Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.32
Franz-Stefan Gady, Greg Austin
Trade in information and communications technologies (ICTs) is a new currency of international power. On the one hand, this commerce boosts national prosperity and the global economy. On the other hand, it puts capabilities for harm into the hands of potential malicious actors or political adversaries. States are scrambling to introduce new security control mechanisms through a variety of laws, regulations, and policies. These practices will have mixed results, not least because some of the more threatening elements of the trade relate to software products and even the results of basic scientific research that cannot be tracked as easily as physical goods. Enforcement of trade restrictions in this area will remain problematic. Even so, states are looking to undertake economic sanctions in this area to retaliate for the malicious behaviour in cyberspace of other states (or of criminals operating with impunity from the territory of other states). The corporate sector has emerged as an independent actor in these interstate controversies, and they have been joined by scientists and civil society activists, all pressing for a more liberal and open approach. While the unilateralist trend seems to have the upper hand for now, common interests and the imperatives of trade may force new collaborative behaviours among states.
{"title":"Global Trade and Cybersecurity","authors":"Franz-Stefan Gady, Greg Austin","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.32","url":null,"abstract":"Trade in information and communications technologies (ICTs) is a new currency of international power. On the one hand, this commerce boosts national prosperity and the global economy. On the other hand, it puts capabilities for harm into the hands of potential malicious actors or political adversaries. States are scrambling to introduce new security control mechanisms through a variety of laws, regulations, and policies. These practices will have mixed results, not least because some of the more threatening elements of the trade relate to software products and even the results of basic scientific research that cannot be tracked as easily as physical goods. Enforcement of trade restrictions in this area will remain problematic. Even so, states are looking to undertake economic sanctions in this area to retaliate for the malicious behaviour in cyberspace of other states (or of criminals operating with impunity from the territory of other states). The corporate sector has emerged as an independent actor in these interstate controversies, and they have been joined by scientists and civil society activists, all pressing for a more liberal and open approach. While the unilateralist trend seems to have the upper hand for now, common interests and the imperatives of trade may force new collaborative behaviours among states.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121261340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.55
Stuart Murdoch
This chapter considers the impact on cyber security of a shift from voluntary coordination to mandatory incident reporting. It traces the efforts to organize collaboration for cyber security incident response back to its voluntary beginnings with the establishment of CERT/CC by DARPA in response to the Morris Worm in 1988, via the establishment of ISACs then ISAOs under successive US presidents, to the CiSP in the UK following the London 2012 Olympics. Recognizing efforts to standardize and automate information sharing, the discussion touches on how information sharing has come to form the basis of national cyber strategies, forming a foundational element of internationally recognized maturity models for those strategies, and it goes on to consider the increasing move towards more mandatory incident reporting, especially in Critical National Infrastructure sectors across the globe, from the Defence Industrial Base in the United States to the NISD throughout the European Union. It considers the impact of mandating reporting on levels of collaboration overall, concluding that regulators must be careful not to create sector-specific silos or undermine existing levels of voluntary sharing through their enforcement of such mandatory schemes.
{"title":"Cybersecurity Information Sharing","authors":"Stuart Murdoch","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.55","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers the impact on cyber security of a shift from voluntary coordination to mandatory incident reporting. It traces the efforts to organize collaboration for cyber security incident response back to its voluntary beginnings with the establishment of CERT/CC by DARPA in response to the Morris Worm in 1988, via the establishment of ISACs then ISAOs under successive US presidents, to the CiSP in the UK following the London 2012 Olympics. Recognizing efforts to standardize and automate information sharing, the discussion touches on how information sharing has come to form the basis of national cyber strategies, forming a foundational element of internationally recognized maturity models for those strategies, and it goes on to consider the increasing move towards more mandatory incident reporting, especially in Critical National Infrastructure sectors across the globe, from the Defence Industrial Base in the United States to the NISD throughout the European Union. It considers the impact of mandating reporting on levels of collaboration overall, concluding that regulators must be careful not to create sector-specific silos or undermine existing levels of voluntary sharing through their enforcement of such mandatory schemes.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130465876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.16
P. Cornish
For all its apparent complexity, deterrence is built upon a relatively straightforward premise: that fear of adverse consequences can serve to prevent unacceptable behaviour. In traditional deterrence theory, particularly that which matured during the Cold War, prevention could be achieved both by fear of punishment and by fear of failure: by punitive measures that would be undertaken in response to a transgression and intended to inflict some pain, damage, or loss upon the transgressor; or by a denial posture intended to impress upon an adversary that the complexities of the defences will be technologically insurmountable and/or the costs of doing so unbearably high. Fresh thinking is required to make deterrence relevant to the cyber era. The challenges of cyber warfare are described here as the ‘four zeros’: ‘zero day’ vulnerability to novel malware; ‘zero source’ or non-attribution of an attack; ‘zero effect’ or covert, non-detectable attack; and ‘zero intent’ or lack of clarity as to an adversary’s intentions. These challenges can be met by allowing deterrence to function in different ways as circumstances allow or require: punitive, constructive, and protective deterrence.
{"title":"The Deterrence and Prevention of Cyber Conflict","authors":"P. Cornish","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.16","url":null,"abstract":"For all its apparent complexity, deterrence is built upon a relatively straightforward premise: that fear of adverse consequences can serve to prevent unacceptable behaviour. In traditional deterrence theory, particularly that which matured during the Cold War, prevention could be achieved both by fear of punishment and by fear of failure: by punitive measures that would be undertaken in response to a transgression and intended to inflict some pain, damage, or loss upon the transgressor; or by a denial posture intended to impress upon an adversary that the complexities of the defences will be technologically insurmountable and/or the costs of doing so unbearably high. Fresh thinking is required to make deterrence relevant to the cyber era. The challenges of cyber warfare are described here as the ‘four zeros’: ‘zero day’ vulnerability to novel malware; ‘zero source’ or non-attribution of an attack; ‘zero effect’ or covert, non-detectable attack; and ‘zero intent’ or lack of clarity as to an adversary’s intentions. These challenges can be met by allowing deterrence to function in different ways as circumstances allow or require: punitive, constructive, and protective deterrence.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"161 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125902738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.5
R. Broadhurst
This chapter describes the definitions and scope of cybercrime including an outline of the history of hackers and the role of criminal networks and markets in the dissemination of malicious software and other contraband such as illicit drugs, stolen credit cards and personal identification, firearms, and criminal services. Different cybercrime types and methods are described, including the widespread use of ‘social engineering’ or deception in computer misuse and identity theft. The challenges facing law enforcement in the suppression of cybercrime and the important role of private and public partnerships, as well as cross-national cooperation in the suppression of cybercrime is illustrated.
{"title":"Cybercrime: Thieves, Swindlers, Bandits, and Privateers in Cyberspace","authors":"R. Broadhurst","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.5","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes the definitions and scope of cybercrime including an outline of the history of hackers and the role of criminal networks and markets in the dissemination of malicious software and other contraband such as illicit drugs, stolen credit cards and personal identification, firearms, and criminal services. Different cybercrime types and methods are described, including the widespread use of ‘social engineering’ or deception in computer misuse and identity theft. The challenges facing law enforcement in the suppression of cybercrime and the important role of private and public partnerships, as well as cross-national cooperation in the suppression of cybercrime is illustrated.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130988302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.44
Anton Shingarev, Anastasiya Kazakova
This chapter discusses the approach of the Russian Federation in the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the context of international security and peace. After analysing the conceptual framework and definitions, as well as key distinguishing features in Russia’s approach, it gives an overview of Russia’s regulatory landscape and main legislative acts concerning cybersecurity and international security broadly. It also provides an analysis of Russian foreign policy on cybersecurity.
{"title":"The Russian Federation’s Approach to Cybersecurity","authors":"Anton Shingarev, Anastasiya Kazakova","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.44","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the approach of the Russian Federation in the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the context of international security and peace. After analysing the conceptual framework and definitions, as well as key distinguishing features in Russia’s approach, it gives an overview of Russia’s regulatory landscape and main legislative acts concerning cybersecurity and international security broadly. It also provides an analysis of Russian foreign policy on cybersecurity.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128098292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.37
T. Wingfield, Harry Wingo
This chapter describes the role of international law in cyberspace and in addressing the legality of cyber-related actions taken by countries, companies, associations, and citizens on the world stage. Cyberspace has been described as a new ‘domain’ that is radically different from the land and sea upon which international law developed, but such law either covers or is evolving to cover issues that have been under development for hundreds of years. Such coverage includes the international law principles of sovereignty, due diligence, jurisdiction, and state responsibility. International law also covers numerous specialized regimes: human rights, diplomatic and consular law, law of the sea, air law, space law, and international telecommunications law. Another developing area of international law and cyberspace concerns international peace and security with respect to cyber activities, but those issues lead right up to the threshold of conflict. The once theoretical and purely academic literature of cybercrime, cyber espionage, and, especially, cyberwar must now be applied to real-world cases, and law and policy for the future of cybersecurity must be formulated with an understanding of these broadly accepted international norms.
{"title":"International Law for Cyberspace","authors":"T. Wingfield, Harry Wingo","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.37","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes the role of international law in cyberspace and in addressing the legality of cyber-related actions taken by countries, companies, associations, and citizens on the world stage. Cyberspace has been described as a new ‘domain’ that is radically different from the land and sea upon which international law developed, but such law either covers or is evolving to cover issues that have been under development for hundreds of years. Such coverage includes the international law principles of sovereignty, due diligence, jurisdiction, and state responsibility. International law also covers numerous specialized regimes: human rights, diplomatic and consular law, law of the sea, air law, space law, and international telecommunications law. Another developing area of international law and cyberspace concerns international peace and security with respect to cyber activities, but those issues lead right up to the threshold of conflict. The once theoretical and purely academic literature of cybercrime, cyber espionage, and, especially, cyberwar must now be applied to real-world cases, and law and policy for the future of cybersecurity must be formulated with an understanding of these broadly accepted international norms.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115594073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.10
Florian J. Egloff
This chapter focuses on intentions and cyberterrorists. In defining cyberterrorism as the use, or threat of use, of cyberspace to deliver violence, through the disruption or destruction of digital data, the chapter captures potentially novel behaviour. It highlights the claims made by intelligence officials about terrorists’ intentions of using cyberspace. It then interrogates to what extent this matches the literature on terrorist motivations and intentions, and whether cyberspace is an attractive means for carrying out terrorist attacks. Finding that a simple cost–benefit analysis does not favour cyberspace as a means of carrying out terrorist acts, the chapter interrogates the vectors of change both on the intentions and capability side of the assessment. It closes with the analysis of a hypothetical case that would match the definition of cyberterror: a religiously inspired version of the Ashley Madison hack.
{"title":"Intentions and Cyberterrorism","authors":"Florian J. Egloff","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.10","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on intentions and cyberterrorists. In defining cyberterrorism as the use, or threat of use, of cyberspace to deliver violence, through the disruption or destruction of digital data, the chapter captures potentially novel behaviour. It highlights the claims made by intelligence officials about terrorists’ intentions of using cyberspace. It then interrogates to what extent this matches the literature on terrorist motivations and intentions, and whether cyberspace is an attractive means for carrying out terrorist attacks. Finding that a simple cost–benefit analysis does not favour cyberspace as a means of carrying out terrorist acts, the chapter interrogates the vectors of change both on the intentions and capability side of the assessment. It closes with the analysis of a hypothetical case that would match the definition of cyberterror: a religiously inspired version of the Ashley Madison hack.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"1048 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123146218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.51
P. Cornish
Cyberspace offers immense benefits and opportunities as well as considerable threats and hazards. It is routinely exploited by a variety of adversaries, aggressors, and predators: hostile states; political extremists and terrorists; businesses practising commercial espionage and theft; individuals and criminal organizations undertaking financial fraud and trafficking in people, armaments, and narcotics; and individual so-called ‘nuisance’ hackers. The efficient and effective response to these threats and hazards is what cybersecurity is all about. The idea that cybersecurity could also have a larger, more comprehensive, and progressive goal might seem to some to be fanciful: an unrealistic and other-worldly response to the very real possibility of encountering substantial harm in and from cyberspace. Yet, the threat/response dynamic, compelling though it is, is surely not all there is to say about cybersecurity: it should be possible for cybersecurity to have a larger goal than the endless pursuit of (defensive) advantage over an adversary. If cyberspace can be valued as much as feared, then the broader purpose of cybersecurity could be not only to disable threats as they arise but also to enable the positive opportunities offered by the information revolution. Cybersecurity must also address the ordering (i.e. safety, security, and governance) of nothing less than a global digital ecosystem that is taking shape rapidly and beneficially, at every level and in every field of human activity. It is both possible and necessary to combine both perspectives—protection from and progress towards—in one account, as this Handbook of Cybersecurity has shown.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"P. Cornish","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.51","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.51","url":null,"abstract":"Cyberspace offers immense benefits and opportunities as well as considerable threats and hazards. It is routinely exploited by a variety of adversaries, aggressors, and predators: hostile states; political extremists and terrorists; businesses practising commercial espionage and theft; individuals and criminal organizations undertaking financial fraud and trafficking in people, armaments, and narcotics; and individual so-called ‘nuisance’ hackers. The efficient and effective response to these threats and hazards is what cybersecurity is all about. The idea that cybersecurity could also have a larger, more comprehensive, and progressive goal might seem to some to be fanciful: an unrealistic and other-worldly response to the very real possibility of encountering substantial harm in and from cyberspace. Yet, the threat/response dynamic, compelling though it is, is surely not all there is to say about cybersecurity: it should be possible for cybersecurity to have a larger goal than the endless pursuit of (defensive) advantage over an adversary. If cyberspace can be valued as much as feared, then the broader purpose of cybersecurity could be not only to disable threats as they arise but also to enable the positive opportunities offered by the information revolution. Cybersecurity must also address the ordering (i.e. safety, security, and governance) of nothing less than a global digital ecosystem that is taking shape rapidly and beneficially, at every level and in every field of human activity. It is both possible and necessary to combine both perspectives—protection from and progress towards—in one account, as this Handbook of Cybersecurity has shown.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125309984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.2
Greg Austin
The technological revolution outlined in the previous chapter has unleashed a social upheaval. If a suite of machines came to be so central in global and national social order, as well as in our personal lives, how does that affect our security? Bearing in mind that we are only at the dawn of the cyber age, what will the future hold? This chapter gives an overview of the profound impact of the information revolution on human welfare for better and for worse, from the individual and community levels to the national and international levels. The chapter begins with some insight into how philosophers have viewed these questions. It then looks at how leading actors have responded to the opportunities and threats. The chapter’s most important single theme is the issue of dependency, arguably the most ignored security aspect of the information age.
{"title":"Opportunity, Threat, and Dependency in the Social Infosphere","authors":"Greg Austin","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.2","url":null,"abstract":"The technological revolution outlined in the previous chapter has unleashed a social upheaval. If a suite of machines came to be so central in global and national social order, as well as in our personal lives, how does that affect our security? Bearing in mind that we are only at the dawn of the cyber age, what will the future hold? This chapter gives an overview of the profound impact of the information revolution on human welfare for better and for worse, from the individual and community levels to the national and international levels. The chapter begins with some insight into how philosophers have viewed these questions. It then looks at how leading actors have responded to the opportunities and threats. The chapter’s most important single theme is the issue of dependency, arguably the most ignored security aspect of the information age.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129867396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-04DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.31
D. Fidler
As private-sector enterprises became dependent on Internet-enabled technologies, cybersecurity threats developed into serious problems in international political economy. This chapter analyses how states use international organizations to address these threats. The chapter explains why international organizations were not prominent in the Internet’s emergence and impact on transnational trade and investment. It examines the main threats companies face, including cybercrime, economic cyber espionage, government surveillance and hacking, innovation in digital technologies, and poor corporate cyber defences. International organizations have been most involved in fighting cybercrime, but these efforts have not been successful. International organizations do not play significant roles in countering other cybersecurity threats in global commerce. The chapter argues that international organizations are unlikely to become more important in the future because geopolitics and shifts in domestic politics in democracies will make collective action on cybersecurity in global commerce more difficult.
{"title":"Cybersecurity, Global Commerce, and International Organizations","authors":"D. Fidler","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.31","url":null,"abstract":"As private-sector enterprises became dependent on Internet-enabled technologies, cybersecurity threats developed into serious problems in international political economy. This chapter analyses how states use international organizations to address these threats. The chapter explains why international organizations were not prominent in the Internet’s emergence and impact on transnational trade and investment. It examines the main threats companies face, including cybercrime, economic cyber espionage, government surveillance and hacking, innovation in digital technologies, and poor corporate cyber defences. International organizations have been most involved in fighting cybercrime, but these efforts have not been successful. International organizations do not play significant roles in countering other cybersecurity threats in global commerce. The chapter argues that international organizations are unlikely to become more important in the future because geopolitics and shifts in domestic politics in democracies will make collective action on cybersecurity in global commerce more difficult.","PeriodicalId":336846,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128735041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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