Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a5
Sonia Vohito
SUMMARY Corporal punishment is the most common form of violence against children worldwide, including in Africa. Corporal punishment violates children's rights to respect for their human dignity and physical integrity. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child provides for every child's right to be protected from violence and ill-treatment. The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other human rights bodies consistently examine states on their progress towards prohibiting and eliminating corporal punishment. In the context of the thirtieth anniversary of the African Children's Charter, this article aims to examine the progress made towards the prohibition and elimination of corporal punishment of children in all settings, in Africa. It highlights the challenges and shortcomings in implementing this campaign in Africa. The role of the African Children's Committee in promoting and protecting the human rights imperative to prohibit corporal punishment of children is also examined, especially as regards the legal barriers to end the corporal punishment of children in Africa. Key words: African Children's Charter; children's rights; corporal punishment; Agenda 2040
{"title":"The African Children's Charter and ending corporal punishment of children in Africa: A work in progress","authors":"Sonia Vohito","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a5","url":null,"abstract":"SUMMARY Corporal punishment is the most common form of violence against children worldwide, including in Africa. Corporal punishment violates children's rights to respect for their human dignity and physical integrity. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child provides for every child's right to be protected from violence and ill-treatment. The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other human rights bodies consistently examine states on their progress towards prohibiting and eliminating corporal punishment. In the context of the thirtieth anniversary of the African Children's Charter, this article aims to examine the progress made towards the prohibition and elimination of corporal punishment of children in all settings, in Africa. It highlights the challenges and shortcomings in implementing this campaign in Africa. The role of the African Children's Committee in promoting and protecting the human rights imperative to prohibit corporal punishment of children is also examined, especially as regards the legal barriers to end the corporal punishment of children in Africa. Key words: African Children's Charter; children's rights; corporal punishment; Agenda 2040","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67473712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a23
T. G. Kasuso, T. Madebwe
SUMMARY The protection of individual labour rights in Zimbabwe is deficient despite the fact that the Constitution protects these rights. In looking to explore how this could be addressed, this article considers the evolution of the state's obligation to protect individual labour rights to this point and relies on individual labour rights protection at a global level with particular insights drawn from the approach taken to the protection of these rights in two jurisdictions, namely, England and South Africa. The approach to the protection of individual labour rights in these two jursidictions has influenced the Zimbabwean approach to highlight that effective protection of individual labour rights is possible only when courts actively look to protect these rights. The article argues that the reason for deficiencies in the Zimbabwean approach is the fact that courts are not doing enough to protect individual labour rights in Zimbabwe. The solution to this issue, therefore, lies in Zimbabwean courts taking a more proactive role in protecting individual labour rights. Key words: labour rights; constitutionalism; individual labour rights; codification; acccess to court
{"title":"The protection of individual labour rights in Zimbabwe","authors":"T. G. Kasuso, T. Madebwe","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a23","url":null,"abstract":"SUMMARY The protection of individual labour rights in Zimbabwe is deficient despite the fact that the Constitution protects these rights. In looking to explore how this could be addressed, this article considers the evolution of the state's obligation to protect individual labour rights to this point and relies on individual labour rights protection at a global level with particular insights drawn from the approach taken to the protection of these rights in two jurisdictions, namely, England and South Africa. The approach to the protection of individual labour rights in these two jursidictions has influenced the Zimbabwean approach to highlight that effective protection of individual labour rights is possible only when courts actively look to protect these rights. The article argues that the reason for deficiencies in the Zimbabwean approach is the fact that courts are not doing enough to protect individual labour rights in Zimbabwe. The solution to this issue, therefore, lies in Zimbabwean courts taking a more proactive role in protecting individual labour rights. Key words: labour rights; constitutionalism; individual labour rights; codification; acccess to court","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67473160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a20
Razaq justice Adebimpe
SUMMARY One of the reasons why women seek abortion in Nigeria is to get rid of unwanted pregnancies resulting from rape. However, due to the prohibition of the procedure, in such circumstances many women resort to secret and mostly unsafe abortions. These abortions contribute to the soaring rates of maternal deaths and morbidity in the country. It is against this background that this article examines the Nigerian laws on abortion and elicits peoples' attitudes to the call for liberalisation thereof, with a focus on pregnancies resulting from rape. The study employs both the doctrinal and the non-doctrinal methods of research. The doctrinal method comprises a contents analysis of literature and the law. The non-doctrinal method consists of field research to obtain information via interviews, which is imperative because of the dearth of primary data to work on. The field research involves representative participants that are selected using a purposive sampling technique. Findings are presented on thematic bases. It is established that the current law is dysfunctional and counter-productive, and that people support its liberalisation. Consequently, the study concludes that an effective strategy to combat unsafe abortion and enhance women 's reproductive health in Nigeria is to liberalise the law to conform to the nation's treaty obligations, while deriving insights from the South African experience. Key words: rape; unsafe abortion; reproductive autonomy; right to choose; Nigeria
{"title":"Liberalisation of Nigeria's abortion laws with a focus on pregnancies resulting from rape: An empirical analysis","authors":"Razaq justice Adebimpe","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n1a20","url":null,"abstract":"SUMMARY One of the reasons why women seek abortion in Nigeria is to get rid of unwanted pregnancies resulting from rape. However, due to the prohibition of the procedure, in such circumstances many women resort to secret and mostly unsafe abortions. These abortions contribute to the soaring rates of maternal deaths and morbidity in the country. It is against this background that this article examines the Nigerian laws on abortion and elicits peoples' attitudes to the call for liberalisation thereof, with a focus on pregnancies resulting from rape. The study employs both the doctrinal and the non-doctrinal methods of research. The doctrinal method comprises a contents analysis of literature and the law. The non-doctrinal method consists of field research to obtain information via interviews, which is imperative because of the dearth of primary data to work on. The field research involves representative participants that are selected using a purposive sampling technique. Findings are presented on thematic bases. It is established that the current law is dysfunctional and counter-productive, and that people support its liberalisation. Consequently, the study concludes that an effective strategy to combat unsafe abortion and enhance women 's reproductive health in Nigeria is to liberalise the law to conform to the nation's treaty obligations, while deriving insights from the South African experience. Key words: rape; unsafe abortion; reproductive autonomy; right to choose; Nigeria","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67473493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A19
Mikaela Heikkilä, Maija Mustaniemi-Laakso
In human rights law the concept of vulnerability is increasingly being used to attract attention to the fact that people are differently resilient and that some are more prone to harm than others. Its use as a legal concept, however, is still embryotic and opens up to several questions. By scrutinising how the judicial bodies within two regional human rights systems – the African and the European – have referred to and used the concept, the article discusses the nature and function of vulnerability in interpreting rights. Discussing the function and the conceptualisation of vulnerability in such practice, it argues that although the idea of special protection implicit in the vulnerability thinking is not revolutionary as such, vulnerability argumentation may be
{"title":"Vulnerability as a human rights variable: African and European developments","authors":"Mikaela Heikkilä, Maija Mustaniemi-Laakso","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A19","url":null,"abstract":"In human rights law the concept of vulnerability is increasingly being used to attract attention to the fact that people are differently resilient and that some are more prone to harm than others. Its use as a legal concept, however, is still embryotic and opens up to several questions. By scrutinising how the judicial bodies within two regional human rights systems – the African and the European – have referred to and used the concept, the article discusses the nature and function of vulnerability in interpreting rights. Discussing the function and the conceptualisation of vulnerability in such practice, it argues that although the idea of special protection implicit in the vulnerability thinking is not revolutionary as such, vulnerability argumentation may be","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"777-798"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49427388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-13DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a12
Yohannes Eneyew Ayalew
The right to freedom of expression is guaranteed under international law and in the constitutions of most countries. The content of this right has developed and recently has come to be thought of as including the internet as a medium of communication, and the question is raised whether access to the internet is protected under the current set of normative principles. The right to freedom of expression is fully protected under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to which Ethiopia is a party. The Ethiopian government restricts freedom of expression on the internet and has adopted extraneous limiting measures. Most of these measures are incompatable with the African Charter. Restrictions to freedom of expression on the internet include internet shutdowns, hate speech and disinformation regulation, repressive laws, and internet censorship. These limitations may (in)directly muzzle freedom of expression in Ethiopia. The writer argues that illegitimate limitations of the right fall short of the quadruple tests of limitation measures, both under the African Charter and the Ethiopian Constitution. As a result, these limitations violate individuals’ freedom of expression on the internet. Finally, the article suggests that the Ethiopian government should draw guidance from the African Commission’s 2019 Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information containing rules on limitation measures imposed on freedom of expression on the internet.
{"title":"Assessing the limitations to freedom of expression on the internet in Ethiopia against the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights","authors":"Yohannes Eneyew Ayalew","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a12","url":null,"abstract":"The right\u0000 to freedom of expression is guaranteed under international law and in \u0000the constitutions of most countries. The content of this right has \u0000developed and recently has come to be thought of as including the \u0000internet as a medium of communication, and the question is raised \u0000whether access to the internet is protected under the current set of \u0000normative principles. The right to freedom of expression is fully \u0000protected under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to \u0000which Ethiopia is a party. The Ethiopian government restricts freedom of\u0000 expression on the internet and has adopted extraneous limiting \u0000measures. Most of these measures are incompatable with the African \u0000Charter. Restrictions to freedom of expression on the internet include \u0000internet shutdowns, hate speech and disinformation regulation, \u0000repressive laws, and internet censorship. These limitations may \u0000(in)directly muzzle freedom of expression in Ethiopia.\u0000The writer argues that \u0000illegitimate limitations of the right fall short of the quadruple tests \u0000of limitation measures, both under the African Charter and the Ethiopian\u0000 Constitution. As a result, these limitations violate individuals’ \u0000freedom of expression on the internet. Finally, the article suggests \u0000that the Ethiopian government should draw guidance from the African \u0000Commission’s 2019 Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Access to \u0000Information containing rules on limitation measures imposed on freedom \u0000of expression on the internet.","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"315-345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47128332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-12DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a2
Gus Waschefort
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has a uniquely broad subject-matter jurisdiction that includes any “relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned” (article 3 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights). This article considers the extent to which the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction includes international humanitarian law (IHL), and the related issue of the Court’s interpretive competence. It is argued that the Court is indeed competent to directly apply norms of IHL. However, the circumstances under which it can do so are limited to two instances: (i) where IHL norms are incorporated by reference into applicable human rights treaties; and (ii) in the likely scenario that the Court regards some IHL conventions as having a human rights character, the primary rules of the applicable IHL obligations must entail an individual right. Whether a given IHL obligation entails an individual right is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and in any event, such instances will be rare. As a consequence of the limited circumstances under which the Court can directly apply IHL, determining the extent to which the Court can rely on the interpretation of IHL in applying human rights norms remains pertinent. In this regard it is argued that the Court can rely on IHL in the application of human rights norms on two bases. First, considering the complementary relationship the Court has with the African Commission, the Court can rely on the African Charter’s interpretation clause (articles 60 and 61). Secondly, the Court has an implied power to interpret IHL in applying human rights treaties, as this power is necessary for the Court to discharge its mandate.
{"title":"The subject-matterjurisdiction and interpretive competence of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in relation to international humanitarian law","authors":"Gus Waschefort","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a2","url":null,"abstract":"The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has a uniquely broad subject-matter jurisdiction that includes any “relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned” (article 3 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights). This article considers the extent to which the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction includes international humanitarian law (IHL), and the related issue of the Court’s interpretive competence. It is argued that the Court is indeed competent to directly apply norms of IHL. However, the circumstances under which it can do so are limited to two instances: (i) where IHL norms are incorporated by reference into applicable human rights treaties; and (ii) in the likely scenario that the Court regards some IHL conventions as having a human rights character, the primary rules of the applicable IHL obligations must entail an individual right. Whether a given IHL obligation entails an individual right is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and in any event, such instances will be rare. As a consequence of the limited circumstances under which the Court can directly apply IHL, determining the extent to which the Court can rely on the interpretation of IHL in applying human rights norms remains pertinent. In this regard it is argued that the Court can rely on IHL in the application of human rights norms on two bases. First, considering the complementary relationship the Court has with the African Commission, the Court can rely on the African Charter’s interpretation clause (articles 60 and 61). Secondly, the Court has an implied power to interpret IHL in applying human rights treaties, as this power is necessary for the Court to discharge its mandate.","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45337608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a11
Lorette Arendse
This article assesses the extent to which the South African Constitutional Court’s seminal findings in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essa NO have bolstered the lower courts to give tangible content to the right to basic education. It is contended that the particular facts of Juma Musjid, which required the Constitutional Court to rule on the negative obligations of section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution, actually played a significant role in the Court’s unequivocal pronouncement that the right is unqualified. The Court’s ruling on the nature of section 29(1)(a) seems to have emboldened lower courts to adopt a substantive interpretation of the right. The article traces the lower courts’ judgments over a period of almost a decade and explores in detail how the right to basic education has been ‘filled out’ incrementally by these courts. The connection between the incremental approach and a conceptualisation of transformation that is cognisant of the changing context of our society is also explored in the article. It is argued that a case-by-case approach to litigating potential violations of the right to basic education ensures that the right is never fixed but keeps on evolving to keep abreast of changing forms of (in)justice in our society.
{"title":"Slowly but surely: The substantive approach to the right to basic education of the South African courts post-Juma Musjid","authors":"Lorette Arendse","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a11","url":null,"abstract":"This article assesses the extent to which the South African Constitutional Court’s seminal findings in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essa NO have bolstered the lower courts to give tangible content to the right to basic education. It is contended that the particular facts of Juma Musjid, which required the Constitutional Court to rule on the negative obligations of section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution, actually played a significant role in the Court’s unequivocal pronouncement that the right is unqualified. The Court’s ruling on the nature of section 29(1)(a) seems to have emboldened lower courts to adopt a substantive interpretation of the right. The article traces the lower courts’ judgments over a period of almost a decade and explores in detail how the right to basic education has been ‘filled out’ incrementally by these courts. The connection between the incremental approach and a conceptualisation of transformation that is cognisant of the changing context of our society is also explored in the article. It is argued that a case-by-case approach to litigating potential violations of the right to basic education ensures that the right is never fixed but keeps on evolving to keep abreast of changing forms of (in)justice in our society.","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67472662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a8
Gift Dorothy Makanje
It is widely acknowledged that crime victims and witnesses for a long time have not been treated fairly in most criminal justice systems. In a bid to remedy this situation, particularly with respect to vulnerable witnesses, most common law jurisdictions have introduced innovative procedural and evidential law changes, which include screening the witness from the defendant’s sight; prohibiting the defendant from personally cross-examining the witness; and restrictions on improper cross-examination, including evidence relating to sexual history. Virtually all these measures have underpinning resource requirements. Presently Malawi does not afford adequate protection to vulnerable witnesses. The article argues that the protection of vulnerable witnesses during trial in a resource-poor nation such as Malawi lies in the hands of judges. While on the face of it Malawi’s lack of resources may appear to be an obstacle to the protection of vulnerable witnesses, the system has a wealth of alternative options that may be used for their benefit. All that is needed is for judges to proactively utilise the available alternatives to the benefit of such witnesses as well as continuing training and education to reinforce their competencies in this regard.
{"title":"The protection of vulnerable witnesses during criminal trials in Malawi: Addressing resource challenges","authors":"Gift Dorothy Makanje","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2020/v20n1a8","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely acknowledged that crime victims and witnesses for a long time have not been treated fairly in most criminal justice systems. In a bid to remedy this situation, particularly with respect to vulnerable witnesses, most common law jurisdictions have introduced innovative procedural and evidential law changes, which include screening the witness from the defendant’s sight; prohibiting the defendant from personally cross-examining the witness; and restrictions on improper cross-examination, including evidence relating to sexual history. Virtually all these measures have underpinning resource requirements. Presently Malawi does not afford adequate protection to vulnerable witnesses. The article argues that the protection of vulnerable witnesses during trial in a resource-poor nation such as Malawi lies in the hands of judges. While on the face of it Malawi’s lack of resources may appear to be an obstacle to the protection of vulnerable witnesses, the system has a wealth of alternative options that may be used for their benefit. All that is needed is for judges to proactively utilise the available alternatives to the benefit of such witnesses as well as continuing training and education to reinforce their competencies in this regard.","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":"206-232"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67472855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A12
Nkatha L. Murungi
{"title":"Editorial introduction to special focus: The African Children's Charter at 30: Reflections on its past and future contribution to the rights of children in Africa","authors":"Nkatha L. Murungi","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67472954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A21
Mkhululi Nyathi, Matshobana Ncube
November 2017 saw the Zimbabwean Defence Forces executing a military coup against Mr Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's long-serving President. The military sought to justify the coup on the basis that there were divisions in the party in government - ZANU-PF - and that it was stepping in to protect what it called the gains of the liberation struggle. The military demanded, among other things, the reinstatement of those ZANU-PF party members who had been removed from their government and party positions. By brazenly involving itself in politics, let alone aligning itself with a political party, the military violated a number of constitutional provisions that prohibit the involvement of the security services in politics. Several individual freedoms and liberties, including the right to liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of movement and the right to security and freedom from torture, were violated during the coup. There are also allegations that there was loss of life directly linked to the coup. In effecting the coup, the military immobilised the police service and arrogated to itself the role of civilian policing, including the setting up of roadblocks on major roads and arresting and detaining those it identified as 'criminal elements'. The Zimbabwean Defence Forces have a long history of serious human rights violations, including politically-related torture and murder. They also stand accused of chronic involvement in politics, including the unleashing of violence during elections on behalf of ZANU-PF. Therefore, there is no hope that human rights protection and promotion will be on the agenda of the post-coup government - itself consisting of the main coup leaders and most of the ministers that served in the repressive Mugabe government. There is a need to establish mechanisms to ensure that those responsible for the coup and its attendant human rights violations and crimes are brought to account.
{"title":"The 2017 military coup in Zimbabwe: Implications for human rights and the rule of law","authors":"Mkhululi Nyathi, Matshobana Ncube","doi":"10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2020/V20N2A21","url":null,"abstract":"November 2017 saw the Zimbabwean Defence Forces executing a military coup against Mr Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's long-serving President. The military sought to justify the coup on the basis that there were divisions in the party in government - ZANU-PF - and that it was stepping in to protect what it called the gains of the liberation struggle. The military demanded, among other things, the reinstatement of those ZANU-PF party members who had been removed from their government and party positions. By brazenly involving itself in politics, let alone aligning itself with a political party, the military violated a number of constitutional provisions that prohibit the involvement of the security services in politics. Several individual freedoms and liberties, including the right to liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of movement and the right to security and freedom from torture, were violated during the coup. There are also allegations that there was loss of life directly linked to the coup. In effecting the coup, the military immobilised the police service and arrogated to itself the role of civilian policing, including the setting up of roadblocks on major roads and arresting and detaining those it identified as 'criminal elements'. The Zimbabwean Defence Forces have a long history of serious human rights violations, including politically-related torture and murder. They also stand accused of chronic involvement in politics, including the unleashing of violence during elections on behalf of ZANU-PF. Therefore, there is no hope that human rights protection and promotion will be on the agenda of the post-coup government - itself consisting of the main coup leaders and most of the ministers that served in the repressive Mugabe government. There is a need to establish mechanisms to ensure that those responsible for the coup and its attendant human rights violations and crimes are brought to account.","PeriodicalId":36136,"journal":{"name":"African Human Rights Law Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67473186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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