Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108615594.004
Kate Baldwin, Pia J. Raffler
Traditional leaders and customary governance institutions remain important, especially at the local level, in many low-income countries. Indeed, many observers have noted a recent resurgence in the importance of traditional institutions (Englebert, 2002; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2015; Logan, 2009), contrary to the expectations and goals of modernists (Mamdani, 1996). The persistence and revival of these institutions is particularly obvious in Africa (Baldwin, 2016b; Logan, 2013), but has also been noted in Latin America (Dı́az-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Van Cott, 2008) and Asia (Henley and Davidson, 2008; Murtazashvili, 2016). As a result, aid agencies are constantly making choices about how best to interact with traditional leaders. In programming areas as diverse as justice, the environment, security sector reform, public health and community empowerment, donors need to decide how to treat traditional chiefs, whether it be by adopting conscious strategies of engagement, choosing deliberate policies of avoidance, or taking ad hoc decisions based on the logistical needs in specific settings.1 In light of this, the goal of this chapter is to review recent evidence on the effects of traditional leaders on locally organized public goods provision, government performance and electoral accountability, with an eye to informing future choices by policymakers and program coordinators. This topic is relevant to aid agencies working in diverse geographic areas, although as an empirical matter, most academic research on this topic has been conducted in sub-Saharan Africa. ⇤Department of Political Science, Yale University, katharine.baldwin@yale.edu. †Department of Government, Harvard University, praffler@fas.harvard.edu. 1For examples of each of these types of choices, see Sheely (2013b), Denney (2013), and Vajja and White (2006) respectively.
{"title":"Traditional Leaders, Service Delivery, and Electoral Accountability","authors":"Kate Baldwin, Pia J. Raffler","doi":"10.1017/9781108615594.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108615594.004","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional leaders and customary governance institutions remain important, especially at the local level, in many low-income countries. Indeed, many observers have noted a recent resurgence in the importance of traditional institutions (Englebert, 2002; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2015; Logan, 2009), contrary to the expectations and goals of modernists (Mamdani, 1996). The persistence and revival of these institutions is particularly obvious in Africa (Baldwin, 2016b; Logan, 2013), but has also been noted in Latin America (Dı́az-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Van Cott, 2008) and Asia (Henley and Davidson, 2008; Murtazashvili, 2016). As a result, aid agencies are constantly making choices about how best to interact with traditional leaders. In programming areas as diverse as justice, the environment, security sector reform, public health and community empowerment, donors need to decide how to treat traditional chiefs, whether it be by adopting conscious strategies of engagement, choosing deliberate policies of avoidance, or taking ad hoc decisions based on the logistical needs in specific settings.1 In light of this, the goal of this chapter is to review recent evidence on the effects of traditional leaders on locally organized public goods provision, government performance and electoral accountability, with an eye to informing future choices by policymakers and program coordinators. This topic is relevant to aid agencies working in diverse geographic areas, although as an empirical matter, most academic research on this topic has been conducted in sub-Saharan Africa. ⇤Department of Political Science, Yale University, katharine.baldwin@yale.edu. †Department of Government, Harvard University, praffler@fas.harvard.edu. 1For examples of each of these types of choices, see Sheely (2013b), Denney (2013), and Vajja and White (2006) respectively.","PeriodicalId":338737,"journal":{"name":"Decentralized Governance and Accountability","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131655925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108615594.005
J. Rodden
{"title":"Decentralized Rule and Revenue","authors":"J. Rodden","doi":"10.1017/9781108615594.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108615594.005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338737,"journal":{"name":"Decentralized Governance and Accountability","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131274318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108615594.002
Erik Wibbels
Accountable governance is defined by four elements: First, the definition of interests on the part of citizens and groups of citizens; second, the aggregation or accumulation of those interests via some “technology”, whether it be by an election, lobby, or social media; third, the translation of those preferences into government behavior; and fourth, a means whereby citizens can evaluate the quality of government behavior. Decentralization has the potential to impact each of these links. Most of the rigorous thinking on how it does so has been institutional in nature. In other words, it has focused on how formal rules governing elections, leadership selection, fiscal federalism, etc. impact political accountability. Donor programming and accompanying impact evaluations, on the other hand, have focused less on institutions and more on mobilizing civil society and “social accountability”, i.e. on approaches to informing and mobilizing citizens such that they might become better participants in politics. These programming efforts have progressed with considerable normative enthusiasm but without, for the most part, reference to recent academic breakthroughs on the social conditions for cooperative behavior and collective action. The goal of this chapter is to consider how recent innovations in the study of information flows and cooperation in social networks might inform donor programming on social accountability. Research on social networks provides insights into the relational characteristics of communities that are certain to impact the prospects for accountability, and gives rigorous underpinnings into the frequent, if underspecified, claim that “context matters”.
{"title":"The Social Underpinnings of Decentralized Governance","authors":"Erik Wibbels","doi":"10.1017/9781108615594.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108615594.002","url":null,"abstract":"Accountable governance is defined by four elements: First, the definition of interests on the part of citizens and groups of citizens; second, the aggregation or accumulation of those interests via some “technology”, whether it be by an election, lobby, or social media; third, the translation of those preferences into government behavior; and fourth, a means whereby citizens can evaluate the quality of government behavior. Decentralization has the potential to impact each of these links. Most of the rigorous thinking on how it does so has been institutional in nature. In other words, it has focused on how formal rules governing elections, leadership selection, fiscal federalism, etc. impact political accountability. Donor programming and accompanying impact evaluations, on the other hand, have focused less on institutions and more on mobilizing civil society and “social accountability”, i.e. on approaches to informing and mobilizing citizens such that they might become better participants in politics. These programming efforts have progressed with considerable normative enthusiasm but without, for the most part, reference to recent academic breakthroughs on the social conditions for cooperative behavior and collective action. The goal of this chapter is to consider how recent innovations in the study of information flows and cooperation in social networks might inform donor programming on social accountability. Research on social networks provides insights into the relational characteristics of communities that are certain to impact the prospects for accountability, and gives rigorous underpinnings into the frequent, if underspecified, claim that “context matters”.","PeriodicalId":338737,"journal":{"name":"Decentralized Governance and Accountability","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115399889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108615594.007
Edmund J. Malesky
{"title":"Decentralization and Business Performance","authors":"Edmund J. Malesky","doi":"10.1017/9781108615594.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108615594.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338737,"journal":{"name":"Decentralized Governance and Accountability","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123136107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108615594.009
Fotini Christia
{"title":"Decentralization in Post-Conflict Settings","authors":"Fotini Christia","doi":"10.1017/9781108615594.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108615594.009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338737,"journal":{"name":"Decentralized Governance and Accountability","volume":"178 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126914009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108615594.011
T. Dunning
{"title":"Decentralization and Ethnic Diversity","authors":"T. Dunning","doi":"10.1017/9781108615594.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108615594.011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338737,"journal":{"name":"Decentralized Governance and Accountability","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123989955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108615594.006
Jan H Pierskalla
{"title":"The Proliferation of Decentralized Governing Units","authors":"Jan H Pierskalla","doi":"10.1017/9781108615594.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108615594.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338737,"journal":{"name":"Decentralized Governance and Accountability","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131143042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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