{"title":"Session details: Application Isolation","authors":"A. Beresford","doi":"10.1145/3247576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3247576","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":311973,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM CCS Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128640855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The security of Android depends on the timely delivery of updates to fix critical vulnerabilities. In this paper we map the complex network of players in the Android ecosystem who must collaborate to provide updates, and determine that inaction by some manufacturers and network operators means many handsets are vulnerable to critical vulnerabilities. We define the FUM security metric to rank the performance of device manufacturers and network operators, based on their provision of updates and exposure to critical vulnerabilities. Using a corpus of 20 400 devices we show that there is significant variability in the timely delivery of security updates across different device manufacturers and network operators. This provides a comparison point for purchasers and regulators to determine which device manufacturers and network operators provide security updates and which do not. We find that on average 87.7% of Android devices are exposed to at least one of 11 known critical vulnerabilities and, across the ecosystem as a whole, assign a FUM security score of 2.87 out of 10. In our data, Nexus devices do considerably better than average with a score of 5.17; and LG is the best manufacturer with a score of 3.97.
{"title":"Security Metrics for the Android Ecosystem","authors":"Daniel R. Thomas, A. Beresford, A. Rice","doi":"10.1145/2808117.2808118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2808117.2808118","url":null,"abstract":"The security of Android depends on the timely delivery of updates to fix critical vulnerabilities. In this paper we map the complex network of players in the Android ecosystem who must collaborate to provide updates, and determine that inaction by some manufacturers and network operators means many handsets are vulnerable to critical vulnerabilities. We define the FUM security metric to rank the performance of device manufacturers and network operators, based on their provision of updates and exposure to critical vulnerabilities. Using a corpus of 20 400 devices we show that there is significant variability in the timely delivery of security updates across different device manufacturers and network operators. This provides a comparison point for purchasers and regulators to determine which device manufacturers and network operators provide security updates and which do not. We find that on average 87.7% of Android devices are exposed to at least one of 11 known critical vulnerabilities and, across the ecosystem as a whole, assign a FUM security score of 2.87 out of 10. In our data, Nexus devices do considerably better than average with a score of 5.17; and LG is the best manufacturer with a score of 3.97.","PeriodicalId":311973,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM CCS Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114802068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Android rooting enables device owners to freely customize their own devices and run useful apps that require root privileges. While useful, rooting weakens the security of Android devices and opens the door for malware to obtain privileged access easily. Thus, several rooting prevention mechanisms have been introduced by vendors, and sensitive or high-value mobile apps perform rooting detection to mitigate potential security exposures on rooted devices. However, there is a lack of understanding whether existing rooting prevention and detection methods are effective. To fill this knowledge gap, we studied existing Android rooting methods and performed manual and dynamic analysis on 182 selected apps, in order to identify current rooting detection methods and evaluate their effectiveness. Our results suggest that these methods are ineffective. We conclude that reliable methods for detecting rooting must come from integrity-protected kernels or trusted execution environments, which are difficult to bypass.
{"title":"Android Rooting: Methods, Detection, and Evasion","authors":"San-Tsai Sun, Andrea Cuadros, K. Beznosov","doi":"10.1145/2808117.2808126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2808117.2808126","url":null,"abstract":"Android rooting enables device owners to freely customize their own devices and run useful apps that require root privileges. While useful, rooting weakens the security of Android devices and opens the door for malware to obtain privileged access easily. Thus, several rooting prevention mechanisms have been introduced by vendors, and sensitive or high-value mobile apps perform rooting detection to mitigate potential security exposures on rooted devices. However, there is a lack of understanding whether existing rooting prevention and detection methods are effective. To fill this knowledge gap, we studied existing Android rooting methods and performed manual and dynamic analysis on 182 selected apps, in order to identify current rooting detection methods and evaluate their effectiveness. Our results suggest that these methods are ineffective. We conclude that reliable methods for detecting rooting must come from integrity-protected kernels or trusted execution environments, which are difficult to bypass.","PeriodicalId":311973,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM CCS Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131993224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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