Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021004
M. Desantis, M. McCarter, Abel M. Winn
We use laboratory experiments to test two self-assessment tax mechanisms for facilitating land assembly. One mechanism is incentive compatible with a complex tax function, while the other uses a flat tax rate to mitigate implementation concerns. Sellers publicly declare a price for their land. Overstating its true value is penalized by using the declared price to assess a property tax; understating its value is penalized by allowing developers to buy the property at the declared price. We find that both mechanisms increase the rate of land assembly and gains from trade relative to a control in which sellers’ price declarations have no effect on their taxes. However, these effects are statistically insignificant or transitory. The assembly rates in our selfassessment treatments are markedly higher than those of prior experimental studies in which the buyer faces bargaining frictions, such as costly delay or capital constraints. 1 Authors listed alphabetically. The current research was supported by the Mercatus Center, a private donation by Douglas and Marion Lee, and the University of Texas at San Antonio Office of the Vice President for Research.
{"title":"Laboratory Experiments of Land Assembly Without Eminent Domain","authors":"M. Desantis, M. McCarter, Abel M. Winn","doi":"10.1108/s0193-230620220000021004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0193-230620220000021004","url":null,"abstract":"We use laboratory experiments to test two self-assessment tax mechanisms for facilitating land assembly. One mechanism is incentive compatible with a complex tax function, while the other uses a flat tax rate to mitigate implementation concerns. Sellers publicly declare a price for their land. Overstating its true value is penalized by using the declared price to assess a property tax; understating its value is penalized by allowing developers to buy the property at the declared price. We find that both mechanisms increase the rate of land assembly and gains from trade relative to a control in which sellers’ price declarations have no effect on their taxes. However, these effects are statistically insignificant or transitory. The assembly rates in our selfassessment treatments are markedly higher than those of prior experimental studies in which the buyer faces bargaining frictions, such as costly delay or capital constraints. 1 Authors listed alphabetically. The current research was supported by the Mercatus Center, a private donation by Douglas and Marion Lee, and the University of Texas at San Antonio Office of the Vice President for Research.","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134106425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021007
Gregory J. DeAngelo, M. Makowsky, Bryan C. McCannon
{"title":"Not as I Do: Hypocrisy Aversion and Optimal Punishment of Common Offenses","authors":"Gregory J. DeAngelo, M. Makowsky, Bryan C. McCannon","doi":"10.1108/s0193-230620220000021007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0193-230620220000021007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123166845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021009
Blake Dunkle, R. Isaac, Philip Solimine
{"title":"The Robustness of Lemons in Experimental Markets","authors":"Blake Dunkle, R. Isaac, Philip Solimine","doi":"10.1108/s0193-230620220000021009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0193-230620220000021009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122171982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021006
Alexandros Vasios Sivvopoulos, Mark van Boening
This experiment analyzes multi-offer versions of the single-offer signaling and screening litigation games, as well as a bilateral multi-offer game. A plaintiff has either a low or a high claim on an uninformed defendant, and the two negotiate in an attempt to reach a pre-trial settlement. Trial is costly, and settlement generates surplus over which the two parties can bargain. In previous experiments, excess disputes occur even though offers contain surplus not predicted under the theory, and fairness appears to be important in explaining deviations from theory. This experiment examines whether renegotiation in the form of successive sequential offers can yield efficiency gains. There are four main findings. One, under the multi-offer structure the excess dispute rate is 23 percentage points lower in the screening game and the high-offer dispute rate is 31 percentage points lower in signaling game. The bilateral game yields an additional 15 percentage point reduction in the high-offer dispute rate, but excess disputes persist. Two, players take advantage of the multi-offer opportunity and make around 3 to 4 offers per negotiation. Three, across games the surplus in a fair offer remains constant at about onesixth of the surplus, but the benchmark from which this is measured varies according to which player has the power to make the offer. Fourth, dynamic behavior in the multi-offer games play an important but complex role in observed outcomes. Multi-offer mechanisms may be alternatives to costly information transmission like disclosure or discovery.
{"title":"Multi-Offer Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Mechanisms","authors":"Alexandros Vasios Sivvopoulos, Mark van Boening","doi":"10.1108/s0193-230620220000021006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0193-230620220000021006","url":null,"abstract":"This experiment analyzes multi-offer versions of the single-offer signaling and screening litigation games, as well as a bilateral multi-offer game. A plaintiff has either a low or a high claim on an uninformed defendant, and the two negotiate in an attempt to reach a pre-trial settlement. Trial is costly, and settlement generates surplus over which the two parties can bargain. In previous experiments, excess disputes occur even though offers contain surplus not predicted under the theory, and fairness appears to be important in explaining deviations from theory. This experiment examines whether renegotiation in the form of successive sequential offers can yield efficiency gains. There are four main findings. One, under the multi-offer structure the excess dispute rate is 23 percentage points lower in the screening game and the high-offer dispute rate is 31 percentage points lower in signaling game. The bilateral game yields an additional 15 percentage point reduction in the high-offer dispute rate, but excess disputes persist. Two, players take advantage of the multi-offer opportunity and make around 3 to 4 offers per negotiation. Three, across games the surplus in a fair offer remains constant at about onesixth of the surplus, but the benchmark from which this is measured varies according to which player has the power to make the offer. Fourth, dynamic behavior in the multi-offer games play an important but complex role in observed outcomes. Multi-offer mechanisms may be alternatives to costly information transmission like disclosure or discovery.","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116449475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1108/s0193-230620220000021002
Javier E. Portillo
{"title":"Land-Assembly Experiments: A Survey","authors":"Javier E. Portillo","doi":"10.1108/s0193-230620220000021002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0193-230620220000021002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125561779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-23DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620180000020001
Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Douglas A. Norton
{"title":"Introduction to Experimental Economics and Culture","authors":"Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Douglas A. Norton","doi":"10.1108/S0193-230620180000020001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-230620180000020001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129339885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-23DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620180000020005
Sun-Ki Chai, Dolgorsuren Dorj, Katerina Sherstyuk
We explain laboratory behavior in the dictator, ultimatum and trust games based on two cultural dimensions adopted from social and cultural anthropology: grid and group, which translate into reciprocity and altruism, respectively, in such games. Altruism and reciprocity characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We find that altruism and reciprocity attributes systematically affect behavior. Subjects with higher altruism scores offer more, accept lower offers and return more. Subjects with higher reciprocity scores are more willing to punish violators of norms by rejecting offers more often, dividing fewer dollars and returning fewer dollars in the ultimatum and trust games.
{"title":"Cultural Values and Behavior in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games: An Experimental Study","authors":"Sun-Ki Chai, Dolgorsuren Dorj, Katerina Sherstyuk","doi":"10.1108/S0193-230620180000020005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-230620180000020005","url":null,"abstract":"We explain laboratory behavior in the dictator, ultimatum and trust games based on two cultural dimensions adopted from social and cultural anthropology: grid and group, which translate into reciprocity and altruism, respectively, in such games. Altruism and reciprocity characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We find that altruism and reciprocity attributes systematically affect behavior. Subjects with higher altruism scores offer more, accept lower offers and return more. Subjects with higher reciprocity scores are more willing to punish violators of norms by rejecting offers more often, dividing fewer dollars and returning fewer dollars in the ultimatum and trust games.","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123377277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-23DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620180000020004
D. Midgley, S. Venaik, D. Christopoulos
The aim of this chapter is to: (1) model culture as a configuration of multiple values, (2) identify different culture archetypes across the globe, and (3) empirically demonstrate heterogeneity in culture archetypes within and across 52 countries. We use Schwartz values from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the archetypal analysis (AA) method to identify diverse culture archetypes within and across countries. We find significant heterogeneity in culture values archetypes within countries and homogeneity across countries, calling into question the assumption of uniform national culture values in economics and other fields. We show how the heterogeneity in culture values across the globe can be represented with a small number of distinctive archetypes. The study could be extended to include a larger set of countries, and/or cover a broader range of theoretically grounded values than those available in the Schwartz values model in the WVS. Research and practice often assume cultural homogeneity within nations and cultural diversity across nations. Our finding of different culture archetypes within countries and similar archetypes across countries demonstrates the important role of culture sharing and exchange as a source of reducing cultural conflicts between nations and enhancing creativity and innovation through interaction and integration in novel ways. We examine culture as a configuration of multiple values, and use a novel AA method to capture heterogeneity in culture values within and across countries.
{"title":"Culture as a Configuration of Values: An Archetypal Perspective","authors":"D. Midgley, S. Venaik, D. Christopoulos","doi":"10.1108/S0193-230620180000020004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-230620180000020004","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this chapter is to: (1) model culture as a configuration of multiple values, (2) identify different culture archetypes across the globe, and (3) empirically demonstrate heterogeneity in culture archetypes within and across 52 countries. We use Schwartz values from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the archetypal analysis (AA) method to identify diverse culture archetypes within and across countries. We find significant heterogeneity in culture values archetypes within countries and homogeneity across countries, calling into question the assumption of uniform national culture values in economics and other fields. We show how the heterogeneity in culture values across the globe can be represented with a small number of distinctive archetypes. The study could be extended to include a larger set of countries, and/or cover a broader range of theoretically grounded values than those available in the Schwartz values model in the WVS. Research and practice often assume cultural homogeneity within nations and cultural diversity across nations. Our finding of different culture archetypes within countries and similar archetypes across countries demonstrates the important role of culture sharing and exchange as a source of reducing cultural conflicts between nations and enhancing creativity and innovation through interaction and integration in novel ways. We examine culture as a configuration of multiple values, and use a novel AA method to capture heterogeneity in culture values within and across countries.","PeriodicalId":330367,"journal":{"name":"Research in Experimental Economics","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127769775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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