We examine the current state of the U.S. public corporation and how it has evolved over the last 40 years. After falling by 50 percent since its peak in 1997, the number of public corporations is now smaller than 40 years ago. These corporations are now much larger and over the last twenty years have become much older; they invest differently, as the average firm invests more in RD and compared to the 1990s, the ratio of investment to assets is lower, especially for large firms. Public firms have record high cash holdings and, in most recent years, the average firm has more cash than long-term debt. Measuring profitability by the ratio of earnings to assets, the average firm is less profitable, but that is driven by smaller firms. Earnings of public firms have become more concentrated – the top 200 firms in profits earn as much as all public firms combined. Firms’ total payouts to shareholders as a percent of earnings are at record levels. Possible explanations for the current state of the public corporation include a decrease in the net benefits of being a public company, changes in financial intermediation, technological change, globalization, and consolidation through mergers.
{"title":"Is the U.S. Public Corporation in Trouble?","authors":"Kathleen M. Kahle, René M. Stulz","doi":"10.1257/JEP.31.3.67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/JEP.31.3.67","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the current state of the U.S. public corporation and how it has evolved over the last 40 years. After falling by 50 percent since its peak in 1997, the number of public corporations is now smaller than 40 years ago. These corporations are now much larger and over the last twenty years have become much older; they invest differently, as the average firm invests more in RD and compared to the 1990s, the ratio of investment to assets is lower, especially for large firms. Public firms have record high cash holdings and, in most recent years, the average firm has more cash than long-term debt. Measuring profitability by the ratio of earnings to assets, the average firm is less profitable, but that is driven by smaller firms. Earnings of public firms have become more concentrated – the top 200 firms in profits earn as much as all public firms combined. Firms’ total payouts to shareholders as a percent of earnings are at record levels. Possible explanations for the current state of the public corporation include a decrease in the net benefits of being a public company, changes in financial intermediation, technological change, globalization, and consolidation through mergers.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115104658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Department of Public Enterprises had made submissions of Self Evaluation Reports, for the purpose of corporate governance, mandatory for all central government owned enterprises. Despite this, an alarming 40% of the enterprises did not do so. This study examines the impact of external policy tools and internal firm specific factors on corporate governance of central public sector enterprises (CPSEs). We use a dataset of all manufacturing and non-financial services owned by the central government of India for the year 2010-11. Using probit, ordered logit and Heckman’s sample selection models, the study finds that the probability and quality of corporate governance is positively influenced by the CPSE getting into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the central government of India, and hence, enjoying more autonomy in terms of day to day operations. Besides these, internal factors, including bigger size and lower debt size contribute significantly to better corporate governance.
{"title":"Pawn or Potentates: Corporate Governance in Indian Central Public Sector Enterprises","authors":"Ritika Jain, Dr. Rajnish Kumar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2746288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2746288","url":null,"abstract":"The Department of Public Enterprises had made submissions of Self Evaluation Reports, for the purpose of corporate governance, mandatory for all central government owned enterprises. Despite this, an alarming 40% of the enterprises did not do so. This study examines the impact of external policy tools and internal firm specific factors on corporate governance of central public sector enterprises (CPSEs). We use a dataset of all manufacturing and non-financial services owned by the central government of India for the year 2010-11. Using probit, ordered logit and Heckman’s sample selection models, the study finds that the probability and quality of corporate governance is positively influenced by the CPSE getting into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the central government of India, and hence, enjoying more autonomy in terms of day to day operations. Besides these, internal factors, including bigger size and lower debt size contribute significantly to better corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131680470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate earnings management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) being a block trade target in China. Some block trades transfer control rights of SOEs to private parties (STP transactions) while others sell shares to another SOE (STS transactions). We find that SOEs manage earnings more upward in STP transactions than in STS transactions. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that SOEs charge higher prices when in STP than in STS. These results are consistent with the idea that target firms engage in earnings management especially when there is serious information asymmetry between bidders and targets.
{"title":"Earnings management of state-owned enterprises as a target: Evidence from China","authors":"Liping Dong, Konari Uchida, Yuyang Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3344462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3344462","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate earnings management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) being a block trade target in China. Some block trades transfer control rights of SOEs to private parties (STP transactions) while others sell shares to another SOE (STS transactions). We find that SOEs manage earnings more upward in STP transactions than in STS transactions. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that SOEs charge higher prices when in STP than in STS. These results are consistent with the idea that target firms engage in earnings management especially when there is serious information asymmetry between bidders and targets.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130671291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how reserve requirements influence the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel in China while also taking into account the role of bank ownership. The implementation of Chinese monetary policy is characterized by the reliance on the reserve requirements as a regular policy tool with frequent adjustments. Using a large dataset of 170 Chinese banks for the period 2004-2013, we analyze the reaction of loan supply to changes in reserve requirements. We find no evidence of the bank lending channel through the use of reserve requirements. We observe, nonetheless, that changes in reserve requirements influence loan growth of banks. The same findings hold true for other monetary policy instruments. Further, we show that the bank ownership format influences transmission of monetary policy.
{"title":"Reserve Requirements and the Bank Lending Channel in China","authors":"Zuzana Fungáčová, Riikka Nuutilainen, L. Weill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2668105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2668105","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how reserve requirements influence the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel in China while also taking into account the role of bank ownership. The implementation of Chinese monetary policy is characterized by the reliance on the reserve requirements as a regular policy tool with frequent adjustments. Using a large dataset of 170 Chinese banks for the period 2004-2013, we analyze the reaction of loan supply to changes in reserve requirements. We find no evidence of the bank lending channel through the use of reserve requirements. We observe, nonetheless, that changes in reserve requirements influence loan growth of banks. The same findings hold true for other monetary policy instruments. Further, we show that the bank ownership format influences transmission of monetary policy.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127936986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Banking sector is one of the fastest growing sectors in India. Today’s banking sector becoming more complex. The objective of this study is to analyze the Financial Position and Performance of the Bank of Baroda and Punjab National Bank in India based on their financial characteristics. This study attempts to measure the relative performance of Indian banks. For this study, we have used public sector banks. We know that in the service sector, it is difficult to quantify the output because it is intangible. We have chosen the CAMEL model and t-test which measures the performance of bank from each of the important parameter like capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earning quality, liquidity and Sensitivity.
{"title":"A Comparative Study on Financial Performance of Public Sector Banks in India: An Analysis on Camel Model","authors":"H. Karri, K. Meghani, B. M. Mishra","doi":"10.12816/0019081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12816/0019081","url":null,"abstract":"Banking sector is one of the fastest growing sectors in India. Today’s banking sector becoming more complex. The objective of this study is to analyze the Financial Position and Performance of the Bank of Baroda and Punjab National Bank in India based on their financial characteristics. This study attempts to measure the relative performance of Indian banks. For this study, we have used public sector banks. We know that in the service sector, it is difficult to quantify the output because it is intangible. We have chosen the CAMEL model and t-test which measures the performance of bank from each of the important parameter like capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earning quality, liquidity and Sensitivity.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123966776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The presence of the State as a dominant shareholder adds an additional complexity to the corporate governance challenges in organizations as often the State has goals that are different from the goals of the classic private shareholder who only seeks private gain.While corporate governance issues, arising from the role of the State as a dominant shareholder, are a sub set of the broader issues that arises from the role of a dominant shareholder, in expropriating minority shareholder rights in an organization, there is a fundamental difference between the position of minority shareholders in a State owned Enterprise (SoE) as compared to the position of minority shareholders in a normal business enterprise. The mere act of publicly listing SoEs does not turn them into capitalist entities whose principal aim changes to maximizing the value of the enterprise; post listing the inherent conflict between broader "national interest" (pursued by the State) and the "minority interest" (pursued by the minority shareholders) often continues in SoEs leading to a principal-principal problem between two sets of shareholders who may have different objectives. Privatization of SoEs inherently sets new terms for the relationship between the state and private capital which could give the latter an edge particularly in the transition period when SoEs are privatized. Investors, often minority shareholders, who have bought into such enterprises on listing, may declare any policy that restrict profiteering, in the guise of development, as amounting to oppression of the minority shareholders and may attempt to cow the State down. However, given that the value of the listed state entity arises, in most of the cases, from its monopoly position or from assets created earlier with public money or from assets/rights granted to the entity by the State, an obvious question that arises is to what extent are the new minority shareholders (after listing) entitled to claim exclusive rights on the value unlocked (post listing) and whether the State, as the majority shareholder, is justified in protecting its own interests (which would include broader social interests), however wrong they may be in the eyes of the new minority shareholders.The disinvestment program in India has been going through the throes of the minority versus majority debate and the challenge is to find an equitable position between the two extreme positions – one where the majority owners view the company’s objective as being run to serve the public interest and not necessarily to maximize its profits and the other where the minority owners go to the extent of holding the board members to be in breach of their fiduciary responsibility when they meekly toe the line in respect of the decision taken by the State, as the majority owner of the enterprise.This paper provides a snap shot of the disinvestment program in India and, in the backdrop of international best practices, draws some useful lessons through an ana
{"title":"Listed State Owned Enterprises (SoEs) and the Treatment of Minority Shareholders – Case Studies from India.","authors":"S. Pande","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2570888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2570888","url":null,"abstract":"The presence of the State as a dominant shareholder adds an additional complexity to the corporate governance challenges in organizations as often the State has goals that are different from the goals of the classic private shareholder who only seeks private gain.While corporate governance issues, arising from the role of the State as a dominant shareholder, are a sub set of the broader issues that arises from the role of a dominant shareholder, in expropriating minority shareholder rights in an organization, there is a fundamental difference between the position of minority shareholders in a State owned Enterprise (SoE) as compared to the position of minority shareholders in a normal business enterprise. The mere act of publicly listing SoEs does not turn them into capitalist entities whose principal aim changes to maximizing the value of the enterprise; post listing the inherent conflict between broader \"national interest\" (pursued by the State) and the \"minority interest\" (pursued by the minority shareholders) often continues in SoEs leading to a principal-principal problem between two sets of shareholders who may have different objectives. Privatization of SoEs inherently sets new terms for the relationship between the state and private capital which could give the latter an edge particularly in the transition period when SoEs are privatized. Investors, often minority shareholders, who have bought into such enterprises on listing, may declare any policy that restrict profiteering, in the guise of development, as amounting to oppression of the minority shareholders and may attempt to cow the State down. However, given that the value of the listed state entity arises, in most of the cases, from its monopoly position or from assets created earlier with public money or from assets/rights granted to the entity by the State, an obvious question that arises is to what extent are the new minority shareholders (after listing) entitled to claim exclusive rights on the value unlocked (post listing) and whether the State, as the majority shareholder, is justified in protecting its own interests (which would include broader social interests), however wrong they may be in the eyes of the new minority shareholders.The disinvestment program in India has been going through the throes of the minority versus majority debate and the challenge is to find an equitable position between the two extreme positions – one where the majority owners view the company’s objective as being run to serve the public interest and not necessarily to maximize its profits and the other where the minority owners go to the extent of holding the board members to be in breach of their fiduciary responsibility when they meekly toe the line in respect of the decision taken by the State, as the majority owner of the enterprise.This paper provides a snap shot of the disinvestment program in India and, in the backdrop of international best practices, draws some useful lessons through an ana","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"95 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122540402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-07-29DOI: 10.1163/9789004282254_017
Ji Li
The rise of state-owned companies and sovereign wealth funds (together SOEs) poses many new questions for the regime of investor-state arbitration. Extant literature treats all SOEs the same and limits its focus to the doctrinal treatment of SOEs. This article, by studying Chinese SOEs, demonstrates the complexity of the structure and management of SOEs and their relations with the State. This paper constructs an analytic framework for properly treating SOEs under the current system. The four factor model (distance from the political centre, characteristics of state ownership, sector, and SOE leadership) may facilitate ICSID tribunals' decision-making with regard to the standing of SOE investors and the application of attribution rules.
{"title":"State-Owned Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration","authors":"Ji Li","doi":"10.1163/9789004282254_017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004282254_017","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of state-owned companies and sovereign wealth funds (together SOEs) poses many new questions for the regime of investor-state arbitration. Extant literature treats all SOEs the same and limits its focus to the doctrinal treatment of SOEs. This article, by studying Chinese SOEs, demonstrates the complexity of the structure and management of SOEs and their relations with the State. This paper constructs an analytic framework for properly treating SOEs under the current system. The four factor model (distance from the political centre, characteristics of state ownership, sector, and SOE leadership) may facilitate ICSID tribunals' decision-making with regard to the standing of SOE investors and the application of attribution rules.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124460246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
State-controlled listed firms in China receive preferential treatment when borrowing from commercial banks; in contrast, private controlled firms rely on informal finance and on trade credit. We argue for and find evidence that private firms located in higher social trust regions use more trade credit from suppliers, extend more trade credit to customers, and collect receivables and pay payables more quickly. These findings are enhanced for firms located in provinces with weak protection of property rights. Our results are robust to different measures of social trust, legal environment, and endogeneity. Overall, our results show that social trust helps private firms overcome institutional difficulties in financing their activities.
{"title":"Trust and the Provision of Trade Credit","authors":"Wenfeng Wu, M. Firth, Oliver M. Rui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2721475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2721475","url":null,"abstract":"State-controlled listed firms in China receive preferential treatment when borrowing from commercial banks; in contrast, private controlled firms rely on informal finance and on trade credit. We argue for and find evidence that private firms located in higher social trust regions use more trade credit from suppliers, extend more trade credit to customers, and collect receivables and pay payables more quickly. These findings are enhanced for firms located in provinces with weak protection of property rights. Our results are robust to different measures of social trust, legal environment, and endogeneity. Overall, our results show that social trust helps private firms overcome institutional difficulties in financing their activities.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132353556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-10-01DOI: 10.5089/9781484392805.001.A001
Jesus R. Gonzalez-Garcia, F. Grigoli
State-owned banks may help to soften the financing constraints of public sector entities and consequently become a factor that hampers fiscal discipline. Using a panel dataset, we find that a larger presence of state-owned banks in the banking system is associated with more credit to the public sector, larger fiscal deficits, higher public debt ratios, and the crowding out of credit to the private sector. These results suggest that the lending practices of state-owned banks should be carefully assessed in any strategy to pursue fiscal discipline.
{"title":"State-Owned Banks and Fiscal Discipline","authors":"Jesus R. Gonzalez-Garcia, F. Grigoli","doi":"10.5089/9781484392805.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484392805.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"State-owned banks may help to soften the financing constraints of public sector entities and consequently become a factor that hampers fiscal discipline. Using a panel dataset, we find that a larger presence of state-owned banks in the banking system is associated with more credit to the public sector, larger fiscal deficits, higher public debt ratios, and the crowding out of credit to the private sector. These results suggest that the lending practices of state-owned banks should be carefully assessed in any strategy to pursue fiscal discipline.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134358684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-03-27DOI: 10.21102/irbrp.2015.03.111.08
Sébastien Dereeper, Q. Trinh
The process firms use to choose their capital structures is explained by different corporate finance theories in which trade-off and pecking order are the two most popular hypotheses. Testing these two models will help to determine whether a target debt ratio exists, and if so, how rapidly firms adjust their current leverage levels to match this target level. The findings in this paper determined that the pecking order theory might not be applied in Vietnam when internal funds and new equity issuance are independent with the leverage level. In contrast, our empirical results proved that the long-run target debt ratio does exist in the Vietnamese market. The partial adjustment model has shown that both private firms and state-owned firms rapidly adjust to their optimal levels of debt. However, the state ownership structure does not affect the amount of debt taken during the year by the firms.
{"title":"Trade-Off Theory or Pecking Order Theory with a State-Ownership Structure: The Vietnam Case","authors":"Sébastien Dereeper, Q. Trinh","doi":"10.21102/irbrp.2015.03.111.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21102/irbrp.2015.03.111.08","url":null,"abstract":"The process firms use to choose their capital structures is explained by different corporate finance theories in which trade-off and pecking order are the two most popular hypotheses. Testing these two models will help to determine whether a target debt ratio exists, and if so, how rapidly firms adjust their current leverage levels to match this target level. The findings in this paper determined that the pecking order theory might not be applied in Vietnam when internal funds and new equity issuance are independent with the leverage level. In contrast, our empirical results proved that the long-run target debt ratio does exist in the Vietnamese market. The partial adjustment model has shown that both private firms and state-owned firms rapidly adjust to their optimal levels of debt. However, the state ownership structure does not affect the amount of debt taken during the year by the firms.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120969782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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