Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.1080/00396338008441922
F. Javed
The article focuses on Europe's shift in its position towards Palestine. Topics discussed include the European Parliament's passage of a resolution in December 2014 recognizing the Palestine statehood along the 1967 armistice lines that divide Jerusalem into East and West to serve as the Palestinian and Israeli capitals, respectively, the European Union's (EU) history of being a proponent of Palestinian statehood, and the implications of the support to EU's relations with the U.S. and Israel.
{"title":"The Palestinian question.","authors":"F. Javed","doi":"10.1080/00396338008441922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338008441922","url":null,"abstract":"The article focuses on Europe's shift in its position towards Palestine. Topics discussed include the European Parliament's passage of a resolution in December 2014 recognizing the Palestine statehood along the 1967 armistice lines that divide Jerusalem into East and West to serve as the Palestinian and Israeli capitals, respectively, the European Union's (EU) history of being a proponent of Palestinian statehood, and the implications of the support to EU's relations with the U.S. and Israel.","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"14-15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00396338008441922","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59292185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article explores the role of visual media and photography in humanitarian crises. Topics covered include the significance of visual journalism and documentary photography in raising social consciousness, the number of people who were killed in the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and the launch of the Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative to improve safety in the ready-made-garment (RMG) sector.
{"title":"Photography as activism","authors":"Ismail Ferdous","doi":"10.4324/9780240812762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780240812762","url":null,"abstract":"The article explores the role of visual media and photography in humanitarian crises. Topics covered include the significance of visual journalism and documentary photography in raising social consciousness, the number of people who were killed in the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and the launch of the Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative to improve safety in the ready-made-garment (RMG) sector.","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"22-25"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70610381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Was the Rose Revolution For? Understanding the Georgian Revolution","authors":"Lincoln A. Mitchell","doi":"10.7916/D8FB5CBF","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8FB5CBF","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71366201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Question of Balance","authors":"M. Sheehan","doi":"10.17226/9692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17226/9692","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"29 1","pages":"5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67589239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lines in the Sand","authors":"S. Bickerstaff","doi":"10.7560/714748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7560/714748","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71337235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-09-22DOI: 10.4324/9780203717417-10
P. Davies
Since World War II, much effort has gone into defining "intelligence." This effort has even given rise to what is sometimes called intelligence theory, which can be traced to Sherman Kent's desire to see intelligence programmatically examined, addressed, and subsumed by the mainstream social science tradition. During World War II Kent served in the Bureau of Analysis and Estimates of the US Office of Strategic Services, and later headed the Office of National Estimates of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Virtually all intelligence theory could be considered a footnote to Kent. His conviction that intelligence should be a broad-based analytical discipline is embodied in his maxim "intelligence is knowledge," which has set the precedent for most subsequent debate. Since Kent's day, many alternative approaches to intelligence have been suggested by a succession of authors. In his 1996 Intelligence Power in Peace and War, British scholar and former intelligence officer Michael Herman tried to present the range of conceptualizations of intelligence as a spectrum, ranging from the broad definitions that approach intelligence primarily as "all-source analysis" (typified by Kent's view) to narrow interpretations that focus on intelligence collection, particularly covert collection. Herman notes in passing that the broader interpretations tend to be favored by US writers and narrow approaches by the British. What Herman does not pursue, however, is the fundamental difference this matter of definition effects in the British and US approaches to intelligence and how those conceptual differences have been reflected in their respective intelligence institutions and in legislation. It is entirely possible that by asking "what is intelligence?" we may be barking up the wrong intell ectual tree. The real questions should perhaps be "How do different countries and institutions define intelligence?" and "What are the consequences of those different definitions?" A Study in Contrast Conceptual divergences in the concept of intelligence are particularly worth keeping in mind when comparing Britain and the United States. The 1995 US Congressional Aspin/Brown Commission examined the British national intelligence machinery. Likewise, one of the first actions of the British Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee after its creation under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act was a similar evaluation of US methodologies. Neither side found anything to incorporate from the other's methods, and yet neither seemed to detect that they were talking--and hence thinking--about entirely different things when they were talking about intelligence. To a large degree, transatlantic dialogue on the subject of intelligence has tended to be conducted at cross-purposes. In current usage, "intelligence in US parlance tends to refer to "finished" intelligence that has been put through the all-source analysis process and turned into a product that can provide advice and opt
{"title":"Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions. (Intelligence)","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.4324/9780203717417-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203717417-10","url":null,"abstract":"Since World War II, much effort has gone into defining \"intelligence.\" This effort has even given rise to what is sometimes called intelligence theory, which can be traced to Sherman Kent's desire to see intelligence programmatically examined, addressed, and subsumed by the mainstream social science tradition. During World War II Kent served in the Bureau of Analysis and Estimates of the US Office of Strategic Services, and later headed the Office of National Estimates of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Virtually all intelligence theory could be considered a footnote to Kent. His conviction that intelligence should be a broad-based analytical discipline is embodied in his maxim \"intelligence is knowledge,\" which has set the precedent for most subsequent debate. Since Kent's day, many alternative approaches to intelligence have been suggested by a succession of authors. In his 1996 Intelligence Power in Peace and War, British scholar and former intelligence officer Michael Herman tried to present the range of conceptualizations of intelligence as a spectrum, ranging from the broad definitions that approach intelligence primarily as \"all-source analysis\" (typified by Kent's view) to narrow interpretations that focus on intelligence collection, particularly covert collection. Herman notes in passing that the broader interpretations tend to be favored by US writers and narrow approaches by the British. What Herman does not pursue, however, is the fundamental difference this matter of definition effects in the British and US approaches to intelligence and how those conceptual differences have been reflected in their respective intelligence institutions and in legislation. It is entirely possible that by asking \"what is intelligence?\" we may be barking up the wrong intell ectual tree. The real questions should perhaps be \"How do different countries and institutions define intelligence?\" and \"What are the consequences of those different definitions?\" A Study in Contrast Conceptual divergences in the concept of intelligence are particularly worth keeping in mind when comparing Britain and the United States. The 1995 US Congressional Aspin/Brown Commission examined the British national intelligence machinery. Likewise, one of the first actions of the British Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee after its creation under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act was a similar evaluation of US methodologies. Neither side found anything to incorporate from the other's methods, and yet neither seemed to detect that they were talking--and hence thinking--about entirely different things when they were talking about intelligence. To a large degree, transatlantic dialogue on the subject of intelligence has tended to be conducted at cross-purposes. In current usage, \"intelligence in US parlance tends to refer to \"finished\" intelligence that has been put through the all-source analysis process and turned into a product that can provide advice and opt","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"104 1","pages":"62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70591787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2001-06-22DOI: 10.4324/9780203402450_chapter_9
Ian F. W. Beckett
Insurgency in Our Midst With the end of the Cold War and its concomitant ideological competition, it is clear that the patterns of military activity have changed. Moreover, increasing globalization and the economic and political links that bind major states have made interstate conflict much more difficult to sustain unilaterally. In Western societies, growing unwillingness to risk large-scale casualties in warfare has coincided with the so-called "revolution in military affairs" resulting from technological development to produce the kind of "virtual war" practiced in the Persian Gulf and, to a much greater extent, in Kosovo. Sanitized "cyberwar" and the supposed "New World Order" ushered in by the collapse of communism, however, have not prevented intrastate conflict. Indeed, insurgency is just as prevalent as it has always been, especially where the state system has remained underdeveloped, as in many parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. New imperatives have also encouraged insurgencies that in some cases have increasingly blurred the distinctions between war and organized crime. Insurgency, therefore, remains a crucial challenge in the contemporary world. Insurgency in History Insurgency became the most prevalent form of conflict in the 20th, century, if not before. Nevertheless, particular scorn has always been reserved for the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir George Milne, who remarked in 1926 that World War I had been "abnormal." In fact, the counter-insurgency campaign on the frontiers of the Empire, to which regulars were supposedly eager to return in 1918, actually did represent the collective experience of the interwar army. Low-intensity conflict has been the principal fare of the British army since 1945. While British soldiers died on active service somewhere in the world in nearly every year between 1945 and 1997, the only significant conventional experience comprised 35 months of British participation in the Korean War, involving no more than five battalions at any one time; 10 days during the Suez Crisis in 1956; 25 days of the land campaign over the Falkland Islands in 1982; and 100 hours of land operations in the Persian Gulf in 1991. To a lesser degr ee, much the same could be said of the experiences of the French, US, Soviet/Russian, Indian, and even Israeli armies since 1945. A survey in 1983 cataloguing guerrilla or terrorist groups existing or having existed since 1945 found 147 such groups in Europe, 115 in Asia and Oceania, 114 in the Americas, 109 in the Middle East, and 84 in Africa. This provided a staggering total of 569 different groups, although many were small, obscure, and of little significance in either national or international politics. Since 1983, of course, many more groups have emerged. Moreover, there have been some very long-running insurgencies in the modern world. For all practical purposes, the struggle for control of China endured for 23 years until Mao Zedong's victory in 1949; t
随着冷战及其伴随而来的意识形态竞争的结束，军事活动的模式显然已经发生了变化。此外，日益增长的全球化以及将大国联系在一起的经济和政治联系，使国家间的冲突更加难以单方面维持。在西方社会，人们越来越不愿意在战争中冒大规模伤亡的风险，这与所谓的“军事革命”相吻合，这种革命是由于技术的发展而产生的，这种“虚拟战争”在波斯湾和更大程度上在科索沃上演。然而，经过净化的“网络战”和共产主义崩溃带来的所谓“新世界秩序”并没有阻止国家内部的冲突。事实上，叛乱一如既往地普遍，特别是在国家制度仍然不发达的地方，如非洲、亚洲和拉丁美洲的许多地方。新的迫切需要也鼓励了叛乱，在某些情况下，这些叛乱日益模糊了战争与有组织犯罪之间的区别。因此，叛乱仍然是当今世界的一个重大挑战。历史上的叛乱叛乱成为20世纪最普遍的冲突形式，如果不是以前的话。然而，英国帝国总参谋长乔治·米尔恩爵士(Sir George Milne)一直受到特别的鄙视，他在1926年评论说，第一次世界大战是“不正常的”。事实上，1918年正规军理应渴望回归的帝国边境的平叛运动，实际上确实代表了两次世界大战之间军队的集体经验。自1945年以来，低强度冲突一直是英国军队的主要任务。从1945年到1997年，几乎每年都有英国士兵在世界各地的某个地方死于现役，但唯一有意义的常规经历是英国参加了35个月的朝鲜战争，每次都不超过5个营;1956年苏伊士危机期间的10天;1982年在福克兰群岛进行的为期25天的陆地战役;1991年在波斯湾进行了100小时的陆上作战。在较小程度上，法国、美国、苏联/俄罗斯、印度甚至以色列军队自1945年以来的经历也是如此。1983年的一项调查显示，1945年以来存在或已经存在的游击队或恐怖组织在欧洲有147个，在亚洲和大洋洲有115个，在美洲有114个，在中东有109个，在非洲有84个。这提供了惊人的总数569个不同的团体，尽管许多是小的，不知名的，在国家或国际政治中没有什么意义。当然，自1983年以来，出现了更多的团体。此外，现代世界还存在一些长期存在的叛乱。南越的战争持续了28年，直到1973年;以及直到1991年的31年里厄立特里亚的独立。经过34年的谈判，终于在1996年结束了危地马拉断断续续的游击冲突，而在摩洛哥和波利萨里奥阵线(解放萨吉耶·埃尔·汉姆拉和巴布·德·奥罗的人民阵线)之间长达25年的冲突之后，自1991年以来，西撒哈拉地区已经达成了脆弱的停火协议。自1976年以来，共产党政府与老挝的蒙古族等山地部落之间的叛乱冲突不断，自1961年以来，库尔德人与历届伊拉克政府之间的叛乱冲突不断。虽然他以前的一些追随者已经与安哥拉政府达成了协议，但若纳斯·萨文比的安盟(安哥拉彻底独立全国联盟)自1975年内战失败以来一直在继续斗争，此前曾与葡萄牙人作战9年。自1969年以来，“北爱尔兰问题”一直影响着北爱尔兰，尽管自1997年以来本应停火。…
{"title":"Forward to the Past","authors":"Ian F. W. Beckett","doi":"10.4324/9780203402450_chapter_9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203402450_chapter_9","url":null,"abstract":"Insurgency in Our Midst With the end of the Cold War and its concomitant ideological competition, it is clear that the patterns of military activity have changed. Moreover, increasing globalization and the economic and political links that bind major states have made interstate conflict much more difficult to sustain unilaterally. In Western societies, growing unwillingness to risk large-scale casualties in warfare has coincided with the so-called \"revolution in military affairs\" resulting from technological development to produce the kind of \"virtual war\" practiced in the Persian Gulf and, to a much greater extent, in Kosovo. Sanitized \"cyberwar\" and the supposed \"New World Order\" ushered in by the collapse of communism, however, have not prevented intrastate conflict. Indeed, insurgency is just as prevalent as it has always been, especially where the state system has remained underdeveloped, as in many parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. New imperatives have also encouraged insurgencies that in some cases have increasingly blurred the distinctions between war and organized crime. Insurgency, therefore, remains a crucial challenge in the contemporary world. Insurgency in History Insurgency became the most prevalent form of conflict in the 20th, century, if not before. Nevertheless, particular scorn has always been reserved for the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir George Milne, who remarked in 1926 that World War I had been \"abnormal.\" In fact, the counter-insurgency campaign on the frontiers of the Empire, to which regulars were supposedly eager to return in 1918, actually did represent the collective experience of the interwar army. Low-intensity conflict has been the principal fare of the British army since 1945. While British soldiers died on active service somewhere in the world in nearly every year between 1945 and 1997, the only significant conventional experience comprised 35 months of British participation in the Korean War, involving no more than five battalions at any one time; 10 days during the Suez Crisis in 1956; 25 days of the land campaign over the Falkland Islands in 1982; and 100 hours of land operations in the Persian Gulf in 1991. To a lesser degr ee, much the same could be said of the experiences of the French, US, Soviet/Russian, Indian, and even Israeli armies since 1945. A survey in 1983 cataloguing guerrilla or terrorist groups existing or having existed since 1945 found 147 such groups in Europe, 115 in Asia and Oceania, 114 in the Americas, 109 in the Middle East, and 84 in Africa. This provided a staggering total of 569 different groups, although many were small, obscure, and of little significance in either national or international politics. Since 1983, of course, many more groups have emerged. Moreover, there have been some very long-running insurgencies in the modern world. For all practical purposes, the struggle for control of China endured for 23 years until Mao Zedong's victory in 1949; t","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"9 1","pages":"59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74105168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rethinking the IMF Response The world is just emerging from the Asian financial crisis, perhaps the most cat event to affect global capitalism since the Great Depression. While the United States emerged from this event unscathed--some might argue that it even benefited from the crisis as plummeting commodity prices reduced domestic inflationary pressures--many developing nations were not so lucky. Whereas the Great Depression induced a great deal of soul searching about capitalism's basic principles, the seemingly quick global recovery from the financial crisis and its limited effect on industrial countries have brought a more mixed response--self-congratulation on the part of some, renewed criticism of the impacts of globalization by others. In both instances, however, the global economic arrangements were clearly inadequate. The international financial institutions and arrangements established at the end of World War II to guard against another global economic depression are widely viewed as incapable of managing the modern global eco nomy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in particular, has failed to perform the tasks for which it was designed. Today, the institution requires serious reform to ensure a more stable global economic environment. Beggar Thy Self The IMF's philosophy has moved far away from its roots. In this past financial crisis, the IMF provided funds under the explicit condition that countries engage in more contractionary fiscal and monetary policies than they might desire. The money went not to finance more expansionary fiscal policies but, instead, to bail out creditors from the more industrialized countries. The beggar-thy-neighbor policies that were so widely condemned gave way to even worse "beggar-thy-self" policies, with disastrous effects both for the home country and for its neighbors. The downward spiral in the region accelerated as declines in domestic GDP led to cutbacks in imports, thereby reducing regional exports. The beggar-thy-neighbor policy at least had the intention of making the nation's own citizens better off. No such benefits resulted from the IMF's beggar-thy-self policies. A country was told to build up its foreign-currency reserves and improve its current-account balance; this meant that it either had to increase expor ts or decrease imports. But exports could not rise overnight--in fact, as the country's neighbors' incomes plummeted, the prospects for increasing exports were even bleaker. Thus imports had to be reduced without imposing tariffs and without further devaluation. There was only one way that imports could be reduced in these circumstances: by reducing the consumption and investments that relied on imports. The immiseration of those at home was thus inevitable. There is a further irony in the policies that the IMF pursued: while the IMF was created to promote global economic stability, some of its policies actually contributed to instability. There is now overwhelming support for th
{"title":"Failure of the Fund","authors":"J. Stiglitz","doi":"10.7916/D82J6NP8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D82J6NP8","url":null,"abstract":"Rethinking the IMF Response The world is just emerging from the Asian financial crisis, perhaps the most cat event to affect global capitalism since the Great Depression. While the United States emerged from this event unscathed--some might argue that it even benefited from the crisis as plummeting commodity prices reduced domestic inflationary pressures--many developing nations were not so lucky. Whereas the Great Depression induced a great deal of soul searching about capitalism's basic principles, the seemingly quick global recovery from the financial crisis and its limited effect on industrial countries have brought a more mixed response--self-congratulation on the part of some, renewed criticism of the impacts of globalization by others. In both instances, however, the global economic arrangements were clearly inadequate. The international financial institutions and arrangements established at the end of World War II to guard against another global economic depression are widely viewed as incapable of managing the modern global eco nomy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in particular, has failed to perform the tasks for which it was designed. Today, the institution requires serious reform to ensure a more stable global economic environment. Beggar Thy Self The IMF's philosophy has moved far away from its roots. In this past financial crisis, the IMF provided funds under the explicit condition that countries engage in more contractionary fiscal and monetary policies than they might desire. The money went not to finance more expansionary fiscal policies but, instead, to bail out creditors from the more industrialized countries. The beggar-thy-neighbor policies that were so widely condemned gave way to even worse \"beggar-thy-self\" policies, with disastrous effects both for the home country and for its neighbors. The downward spiral in the region accelerated as declines in domestic GDP led to cutbacks in imports, thereby reducing regional exports. The beggar-thy-neighbor policy at least had the intention of making the nation's own citizens better off. No such benefits resulted from the IMF's beggar-thy-self policies. A country was told to build up its foreign-currency reserves and improve its current-account balance; this meant that it either had to increase expor ts or decrease imports. But exports could not rise overnight--in fact, as the country's neighbors' incomes plummeted, the prospects for increasing exports were even bleaker. Thus imports had to be reduced without imposing tariffs and without further devaluation. There was only one way that imports could be reduced in these circumstances: by reducing the consumption and investments that relied on imports. The immiseration of those at home was thus inevitable. There is a further irony in the policies that the IMF pursued: while the IMF was created to promote global economic stability, some of its policies actually contributed to instability. There is now overwhelming support for th","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"23 1","pages":"14-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71364197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2001-03-22DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-VOL1-NO1-5
M. Adelman
OPEC's Uncertain Future Since 1970 the world price of crude oil has been both high and unstable. The price-setter, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose members include the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait; Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, has since 1980 followed a bumpy downward path that is unlikely to reverse itself in the foreseeable future. An important factor in OPEC'S downward spiral is that it is not a single entity but a collection of independent developing sovereign states. Conferring regularly, these states must from time to time agree to restrict output and to maintain or raise prices. Without their collective restraint, prices would decline toward the competitive floor. When members begin to jostle each other with competitive offers and prices fall or threaten to do so, new actions must be taken. Ironically, the OPEC mission has been made more difficult by its own success. Consumers responded, however slowly, to 1970's higher prices, and OPEC exports have never regained their 197 3-74 peak. Since then, world oil consumption has grown by only one percent per year instead of the previous seven percent. In addition, when OPEC restricted its lower-cost output in the 1970s, non-OPEC output grew. Once around 65 percent, the OPEC share of the world market is down to a little over 35 percent. It is important, moreover, to keep in mind that OPEC exports are the only valid measure of their market share. Internal OPEC consumption, now nearly one-fifth of OPEC countries' output, is unrelated to the world market price and yields no foreign exchange. In Iran, 30 percent of the nation's crude oil is refined for the local market, at prices so low that products are smuggled out and replaced with higher-priced imports. In any market ruled by competition, low-cost suppliers gain market share from high-cost suppliers. But since 1970, just the opposite has occurred in the oil industry: low-cost areas (i.e. OPEC) have continually-lost ground to high-cost areas. By cutting their production, the OPEC nations have created all the oil shortages of the past three decades. Moreover, the OPEC nations have held back unused production capacity. The market has thus been turned upside down. This odd and ineffective arrangement must be perpetuated to keep prices high. Awkward Collaboration Group collective control is inherently awkward and slow. First, OPEC must forecast market demand by trial and error--especially error, because inventory data are poor and do not reveal forecasting errors as they should. This inexactitude is what leads to collective control's awkwardness. Next, OPEC estimates non-OPEC output and subtracts it from consumption. OPEC must then supply the remaining amount. The harder task is to allocate this share among members, who are each trying to maximize their individual output while leaving to others the burden of curtailment. The OPEC nations must reach a consensus on who produces
{"title":"The Clumsy Cartel","authors":"M. Adelman","doi":"10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-VOL1-NO1-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-VOL1-NO1-5","url":null,"abstract":"OPEC's Uncertain Future Since 1970 the world price of crude oil has been both high and unstable. The price-setter, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose members include the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait; Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, has since 1980 followed a bumpy downward path that is unlikely to reverse itself in the foreseeable future. An important factor in OPEC'S downward spiral is that it is not a single entity but a collection of independent developing sovereign states. Conferring regularly, these states must from time to time agree to restrict output and to maintain or raise prices. Without their collective restraint, prices would decline toward the competitive floor. When members begin to jostle each other with competitive offers and prices fall or threaten to do so, new actions must be taken. Ironically, the OPEC mission has been made more difficult by its own success. Consumers responded, however slowly, to 1970's higher prices, and OPEC exports have never regained their 197 3-74 peak. Since then, world oil consumption has grown by only one percent per year instead of the previous seven percent. In addition, when OPEC restricted its lower-cost output in the 1970s, non-OPEC output grew. Once around 65 percent, the OPEC share of the world market is down to a little over 35 percent. It is important, moreover, to keep in mind that OPEC exports are the only valid measure of their market share. Internal OPEC consumption, now nearly one-fifth of OPEC countries' output, is unrelated to the world market price and yields no foreign exchange. In Iran, 30 percent of the nation's crude oil is refined for the local market, at prices so low that products are smuggled out and replaced with higher-priced imports. In any market ruled by competition, low-cost suppliers gain market share from high-cost suppliers. But since 1970, just the opposite has occurred in the oil industry: low-cost areas (i.e. OPEC) have continually-lost ground to high-cost areas. By cutting their production, the OPEC nations have created all the oil shortages of the past three decades. Moreover, the OPEC nations have held back unused production capacity. The market has thus been turned upside down. This odd and ineffective arrangement must be perpetuated to keep prices high. Awkward Collaboration Group collective control is inherently awkward and slow. First, OPEC must forecast market demand by trial and error--especially error, because inventory data are poor and do not reveal forecasting errors as they should. This inexactitude is what leads to collective control's awkwardness. Next, OPEC estimates non-OPEC output and subtracts it from consumption. OPEC must then supply the remaining amount. The harder task is to allocate this share among members, who are each trying to maximize their individual output while leaving to others the burden of curtailment. The OPEC nations must reach a consensus on who produces","PeriodicalId":35816,"journal":{"name":"Harvard International Review","volume":"23 1","pages":"20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71000060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-06-22DOI: 10.1057/9781137291790.0005
T. Mbeki
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