Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0007
G. Rae
This chapter focuses on Giorgio Agamben’s work on biopolitical sovereignty. It focuses on Homo Sacer and State of Exception to show that Agamben links sovereign violence to the establishment of a state of exception, wherein life is controlled through its exclusion from the juridical order. With this, Agamben continues the biopolitical line that sovereignty is orientated towards the regulation of life rather than the establishment of juridical order. The second part of the chapter ties this to Agamben’s discussion of civil war to argue that, contra Foucault, Agamben holds that the fundamental division marking Western politics is not a racial one, but one between oikos and polis, private and public. From this, Agamben argues that this political division makes possible and so subtends the sovereign decision to exclude individuals from law by establishing a state of exception. The key point is that Agamben links sovereign violence to life by excluding the latter from the juridical order. The chapter concludes by critically evaluating Agamben’s proposals to overcome this.
本章主要讨论乔治·阿甘本关于生命政治主权的著作。它将重点放在神圣人(Homo Sacer)和例外状态(State of Exception)上，以表明阿甘本将主权暴力与例外状态(State of Exception)的建立联系起来，在这种状态下，生活是通过将其排除在司法秩序之外来控制的。在此基础上，阿甘本继续了生命政治的路线，即主权的目标是对生活的规范，而不是建立司法秩序。本章的第二部分将此与阿甘本对内战的讨论联系起来，认为与福柯相反，阿甘本认为标志着西方政治的基本划分不是种族划分，而是oikos和polis，私人和公共之间的划分。由此，阿甘本认为，这种政治分裂使得通过建立例外状态将个人排除在法律之外的主权决定成为可能，并因此支持了这一决定。关键的一点是，阿甘本将主权暴力与生活联系起来，将后者排除在司法秩序之外。本章以批判性地评价阿甘本的建议来结束。
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Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0009
G. Rae
This chapter provides an overview of the trajectory of the argument developed throughout the book and identifies what is insightful and innovative about the bio-juridical model; namely, that it challenges the binary ‘logic of versus’ underpinning the juridical and biopolitical models to instead propose a logic of contamination wherein apparently opposing concepts and ends meld into one another. In this respect, sovereign violence is no longer tied to a singular end, pre-defined purpose, and/or means-end logic, but is rather caught between multiple ends, none of which are clear-cut or predetermined.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"G. Rae","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides an overview of the trajectory of the argument developed throughout the book and identifies what is insightful and innovative about the bio-juridical model; namely, that it challenges the binary ‘logic of versus’ underpinning the juridical and biopolitical models to instead propose a logic of contamination wherein apparently opposing concepts and ends meld into one another. In this respect, sovereign violence is no longer tied to a singular end, pre-defined purpose, and/or means-end logic, but is rather caught between multiple ends, none of which are clear-cut or predetermined.","PeriodicalId":319604,"journal":{"name":"Critiquing Sovereign Violence","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121695672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0001
G. Rae
This chapter introduces the problematic governing the book, outlines a brief history of the concept of sovereignty from the Middle Ages up to the eighteenth century to develop the basic co-ordinates of the classic-juridical conception that forms the basis from which the three models engaged within in the book are developed against, and provides an overview of the argument and structure of the book.
{"title":"The Classic-Juridical Model","authors":"G. Rae","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the problematic governing the book, outlines a brief history of the concept of sovereignty from the Middle Ages up to the eighteenth century to develop the basic co-ordinates of the classic-juridical conception that forms the basis from which the three models engaged within in the book are developed against, and provides an overview of the argument and structure of the book.","PeriodicalId":319604,"journal":{"name":"Critiquing Sovereign Violence","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129738983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0003
G. Rae
This chapter examines Carl Schmitt’s claim that sovereignty is not divided between a legal and divine sovereign as maintained by Walter Benjamin; law is defined by a division between its explicit, statute form and the subtending power supporting and generating it. At the latter level, sovereignty is defined by the populace, who, living in a state of chaos, make a spontaneous and normless decision regarding its constitutional norms. At the former, constitutional level, Schmitt claims that there must always be an individual who makes the ultimate political decision regarding how to interpret and/or apply those norms. Famously, this requires that a decision be made regarding who is a friend and who is an enemy. Importantly, the constituting-power always subtends the constitution, making it possible that the populace will always usurp the constitutional sovereign. Schmitt’s point is that sovereignty is divisible, with the consequence that deposing constitutional sovereignty does not rely on divine action; it arises when the constituting-power subtending the constitutional sovereign demands an alternative juridical order.
{"title":"Divinity within the Law: Schmitt on the Violence of Sovereignty","authors":"G. Rae","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines Carl Schmitt’s claim that sovereignty is not divided between a legal and divine sovereign as maintained by Walter Benjamin; law is defined by a division between its explicit, statute form and the subtending power supporting and generating it. At the latter level, sovereignty is defined by the populace, who, living in a state of chaos, make a spontaneous and normless decision regarding its constitutional norms. At the former, constitutional level, Schmitt claims that there must always be an individual who makes the ultimate political decision regarding how to interpret and/or apply those norms. Famously, this requires that a decision be made regarding who is a friend and who is an enemy. Importantly, the constituting-power always subtends the constitution, making it possible that the populace will always usurp the constitutional sovereign. Schmitt’s point is that sovereignty is divisible, with the consequence that deposing constitutional sovereignty does not rely on divine action; it arises when the constituting-power subtending the constitutional sovereign demands an alternative juridical order.","PeriodicalId":319604,"journal":{"name":"Critiquing Sovereign Violence","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134245969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0002
G. Rae
Focusing on Walter Benjamin’s famous critique of violence in his 1921 essay of the same title, this chapter argues that Benjamin’s distinction between divine and legal violence also points to two distinct forms of sovereignty, one internal to law and one external to it. With this, he disrupts the classic notion that sovereignty is indivisible. Tracing the relationship between the two forms demonstrates that Benjamin develops a sophisticated account of the relationship between law and violence, undermines the classic notion that violence is instrumental to (legal) sovereignty, and shows that divine sovereign violence can justifiably usurp legal sovereign violence, thereby offering the possibility of a fresh start. However, the chapter also notes the ambiguity in Benjamin’s account regarding whether divine violence can take on (non-divine) political significance to suggest that his appeal to divine violence is an attempt to develop a just order based on an ethics of responsibility, whereby he allows that we can confront legal sovereignty in the name of create a more just legal framework, but insists that we cannot ground that decision on a transcendent principle. It concludes that Benjamin’s point is that any challenge to legal sovereign violence must emanate from a pure decision that we take responsibility for.
{"title":"Critiquing Violence: Benjamin on Law and the Divine","authors":"G. Rae","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Focusing on Walter Benjamin’s famous critique of violence in his 1921 essay of the same title, this chapter argues that Benjamin’s distinction between divine and legal violence also points to two distinct forms of sovereignty, one internal to law and one external to it. With this, he disrupts the classic notion that sovereignty is indivisible. Tracing the relationship between the two forms demonstrates that Benjamin develops a sophisticated account of the relationship between law and violence, undermines the classic notion that violence is instrumental to (legal) sovereignty, and shows that divine sovereign violence can justifiably usurp legal sovereign violence, thereby offering the possibility of a fresh start. However, the chapter also notes the ambiguity in Benjamin’s account regarding whether divine violence can take on (non-divine) political significance to suggest that his appeal to divine violence is an attempt to develop a just order based on an ethics of responsibility, whereby he allows that we can confront legal sovereignty in the name of create a more just legal framework, but insists that we cannot ground that decision on a transcendent principle. It concludes that Benjamin’s point is that any challenge to legal sovereign violence must emanate from a pure decision that we take responsibility for.","PeriodicalId":319604,"journal":{"name":"Critiquing Sovereign Violence","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123116771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0006
G. Rae
The chapter argues that Michel Foucault introduces a fundamental rupture from the classical and radical-juridical conceptions of sovereign violence by claiming that it is no longer orientated towards the establishment, preservation, or maintenance of juridical order, but is, first and foremost, orientated towards the regulation of life. In turn, this regulation depends upon the introduction of a division, which, in the 1976 lecture course Society must be Defended, Foucault identifies as a racist one that divides those deemed to be biologically acceptable from those deemed to be unacceptable. Violence is needed to save the former from the alter, with the consequence that Foucault points to a hygiene function for sovereign violence that is fundamentally different to the purpose afforded violence in juridical models.
{"title":"From Law to Life: Foucault, Sovereignty, and Biopolitical Racism","authors":"G. Rae","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter argues that Michel Foucault introduces a fundamental rupture from the classical and radical-juridical conceptions of sovereign violence by claiming that it is no longer orientated towards the establishment, preservation, or maintenance of juridical order, but is, first and foremost, orientated towards the regulation of life. In turn, this regulation depends upon the introduction of a division, which, in the 1976 lecture course Society must be Defended, Foucault identifies as a racist one that divides those deemed to be biologically acceptable from those deemed to be unacceptable. Violence is needed to save the former from the alter, with the consequence that Foucault points to a hygiene function for sovereign violence that is fundamentally different to the purpose afforded violence in juridical models.","PeriodicalId":319604,"journal":{"name":"Critiquing Sovereign Violence","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131718091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0004
G. Rae
This chapter focuses on Hannah Arendt’s claim that sovereignty is not based, as Carl Schmitt maintains, on a collective decision but on collective agreement. The chapter outlines her critique of Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s theory of sovereignty to show how she departs from the classic-juridical model, before setting out to reconstruct her own revised version of sovereignty based on an analysis of violence. Noting an ambiguity in the relationship between her earlier writings—notably a number published during the Second World War that hold violence to be an inherently political action and the Human Condition that sees violence, in the form of fabrication, as being constitutive of human action—and her later On Violence in which violence is understood to be instrumental to rather than constitutive of politics, the chapter explains the apparent contradiction through her claim that contemporary society has increasingly fetishized the means of fabrication over the end, a logic that sees all things (including humans) as pure means. To prevent this, Arendt advocates that power and violence be radically opposed. In so doing, however, she insists on an undifferentiated opposition between violence and power that was undermined by her own examples and much later thought.
{"title":"Violence and Power: Arendt on the Logic of Totalitarianism","authors":"G. Rae","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on Hannah Arendt’s claim that sovereignty is not based, as Carl Schmitt maintains, on a collective decision but on collective agreement. The chapter outlines her critique of Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s theory of sovereignty to show how she departs from the classic-juridical model, before setting out to reconstruct her own revised version of sovereignty based on an analysis of violence. Noting an ambiguity in the relationship between her earlier writings—notably a number published during the Second World War that hold violence to be an inherently political action and the Human Condition that sees violence, in the form of fabrication, as being constitutive of human action—and her later On Violence in which violence is understood to be instrumental to rather than constitutive of politics, the chapter explains the apparent contradiction through her claim that contemporary society has increasingly fetishized the means of fabrication over the end, a logic that sees all things (including humans) as pure means. To prevent this, Arendt advocates that power and violence be radically opposed. In so doing, however, she insists on an undifferentiated opposition between violence and power that was undermined by her own examples and much later thought.","PeriodicalId":319604,"journal":{"name":"Critiquing Sovereign Violence","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130875214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0005
G. Rae
This chapter engages with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s analysis of the war machine, suggesting that it contradicts Arendt’s analysis and offers the most radical critique within the radical-juridical paradigm. Premised on the notion that we must rethink sovereignty from ontological difference rather than unity, Deleuze and Guattari radically undermine the indivisibility that defines the classic-juridical conception. Far from being located in one individual or point, sovereignty is always tied to the State, which is a multiplicity that expresses the constantly moving, fluid, and dynamic field of difference. By thinking the social world in terms of heterogeneity, Deleuze and Guattari undermine the hierarchical conception of sovereignty underpinning the classic-juridical model, but continue to implicitly insist that State sovereignty is tied to the maintenance of juridical order; an order that is always threatened by or in conflict with the war machine that disrupts it. As a consequence, they conclude that sovereign order is always far more unstable and disordered than it appears to be.
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Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474445283.003.0008
G. Rae
This chapter moves from the second to third part of the book and from the biopolitical model to the bio-juridical one. The fundamental problem with the two paradigms outlined up to this point is that they set up a binary opposition between those thinkers that affirm the relationship between sovereign violence and the juridical order and those that affirm its relationship to life. The chapter focuses on Jacques Derrida’s analysis of the sovereign violence inherent in the death penalty to show that he claims that sovereign violence is not simply orientated to juridical legal order or the regulation of life through the creation of social norms, but simultaneously expresses itself through two faces—the juridical and biopolitical, or law and life—wherein the one demands and expresses the other: the juridical expression of sovereignty regulates life, whereas the sovereign’s regulation of life (and death) always takes a juridical form.
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