Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.4324/9780429270949-47
J. Judd, Brian Motley
{"title":"Ending Inflation","authors":"J. Judd, Brian Motley","doi":"10.4324/9780429270949-47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429270949-47","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":307845,"journal":{"name":"Handbook of Monetary Policy","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125455394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.4324/9780429270949-23
C. Walsh
{"title":"A Primer on Monetary Policy","authors":"C. Walsh","doi":"10.4324/9780429270949-23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429270949-23","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":307845,"journal":{"name":"Handbook of Monetary Policy","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132987390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Shocks","authors":"Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, Scott D. Schuh","doi":"10.4324/9780429270949-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429270949-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":307845,"journal":{"name":"Handbook of Monetary Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114887506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can neoclassical theory account for the Great Depression in the United States—both the downturn in output between 1929 and 1933 and the recovery between 1934 and 1939? Yes and no. Given the large real and monetary shocks to the U.S. economy during 1929–33, neoclassical theory does predict a long, deep downturn. However, theory predicts a much different recovery from this downturn than actually occurred. Given the period’s sharp increases in total factor productivity and the money supply and the elimination of deflation and bank failures, theory predicts an extremely rapid recovery that returns output to trend around 1936. In sharp contrast, real output remained between 25 and 30 percent below trend through the late 1930s. We conclude that a new shock is needed to account for the Depression’s weak recovery. A likely culprit is New Deal policies toward monopoly and the distribution of income.
{"title":"The Great Depression in the United States from a Neoclassical Perspective","authors":"Harold L. Cole, L. Ohanian","doi":"10.21034/QR.2311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21034/QR.2311","url":null,"abstract":"Can neoclassical theory account for the Great Depression in the United States—both the downturn in output between 1929 and 1933 and the recovery between 1934 and 1939? Yes and no. Given the large real and monetary shocks to the U.S. economy during 1929–33, neoclassical theory does predict a long, deep downturn. However, theory predicts a much different recovery from this downturn than actually occurred. Given the period’s sharp increases in total factor productivity and the money supply and the elimination of deflation and bank failures, theory predicts an extremely rapid recovery that returns output to trend around 1936. In sharp contrast, real output remained between 25 and 30 percent below trend through the late 1930s. We conclude that a new shock is needed to account for the Depression’s weak recovery. A likely culprit is New Deal policies toward monopoly and the distribution of income.","PeriodicalId":307845,"journal":{"name":"Handbook of Monetary Policy","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115756738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.4324/9780429270949-53
Brian Motley
{"title":"Inflation and Growth","authors":"Brian Motley","doi":"10.4324/9780429270949-53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429270949-53","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":307845,"journal":{"name":"Handbook of Monetary Policy","volume":"56 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141209268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.4324/9780429270949-11
Chan Guk Huh
Traditionally, economists have focused on aggregate money stock measures such as M 1 and M2 as indicators of future economic activity. However, the relationship between these aggregates and real GDP has deteriorated in recent years. Thus there is a growing interest in alternative indicators, some of which are conceptually quite new compared to the conventional financial market aggregates. For example, Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) examine the ratio of bank loans to the sum of both bank loans and funds raised through issuing commercial paper by firms.
{"title":"Interest Rate Spreads as Indicators for Monetary Policy","authors":"Chan Guk Huh","doi":"10.4324/9780429270949-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429270949-11","url":null,"abstract":"Traditionally, economists have focused on aggregate money stock measures such as M 1 and M2 as indicators of future economic activity. However, the relationship between these aggregates and real GDP has deteriorated in recent years. Thus there is a growing interest in alternative indicators, some of which are conceptually quite new compared to the conventional financial market aggregates. For example, Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) examine the ratio of bank loans to the sum of both bank loans and funds raised through issuing commercial paper by firms.","PeriodicalId":307845,"journal":{"name":"Handbook of Monetary Policy","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114137176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.4324/9780429270949-58
W. DeWald
{"title":"Historical U.S. Money Growth, Inflation, and Inflation Credibility","authors":"W. DeWald","doi":"10.4324/9780429270949-58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429270949-58","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":307845,"journal":{"name":"Handbook of Monetary Policy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125203824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.4324/9780429270949-60
Mark A. Wynne
On January 1, 1999, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) began conducting monetary policy for eleven of the fifteen nations of the European Union, formally creating an economic and monetary union. The ESCB is governed by the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and manages Europe's new currency, the euro. The structure of the ESCB is in many ways similar to that of the Federal Reserve System, with the ECB playing a role similar to that of the Board of Governors and the various national central banks occupying positions not unlike those of the regional Reserve Banks. In this article, Mark Wynne compares the two central banks, drawing on the insights of economic theory to shed light on how monetary policy is likely to be made in Europe under monetary union. He documents two key differences between the ESCB and the Federal Reserve System. First, the ESCB has a much stronger price stability mandate. Second, power is much more diffusely distributed in the ESCB. The strong mandate for price stability will enhance the euro's credibility. But the diffuse power structure may make it difficult to resolve conflicts, which will undermine credibility. The monetary union's fate depends on which of these two features of the monetary policy process dominates.
{"title":"European System of Central Banks","authors":"Mark A. Wynne","doi":"10.4324/9780429270949-60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429270949-60","url":null,"abstract":"On January 1, 1999, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) began conducting monetary policy for eleven of the fifteen nations of the European Union, formally creating an economic and monetary union. The ESCB is governed by the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and manages Europe's new currency, the euro. The structure of the ESCB is in many ways similar to that of the Federal Reserve System, with the ECB playing a role similar to that of the Board of Governors and the various national central banks occupying positions not unlike those of the regional Reserve Banks. In this article, Mark Wynne compares the two central banks, drawing on the insights of economic theory to shed light on how monetary policy is likely to be made in Europe under monetary union. He documents two key differences between the ESCB and the Federal Reserve System. First, the ESCB has a much stronger price stability mandate. Second, power is much more diffusely distributed in the ESCB. The strong mandate for price stability will enhance the euro's credibility. But the diffuse power structure may make it difficult to resolve conflicts, which will undermine credibility. The monetary union's fate depends on which of these two features of the monetary policy process dominates.","PeriodicalId":307845,"journal":{"name":"Handbook of Monetary Policy","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130655679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：