Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0011
E. Osokina
This chapter explores how, in the early 1930s, the Soviet government faced a dilemma of how to increase hard-currency transfers from abroad while not paying even a cent in foreign money to recipients in the USSR. The mass famine and Torgsin prompted a solution: pleas for help from the starving forced their relatives abroad to send money to the USSR, but instead of foreign currency, the recipients received Torgsin rubles and were forced to buy goods in its stores at high prices. All hard currency from foreign remittances went to the state. Torgsin became a truly ingenious solution to the crisis of foreign-currency transfers. Eventually, Soviet trade missions abroad started advertising these hard-currency transfer operations. The call “Send dollars to Torgsin!” was not so much a line from an ad as a cry for help. Due to rumors of raging famine, Torgsin's fame abroad grew quickly.
{"title":"Send Dollars to Torgsin!","authors":"E. Osokina","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores how, in the early 1930s, the Soviet government faced a dilemma of how to increase hard-currency transfers from abroad while not paying even a cent in foreign money to recipients in the USSR. The mass famine and Torgsin prompted a solution: pleas for help from the starving forced their relatives abroad to send money to the USSR, but instead of foreign currency, the recipients received Torgsin rubles and were forced to buy goods in its stores at high prices. All hard currency from foreign remittances went to the state. Torgsin became a truly ingenious solution to the crisis of foreign-currency transfers. Eventually, Soviet trade missions abroad started advertising these hard-currency transfer operations. The call “Send dollars to Torgsin!” was not so much a line from an ad as a cry for help. Due to rumors of raging famine, Torgsin's fame abroad grew quickly.","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123995288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0020
Elena Osokina
This chapter assesses how Torgsin became a sorcerer's stone of Soviet industrialization. Torgsin did not sell anything abroad but nonetheless was considered an export organization because it turned the country's resources into gold and foreign currency. The terms and conditions under which Torgsin worked contributed to its hard-currency success. It saved on expenses related to export, but most important, Torgsin's sale prices were not affected by the world economic crisis and international competition because Torgsin sold at home, where shortages and famine raged and the state had a price monopoly. Torgsin's methods were predatory, but if the government, instead of opening Torgsin to Soviet people, had tried to gain more hard currency by further increasing food exports under the unfavorable world market conditions, the scope of the famine would have been even greater.
{"title":"The Sorcerer’s Stone","authors":"Elena Osokina","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0020","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses how Torgsin became a sorcerer's stone of Soviet industrialization. Torgsin did not sell anything abroad but nonetheless was considered an export organization because it turned the country's resources into gold and foreign currency. The terms and conditions under which Torgsin worked contributed to its hard-currency success. It saved on expenses related to export, but most important, Torgsin's sale prices were not affected by the world economic crisis and international competition because Torgsin sold at home, where shortages and famine raged and the state had a price monopoly. Torgsin's methods were predatory, but if the government, instead of opening Torgsin to Soviet people, had tried to gain more hard currency by further increasing food exports under the unfavorable world market conditions, the scope of the famine would have been even greater.","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133263248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0016
E. Osokina
This chapter reviews the relationship between Torgsin and the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), the political police. At first, the OGPU considered Torgsin to be harmful and argued against opening it to Soviet customers. After the politburo made a positive decision on the matter, however, the OGPU had to obey. Its representatives were on the governmental commission that, at the end of 1931, defined the regions and methods of Torgsin's activities. The local OGPU offices provided information to Torgsin's emissaries about the “gold potential” of the region and the expediency of opening a hard-currency store there. Torgsin used the OGPU for many other purposes — to put pressure on negligent suppliers, to transport secret correspondence and valuables, to purge its apparatus of “socially alien elements,” and to fight embezzlement and other economic crimes, to name a few. Alongside this cooperation, there was a rivalry between Torgsin and the OGPU caused by the fact that both relied on the same source — people's valuable savings — to fulfill hard-currency and gold quotas prescribed by the state.
{"title":"Torgsin and the Political Police","authors":"E. Osokina","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews the relationship between Torgsin and the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), the political police. At first, the OGPU considered Torgsin to be harmful and argued against opening it to Soviet customers. After the politburo made a positive decision on the matter, however, the OGPU had to obey. Its representatives were on the governmental commission that, at the end of 1931, defined the regions and methods of Torgsin's activities. The local OGPU offices provided information to Torgsin's emissaries about the “gold potential” of the region and the expediency of opening a hard-currency store there. Torgsin used the OGPU for many other purposes — to put pressure on negligent suppliers, to transport secret correspondence and valuables, to purge its apparatus of “socially alien elements,” and to fight embezzlement and other economic crimes, to name a few. Alongside this cooperation, there was a rivalry between Torgsin and the OGPU caused by the fact that both relied on the same source — people's valuable savings — to fulfill hard-currency and gold quotas prescribed by the state.","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124162062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501758539-016
{"title":"15. Torgsin and the Political Police","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501758539-016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501758539-016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124623949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501758539-017
{"title":"16. The Seller Is Always Right","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501758539-017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501758539-017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123349464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0006
E. Osokina
This chapter assesses why Joseph Stalin needed Torgsin. The analysis of Soviet foreign trade data, foreign debt, gold and currency reserves, and gold production shows a direct and tight correlation between the opening of Torgsin and the currency needs of industrialization. The year 1931, when Torgsin began its large-scale operation of buying up gold from the population, marked the high point of industrial imports. The country was deep in debt and had little with which to pay it off: exports had failed to bring in the expected currency earnings, and the gold reserve of the Russian Empire had been exhausted. The acute gold and hard-currency crisis defined the moment when the elite “for foreigners only” Torgsin began to turn into a people's enterprise. The urgent need for Torgsin was also determined by the fact that the country's gold mining industry had yet to be created.
{"title":"Why Did Stalin Need Torgsin?","authors":"E. Osokina","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses why Joseph Stalin needed Torgsin. The analysis of Soviet foreign trade data, foreign debt, gold and currency reserves, and gold production shows a direct and tight correlation between the opening of Torgsin and the currency needs of industrialization. The year 1931, when Torgsin began its large-scale operation of buying up gold from the population, marked the high point of industrial imports. The country was deep in debt and had little with which to pay it off: exports had failed to bring in the expected currency earnings, and the gold reserve of the Russian Empire had been exhausted. The acute gold and hard-currency crisis defined the moment when the elite “for foreigners only” Torgsin began to turn into a people's enterprise. The urgent need for Torgsin was also determined by the fact that the country's gold mining industry had yet to be created.","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128593309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0010
E. Osokina
This chapter describes how Narkomvneshtorg only started to discuss Torgsin's acceptance of diamonds in April of 1933, while the permission to begin operations came much later, in August, when the famine of 1932–1933 was already over. At first, the government only allowed the purchase of diamonds in three cities — Moscow, then Leningrad and Khar'kov. The initial results were encouraging. As soon as diamond operations began in the elite cities, the requests from other Torgsin offices to be allowed to purchase diamonds became insistent. In October of 1934, the government allowed Torgsin to procure other precious stones as well. Eventually, the decision to buy diamonds raised the question of platinum, because diamonds were often framed in this metal. The platinum purchasing operation started in Torgsin only in 1934.
{"title":"Diamonds and Platinum","authors":"E. Osokina","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes how Narkomvneshtorg only started to discuss Torgsin's acceptance of diamonds in April of 1933, while the permission to begin operations came much later, in August, when the famine of 1932–1933 was already over. At first, the government only allowed the purchase of diamonds in three cities — Moscow, then Leningrad and Khar'kov. The initial results were encouraging. As soon as diamond operations began in the elite cities, the requests from other Torgsin offices to be allowed to purchase diamonds became insistent. In October of 1934, the government allowed Torgsin to procure other precious stones as well. Eventually, the decision to buy diamonds raised the question of platinum, because diamonds were often framed in this metal. The platinum purchasing operation started in Torgsin only in 1934.","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115095392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0015
E. Osokina
This chapter discusses the brothels in Torgsin. The foreign exchange earnings of the seaport torgsins were not great, but the ship chandlers' operations, perhaps, more than any other Torgsin activities, reveal the essence of this enterprise — a rejection of ideological principles for the sake of profits in hard cash. The opening of the seaport torgsins became part of a nationwide centralization of hard-currency operations to provide for industrial development. According to its authorities, Torgsin represented the world's first attempt at “a centralized supply of foreign ships.” Documents, however, show that Torgsin's seaport service largely followed in the footsteps of prerevolutionary practices. A significant number of Torgsin ship chandlers used to work in the private seaport trade under the tsar. They brought with them to Torgsin the “evils of capitalism” — bribes, social segregation, alcoholism, and prostitution. There were plenty of Soviet characteristics in Torgsin's seaport service as well: mismanagement, poor-quality products, and omnipresence of the political police. The political police pursued goals other than personal interests in preserving the torgsin dens: the prostitutes and speculators collected information about foreigners.
{"title":"Soviet Brothels","authors":"E. Osokina","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the brothels in Torgsin. The foreign exchange earnings of the seaport torgsins were not great, but the ship chandlers' operations, perhaps, more than any other Torgsin activities, reveal the essence of this enterprise — a rejection of ideological principles for the sake of profits in hard cash. The opening of the seaport torgsins became part of a nationwide centralization of hard-currency operations to provide for industrial development. According to its authorities, Torgsin represented the world's first attempt at “a centralized supply of foreign ships.” Documents, however, show that Torgsin's seaport service largely followed in the footsteps of prerevolutionary practices. A significant number of Torgsin ship chandlers used to work in the private seaport trade under the tsar. They brought with them to Torgsin the “evils of capitalism” — bribes, social segregation, alcoholism, and prostitution. There were plenty of Soviet characteristics in Torgsin's seaport service as well: mismanagement, poor-quality products, and omnipresence of the political police. The political police pursued goals other than personal interests in preserving the torgsin dens: the prostitutes and speculators collected information about foreigners.","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124017524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0007
E. Osokina
This chapter details how the fate of the first communist state depended not on world revolution but gold. With the beginning of industrialization, the country's leadership went through a gold panic, which reached its apogee in 1931–1932. The country had to create the nation's gold reserves from scratch. To do that, the government took whatever it could lay its hands on, without disdain for anything. Torgsin became one of many episodes in the gold panic caused by industrialization and the state's hard-currency bankruptcy. Gold played a major role in Torgsin's story, providing the lion's share of its revenues. Torgsin accepted gold in all forms: scrap, jewelry, art and household objects, coins, bullion, sand, nuggets, and even gold containing waste. The revolution and the nationalization that followed struck a death blow to private wealth, and Torgsin carried on this destruction.
{"title":"Gold","authors":"E. Osokina","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter details how the fate of the first communist state depended not on world revolution but gold. With the beginning of industrialization, the country's leadership went through a gold panic, which reached its apogee in 1931–1932. The country had to create the nation's gold reserves from scratch. To do that, the government took whatever it could lay its hands on, without disdain for anything. Torgsin became one of many episodes in the gold panic caused by industrialization and the state's hard-currency bankruptcy. Gold played a major role in Torgsin's story, providing the lion's share of its revenues. Torgsin accepted gold in all forms: scrap, jewelry, art and household objects, coins, bullion, sand, nuggets, and even gold containing waste. The revolution and the nationalization that followed struck a death blow to private wealth, and Torgsin carried on this destruction.","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124255076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0021
E. Osokina
This concluding chapter addresses the paradoxes of Torgsin. Torgsin's entrepreneurial — capitalist, from a Marxist political economy point of view — methods served the victory of socialism. For the sake of gold, Torgsin sacrificed one of the fundamental Marxist principles — the class approach. Indeed, it was not the proletariat that benefited from Torgsin but the socially alien — those who had wealth. Not only were Torgsin's capitalist methods and socialist goals in ideological contradiction, but paradoxes also existed in perceptions of Torgsin among the country's leadership and ordinary contemporaries. Government documents of the time strongly emphasized Torgsin's economic as well as political importance. Its success was the key to industrialization and, therefore, to the final victory of the revolution. However, in the Soviet official political language of the 1930s, the name “Torgsin” became synonymous not with heroism but rather with philistinism, petit-bourgeoisness, soppiness, acquisitiveness, and greed. Torgsin was viewed as the antithesis of revolution.
{"title":"Instead of a Conclusion","authors":"E. Osokina","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758515.003.0021","url":null,"abstract":"This concluding chapter addresses the paradoxes of Torgsin. Torgsin's entrepreneurial — capitalist, from a Marxist political economy point of view — methods served the victory of socialism. For the sake of gold, Torgsin sacrificed one of the fundamental Marxist principles — the class approach. Indeed, it was not the proletariat that benefited from Torgsin but the socially alien — those who had wealth. Not only were Torgsin's capitalist methods and socialist goals in ideological contradiction, but paradoxes also existed in perceptions of Torgsin among the country's leadership and ordinary contemporaries. Government documents of the time strongly emphasized Torgsin's economic as well as political importance. Its success was the key to industrialization and, therefore, to the final victory of the revolution. However, in the Soviet official political language of the 1930s, the name “Torgsin” became synonymous not with heroism but rather with philistinism, petit-bourgeoisness, soppiness, acquisitiveness, and greed. Torgsin was viewed as the antithesis of revolution.","PeriodicalId":315711,"journal":{"name":"Stalin's Quest for Gold","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125263489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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