It is our great pleasure to welcome you to the SafeConfig'16 Workshop. This workshop is in its 9th year, each one focusing on different aspect of cyber systems. The 2016 workshop focuses on the testing and validation of cyber systems, specifically those involving active security and resilient systems. The premise is existing tools and methods for security assessments are necessary but insufficient for scientifically rigorous testing and evaluation of resilient and active cyber systems. This workshop will explore and discuss scientifically sound testing regimen(s) that will continuously and dynamically probe, attack, and "test" the various resilient and active technologies. This concept necessitates potentially wholesale new developments to ensure that resilientand agile-aware security testing is available to the research community. All testing, validation and experimentation must also be repeatable, reproducible, subject to scientific scrutiny, measurable and meaningful to both researchers and practitioners. The call for papers attracted submissions from Asia, Europe, and the United States. Of the 13 papers submitted, the program committee recommended acceptance of 6 for an overall acceptance rate of 46%. In addition to the six accepted papers, we are also excited to have one keynote and a panel to examine this topic from an academic, business, and government point of view. The first keynote, Configuring Software and Systems for Defense-in-Depth will be given by Dr. Trent Jaeger from Penn State University. He will discuss how achieving defense in depth has a significant component in configuration. In particular, he advocates configuring security requirements for various layers of software defenses (e.g., privilege separation, authorization, and auditing) and generating software and systems defenses that implement such configurations (mostly) automatically. Dr. Jaeger will focus mainly on the challenge of retrofitting software with authorization code automatically to demonstrate the configuration problems faced by the community, and discuss how we may leverage these lessons to configuring software and systems for defense in depth. The second keynote, From Cyber Security to Collaborative Cyber Resilience, will be given by Dr. George Sharkov, the Cybersecurity Coordinator for the Bulgarian Government. Dr. Sharkov will discuss his view of a holistic approach to cyber resilience as a means of preparing for the "unknown unknowns". He will also discuss the multi-stakeholder engagement needed and the complementarity of governance, law, and business/industry initiatives. He will end with an example of the collaborative model in the Bulgarian national strategy and its multi-national engagements. Finally, we will have a panel of experts from diverse backgrounds to discuss their perspective of the subject of this workshop. The specific participants include: Ehab Al-Shaer, University of North Carolina Charlotte Bob Cowles, BrightLite Information
我们非常高兴地欢迎您参加16年安全经济研讨会。这个研讨会已经是第9个年头了，每次都关注网络系统的不同方面。2016年研讨会的重点是网络系统的测试和验证，特别是那些涉及主动安全和弹性系统的系统。前提是现有的安全评估工具和方法是必要的，但不足以对有弹性和活跃的网络系统进行科学严格的测试和评估。本次研讨会将探索和讨论科学合理的测试方案，将持续和动态地探测，攻击和“测试”各种弹性和主动技术。这个概念需要潜在的大规模新开发，以确保研究社区可以使用弹性和敏捷性安全测试。所有的测试、验证和实验也必须是可重复的、可再现的、接受科学审查的、可测量的、对研究人员和从业者都有意义的。论文征集活动吸引了来自亚洲、欧洲和美国的投稿。在提交的13篇论文中，计划委员会建议接受6篇，总体录取率为46%。除了六篇被接受的论文外，我们还很高兴有一个主题演讲和一个小组从学术、商业和政府的角度来研究这个话题。第一个主题演讲“配置纵深防御的软件和系统”将由宾夕法尼亚州立大学的Trent Jaeger博士发表。他将讨论如何实现纵深防御在配置中具有重要组成部分。特别是，他提倡为软件防御的各个层配置安全需求(例如，特权分离、授权和审计)，并生成自动实现这些配置的软件和系统防御。Jaeger博士将主要关注使用授权代码自动改造软件的挑战，以演示社区面临的配置问题，并讨论我们如何利用这些经验来配置软件和系统以进行深度防御。第二个主题演讲，从网络安全到协同网络弹性，将由保加利亚政府网络安全协调员George Sharkov博士发表。Sharkov博士将讨论他对网络复原力的整体方法的看法，这是为“未知的未知”做准备的一种手段。他还将讨论所需的多方利益相关者参与以及治理、法律和商业/行业倡议的互补性。最后，他将举例说明保加利亚国家战略及其多国参与中的合作模式。最后，我们将邀请来自不同背景的专家小组讨论他们对本次研讨会主题的看法。具体与会者包括:Ehab Al-Shaer、北卡罗来纳大学Charlotte Bob Cowles、BrightLite信息安全Jorge Cuellar、西门子公司Christopher Oehmen、太平洋西北国家实验室Gregory Shannon、白宫科技政策办公室
{"title":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","authors":"Nicholas J. Multari, A. Singhal, David O. Manz","doi":"10.1145/2994475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475","url":null,"abstract":"It is our great pleasure to welcome you to the SafeConfig'16 Workshop. This workshop is in its 9th year, each one focusing on different aspect of cyber systems. The 2016 workshop focuses on the testing and validation of cyber systems, specifically those involving active security and resilient systems. The premise is existing tools and methods for security assessments are necessary but insufficient for scientifically rigorous testing and evaluation of resilient and active cyber systems. This workshop will explore and discuss scientifically sound testing regimen(s) that will continuously and dynamically probe, attack, and \"test\" the various resilient and active technologies. This concept necessitates potentially wholesale new developments to ensure that resilientand agile-aware security testing is available to the research community. All testing, validation and experimentation must also be repeatable, reproducible, subject to scientific scrutiny, measurable and meaningful to both researchers and practitioners. \u0000 \u0000The call for papers attracted submissions from Asia, Europe, and the United States. Of the 13 papers submitted, the program committee recommended acceptance of 6 for an overall acceptance rate of 46%. In addition to the six accepted papers, we are also excited to have one keynote and a panel to examine this topic from an academic, business, and government point of view. \u0000 \u0000The first keynote, Configuring Software and Systems for Defense-in-Depth will be given by Dr. Trent Jaeger from Penn State University. He will discuss how achieving defense in depth has a significant component in configuration. In particular, he advocates configuring security requirements for various layers of software defenses (e.g., privilege separation, authorization, and auditing) and generating software and systems defenses that implement such configurations (mostly) automatically. Dr. Jaeger will focus mainly on the challenge of retrofitting software with authorization code automatically to demonstrate the configuration problems faced by the community, and discuss how we may leverage these lessons to configuring software and systems for defense in depth. \u0000 \u0000The second keynote, From Cyber Security to Collaborative Cyber Resilience, will be given by Dr. George Sharkov, the Cybersecurity Coordinator for the Bulgarian Government. Dr. Sharkov will discuss his view of a holistic approach to cyber resilience as a means of preparing for the \"unknown unknowns\". He will also discuss the multi-stakeholder engagement needed and the complementarity of governance, law, and business/industry initiatives. He will end with an example of the collaborative model in the Bulgarian national strategy and its multi-national engagements. \u0000 \u0000Finally, we will have a panel of experts from diverse backgrounds to discuss their perspective of the subject of this workshop. The specific participants include: \u0000Ehab Al-Shaer, University of North Carolina Charlotte \u0000Bob Cowles, BrightLite Information","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117088099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The computer security community has long advocated defense in depth, building multiple layers of defense to protect a system. Realizing this vision is not yet practical, as software often ships with inadequate defenses, typically developed in an ad hoc fashion. Currently, programmers reason about security manually and lack tools to validate assurance that security controls provide satisfactory defenses. In this keynote talk, I will discuss how achieving defense in depth has a significant component in configuration. In particular, we advocate configuring security requirements for various layers of software defenses (e.g., privilege separation, authorization, and auditing) and generating software and systems defenses that implement such configurations (mostly) automatically. I will focus mainly on the challenge of retrofitting software with authorization code automatically to demonstrate the configuration problems faced by the community, and discuss how we may leverage these lessons to configuring software and systems for defense in depth.
{"title":"Configuring Software and Systems for Defense-in-Depth","authors":"T. Jaeger","doi":"10.1145/2994475.2994483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475.2994483","url":null,"abstract":"The computer security community has long advocated defense in depth, building multiple layers of defense to protect a system. Realizing this vision is not yet practical, as software often ships with inadequate defenses, typically developed in an ad hoc fashion. Currently, programmers reason about security manually and lack tools to validate assurance that security controls provide satisfactory defenses. In this keynote talk, I will discuss how achieving defense in depth has a significant component in configuration. In particular, we advocate configuring security requirements for various layers of software defenses (e.g., privilege separation, authorization, and auditing) and generating software and systems defenses that implement such configurations (mostly) automatically. I will focus mainly on the challenge of retrofitting software with authorization code automatically to demonstrate the configuration problems faced by the community, and discuss how we may leverage these lessons to configuring software and systems for defense in depth.","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130402258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nicholas J. Multari, A. Singhal, David O. Manz, Robert Cowles, Jorge Cuéllar, C. Oehmen, G. Shannon
The premise of the SafeConfig'16 Workshop is existing tools and methods for security assessments are necessary but insufficient for scientifically rigorous testing and evaluation of resilient and active cyber systems. The objective for this workshop is the exploration and discussion of scientifically sound testing regimen(s) that will continuously and dynamically probe, attack, and "test" the various resilient and active technologies. This adaptation and change in focus necessitates at the very least modification, and potentially, wholesale new developments to ensure that resilient- and agile-aware security testing is available to the research community. All testing, validation and experimentation must also be repeatable, reproducible, subject to scientific scrutiny, measurable and meaningful to both researchers and practitioners. The workshop will convene a panel of experts to explore this concept. The topic will be discussed from three different perspectives. One perspective is that of the practitioner. We will explore whether active and resilient technologies are or are planned for deployment and whether the verification methodology affects that decision. The second perspective will be that of the research community. We will address the shortcomings of current approaches and the research directions needed to address the practitioner's concerns. The third perspective is that of the policy community. Specifically, we will explore the dynamics between technology, verification, and policy.
{"title":"SafeConfig'16: Testing and Evaluation for Active & Resilient Cyber Systems Panel Verification of Active and Resilient Systems: Practical or Utopian?","authors":"Nicholas J. Multari, A. Singhal, David O. Manz, Robert Cowles, Jorge Cuéllar, C. Oehmen, G. Shannon","doi":"10.1145/2994475.2994486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475.2994486","url":null,"abstract":"The premise of the SafeConfig'16 Workshop is existing tools and methods for security assessments are necessary but insufficient for scientifically rigorous testing and evaluation of resilient and active cyber systems. The objective for this workshop is the exploration and discussion of scientifically sound testing regimen(s) that will continuously and dynamically probe, attack, and \"test\" the various resilient and active technologies. This adaptation and change in focus necessitates at the very least modification, and potentially, wholesale new developments to ensure that resilient- and agile-aware security testing is available to the research community. All testing, validation and experimentation must also be repeatable, reproducible, subject to scientific scrutiny, measurable and meaningful to both researchers and practitioners. The workshop will convene a panel of experts to explore this concept. The topic will be discussed from three different perspectives. One perspective is that of the practitioner. We will explore whether active and resilient technologies are or are planned for deployment and whether the verification methodology affects that decision. The second perspective will be that of the research community. We will address the shortcomings of current approaches and the research directions needed to address the practitioner's concerns. The third perspective is that of the policy community. Specifically, we will explore the dynamics between technology, verification, and policy.","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"402 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115978902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most cyber network attacks begin with an adversary gaining a foothold within the network and proceed with lateral movement until a desired goal is achieved. The mechanism by which lateral movement occurs varies but the basic signature of hopping between hosts by exploiting vulnerabilities is the same. Because of the nature of the vulnerabilities typically exploited, lateral movement is very difficult to detect and defend against. In this paper we define a dynamic reachability graph model of the network to discover possible paths that an adversary could take using different vulnerabilities, and how those paths evolve over time. We use this reachability graph to develop dynamic machine-level and network-level impact scores. Lateral movement mitigation strategies which make use of our impact scores are also discussed, and we detail an example using a freely available data set.
{"title":"A Graph-Based Impact Metric for Mitigating Lateral Movement Cyber Attacks","authors":"Emilie Purvine, John R. Johnson, C. Lo","doi":"10.1145/2994475.2994476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475.2994476","url":null,"abstract":"Most cyber network attacks begin with an adversary gaining a foothold within the network and proceed with lateral movement until a desired goal is achieved. The mechanism by which lateral movement occurs varies but the basic signature of hopping between hosts by exploiting vulnerabilities is the same. Because of the nature of the vulnerabilities typically exploited, lateral movement is very difficult to detect and defend against. In this paper we define a dynamic reachability graph model of the network to discover possible paths that an adversary could take using different vulnerabilities, and how those paths evolve over time. We use this reachability graph to develop dynamic machine-level and network-level impact scores. Lateral movement mitigation strategies which make use of our impact scores are also discussed, and we detail an example using a freely available data set.","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133622876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Panel Session","authors":"David O. Manz","doi":"10.1145/3252798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3252798","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131388995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Prevention, Detection and Metrics","authors":"David O. Manz","doi":"10.1145/3252797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3252797","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133277717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fabio De Gaspari, S. Jajodia, L. Mancini, Agostino Panico
Active defense is a popular defense technique based on systems that hinder an attacker's progress by design, rather than reactively responding to an attack only after its detection. Well-known active defense systems are honeypots. Honeypots are fake systems, designed to look like real production systems, aimed at trapping an attacker, and analyzing his attack strategy and goals. These types of systems suffer from a major weakness: it is extremely hard to design them in such a way that an attacker cannot distinguish them from a real production system. In this paper, we advocate that, instead of adding additional fake systems in the corporate network, the production systems themselves should be instrumented to provide active defense capabilities. This perspective to active defense allows containing costs and complexity, while at the same time provides the attacker with a more realistic-looking target, and gives the Incident Response Team more time to identify the attacker. The proposed proof-of-concept prototype system can be used to implement active defense in any corporate production network, with little upfront work, and little maintenance.
{"title":"AHEAD: A New Architecture for Active Defense","authors":"Fabio De Gaspari, S. Jajodia, L. Mancini, Agostino Panico","doi":"10.1145/2994475.2994481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475.2994481","url":null,"abstract":"Active defense is a popular defense technique based on systems that hinder an attacker's progress by design, rather than reactively responding to an attack only after its detection. Well-known active defense systems are honeypots. Honeypots are fake systems, designed to look like real production systems, aimed at trapping an attacker, and analyzing his attack strategy and goals. These types of systems suffer from a major weakness: it is extremely hard to design them in such a way that an attacker cannot distinguish them from a real production system. In this paper, we advocate that, instead of adding additional fake systems in the corporate network, the production systems themselves should be instrumented to provide active defense capabilities. This perspective to active defense allows containing costs and complexity, while at the same time provides the attacker with a more realistic-looking target, and gives the Incident Response Team more time to identify the attacker. The proposed proof-of-concept prototype system can be used to implement active defense in any corporate production network, with little upfront work, and little maintenance.","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129433913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefan Marksteiner, Harald Lernbeiß, Bernhard Jandl-Scherf
As today's organizational computer networks are ever evolving and becoming more and more complex, finding potential vulnerabilities and conducting security audits has become a crucial element in securing these networks. The first step in auditing a network is reconnaissance by mapping it to get a comprehensive overview over its structure. The growing complexity, however, makes this task increasingly effortful, even more as mapping (instead of plain scanning), presently, still involves a lot of manual work. Therefore, the concept proposed in this paper automates the scanning and mapping of unknown and non-cooperative computer networks in order to find security weaknesses or verify access controls. It further helps to conduct audits by allowing comparing documented with actual networks and finding unauthorized network devices, as well as evaluating access control methods by conducting delta scans. It uses a novel approach of augmenting data from iteratively chained existing scanning tools with context, using genuine analytics modules to allow assessing a network's topology instead of just generating a list of scanned devices. It further contains a visualization model that provides a clear, lucid topology map and a special graph for comparative analysis. The goal is to provide maximum insight with a minimum of a priori knowledge.
{"title":"An Iterative and Toolchain-Based Approach to Automate Scanning and Mapping Computer Networks","authors":"Stefan Marksteiner, Harald Lernbeiß, Bernhard Jandl-Scherf","doi":"10.1145/2994475.2994479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475.2994479","url":null,"abstract":"As today's organizational computer networks are ever evolving and becoming more and more complex, finding potential vulnerabilities and conducting security audits has become a crucial element in securing these networks. The first step in auditing a network is reconnaissance by mapping it to get a comprehensive overview over its structure. The growing complexity, however, makes this task increasingly effortful, even more as mapping (instead of plain scanning), presently, still involves a lot of manual work. Therefore, the concept proposed in this paper automates the scanning and mapping of unknown and non-cooperative computer networks in order to find security weaknesses or verify access controls. It further helps to conduct audits by allowing comparing documented with actual networks and finding unauthorized network devices, as well as evaluating access control methods by conducting delta scans. It uses a novel approach of augmenting data from iteratively chained existing scanning tools with context, using genuine analytics modules to allow assessing a network's topology instead of just generating a list of scanned devices. It further contains a visualization model that provides a clear, lucid topology map and a special graph for comparative analysis. The goal is to provide maximum insight with a minimum of a priori knowledge.","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123954992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents the holistic approach to cyber resilience as a means of preparing for the "unknown unknowns". Principles of augmented cyber risks management and resilience management model at national level are presented, with elaboration on multi-stakeholder engagement and partnership for the implementation of national cyber resilience collaborative framework. The complementarity of governance, law, and business/industry initiatives is outlined, with examples of the collaborative resilience model for the Bulgarian national strategy and its multi-national engagements.
{"title":"From Cybersecurity to Collaborative Resiliency","authors":"George Sharkov","doi":"10.1145/2994475.2994484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475.2994484","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the holistic approach to cyber resilience as a means of preparing for the \"unknown unknowns\". Principles of augmented cyber risks management and resilience management model at national level are presented, with elaboration on multi-stakeholder engagement and partnership for the implementation of national cyber resilience collaborative framework. The complementarity of governance, law, and business/industry initiatives is outlined, with examples of the collaborative resilience model for the Bulgarian national strategy and its multi-national engagements.","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122542703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Architectures, configurations and verification","authors":"Nicholas J. Multari","doi":"10.1145/3252796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3252796","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124949210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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