{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130608732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Causal Connections","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"204 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114365670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Three Conceptions Revisited","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"281 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116852499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Theoretical Explanation","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132813265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Probabilistic Causality","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126916193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Statistical Explanation and Its Models","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131937998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Boyle, Isaac Beeckman, Nicholas Lemery, C. Huygens
Robert Boyle grouped his seventeenth century corpuscularian predecessors and contemporaries as the ‘mechanical philosophers’.1 He intended the term as neutral between atomists and non-atomist defenders of a common vision—that the physical world is machine-like and composed of a discernable material substratum the bits of which, in combination, give rise to familiar macro-sized entities and phenomena. While their differences regarding the nature of matter were great, two issues drew together early modern corpuscularians of all sorts, Gassendi among them. First, they were concerned to provide a suitable ontology for the mechanical philosophy. Among other things, this entailed making the mechanist picture work all the way down to the subvisible level, and building that picture up from that level. One reason this is necessary is to guarantee the scalar invariance of physical laws—that such laws work across the spectrum of magnitudes. Second, they were for the most part concerned to meet empiricist constraints and interests of the new science. This entailed,
{"title":"The Mechanical Philosophy","authors":"R. Boyle, Isaac Beeckman, Nicholas Lemery, C. Huygens","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.13","url":null,"abstract":"Robert Boyle grouped his seventeenth century corpuscularian predecessors and contemporaries as the ‘mechanical philosophers’.1 He intended the term as neutral between atomists and non-atomist defenders of a common vision—that the physical world is machine-like and composed of a discernable material substratum the bits of which, in combination, give rise to familiar macro-sized entities and phenomena. While their differences regarding the nature of matter were great, two issues drew together early modern corpuscularians of all sorts, Gassendi among them. First, they were concerned to provide a suitable ontology for the mechanical philosophy. Among other things, this entailed making the mechanist picture work all the way down to the subvisible level, and building that picture up from that level. One reason this is necessary is to guarantee the scalar invariance of physical laws—that such laws work across the spectrum of magnitudes. Second, they were for the most part concerned to meet empiricist constraints and interests of the new science. This entailed,","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125371561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Objective Homogeneity","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130426972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Back Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125216264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The title of this chapter is misleading. “Scientific explanation” is the traditional name for a topic philosophers of science are supposed to have something to say about. But it is a bad name for that topic. For one thing, theories of scientific explanation don’t have an activity that is exclusive to scientists as their subject matter. Non-scientists do it too, all the time; they just have less specialized knowledge to use, and direct their attention to less complicated phenomena. This suggests that we drop the adjective “scientific” and call the topic “explanation.” But the word “explanation” all by itself is also a bad name for the topic. What philosophers have called theories of explanation are meant to say something about what is happening in scenarios like these:
{"title":"Scientific Explanation:","authors":"Bradford Skow","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh.5","url":null,"abstract":"The title of this chapter is misleading. “Scientific explanation” is the traditional name for a topic philosophers of science are supposed to have something to say about. But it is a bad name for that topic. For one thing, theories of scientific explanation don’t have an activity that is exclusive to scientists as their subject matter. Non-scientists do it too, all the time; they just have less specialized knowledge to use, and direct their attention to less complicated phenomena. This suggests that we drop the adjective “scientific” and call the topic “explanation.” But the word “explanation” all by itself is also a bad name for the topic. What philosophers have called theories of explanation are meant to say something about what is happening in scenarios like these:","PeriodicalId":351770,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123164477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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