Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.15
K. Gelber
This chapter studies the idea that the best remedy for speech with which one disagrees, or which one finds intolerable, is to engage in counter-speech, to speak back. This view, that speech will expose lies and silence will not, and that engaging in more speech is educative and therefore the appropriate remedy to speech with which one disagrees, is attractive because it engages one’s sense of fair play and justice. Given some of the free speech challenges facing the globe today, understanding the contours of counter-speech appears more important than it has ever been. The chapter then traces the origins of the idea of speaking back and its connection with theories of freedom of speech. It shows the contours of the debate around when it is, or may not be, appropriate to rely on speaking back as the preferred remedy to bad speech. The chapter also outlines alternative conceptions of speaking back, which suggest that effective speaking back requires that both it and free speech be thought of in positive, and not negative, terms. Speaking back is essential to participatory political discourse, and its realization requires more than the traditional negative conception of freedom of speech implies.
{"title":"Speaking Back","authors":"K. Gelber","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.15","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter studies the idea that the best remedy for speech with which one disagrees, or which one finds intolerable, is to engage in counter-speech, to speak back. This view, that speech will expose lies and silence will not, and that engaging in more speech is educative and therefore the appropriate remedy to speech with which one disagrees, is attractive because it engages one’s sense of fair play and justice. Given some of the free speech challenges facing the globe today, understanding the contours of counter-speech appears more important than it has ever been. The chapter then traces the origins of the idea of speaking back and its connection with theories of freedom of speech. It shows the contours of the debate around when it is, or may not be, appropriate to rely on speaking back as the preferred remedy to bad speech. The chapter also outlines alternative conceptions of speaking back, which suggest that effective speaking back requires that both it and free speech be thought of in positive, and not negative, terms. Speaking back is essential to participatory political discourse, and its realization requires more than the traditional negative conception of freedom of speech implies.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128438239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.24
F. Schauer
This chapter studies the relationship between free speech and commercial advertising. In the contemporary world, a substantial percentage of the universe of public communication consists of advertising. Speech offering to sell goods and services, typically with inducements to purchase, and often including the price and other conditions of the proposed sale, is a ubiquitous part of modern life. An important question in the theory and practice of freedom of speech is the extent to which, if at all, such communications should be protected against government regulation. Given that the United States is something of a protective outlier on free speech questions generally, even when compared to other liberal industrialized democracies, it is not surprising that free speech protection for commercial advertising is more robust in American law than it is anywhere else in the world. But the question has arisen in many other countries that profess to take the freedom of speech seriously, and thus the chapter will deal with the question of free speech protection for commercial advertising of some sort and to some degree as a question with worldwide implications, and with both theoretical and doctrinal dimensions. It is common in much of the relevant literature to refer to the topic under discussion as ‘commercial speech’.
{"title":"Free Speech and Commercial Advertising","authors":"F. Schauer","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.24","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter studies the relationship between free speech and commercial advertising. In the contemporary world, a substantial percentage of the universe of public communication consists of advertising. Speech offering to sell goods and services, typically with inducements to purchase, and often including the price and other conditions of the proposed sale, is a ubiquitous part of modern life. An important question in the theory and practice of freedom of speech is the extent to which, if at all, such communications should be protected against government regulation. Given that the United States is something of a protective outlier on free speech questions generally, even when compared to other liberal industrialized democracies, it is not surprising that free speech protection for commercial advertising is more robust in American law than it is anywhere else in the world. But the question has arisen in many other countries that profess to take the freedom of speech seriously, and thus the chapter will deal with the question of free speech protection for commercial advertising of some sort and to some degree as a question with worldwide implications, and with both theoretical and doctrinal dimensions. It is common in much of the relevant literature to refer to the topic under discussion as ‘commercial speech’.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130390697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.26
Gautam Bhatia
This chapter examines religious speech, and the tensions between religion and freedom of expression. As a wide-ranging system of moral beliefs and commitments, religion, by its very nature, assigns to the freedom of expression a particular place in its hierarchical order of values. In non-theocratic States, this may clash with the (higher) normative value accorded to the freedom of expression under the secular order. Religious claims themselves will often be made from within the constitutional system: that is, the State’s own constitutional commitment to protect religious freedom will be invoked to argue that, in certain domains, the secular order must defer to religion’s hierarchy of values. This may include the subordination of religious expression to revealed religious truth. Disputes will often also involve contestation over a constellation of other constitutional norms, such as the commitment to maintaining diversity and pluralism, the right to equality and cultural dissent, and not least, the imperatives of public order. Consequently, such disputes raise a host of complex issues. The State’s adjudicatory authorities must decide whether to attempt an accommodation between the conflicting claims of religion and free speech, or privilege one over the other. The chapter then discusses the role of religion in censorship.
{"title":"Religious Speech","authors":"Gautam Bhatia","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.26","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines religious speech, and the tensions between religion and freedom of expression. As a wide-ranging system of moral beliefs and commitments, religion, by its very nature, assigns to the freedom of expression a particular place in its hierarchical order of values. In non-theocratic States, this may clash with the (higher) normative value accorded to the freedom of expression under the secular order. Religious claims themselves will often be made from within the constitutional system: that is, the State’s own constitutional commitment to protect religious freedom will be invoked to argue that, in certain domains, the secular order must defer to religion’s hierarchy of values. This may include the subordination of religious expression to revealed religious truth. Disputes will often also involve contestation over a constellation of other constitutional norms, such as the commitment to maintaining diversity and pluralism, the right to equality and cultural dissent, and not least, the imperatives of public order. Consequently, such disputes raise a host of complex issues. The State’s adjudicatory authorities must decide whether to attempt an accommodation between the conflicting claims of religion and free speech, or privilege one over the other. The chapter then discusses the role of religion in censorship.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124053570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.25
Alon Harel
This chapter highlights hate speech, which is abusive speech that targets members of certain groups—typically minority groups—including racial groups, ethnic groups, religious groups, and groups defined on the basis of sexual orientation. Most groups protected by hate speech legislation are groups that have been subjected to past discriminatory treatment. However, the restrictions on hate speech legislation have often been expanded and the proper scope of the groups that deserve protection have been subject to a fierce debate. While much of hate speech can be legitimately prohibited by standard recognized legal exceptions to free speech, such as fighting words or incitement to violence, other forms of hate speech cannot. To address the prevalence of hate speech as such, many legal systems prohibit some forms of hate speech and impose criminal or civil sanctions for violating such prohibitions. Those systems need to address the serious challenge of defining the category of hate speech, draw its boundaries, and determine the sanctions. The chapter then explores the moral and political arguments for and against the legal regulation of hate speech as such or, at least, some sub-categories of hate speech.
{"title":"Hate Speech","authors":"Alon Harel","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.25","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter highlights hate speech, which is abusive speech that targets members of certain groups—typically minority groups—including racial groups, ethnic groups, religious groups, and groups defined on the basis of sexual orientation. Most groups protected by hate speech legislation are groups that have been subjected to past discriminatory treatment. However, the restrictions on hate speech legislation have often been expanded and the proper scope of the groups that deserve protection have been subject to a fierce debate. While much of hate speech can be legitimately prohibited by standard recognized legal exceptions to free speech, such as fighting words or incitement to violence, other forms of hate speech cannot. To address the prevalence of hate speech as such, many legal systems prohibit some forms of hate speech and impose criminal or civil sanctions for violating such prohibitions. Those systems need to address the serious challenge of defining the category of hate speech, draw its boundaries, and determine the sanctions. The chapter then explores the moral and political arguments for and against the legal regulation of hate speech as such or, at least, some sub-categories of hate speech.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134348751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.3
William P. Marshall
This chapter investigates the complexities of the truth justification for freedom of speech. According to this rationale, protecting freedom of speech creates a marketplace of ideas in which truth ultimately prevails over falsity. Speech therefore must not be restricted because to do so would inhibit this search for truth. The chapter then presents brief accounts of how the truth justification developed, how it has been applied in United States First Amendment jurisprudence, and how it has been accepted in legal systems outside the United States. It also explores the reasons that have been advanced in defence of the truth justification and the attacks that have been raised against its validity. Finally, the chapter discusses another possible explanation in support of the truth justification—that the search for truth provides a valuable narrative for human existence even if the goal of discovering truth is unlikely to be realized.
{"title":"The Truth Justification for Freedom of Speech","authors":"William P. Marshall","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.3","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates the complexities of the truth justification for freedom of speech. According to this rationale, protecting freedom of speech creates a marketplace of ideas in which truth ultimately prevails over falsity. Speech therefore must not be restricted because to do so would inhibit this search for truth. The chapter then presents brief accounts of how the truth justification developed, how it has been applied in United States First Amendment jurisprudence, and how it has been accepted in legal systems outside the United States. It also explores the reasons that have been advanced in defence of the truth justification and the attacks that have been raised against its validity. Finally, the chapter discusses another possible explanation in support of the truth justification—that the search for truth provides a valuable narrative for human existence even if the goal of discovering truth is unlikely to be realized.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133789227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.23
M. Tushnet
This chapter explores the problem of incorporating music and art into a theory of freedom of speech without also including a far wider range of human activities. Constitution writers and scholars of free expression agree that music and art are covered by principles of free expression. Exactly why they are is a bit unclear, but the unclarity has few practical implications. Examination of the coverage of music and art, though, may reveal something about free expression theory. It may show that that theory deals with subjects sharing a family resemblance rather than resting upon ‘foundations’. If so, the examination has significant theoretical implications—and almost no practical ones. Democratic governments rarely attempt to coercively regulate art and music.
{"title":"Music and Art","authors":"M. Tushnet","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.23","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the problem of incorporating music and art into a theory of freedom of speech without also including a far wider range of human activities. Constitution writers and scholars of free expression agree that music and art are covered by principles of free expression. Exactly why they are is a bit unclear, but the unclarity has few practical implications. Examination of the coverage of music and art, though, may reveal something about free expression theory. It may show that that theory deals with subjects sharing a family resemblance rather than resting upon ‘foundations’. If so, the examination has significant theoretical implications—and almost no practical ones. Democratic governments rarely attempt to coercively regulate art and music.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130107688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.27
C. Estlund
This chapter addresses the implications for democratic government of employment-based limitations on freedom of speech. The workplace is a distinctive expressive domain because the ‘censor’ and the speaker are typically bound together by an employment contract that affords the former a large measure of hierarchical control over the latter. The employer, having hired the employee to do a job, has legitimate interests in regulating some employee speech. The employee, for their part, is typically dependent on the employer for their livelihood, and vulnerable to the employer’s overreaching beyond those legitimate interests. Those features of the employment relationship give rise to a distinct set of questions about the value and limits of free speech in the workplace setting, public or private. The chapter then focuses on how US law, primarily constitutional law but also non-constitutional law, has dealt with those questions. While the US law governing freedom of expression in the workplace is unique in some ways, the problems it deals with will arise in any society that both recognizes the value of freedom of expression and channels labour into the production of goods and services largely through the institution of employment.
{"title":"Freedom of Expression in the Workplace","authors":"C. Estlund","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.27","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the implications for democratic government of employment-based limitations on freedom of speech. The workplace is a distinctive expressive domain because the ‘censor’ and the speaker are typically bound together by an employment contract that affords the former a large measure of hierarchical control over the latter. The employer, having hired the employee to do a job, has legitimate interests in regulating some employee speech. The employee, for their part, is typically dependent on the employer for their livelihood, and vulnerable to the employer’s overreaching beyond those legitimate interests. Those features of the employment relationship give rise to a distinct set of questions about the value and limits of free speech in the workplace setting, public or private. The chapter then focuses on how US law, primarily constitutional law but also non-constitutional law, has dealt with those questions. While the US law governing freedom of expression in the workplace is unique in some ways, the problems it deals with will arise in any society that both recognizes the value of freedom of expression and channels labour into the production of goods and services largely through the institution of employment.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132009163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.10
F. Schauer
This chapter assesses the question of coverage of the right to freedom of speech. Beneath the language and complexities of the question of coverage, and apart from the misleading question, ‘what is speech?’, is a much simpler question that is necessarily the first question always to be asked: ‘is this a free speech dispute?’. The question of coverage is this question. At times the answer will be determined by an authoritative text. At times it will be answered by examining the underlying point of a distinct and weighty principle of free speech. And at times the answer will be so obviously ‘yes’ or ‘no’ that one may not even recognize that the question is there. But the question, whether explicit or implicit, is always there. Labelling the question as the question of coverage, and distinguishing between coverage and protection, brings to the surface a component that is necessarily part of addressing any free speech issue and any free speech dispute.
{"title":"What Is Speech? The Question of Coverage","authors":"F. Schauer","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.10","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses the question of coverage of the right to freedom of speech. Beneath the language and complexities of the question of coverage, and apart from the misleading question, ‘what is speech?’, is a much simpler question that is necessarily the first question always to be asked: ‘is this a free speech dispute?’. The question of coverage is this question. At times the answer will be determined by an authoritative text. At times it will be answered by examining the underlying point of a distinct and weighty principle of free speech. And at times the answer will be so obviously ‘yes’ or ‘no’ that one may not even recognize that the question is there. But the question, whether explicit or implicit, is always there. Labelling the question as the question of coverage, and distinguishing between coverage and protection, brings to the surface a component that is necessarily part of addressing any free speech issue and any free speech dispute.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122162868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.1
C. Macleod
This chapter discuses Chapter Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, ‘On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion’, which is the best-known defence of free speech in the philosophical canon. It suggests that Mill’s argument in chapter two of On Liberty is a distinctively epistemic argument, and one which relies on a specific conception of man’s cognitive nature and the character of human knowledge. There is a strong connection between Mill’s Freedom of Discussion Principle and the way in which human beings come to know the world. The chapter then identifies what Mill means to rule out by his argument—what, in short, freedom of discussion is freedom from—and what he means to rule in. It also considers the relation between the Freedom of Discussion Principle and its better known sibling, the Harm Principle, and the conditions under which these principles are applicable.
{"title":"Mill on the Liberty of Thought and Discussion","authors":"C. Macleod","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198827580.013.1","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discuses Chapter Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, ‘On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion’, which is the best-known defence of free speech in the philosophical canon. It suggests that Mill’s argument in chapter two of On Liberty is a distinctively epistemic argument, and one which relies on a specific conception of man’s cognitive nature and the character of human knowledge. There is a strong connection between Mill’s Freedom of Discussion Principle and the way in which human beings come to know the world. The chapter then identifies what Mill means to rule out by his argument—what, in short, freedom of discussion is freedom from—and what he means to rule in. It also considers the relation between the Freedom of Discussion Principle and its better known sibling, the Harm Principle, and the conditions under which these principles are applicable.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123780972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.4324/9781315254999-25
Ioanna Tourkochoriti
This chapter discusses the concept of privacy and case law which shows the different approaches between Europe and the US concerning the balancing of freedom of speech when it conflicts with other rights. Judges and scholars also refer to the concept of human dignity in this area. The concept of dignity can serve in the US in order to limit freedom of expression, whereas it serves in Europe as a foundation of the need to limit freedom of expression. The requirement for government transparency creates a presumption in favour of protecting expression. The extended interpretation of ‘privacy’ in the law of many European states means depriving the public debate from information that would be crucial to a well-informed electorate. The chapter then looks at the intermediate concepts that judges have come up with in order to balance the exercise of rights in conflict. Those criteria concern the periphery of the activities that are to be protected by the right to privacy. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the right to be forgotten.
{"title":"Privacy and Speech","authors":"Ioanna Tourkochoriti","doi":"10.4324/9781315254999-25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315254999-25","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the concept of privacy and case law which shows the different approaches between Europe and the US concerning the balancing of freedom of speech when it conflicts with other rights. Judges and scholars also refer to the concept of human dignity in this area. The concept of dignity can serve in the US in order to limit freedom of expression, whereas it serves in Europe as a foundation of the need to limit freedom of expression. The requirement for government transparency creates a presumption in favour of protecting expression. The extended interpretation of ‘privacy’ in the law of many European states means depriving the public debate from information that would be crucial to a well-informed electorate. The chapter then looks at the intermediate concepts that judges have come up with in order to balance the exercise of rights in conflict. Those criteria concern the periphery of the activities that are to be protected by the right to privacy. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the right to be forgotten.","PeriodicalId":348867,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129797453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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