Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJACT.2010.038305
I. Goldberg, Atefeh Mashatan, Douglas R Stinson
We look at message recognition protocols (MRPs) and prove that there is a one-to-one correspondence between stateless non-interactive MRPs and digital signature schemes. Next, we examine the Jane Doe protocol and note its inability to recover in case of a certain adversarial disruption. We propose a variant of this protocol which is equipped with a resynchronisation technique that allows users to resynchronise whenever they wish. Moreover, we propose another protocol which self-recovers in case of an intrusion. This protocol incorporates the resynchronisation technique within itself. Further, we enumerate all possible attacks against this protocol and show that none of the attacks can occur. Finally, we prove the security of the new protocol and its ability to self-recover once the disruption has stopped. Finally, we propose an MRP which provides explicit confirmation to the sender on whether or not the message was accepted by the receiver.
{"title":"On message recognition protocols: recoverability and explicit confirmation","authors":"I. Goldberg, Atefeh Mashatan, Douglas R Stinson","doi":"10.1504/IJACT.2010.038305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJACT.2010.038305","url":null,"abstract":"We look at message recognition protocols (MRPs) and prove that there is a one-to-one correspondence between stateless non-interactive MRPs and digital signature schemes. Next, we examine the Jane Doe protocol and note its inability to recover in case of a certain adversarial disruption. We propose a variant of this protocol which is equipped with a resynchronisation technique that allows users to resynchronise whenever they wish. Moreover, we propose another protocol which self-recovers in case of an intrusion. This protocol incorporates the resynchronisation technique within itself. Further, we enumerate all possible attacks against this protocol and show that none of the attacks can occur. Finally, we prove the security of the new protocol and its ability to self-recover once the disruption has stopped. Finally, we propose an MRP which provides explicit confirmation to the sender on whether or not the message was accepted by the receiver.","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121376729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/ijact.2022.10052385
Jorg Schwenk, D. Stebila
Kerberos is one of the earliest network security protocols, providing authentication between clients and servers with the assistance of trusted servers. It remains widely used, notably as the default authentication protocol in Microsoft Active Directory (thus shipped with every major operating system), and is the ancestor of modern single sign-on protocols like OAuth and OpenID Connect. There have been many analyses of Kerberos in the symbolic (Dolev–Yao) model, which is more amenable to computer-aided verification tools than the computational model, but also idealizes messages and cryptographic primitives more. Reduction-based proofs in the computational model can provide assurance against a richer class of adversaries, and proofs with concrete probability analyses help in picking security parameters, but Kerberos has had no such analyses to date. We give a reduction-based security proof of Kerberos authentication and key establishment, focusing on the mandatory 3-party mode. We show that it is a secure authentication protocol under standard assumptions on its encryption scheme; our results can be lifted to apply to quantum adversaries as well. As has been the case for other real-world authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, the standard AKE security notion of session key indistinguishability cannot be proven for Kerberos since the session key is used in the protocol itself, breaking indistinguishability. We provide two positive results despite this: we show that the standardized but optional sub-session mode of Kerberos does yield secure session keys, and that the hash of the main session key is also a secure session key under Krawczyk’s generalization of the authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) model.
Kerberos是最早的网络安全协议之一，它在可信服务器的帮助下提供客户机和服务器之间的身份验证。它仍然被广泛使用，特别是作为Microsoft Active Directory中的默认身份验证协议(因此每个主要操作系统都配备了它)，并且是现代单点登录协议(如OAuth和OpenID Connect)的祖先。在符号(Dolev-Yao)模型中对Kerberos进行了许多分析，该模型比计算模型更适合计算机辅助验证工具，但也更理想化消息和加密原语。计算模型中基于约简的证明可以提供针对更丰富的攻击类的保证，并且具有具体概率分析的证明有助于选择安全参数，但是Kerberos迄今为止还没有这样的分析。我们给出了基于约简的Kerberos身份验证和密钥建立的安全性证明，重点讨论了强制的三方模式。在对其加密方案的标准假设下，证明了它是一种安全的认证协议;我们的结果也可以应用于量子对手。与其他真实世界的身份验证密钥交换(AKE)协议的情况一样，Kerberos无法证明会话密钥不可区分的标准AKE安全概念，因为会话密钥在协议本身中使用，从而破坏了不可区分性。尽管如此，我们还是提供了两个积极的结果:我们证明了Kerberos的标准化但可选的子会话模式确实产生安全会话密钥，并且在Krawczyk对身份验证和保密通道建立(ACCE)模型的推广下，主会话密钥的哈希也是安全会话密钥。
{"title":"A Reduction-Based Proof for Authentication and Session Key Security in 3-Party Kerberos","authors":"Jorg Schwenk, D. Stebila","doi":"10.1504/ijact.2022.10052385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/ijact.2022.10052385","url":null,"abstract":"Kerberos is one of the earliest network security protocols, providing authentication between clients and servers with the assistance of trusted servers. It remains widely used, notably as the default authentication protocol in Microsoft Active Directory (thus shipped with every major operating system), and is the ancestor of modern single sign-on protocols like OAuth and OpenID Connect. There have been many analyses of Kerberos in the symbolic (Dolev–Yao) model, which is more amenable to computer-aided verification tools than the computational model, but also idealizes messages and cryptographic primitives more. Reduction-based proofs in the computational model can provide assurance against a richer class of adversaries, and proofs with concrete probability analyses help in picking security parameters, but Kerberos has had no such analyses to date. We give a reduction-based security proof of Kerberos authentication and key establishment, focusing on the mandatory 3-party mode. We show that it is a secure authentication protocol under standard assumptions on its encryption scheme; our results can be lifted to apply to quantum adversaries as well. As has been the case for other real-world authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, the standard AKE security notion of session key indistinguishability cannot be proven for Kerberos since the session key is used in the protocol itself, breaking indistinguishability. We provide two positive results despite this: we show that the standardized but optional sub-session mode of Kerberos does yield secure session keys, and that the hash of the main session key is also a secure session key under Krawczyk’s generalization of the authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) model.","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121391888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/ijact.2022.10056073
Samiran Bag, M. A. Azad, F. Hao
In this paper, we propose the first end-to-end (E2E) verifiable e-voting system for cumulative voting without requiring any tallying authorities. Cumulative voting is an electoral system, heavily used in corporate governance as practised in several US states, and in participatory budgeting as seen in many European cities where local residents decide how to spend a portion of the local government’s budget through voting. Traditionally, cumulative voting is done with pen and paper, but the manual counting process is time consuming and costly, especially when such voting events occur frequently. Many systems have changed to use electronic voting, but without considering the security aspects of this change. To our knowledge, none of the existing e-voting systems implemented for cumulative voting are end-to-end verifiable; if there is any bug or tempering at the tallying software, the tally would be inadvertently modified without any voter noticing this. Although there are existing voting systems (e.g., mix-net based) that could be adapted to support cumulative voting with E2E verifiability, they generally require a set of tallying authorities, which can lead to substantial complexity of finding and managing such authorities in practice. We address this issue by adopting novel cryptographic techniques to achieve E2E verifiability for cumulative voting, but without involving any tallying authorities. We formally define a model to prove the security of our system, and present the efficiency analysis to show that our proposed solution is feasible for practical use.
{"title":"End-to-end verifiable cumulative voting without tallying authorities","authors":"Samiran Bag, M. A. Azad, F. Hao","doi":"10.1504/ijact.2022.10056073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/ijact.2022.10056073","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we propose the first end-to-end (E2E) verifiable e-voting system for cumulative voting without requiring any tallying authorities. Cumulative voting is an electoral system, heavily used in corporate governance as practised in several US states, and in participatory budgeting as seen in many European cities where local residents decide how to spend a portion of the local government’s budget through voting. Traditionally, cumulative voting is done with pen and paper, but the manual counting process is time consuming and costly, especially when such voting events occur frequently. Many systems have changed to use electronic voting, but without considering the security aspects of this change. To our knowledge, none of the existing e-voting systems implemented for cumulative voting are end-to-end verifiable; if there is any bug or tempering at the tallying software, the tally would be inadvertently modified without any voter noticing this. Although there are existing voting systems (e.g., mix-net based) that could be adapted to support cumulative voting with E2E verifiability, they generally require a set of tallying authorities, which can lead to substantial complexity of finding and managing such authorities in practice. We address this issue by adopting novel cryptographic techniques to achieve E2E verifiability for cumulative voting, but without involving any tallying authorities. We formally define a model to prove the security of our system, and present the efficiency analysis to show that our proposed solution is feasible for practical use.","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134219310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJACT.2010.038304
C. Cremers
In the paper, 'stronger security of authenticated key exchange' (LaMacchia et al., 2006, 2007), a new security model for authenticated key exchange protocols (eCK) is proposed. The new model is suggested to be at least as strong as previous models for key exchange protocols, such as the CK model (Canetti and Krawczyk, 2001; Krawczyk, 2005). The model includes a new notion of an EphemeralKeyReveal adversary query, which is claimed in e.g., LaMacchia et al. (2006), Okamoto (2007), and Ustaoglu (2008), to be at least as strong as the Session-StateReveal query. We investigate the relation between the two models by focusing on the difference in adversary queries. We formally model the NAXOS protocol and a variant of the eCK model, called eCK', in which the EphemeralKeyReveal query is replaced by the Session-StateReveal query. Using Scyther, a formal protocol analysis tool, we automatically find attacks on the protocol, showing that the protocol is insecure in the eCK' model. Our attacks prove that the Session-StateReveal query is stronger than the EphemeralKeyReveal query and that the eCK security model is incomparable to the CK model, disproving several claims made in the literature.
在“验证密钥交换的更强安全性”一文中(LaMacchia et al.， 2006, 2007)，提出了一种新的验证密钥交换协议(eCK)的安全模型。新模型被认为至少与以前的密钥交换协议模型一样强大，例如CK模型(Canetti和Krawczyk, 2001;2005年,杰哈卡胡奇)。该模型包含了一个EphemeralKeyReveal对手查询的新概念，例如LaMacchia等人(2006)、Okamoto(2007)和Ustaoglu(2008)声称，它至少与session - staterreveal查询一样强大。我们通过关注对手查询的差异来研究这两个模型之间的关系。我们正式建模了NAXOS协议和eCK模型的一个变体，称为eCK，其中EphemeralKeyReveal查询被Session-StateReveal查询所取代。使用正式的协议分析工具Scyther，我们自动发现对协议的攻击，表明协议在eCK模型中是不安全的。我们的攻击证明了Session-StateReveal查询比EphemeralKeyReveal查询更强大，eCK安全模型无法与CK模型相比，反驳了文献中的一些说法。
{"title":"Session-StateReveal is stronger than eCKs EphemeralKeyReveal: using automatic analysis to attack the NAXOS protocol","authors":"C. Cremers","doi":"10.1504/IJACT.2010.038304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJACT.2010.038304","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper, 'stronger security of authenticated key exchange' (LaMacchia et al., 2006, 2007), a new security model for authenticated key exchange protocols (eCK) is proposed. The new model is suggested to be at least as strong as previous models for key exchange protocols, such as the CK model (Canetti and Krawczyk, 2001; Krawczyk, 2005). The model includes a new notion of an EphemeralKeyReveal adversary query, which is claimed in e.g., LaMacchia et al. (2006), Okamoto (2007), and Ustaoglu (2008), to be at least as strong as the Session-StateReveal query. We investigate the relation between the two models by focusing on the difference in adversary queries. We formally model the NAXOS protocol and a variant of the eCK model, called eCK', in which the EphemeralKeyReveal query is replaced by the Session-StateReveal query. Using Scyther, a formal protocol analysis tool, we automatically find attacks on the protocol, showing that the protocol is insecure in the eCK' model. Our attacks prove that the Session-StateReveal query is stronger than the EphemeralKeyReveal query and that the eCK security model is incomparable to the CK model, disproving several claims made in the literature.","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133856779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJACT.2010.038309
A. Patra, Ashish Choudhury, C. Pandu Rangan, Kannan Srinathan
We study the interplay of network connectivity and the issues related to the 'possibility', 'feasibility' and 'optimality' for unconditionally reliable message transmission (URMT) and unconditionally secure message transmission (USMT) in an undirected synchronous network, under the influence of an adaptive mixed adversary having unbounded computing power, who can corrupt some of the nodes in the network in Byzantine, omission, fail-stop and passive fashion respectively. We consider two types of adversary, namely threshold and non-threshold. One of the important conclusions we arrive at from our study is that allowing a negligible error probability significantly helps in the 'possibility', 'feasibility' and 'optimality' of both reliable and secure message transmission protocols. To design our protocols, we propose several new techniques which are of independent interest.
{"title":"Unconditionally reliable and secure message transmission in undirected synchronous networks: possibility, feasibility and optimality","authors":"A. Patra, Ashish Choudhury, C. Pandu Rangan, Kannan Srinathan","doi":"10.1504/IJACT.2010.038309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJACT.2010.038309","url":null,"abstract":"We study the interplay of network connectivity and the issues related to the 'possibility', 'feasibility' and 'optimality' for unconditionally reliable message transmission (URMT) and unconditionally secure message transmission (USMT) in an undirected synchronous network, under the influence of an adaptive mixed adversary having unbounded computing power, who can corrupt some of the nodes in the network in Byzantine, omission, fail-stop and passive fashion respectively. We consider two types of adversary, namely threshold and non-threshold. One of the important conclusions we arrive at from our study is that allowing a negligible error probability significantly helps in the 'possibility', 'feasibility' and 'optimality' of both reliable and secure message transmission protocols. To design our protocols, we propose several new techniques which are of independent interest.","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125175630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJACT.2017.10010330
Augustin P. Sarr, P. Elbaz-Vincent
The HMQV protocol is under consideration for IEEE P1363 standardisation. We provide a complementary analysis of the HMQV(-C) protocol. Namely, we point out a key compromise impersonation and a man-in-the-middle attack in the case of a static private key leakage, showing that the HMQV(-C) protocols cannot achieve their security goals. Next, we revisit the FHMQV building blocks, design and security arguments. We clarify the security and efficiency separation between HMQV and FHMQV, showing the advantages of FHMQV over HMQV.
{"title":"On the separation between the FHMQV and HMQV protocols","authors":"Augustin P. Sarr, P. Elbaz-Vincent","doi":"10.1504/IJACT.2017.10010330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJACT.2017.10010330","url":null,"abstract":"The HMQV protocol is under consideration for IEEE P1363 standardisation. We provide a complementary analysis of the HMQV(-C) protocol. Namely, we point out a key compromise impersonation and a man-in-the-middle attack in the case of a static private key leakage, showing that the HMQV(-C) protocols cannot achieve their security goals. Next, we revisit the FHMQV building blocks, design and security arguments. We clarify the security and efficiency separation between HMQV and FHMQV, showing the advantages of FHMQV over HMQV.","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121421727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJACT.2010.038306
E. Prouff, Matthieu Rivain
A large variety of side channel analyses performed on embedded devices involve the linear correlation coefficient as wrong-key distinguisher. This coefficient is actually a sound statistical tool to quantify linear dependencies between univariate variables. At CHES 2008, Gierlichs et al. proposed to use the mutual information measure as an alternative to the correlation coefficient since it detects any kind of statistical dependency. Substituting it for the correlation coefficient may indeed be considered as a natural extension of the existing attacks. Nevertheless, the first published applications have raised several open issues. In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of MIA in the Gaussian leakage model to explore the reasons why and when it is a sound key recovery attack. Also, we generalise MIA to higher-orders (i.e., against masked implementations). Secondly, we address the main practical issue of MIA: the mutual information estimation which itself relies on the estimation of statistical distributions. We describe three classical estimation methods and we apply them in the context of MIA. Eventually, we present various attack simulations and practical attack experiments that allow us to check the efficiency of MIA in practice and to compare it to classical correlation-based attacks.
{"title":"Theoretical and practical aspects of mutual information-based side channel analysis","authors":"E. Prouff, Matthieu Rivain","doi":"10.1504/IJACT.2010.038306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJACT.2010.038306","url":null,"abstract":"A large variety of side channel analyses performed on embedded devices involve the linear correlation coefficient as wrong-key distinguisher. This coefficient is actually a sound statistical tool to quantify linear dependencies between univariate variables. At CHES 2008, Gierlichs et al. proposed to use the mutual information measure as an alternative to the correlation coefficient since it detects any kind of statistical dependency. Substituting it for the correlation coefficient may indeed be considered as a natural extension of the existing attacks. Nevertheless, the first published applications have raised several open issues. In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of MIA in the Gaussian leakage model to explore the reasons why and when it is a sound key recovery attack. Also, we generalise MIA to higher-orders (i.e., against masked implementations). Secondly, we address the main practical issue of MIA: the mutual information estimation which itself relies on the estimation of statistical distributions. We describe three classical estimation methods and we apply them in the context of MIA. Eventually, we present various attack simulations and practical attack experiments that allow us to check the efficiency of MIA in practice and to compare it to classical correlation-based attacks.","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125761431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJACT.2010.038308
A. Menezes, Berkant Ustaoglu
A party may choose to reuse ephemeral public keys in a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol in order to reduce its computational workload or to mitigate against denial-of-service attacks. In this note, we show that small-subgroup attacks can be successfully launched on some Diffie-Hellman protocols that reuse ephemeral keys if domain parameters are not appropriately selected or if public keys are not appropriately validated.
{"title":"On reusing ephemeral keys in Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols","authors":"A. Menezes, Berkant Ustaoglu","doi":"10.1504/IJACT.2010.038308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJACT.2010.038308","url":null,"abstract":"A party may choose to reuse ephemeral public keys in a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol in order to reduce its computational workload or to mitigate against denial-of-service attacks. In this note, we show that small-subgroup attacks can be successfully launched on some Diffie-Hellman protocols that reuse ephemeral keys if domain parameters are not appropriately selected or if public keys are not appropriately validated.","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"80 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131893047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1504/ijact.2022.10056083
Zhuo Chen
{"title":"A novel architecture to make anonymous blind signature-based e-coins more efficient and applicable","authors":"Zhuo Chen","doi":"10.1504/ijact.2022.10056083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/ijact.2022.10056083","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":350332,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr.","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125684878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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