the structure of those hard instances. Our work brings the important aspect of systematic investigation of hard input classes to access control research.
{"title":"Hard Instances for Verification Problems in Access Control","authors":"Nima Mousavi, Mahesh V. Tripunitara","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752959","url":null,"abstract":"We address the generation and analysis of hard instances for verification problems in access control that are NP-hard. Given the customary assumption that P ≠ NP, we know that such classes exist. We focus on a particular problem, the user-authorization query problem (UAQ) in Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). We show how to systematically generate hard instances for it. We then analyze what we call the structure of those hard instances. Our work brings the important aspect of systematic investigation of hard input classes to access control research.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114326708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Carlos E. Rubio-Medrano, Ziming Zhao, Adam Doupé, Gail-Joon Ahn
With the advent of various collaborative sharing mechanisms such as Grids, P2P and Clouds, organizations including private and public sectors have recognized the benefits of being involved in inter-organizational, multi-disciplinary, and collaborative projects that may require diverse resources to be shared among participants. In particular, an environment that often makes use of a group of high-performance network facilities would involve large-scale collaborative projects and tremendously seek a robust and flexible access control for allowing collaborators to leverage and consume resources, e.g., computing power and bandwidth. In this paper, we propose a federated access management scheme that leverages the notion of attributes. Our approach allows resource-sharing organizations to provide distributed provisioning (publication, location, communication, and evaluation) of both attributes and policies for federated access management purposes. Also, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation that leverages distributed hash tables (DHT) to traverse chains of attributes and effectively handle the federated access management requirements devised for inter-organizational resource sharing and collaborations.
{"title":"Federated Access Management for Collaborative Network Environments: Framework and Case Study","authors":"Carlos E. Rubio-Medrano, Ziming Zhao, Adam Doupé, Gail-Joon Ahn","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752977","url":null,"abstract":"With the advent of various collaborative sharing mechanisms such as Grids, P2P and Clouds, organizations including private and public sectors have recognized the benefits of being involved in inter-organizational, multi-disciplinary, and collaborative projects that may require diverse resources to be shared among participants. In particular, an environment that often makes use of a group of high-performance network facilities would involve large-scale collaborative projects and tremendously seek a robust and flexible access control for allowing collaborators to leverage and consume resources, e.g., computing power and bandwidth. In this paper, we propose a federated access management scheme that leverages the notion of attributes. Our approach allows resource-sharing organizations to provide distributed provisioning (publication, location, communication, and evaluation) of both attributes and policies for federated access management purposes. Also, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation that leverages distributed hash tables (DHT) to traverse chains of attributes and effectively handle the federated access management requirements devised for inter-organizational resource sharing and collaborations.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130310549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Access control vulnerabilities due to programming errors have consistently ranked amongst top software vulnerabilities. Previous research efforts have concentrated on using automatic program analysis techniques to detect access control vulnerabilities in applications. We report a comparative study of six open source PHP applications, and find that implicit assumptions of previous research techniques can significantly limit their effectiveness. We propose a more effective hybrid approach to mitigate access control vulnerabilities. Developers are reminded in-situ of potential access control vulnerabilities, where self-review of code can help them discover mistakes. Additionally, developers are prompted for application-specific access control knowledge, providing samples of code that could be thought of as static analysis by example. These examples are turned into code patterns that can be used in performing static analysis to detect additional access control vulnerabilities and alert the developer to take corrective actions. Our evaluation of six open source applications detected 20 zero-day access control vulnerabilities in addition to finding all access control vulnerabilities detected in previous works.
{"title":"Mitigating Access Control Vulnerabilities through Interactive Static Analysis","authors":"Jun Zhu, Bill Chu, H. Lipford, Tyler Thomas","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752976","url":null,"abstract":"Access control vulnerabilities due to programming errors have consistently ranked amongst top software vulnerabilities. Previous research efforts have concentrated on using automatic program analysis techniques to detect access control vulnerabilities in applications. We report a comparative study of six open source PHP applications, and find that implicit assumptions of previous research techniques can significantly limit their effectiveness. We propose a more effective hybrid approach to mitigate access control vulnerabilities. Developers are reminded in-situ of potential access control vulnerabilities, where self-review of code can help them discover mistakes. Additionally, developers are prompted for application-specific access control knowledge, providing samples of code that could be thought of as static analysis by example. These examples are turned into code patterns that can be used in performing static analysis to detect additional access control vulnerabilities and alert the developer to take corrective actions. Our evaluation of six open source applications detected 20 zero-day access control vulnerabilities in addition to finding all access control vulnerabilities detected in previous works.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114594746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Authorized insiders downloading mass data via their user interface are still a problem. In this paper a prototype to prevent mass data extractions is proposed. Access control models efficiently protect security objects but fail to define subsets of data which are narrow enough to be harmless if downloaded. Instead of controlling access to security objects the prototype limits the amount of accessible information. A heuristic approach to measures the amount of information is used. The paper describes the implementation of the prototype which is an extension of an SAP system as an example for a large enterprise information system.
{"title":"A Prototype to Reduce the Amount of Accessible Information","authors":"Rainer Fischer","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752953","url":null,"abstract":"Authorized insiders downloading mass data via their user interface are still a problem. In this paper a prototype to prevent mass data extractions is proposed. Access control models efficiently protect security objects but fail to define subsets of data which are narrow enough to be harmless if downloaded. Instead of controlling access to security objects the prototype limits the amount of accessible information. A heuristic approach to measures the amount of information is used. The paper describes the implementation of the prototype which is an extension of an SAP system as an example for a large enterprise information system.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126023757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With the introduction and the widely use of external hosted infrastructures, secure storage of sensitive data becomes more and more important. There are systems available to store and query encrypted data in a database, but not all applications may start with empty tables rather than having sets of legacy data. Hence, there is a need to transform existing plaintext databases to encrypted form. Usually existing enterprise databases may contain terabytes of data. A single machine would require many months for the initial encryption of a large data set. We propose encrypting data in parallel using a Hadoop cluster which is a simple five step process including the Hadoop set up, target preparation, source data import, encrypting the data, and finally exporting it to the target. We evaluated our solution on real world data and report on performance and data consumption. The results show that encrypting data in parallel can be done in a very scalable manner. Using a parallelized encryption cluster compared to a single server machine reduces the encryption time from months down to days or even hours.
{"title":"Initial Encryption of large Searchable Data Sets using Hadoop","authors":"Feng Wang, Mathias Kohler, A. Schaad","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752960","url":null,"abstract":"With the introduction and the widely use of external hosted infrastructures, secure storage of sensitive data becomes more and more important. There are systems available to store and query encrypted data in a database, but not all applications may start with empty tables rather than having sets of legacy data. Hence, there is a need to transform existing plaintext databases to encrypted form. Usually existing enterprise databases may contain terabytes of data. A single machine would require many months for the initial encryption of a large data set. We propose encrypting data in parallel using a Hadoop cluster which is a simple five step process including the Hadoop set up, target preparation, source data import, encrypting the data, and finally exporting it to the target. We evaluated our solution on real world data and report on performance and data consumption. The results show that encrypting data in parallel can be done in a very scalable manner. Using a parallelized encryption cluster compared to a single server machine reduces the encryption time from months down to days or even hours.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134070028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we present a novel, semi-automated approach to infer access control policies automatically for web-based applications. Our goal is to support the validation of implemented access control policies, even when they have not been clearly specified or documented. We use role-based access control as a reference model. Built on top of a suite of security tools, our approach automatically exercises a system under test and builds access spaces for a set of known users and roles. Then, we apply a machine learning technique to infer access rules. Inconsistent rules are then analysed and fed back to the process for further testing and improvement. Finally, the inferred rules can be validated based on pre-specified rules if they exist. Otherwise, the inferred rules are presented to human experts for validation and for detecting access control issues. We have evaluated our approach on two applications; one is open source while the other is a proprietary system built by our industry partner. The obtained results are very promising in terms of the quality of inferred rules and the access control vulnerabilities it helped detect.
{"title":"Automated Inference of Access Control Policies for Web Applications","authors":"H. Le, Duy Cu Nguyen, L. Briand, Benjamin Hourte","doi":"10.1145/2752952.2752969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2752952.2752969","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a novel, semi-automated approach to infer access control policies automatically for web-based applications. Our goal is to support the validation of implemented access control policies, even when they have not been clearly specified or documented. We use role-based access control as a reference model. Built on top of a suite of security tools, our approach automatically exercises a system under test and builds access spaces for a set of known users and roles. Then, we apply a machine learning technique to infer access rules. Inconsistent rules are then analysed and fed back to the process for further testing and improvement. Finally, the inferred rules can be validated based on pre-specified rules if they exist. Otherwise, the inferred rules are presented to human experts for validation and for detecting access control issues. We have evaluated our approach on two applications; one is open source while the other is a proprietary system built by our industry partner. The obtained results are very promising in terms of the quality of inferred rules and the access control vulnerabilities it helped detect.","PeriodicalId":305802,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128077762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：