Pub Date : 2019-11-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0002
P. Carruthers
If animals lack mental states altogether then of course they can’t be capable of phenomenal consciousness, either. And even assuming that they have mental states, it would be natural to think that much might turn on just how sophisticated the minds of various species of animal are, and on the extent of the discontinuities between human and animal minds. The present chapter argues against strong discontinuity views. It also considers evidence of working memory, planning, self-control, metacognition, and language in animals, which are especially relevant to later discussions. I argue that there is significant and widespread support for the first three, but little evidence supporting metacognition or language.
{"title":"Animal minds","authors":"P. Carruthers","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"If animals lack mental states altogether then of course they can’t be capable of phenomenal consciousness, either. And even assuming that they have mental states, it would be natural to think that much might turn on just how sophisticated the minds of various species of animal are, and on the extent of the discontinuities between human and animal minds. The present chapter argues against strong discontinuity views. It also considers evidence of working memory, planning, self-control, metacognition, and language in animals, which are especially relevant to later discussions. I argue that there is significant and widespread support for the first three, but little evidence supporting metacognition or language.","PeriodicalId":347213,"journal":{"name":"Human and Animal Minds","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125560274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0001
P. Carruthers
This chapter does some initial—but important—ground-clearing and foundation-building. It starts by drawing a number of distinctions, more precisely delineating the target, and setting the terms for the debates that follow. It explains some of the different things that people mean by “consciousness,” in particular, as well as some of the claims that have been made about the nature of consciousness. The chapter also argues in support of a pair of substantive theses on the topic that will be relied upon later. Specifically, it argues that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively nonconceptual in nature, and that it doesn’t admit of degrees: it is either categorically present or categorically absent. Finally, the chapter situates the topic in relation to the traditional problem of other minds.
{"title":"Important preliminaries","authors":"P. Carruthers","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter does some initial—but important—ground-clearing and foundation-building. It starts by drawing a number of distinctions, more precisely delineating the target, and setting the terms for the debates that follow. It explains some of the different things that people mean by “consciousness,” in particular, as well as some of the claims that have been made about the nature of consciousness. The chapter also argues in support of a pair of substantive theses on the topic that will be relied upon later. Specifically, it argues that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively nonconceptual in nature, and that it doesn’t admit of degrees: it is either categorically present or categorically absent. Finally, the chapter situates the topic in relation to the traditional problem of other minds.","PeriodicalId":347213,"journal":{"name":"Human and Animal Minds","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131136411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0007
P. Carruthers
This chapter argues that if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals. But this is not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of this conclusion turns on the idea that while global broadcasting is all-or-nothing in the human mind, it is framed in terms that imply gradations across species. Yet our concept of phenomenal consciousness doesn’t permit mental states to be to some degree conscious. Moreover, the first-person concepts that give rise to the problem of consciousness cannot intelligibly be projected into minds significantly different from our own.
{"title":"Consciousness in animals","authors":"P. Carruthers","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198843702.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals. But this is not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of this conclusion turns on the idea that while global broadcasting is all-or-nothing in the human mind, it is framed in terms that imply gradations across species. Yet our concept of phenomenal consciousness doesn’t permit mental states to be to some degree conscious. Moreover, the first-person concepts that give rise to the problem of consciousness cannot intelligibly be projected into minds significantly different from our own.","PeriodicalId":347213,"journal":{"name":"Human and Animal Minds","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122639028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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