Pub Date : 1992-06-16DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1992.236782
C. O'Halloran
Any foundation for computer security needs to be tested to see whether it is strong enough to support a useful theory. In this paper a case study is presented which illustrates a particular foundation for confidentiality. A natural language confidentiality requirement is formalized in a calculus of information flow and analysed to assess possible conflicts.<>
{"title":"On requirements and security in a CCIS","authors":"C. O'Halloran","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1992.236782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1992.236782","url":null,"abstract":"Any foundation for computer security needs to be tested to see whether it is strong enough to support a useful theory. In this paper a case study is presented which illustrates a particular foundation for confidentiality. A natural language confidentiality requirement is formalized in a calculus of information flow and analysed to assess possible conflicts.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":350578,"journal":{"name":"[1992] Proceedings The Computer Security Foundations Workshop V","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126293098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-06-16DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1992.236787
P. Bieber, F. Cuppens
Most security models explicitly (or implicitly) include the tranquillity principle which prohibits changing the security level of a given piece of information. Yet in practical systems, classification of objects may evolve due to declassification and subject current level may evolve according to subject requests. The authors previously proposed a modal logic definition of security whose counterpart is a constraint on the system traces that they called causality. In this paper, they give a generalization of causality which avoids the tranquillity principle. They give an interpretation of their model in the case of a multilevel security policy when the levels can be assigned dynamically. Then they provide efficient conditions to control the dynamic assignment of both the object classification and the subject current level. They propose a comparison of their approach with the nondeducibility generalization. Finally they give several examples of systems where security levels are dynamically assigned.<>
{"title":"Secure dependencies with dynamic level assignments","authors":"P. Bieber, F. Cuppens","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1992.236787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1992.236787","url":null,"abstract":"Most security models explicitly (or implicitly) include the tranquillity principle which prohibits changing the security level of a given piece of information. Yet in practical systems, classification of objects may evolve due to declassification and subject current level may evolve according to subject requests. The authors previously proposed a modal logic definition of security whose counterpart is a constraint on the system traces that they called causality. In this paper, they give a generalization of causality which avoids the tranquillity principle. They give an interpretation of their model in the case of a multilevel security policy when the levels can be assigned dynamically. Then they provide efficient conditions to control the dynamic assignment of both the object classification and the subject current level. They propose a comparison of their approach with the nondeducibility generalization. Finally they give several examples of systems where security levels are dynamically assigned.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":350578,"journal":{"name":"[1992] Proceedings The Computer Security Foundations Workshop V","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114271814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-06-16DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1992.236790
John Graham-Cumming
The author defines non-interference in the algebra of CSP; that definition leads to simple proof rules for non-interference concerning, amongst other things, composition of systems exhibiting non-interference. The author works through a case study of a multi-level secure system to illustrate those laws.<>
{"title":"Some laws of non-interference (CSP algebra)","authors":"John Graham-Cumming","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1992.236790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1992.236790","url":null,"abstract":"The author defines non-interference in the algebra of CSP; that definition leads to simple proof rules for non-interference concerning, amongst other things, composition of systems exhibiting non-interference. The author works through a case study of a multi-level secure system to illustrate those laws.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":350578,"journal":{"name":"[1992] Proceedings The Computer Security Foundations Workshop V","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115300889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-06-16DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1992.236791
Sandra Rawlings Murphy, S. D. Crocker, T. Redmond
The LOCK definition of non-interference and the LOCK unwinding theorem provide a method of using a non-interference model in a system with an identified potential for interference. However, the LOCK work is presented in terms specific to the LOCK system. The authors generalize the LOCK definitions and theorems so that they could be used in systems other than LOCK that have specifically identified potentials for interference They state and prove a general winding theorem for this purpose. They also show that the LOCK unwinding theorem follows from their general unwinding theorem.<>
{"title":"Unwinding and the LOCK proof referees study","authors":"Sandra Rawlings Murphy, S. D. Crocker, T. Redmond","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1992.236791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1992.236791","url":null,"abstract":"The LOCK definition of non-interference and the LOCK unwinding theorem provide a method of using a non-interference model in a system with an identified potential for interference. However, the LOCK work is presented in terms specific to the LOCK system. The authors generalize the LOCK definitions and theorems so that they could be used in systems other than LOCK that have specifically identified potentials for interference They state and prove a general winding theorem for this purpose. They also show that the LOCK unwinding theorem follows from their general unwinding theorem.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":350578,"journal":{"name":"[1992] Proceedings The Computer Security Foundations Workshop V","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128571659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-06-16DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1992.236786
T. Garvey
An inference problem in computer security occurs when an individual can infer classified information by viewing only information of strictly lower classification. This paper introduces questions for discussion for the computer security community. These questions are organized into the following areas: definition of the inference problem; requirements for a theory of the inference problem; mechanisms for controlling inference; and practical formulations of inference control. The author believes that investigation of these issues is required in order for progress to be made toward addressing the management of inference in computer security.<>
{"title":"The inference problem for computer security","authors":"T. Garvey","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1992.236786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1992.236786","url":null,"abstract":"An inference problem in computer security occurs when an individual can infer classified information by viewing only information of strictly lower classification. This paper introduces questions for discussion for the computer security community. These questions are organized into the following areas: definition of the inference problem; requirements for a theory of the inference problem; mechanisms for controlling inference; and practical formulations of inference control. The author believes that investigation of these issues is required in order for progress to be made toward addressing the management of inference in computer security.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":350578,"journal":{"name":"[1992] Proceedings The Computer Security Foundations Workshop V","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114805812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1992.236781
B. Thuraisingham
For pt.I. see Proc. 4th Computer Security Foundations, Franconia, USA (1991). In pt.I the author described a logic called nonmonotonic typed multilevel logic (NTML) for multilevel database applications. They also described various approaches to viewing multilevel databases through NTML. In this paper he continues with his discussion of the applications of NTML. In particular, the use of NTML as a programming language, issues on handling negative information in multilevel databases, and approaches for integrity checking in multilevel database systems are described. His work on NTML will be of significance to multilevel data/knowledge base applications in the same way logic programming has been to the development of data/knowledge base applications.<>
{"title":"A nonmonotonic typed multilevel logic for multilevel secure data/knowledge base management systems. II","authors":"B. Thuraisingham","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1992.236781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1992.236781","url":null,"abstract":"For pt.I. see Proc. 4th Computer Security Foundations, Franconia, USA (1991). In pt.I the author described a logic called nonmonotonic typed multilevel logic (NTML) for multilevel database applications. They also described various approaches to viewing multilevel databases through NTML. In this paper he continues with his discussion of the applications of NTML. In particular, the use of NTML as a programming language, issues on handling negative information in multilevel databases, and approaches for integrity checking in multilevel database systems are described. His work on NTML will be of significance to multilevel data/knowledge base applications in the same way logic programming has been to the development of data/knowledge base applications.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":350578,"journal":{"name":"[1992] Proceedings The Computer Security Foundations Workshop V","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132828792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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