M. Colombo, L. Grilli, S. Murtinu, L. Piscitello, E. Piva
In this paper we use the theoretical lens of resource and competence-based perspectives and global strategic network theories to analyze the effects of international R&D alliances on the performance of high-tech start-ups. In the empirical section of the paper we consider the European Union funded international R&D alliances established by a large sample of Italian high-tech start-ups over the period from 1994 to 2003. We measure firm performance through total factor productivity and we resort to generalized method of moments system estimates to detect the treatment effect of alliance formation according to type and home country of the partners. The econometric results suggest that international R&D alliances are most beneficial to high-tech startups if i) they involve industrial partners located in a variety of countries and ii) these countries are closer to world knowledge sources.
{"title":"Effects of International R&D Alliances on Performance of High-Tech Start-Ups: A Longitudinal Analysis","authors":"M. Colombo, L. Grilli, S. Murtinu, L. Piscitello, E. Piva","doi":"10.1002/SEJ.78","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/SEJ.78","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we use the theoretical lens of resource and competence-based perspectives and global strategic network theories to analyze the effects of international R&D alliances on the performance of high-tech start-ups. In the empirical section of the paper we consider the European Union funded international R&D alliances established by a large sample of Italian high-tech start-ups over the period from 1994 to 2003. We measure firm performance through total factor productivity and we resort to generalized method of moments system estimates to detect the treatment effect of alliance formation according to type and home country of the partners. The econometric results suggest that international R&D alliances are most beneficial to high-tech startups if i) they involve industrial partners located in a variety of countries and ii) these countries are closer to world knowledge sources.","PeriodicalId":320323,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116859754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with innovations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We show that for low success probabilities of research, the incumbent can seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the efficiency effect outweighs the replacement effect. It is vice versa for high probabilities. Moreover, the incumbent specializes in “safe” research and the potential entrant in “risky” research. We also show that the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success probability. Since even at the peak entry is rather unlikely, the persistence of the monopoly is high.
{"title":"Persistence of Monopoly and Research Specialization","authors":"Philipp Weinschenk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1373764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1373764","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with innovations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We show that for low success probabilities of research, the incumbent can seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the efficiency effect outweighs the replacement effect. It is vice versa for high probabilities. Moreover, the incumbent specializes in “safe” research and the potential entrant in “risky” research. We also show that the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success probability. Since even at the peak entry is rather unlikely, the persistence of the monopoly is high.","PeriodicalId":320323,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130088862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While the variability of public equity financing has been long recognized, its impact on firms has attracted little empirical scrutiny. This paper examines one setting where theory suggests that variations in financing conditions should matter, alliances between small R&D firms and major corporations: Aghion and Tirole [1994] suggest that when financial markets are weak, assigning the control rights to the small firm may be sometimes desirable but not feasible. The performance of 200 agreements entered into by biotechnology firms between 1980 and 1995 suggests that financing availability does matter. Consistent with theory, agreements signed during periods with little external equity financing that assign the bulk of the control to the corporate partner are significantly less successful than other alliances. These agreements are also disproportionately likely to be renegotiated if financial market conditions improve.
{"title":"Do Equity Financing Cycles Matter?: Evidence from Biotechnology Alliances","authors":"Alexander C Tsai, J. Lerner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.169789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.169789","url":null,"abstract":"While the variability of public equity financing has been long recognized, its impact on firms has attracted little empirical scrutiny. This paper examines one setting where theory suggests that variations in financing conditions should matter, alliances between small R&D firms and major corporations: Aghion and Tirole [1994] suggest that when financial markets are weak, assigning the control rights to the small firm may be sometimes desirable but not feasible. The performance of 200 agreements entered into by biotechnology firms between 1980 and 1995 suggests that financing availability does matter. Consistent with theory, agreements signed during periods with little external equity financing that assign the bulk of the control to the corporate partner are significantly less successful than other alliances. These agreements are also disproportionately likely to be renegotiated if financial market conditions improve.","PeriodicalId":320323,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123923636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to economists game theory is the study of strategy, or study of actions of agents whose outcome depends on the actions of other agents. The objective of this paper is to outline the major contributions of game theory to an examination of the individual rationality of firms that causes them to seek and implement R&D alliances. We examine the answers proposed by the recent literature (since 1985) to two questions of importance: under what circumstances should a firm prefer an R&D strategic alliance to in-house development? how should an R&D strategic alliance be successfully implemented?
{"title":"Game Theory and the Logic of R&D Strategic Alliances","authors":"S. Ramani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2179268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179268","url":null,"abstract":"According to economists game theory is the study of strategy, or study of actions of agents whose outcome depends on the actions of other agents. The objective of this paper is to outline the major contributions of game theory to an examination of the individual rationality of firms that causes them to seek and implement R&D alliances. We examine the answers proposed by the recent literature (since 1985) to two questions of importance: under what circumstances should a firm prefer an R&D strategic alliance to in-house development? how should an R&D strategic alliance be successfully implemented?","PeriodicalId":320323,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128605643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study provides insights into the effects of public R&D grants on R&D input and output of firms from Germany. Previous research has shown that the allocation of R&D project grants is rather stable regarding the pool of beneficiaries. The question is whether this participation pattern can be justified by its realized effects. In addition, the impact of the grant size on the effects is investigated. Therefore, I allow to a certain extent for heterogeneous treatment effects in these two dimensions. Using a sample of about 8,500 observations, a non-parametric matching approach with multiple treatments is applied to estimate the effects of public R&D grants on firm's R&D input. The results show that particularly frequently given grants as well as medium and large grants are suitable to increase the scope of firm-financed R&D plans. For the analysis of the effects on firm's R&D output the R&D expenditures are disentangled in R&D which would have been spent in the absence of the grant and publicly induced R&D, including the grant and the effect on private R&D expenditures. Basically both types of R&D are equally productive in terms of innovative output. For the statement that a rather stable pattern of program participation leads to a lower effectiveness of the instrument no evidence has been found.
{"title":"The Effect of Subsidies on R&D Investment and Success – Do Subsidy History and Size Matter?","authors":"Birgit Aschhoff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1433275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1433275","url":null,"abstract":"This study provides insights into the effects of public R&D grants on R&D input and output of firms from Germany. Previous research has shown that the allocation of R&D project grants is rather stable regarding the pool of beneficiaries. The question is whether this participation pattern can be justified by its realized effects. In addition, the impact of the grant size on the effects is investigated. Therefore, I allow to a certain extent for heterogeneous treatment effects in these two dimensions. Using a sample of about 8,500 observations, a non-parametric matching approach with multiple treatments is applied to estimate the effects of public R&D grants on firm's R&D input. The results show that particularly frequently given grants as well as medium and large grants are suitable to increase the scope of firm-financed R&D plans. For the analysis of the effects on firm's R&D output the R&D expenditures are disentangled in R&D which would have been spent in the absence of the grant and publicly induced R&D, including the grant and the effect on private R&D expenditures. Basically both types of R&D are equally productive in terms of innovative output. For the statement that a rather stable pattern of program participation leads to a lower effectiveness of the instrument no evidence has been found.","PeriodicalId":320323,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122327644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：