Pub Date : 2006-03-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00585_6.x
S. Andrews
No abstract available.
没有摘要。
{"title":"The Law and Ethics of Medical Research: International Bioethics and Human Rights","authors":"S. Andrews","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00585_6.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00585_6.x","url":null,"abstract":"No abstract available.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"13 45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122006754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00579_6.x
James J. Edelman
No abstract available.
没有摘要。
{"title":"The Law and Ethics of Restitution","authors":"James J. Edelman","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00579_6.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2006.00579_6.x","url":null,"abstract":"No abstract available.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127477239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Professional services require certain organizational patterns in order to avoid information asymmetries and external effects. These same patterns are used within production structures involving various degrees of monopoly. However, competitive restraints are justified today only when substantial external effects are clearly present, whereas information asymmetries hardly justify such restraints because reputational investments have become widespread in the economy and are relatively efficient in overcoming such asymmetries. As a consequence, innovation in the production of externalities can make competitive constraints unnecessary.
{"title":"Managing Competition in Professional Services and the Burden of Inertia","authors":"Benito Arruñada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.859245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.859245","url":null,"abstract":"Professional services require certain organizational patterns in order to avoid information asymmetries and external effects. These same patterns are used within production structures involving various degrees of monopoly. However, competitive restraints are justified today only when substantial external effects are clearly present, whereas information asymmetries hardly justify such restraints because reputational investments have become widespread in the economy and are relatively efficient in overcoming such asymmetries. As a consequence, innovation in the production of externalities can make competitive constraints unnecessary.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134201989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides a signaling model to analyze the equilibrium fee structures arising when attorneys are heterogeneous with regard to unobservable ability. Unlike fixed fees, contingent fees are more profitable to attorneys who have a greater probability of winning, and thus may serve as an ability signal. It is shown that pooling equilibria are the only equilibria when high-ability attorneys do not have sufficient capacity to serve all consumers. For all pooling equilibria (i) both high- and low-ability attorneys charge the same simple contingent percentage fee, and (ii) the highs operate at capacity while the lows have excess capacity. In some equilibria, positive profits are earned by both types of attorneys despite the excess capacity.
{"title":"Equilibrium Contingent Fees with Heterogeneous Attorneys","authors":"Rudy Santore","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.775166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.775166","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a signaling model to analyze the equilibrium fee structures arising when attorneys are heterogeneous with regard to unobservable ability. Unlike fixed fees, contingent fees are more profitable to attorneys who have a greater probability of winning, and thus may serve as an ability signal. It is shown that pooling equilibria are the only equilibria when high-ability attorneys do not have sufficient capacity to serve all consumers. For all pooling equilibria (i) both high- and low-ability attorneys charge the same simple contingent percentage fee, and (ii) the highs operate at capacity while the lows have excess capacity. In some equilibria, positive profits are earned by both types of attorneys despite the excess capacity.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122708943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Both Republicans and Democrats complain about the difficulty in getting judges confirmed when it is their nominees who are up for confirmation, but there has not been any systematic study of either how much worse this problem has gotten nor what its causes might be. Several patterns do emerge for data from the beginning of Jimmy Carter's administration through the end of George W. Bush's first term. It is taking even longer for confirmation, and the more important the position, the longer confirmation takes. Among the findings, it took almost three times longer for Circuit Court judges to be confirmed under George W. Bush than under his father. The rate of confirmation for Circuit Court judges has also fallen while the confirmation rate for District Court judges has risen. Higher quality judges, measured by their output once they are on the court (e.g., number of citations to their opinions or number of published opinions), take much longer to get confirmed. Evaluated at the mean judicial quality, a one percent increase in judicial quality increases the length of the confirmation process by between 1 and 3 percent. Many of the traditional ex ante measures of judicial quality such as where they went to law school or a nominee's American Bar Association ratings add little if anything to predicting how well they will do on the bench. A one percent increase in polarization in the voting differences between the political parties in the Senate produce between a 3 and 10 percent increase in the length of the confirmation process for Circuit Court judges. Even after accounting for quality differences, Republican Circuit Court nominees also have significantly lower ABA ratings than Democratic nominees and ABA scores don't affect the length of Circuit Court confirmations.
共和党人和民主党人都在抱怨，当他们提名的法官等待确认时，很难得到法官的确认，但目前还没有任何系统的研究表明，这个问题已经恶化到什么程度，也没有任何系统的研究表明其原因可能是什么。从吉米·卡特(Jimmy Carter)政府开始到乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)第一个任期结束的数据中，确实出现了一些模式。确认的时间甚至更长，职位越重要，确认的时间就越长。在调查结果中，在乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)任内，巡回法院法官的确认时间几乎是他父亲任内的三倍。巡回法院法官的确认率也有所下降，而地方法院法官的确认率有所上升。高质量的法官，根据他们在法庭上的产出来衡量(例如，他们的意见被引用的次数或发表的意见的数量)，需要更长的时间才能得到确认。以平均司法质量来衡量，司法质量每提高1%，确认过程的时间就会增加1%到3%。许多传统的事先衡量司法质量的标准，比如他们上的法学院，或者被提名人在美国律师协会(American Bar Association)的评级，对预测他们在法官职位上的表现几乎没有任何帮助。参议院政党之间的投票差异每增加1%，巡回法院法官的确认过程就会增加3%到10%。即使在考虑了质量差异之后，共和党巡回法院提名人的ABA评分也明显低于民主党提名人，而且ABA评分并不影响巡回法院确认的时长。
{"title":"The Judicial Confirmation Process: The Difficulty in Being Smart","authors":"J. Lott","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.664006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.664006","url":null,"abstract":"Both Republicans and Democrats complain about the difficulty in getting judges confirmed when it is their nominees who are up for confirmation, but there has not been any systematic study of either how much worse this problem has gotten nor what its causes might be. Several patterns do emerge for data from the beginning of Jimmy Carter's administration through the end of George W. Bush's first term. It is taking even longer for confirmation, and the more important the position, the longer confirmation takes. Among the findings, it took almost three times longer for Circuit Court judges to be confirmed under George W. Bush than under his father. The rate of confirmation for Circuit Court judges has also fallen while the confirmation rate for District Court judges has risen. Higher quality judges, measured by their output once they are on the court (e.g., number of citations to their opinions or number of published opinions), take much longer to get confirmed. Evaluated at the mean judicial quality, a one percent increase in judicial quality increases the length of the confirmation process by between 1 and 3 percent. Many of the traditional ex ante measures of judicial quality such as where they went to law school or a nominee's American Bar Association ratings add little if anything to predicting how well they will do on the bench. A one percent increase in polarization in the voting differences between the political parties in the Senate produce between a 3 and 10 percent increase in the length of the confirmation process for Circuit Court judges. Even after accounting for quality differences, Republican Circuit Court nominees also have significantly lower ABA ratings than Democratic nominees and ABA scores don't affect the length of Circuit Court confirmations.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128800424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyzes the highly unusual situation where an allegation of bias is brought against a Supreme Court justice after a decision is rendered. This happened at the Supreme Court of Canada in 2003 after it had rendered a unanimous decision in the case of Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada several months earlier. Justice Ian Binnie had written the decision for the Court and he was the subject of the charge of reasonable apprehension of bias due to his limited involvement with the case some 17 years before as a senior official in the Canadian Department of Justice. Ultimately, the other 8 justices dismissed the motion to vacate the original decision. This article argues that Wewaykum is an important constitutional case because it implicates the core constitutional value of judicial impartiality. The article asserts that other parties in the legal system besides the Supreme Court of Canada - the bar, the government and the Court itself, - have a duty to protect the guardians of the Canadian Constitution, i.e. the Supreme Court of Canada.
{"title":"Constitutional Legitimacy and Responsibility: Confronting Allegations of Bias after Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada","authors":"A. Dodek","doi":"10.60082/2563-8505.1062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1062","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the highly unusual situation where an allegation of bias is brought against a Supreme Court justice after a decision is rendered. This happened at the Supreme Court of Canada in 2003 after it had rendered a unanimous decision in the case of Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada several months earlier. Justice Ian Binnie had written the decision for the Court and he was the subject of the charge of reasonable apprehension of bias due to his limited involvement with the case some 17 years before as a senior official in the Canadian Department of Justice. Ultimately, the other 8 justices dismissed the motion to vacate the original decision. This article argues that Wewaykum is an important constitutional case because it implicates the core constitutional value of judicial impartiality. The article asserts that other parties in the legal system besides the Supreme Court of Canada - the bar, the government and the Court itself, - have a duty to protect the guardians of the Canadian Constitution, i.e. the Supreme Court of Canada.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134135900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The potential conflict of interest between lawyers and clients is well known. If a lawyer is paid for his time regardless of the outcome of the case, the lawyer may wish to bring the case even when it is not in the best interest of the client, may spend more hours working on the case than the client would want, and may reject a settlement when the client would be better off if it were accepted. Alternatively, if the lawyer is compensated according to the conventional contingent fee arrangement--under which he is paid a fraction of any trial award or settlement but bears all of the cost of litigation--the lawyer may have an insufficient incentive to bring the case, may spend too little time working on it if it is brought, and may encourage a settlement when the client would be better off going to trial. In this article we propose a method of compensating lawyers that overcomes the conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client. Our system is a variation of the conventional contingent fee system, but, in contrast to that system, we would have the lawyer bear only a fraction of the cost of litigation--the same fraction that the lawyer obtains of the award or settlement. We demonstrate that when the fraction of the cost that the lawyer bears equals the fraction of the award or settlement that he obtains, he will have an incentive to do exactly what a knowledgeable client would want him to do with respect to accepting the case, spending time on the case, and settling the case. Under our modified contingent fee system, a third party would compensate the lawyer for a certain fraction of his costs, in return for which the lawyer would pay that party an up-front fee. In this way, the client would not bear any costs, even if the case were lost, just as under the conventional contingent fee system. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
{"title":"Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients","authors":"A. Polinsky, D. Rubinfeld","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.281628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.281628","url":null,"abstract":"The potential conflict of interest between lawyers and clients is well known. If a lawyer is paid for his time regardless of the outcome of the case, the lawyer may wish to bring the case even when it is not in the best interest of the client, may spend more hours working on the case than the client would want, and may reject a settlement when the client would be better off if it were accepted. Alternatively, if the lawyer is compensated according to the conventional contingent fee arrangement--under which he is paid a fraction of any trial award or settlement but bears all of the cost of litigation--the lawyer may have an insufficient incentive to bring the case, may spend too little time working on it if it is brought, and may encourage a settlement when the client would be better off going to trial. In this article we propose a method of compensating lawyers that overcomes the conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client. Our system is a variation of the conventional contingent fee system, but, in contrast to that system, we would have the lawyer bear only a fraction of the cost of litigation--the same fraction that the lawyer obtains of the award or settlement. We demonstrate that when the fraction of the cost that the lawyer bears equals the fraction of the award or settlement that he obtains, he will have an incentive to do exactly what a knowledgeable client would want him to do with respect to accepting the case, spending time on the case, and settling the case. Under our modified contingent fee system, a third party would compensate the lawyer for a certain fraction of his costs, in return for which the lawyer would pay that party an up-front fee. In this way, the client would not bear any costs, even if the case were lost, just as under the conventional contingent fee system. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117202463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rule 501 of the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct prohibits acts that are discreditable to the profession. A few examples are given but the Rule is basically open-ended. Supposedly aimed at protecting the public interest, the Rule can be quite self-serving. Rather than protecting the public, application of the Rule can be used to protect the profession, perhaps at the expense of the general public or at the expense of individual rights. The author suggests that the Rule be repealed.
{"title":"What Constitutes an Act Discreditable to the Profession? A Philosophical Look at a Practical Ethical Question","authors":"Robert W. McGee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.251474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.251474","url":null,"abstract":"Rule 501 of the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct prohibits acts that are discreditable to the profession. A few examples are given but the Rule is basically open-ended. Supposedly aimed at protecting the public interest, the Rule can be quite self-serving. Rather than protecting the public, application of the Rule can be used to protect the profession, perhaps at the expense of the general public or at the expense of individual rights. The author suggests that the Rule be repealed.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"2013 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133032142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter for the OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LEGAL STUDIES provides an overview of the theoretical literature in Intellectual Property, and suggests directions for further study. The emphasis is on economic analysis, but effort is made to embrace other perspectives as well.
{"title":"Intellectual Property","authors":"W. J. Gordon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.413001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.413001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter for the OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LEGAL STUDIES provides an overview of the theoretical literature in Intellectual Property, and suggests directions for further study. The emphasis is on economic analysis, but effort is made to embrace other perspectives as well.","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1985-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129409871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is a publisher's version of an article published in Victorian Bar News 2004 published by the Victorian Bar. This version is reproduced with permission from Victorian Bar News. http://www.vicbar.com.au/d.2.aspx
{"title":"The Heirs of Howe and Hummel","authors":"M. Park","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1540213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1540213","url":null,"abstract":"This is a publisher's version of an article published in Victorian Bar News 2004 published by the Victorian Bar. This version is reproduced with permission from Victorian Bar News. http://www.vicbar.com.au/d.2.aspx","PeriodicalId":318823,"journal":{"name":"Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129900209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：