In the context of changing demographics, the increasing cost of health care services, and continuing federal budgetary pressures, Medicare has become one of the most controversial federal programs. To facilitate an informed debate about the future of this important public initiative, this article examines and debunks the following ten myths surrounding Medicare: (1) there is one Medicare program, (2) Medicare is going bankrupt, (3) Medicare is government health care, (4) Medicare covers all medical costs for its beneficiaries, (5) Medicare pays for long-term care expenses, (6) the program is immune to budgetary reduction, (7) it wastes much of its money on futile care, (8) Medicare is less efficient than private health insurance, (9) Medicare is not means-tested, and (10) increased longevity will sink Medicare.
{"title":"Top Ten Myths of Medicare","authors":"R. Kaplan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2111535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2111535","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of changing demographics, the increasing cost of health care services, and continuing federal budgetary pressures, Medicare has become one of the most controversial federal programs. To facilitate an informed debate about the future of this important public initiative, this article examines and debunks the following ten myths surrounding Medicare: (1) there is one Medicare program, (2) Medicare is going bankrupt, (3) Medicare is government health care, (4) Medicare covers all medical costs for its beneficiaries, (5) Medicare pays for long-term care expenses, (6) the program is immune to budgetary reduction, (7) it wastes much of its money on futile care, (8) Medicare is less efficient than private health insurance, (9) Medicare is not means-tested, and (10) increased longevity will sink Medicare.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121753449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A previous empirical study suggested that as copyrighted songs transitioned into the public domain they were used just as frequently in movie soundtracks as when they were still legally protected. That study, however, did not account for the number people who viewed each movie in the theater. Since the debate over copyright term extension centers on the continuing “availability” of works as they fall into the public domain, a better measure of the availability of songs in movies would account for the relative box office success of the movies in which the songs appear. The present study collects box office data for hundreds of movies from 1968-2008 in which appeared hundreds of songs and concludes that public domain songs were heard by just as many people in movie theaters before and after they fell into the public domain.
{"title":"More Music in Movies: What Box Office Data Reveals About the Availability of Public Domain Songs in Movies from 1968-2008","authors":"P. Heald, Peibei Shi, J. Stoiber, Qingyao Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2080184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2080184","url":null,"abstract":"A previous empirical study suggested that as copyrighted songs transitioned into the public domain they were used just as frequently in movie soundtracks as when they were still legally protected. That study, however, did not account for the number people who viewed each movie in the theater. Since the debate over copyright term extension centers on the continuing “availability” of works as they fall into the public domain, a better measure of the availability of songs in movies would account for the relative box office success of the movies in which the songs appear. The present study collects box office data for hundreds of movies from 1968-2008 in which appeared hundreds of songs and concludes that public domain songs were heard by just as many people in movie theaters before and after they fell into the public domain.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117235502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-Castro, Rafel Crespí-Cladera, Ruth V. Aguilera
We assemble a new data on dual-class firms in Latin America and analyze the relationship between the largest shareholder characteristics and its decision to leverage voting rights. First, we describe who are the largest shareholders in Latin American firms. Second, we find that both the type and origin of the largest shareholder, together with firm- and country-level characteristics, are key determinants to explain the decision to separate voting from cash-flow rights. To tackle the determinants of ownership in Latin American publicly listed firms has both managerial and policy implications, because the largest shareholders are those in charge to define business strategies and the allocation of firms’ resources.
{"title":"Corporate Ownership in Latin American Firms: A Comparative Analysis of Dual-Class Shares","authors":"Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-Castro, Rafel Crespí-Cladera, Ruth V. Aguilera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2071217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2071217","url":null,"abstract":"We assemble a new data on dual-class firms in Latin America and analyze the relationship between the largest shareholder characteristics and its decision to leverage voting rights. First, we describe who are the largest shareholders in Latin American firms. Second, we find that both the type and origin of the largest shareholder, together with firm- and country-level characteristics, are key determinants to explain the decision to separate voting from cash-flow rights. To tackle the determinants of ownership in Latin American publicly listed firms has both managerial and policy implications, because the largest shareholders are those in charge to define business strategies and the allocation of firms’ resources.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115397500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reviewing recent developments in U.S. patent law and patent policy with an eye towards the future is no easy task - the temptation is too great to speculate on the entire future of patent law and the patent system. That said, there is no crystal ball or legal or empirical test that might predict the future of patent law and policy. This essay contends that recent developments in patent law and patent policy illustrate four trends which will bear on any patent possibility in the future: continued active shaping of patent law doctrine and patent policy by the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Supreme Court’s significant, renewed interest in patent law; recent legislative changes to the patent law, including statutory reform and judicial reform with the passage of both the AIA and the pilot patent specialization program in designated judicial districts; and the ripple effects of these developments on the patent system as a whole. Importantly, recent patent legislative reform illustrates that two clear stakeholders are coming to the fore - large pharmaceutical/biotechnology/life science companies and large information technology companies. Any patent possibility that includes a unitary patent system - the same patent law for all technology sectors - must account for these stakeholders’ differential reliance on patent assets to appropriate benefits from the marketplace for their innovations lest the motivation for a continued unitary system may be lost. It is also clear that Congress is interested in bringing U.S. patent law into conformity with popular international law. In many ways, it is possible to see the AIA as a move towards that goal as well as a unitary solution for Pharma and IT, with the possible concern that it comes at the expense of discouraging innovation by start-ups and small business. These are indeed exciting times for patent aficionados.
{"title":"Taking Stock and Looking Ahead: The Future of U.S. Patent Law","authors":"J. Kesan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1372382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1372382","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewing recent developments in U.S. patent law and patent policy with an eye towards the future is no easy task - the temptation is too great to speculate on the entire future of patent law and the patent system. That said, there is no crystal ball or legal or empirical test that might predict the future of patent law and policy. This essay contends that recent developments in patent law and patent policy illustrate four trends which will bear on any patent possibility in the future: continued active shaping of patent law doctrine and patent policy by the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Supreme Court’s significant, renewed interest in patent law; recent legislative changes to the patent law, including statutory reform and judicial reform with the passage of both the AIA and the pilot patent specialization program in designated judicial districts; and the ripple effects of these developments on the patent system as a whole. Importantly, recent patent legislative reform illustrates that two clear stakeholders are coming to the fore - large pharmaceutical/biotechnology/life science companies and large information technology companies. Any patent possibility that includes a unitary patent system - the same patent law for all technology sectors - must account for these stakeholders’ differential reliance on patent assets to appropriate benefits from the marketplace for their innovations lest the motivation for a continued unitary system may be lost. It is also clear that Congress is interested in bringing U.S. patent law into conformity with popular international law. In many ways, it is possible to see the AIA as a move towards that goal as well as a unitary solution for Pharma and IT, with the possible concern that it comes at the expense of discouraging innovation by start-ups and small business. These are indeed exciting times for patent aficionados.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122956694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This report is in response to a request from the Federal Judicial Center to perform a study of the use of special masters in patent litigation. The analysis is based on 116 patent cases terminated in 2005 and 2006 that were identified by the Federal Judicial Center as having involved special masters. Our findings are as follows: 1. The individuals appointed as special masters are, on the whole, highly qualified with substantial legal experience and strong professional credentials. They are almost exclusively specialists in patent law. 2. The orders appointing special masters universally specify the scope of work of the master and usually describe how he or she will be compensated. However, the orders are less compliant with the other requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b). 3. Special masters tend to be appointed in the most complex (i.e., long duration) of patent cases. These cases are the least likely to be resolved through a negotiated settlement and are among the most expensive and long-lived cases. Masters tend to be appointed after the case has already endured longer than the average case, suggesting that the court and parties have recognized the complexity of the issues at hand and seek expert help. 4. Special masters are most likely to be employed to oversee the discovery process or to conduct claim construction. They usually write a report recommending how to handle these issues. Sometimes they preside over the Markman hearing. 5. The reports and recommendations produced by the special masters are nearly always adopted by the court, usually with no modification. 6. The appeal rate among cases in which special masters were employed was comparable to that of the total population of patent cases, as was the reversal rate. 7. Since special masters are most often appointed in complex, long-duration patent cases, it is meaningful to compare the appeal rate and the reversal rate of special-master-appointed patent cases with other complex patent cases. The appeal rate among cases in which special masters were employed was half that of other complex patent cases. The reversal rate is also lower for patent cases with special masters when compared to the reversal rate for all complex patent cases. 8. The most common area in which special masters worked - claim construction - is less likely to be the subject of an appeal when compared to the appeal rate for claim construction in all complex patent cases.
{"title":"A Study of the Role and Impact of Special Masters in Patent Cases","authors":"J. Kesan, Gwendolyn G. Ball","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1372366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1372366","url":null,"abstract":"This report is in response to a request from the Federal Judicial Center to perform a study of the use of special masters in patent litigation. The analysis is based on 116 patent cases terminated in 2005 and 2006 that were identified by the Federal Judicial Center as having involved special masters. Our findings are as follows: 1. The individuals appointed as special masters are, on the whole, highly qualified with substantial legal experience and strong professional credentials. They are almost exclusively specialists in patent law. 2. The orders appointing special masters universally specify the scope of work of the master and usually describe how he or she will be compensated. However, the orders are less compliant with the other requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b). 3. Special masters tend to be appointed in the most complex (i.e., long duration) of patent cases. These cases are the least likely to be resolved through a negotiated settlement and are among the most expensive and long-lived cases. Masters tend to be appointed after the case has already endured longer than the average case, suggesting that the court and parties have recognized the complexity of the issues at hand and seek expert help. 4. Special masters are most likely to be employed to oversee the discovery process or to conduct claim construction. They usually write a report recommending how to handle these issues. Sometimes they preside over the Markman hearing. 5. The reports and recommendations produced by the special masters are nearly always adopted by the court, usually with no modification. 6. The appeal rate among cases in which special masters were employed was comparable to that of the total population of patent cases, as was the reversal rate. 7. Since special masters are most often appointed in complex, long-duration patent cases, it is meaningful to compare the appeal rate and the reversal rate of special-master-appointed patent cases with other complex patent cases. The appeal rate among cases in which special masters were employed was half that of other complex patent cases. The reversal rate is also lower for patent cases with special masters when compared to the reversal rate for all complex patent cases. 8. The most common area in which special masters worked - claim construction - is less likely to be the subject of an appeal when compared to the appeal rate for claim construction in all complex patent cases.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121419036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Should the law permit hackback? How should the law on self-defense in cyberspace be designed? In this paper, we use game-theoretic analysis to develop criteria that determine whether police enforcement, litigation, or hackback is best, and under what circumstances. Our model suggests that the law should permit hackback only if: (1) other alternatives, such as police enforcement and resort to courts, would be ineffective; (2) there is a serious prospect of hitting the hacker instead of innocent third parties; and (3) the damages that can be potentially mitigated to the defender's systems outweigh the potential damages to third parties. The law should require that counterstrikers use only force that is necessary to avoid damage to their own systems. Also, proper liability rules will induce counterstrikers to internalize the damages of third parties in their decision-making. Finally, better intrusion detection systems (IDS) and traceback technology improve the deterrent effect and efficacy of hackback.
{"title":"Hacking Back: Optimal Use of Self-Defense in Cyberspace","authors":"Ruperto P. Majuca, J. Kesan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1363932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1363932","url":null,"abstract":"Should the law permit hackback? How should the law on self-defense in cyberspace be designed? In this paper, we use game-theoretic analysis to develop criteria that determine whether police enforcement, litigation, or hackback is best, and under what circumstances. Our model suggests that the law should permit hackback only if: (1) other alternatives, such as police enforcement and resort to courts, would be ineffective; (2) there is a serious prospect of hitting the hacker instead of innocent third parties; and (3) the damages that can be potentially mitigated to the defender's systems outweigh the potential damages to third parties. The law should require that counterstrikers use only force that is necessary to avoid damage to their own systems. Also, proper liability rules will induce counterstrikers to internalize the damages of third parties in their decision-making. Finally, better intrusion detection systems (IDS) and traceback technology improve the deterrent effect and efficacy of hackback.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124869998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, it will explain the concepts of federal tax-exemption law as they apply to the NCAA and to the universities operating Division I football and basketball programs. As the article indicates, current law makes it virtually impossible for the IRS to withdraw exemption either from the NCAA or universities operating major athletic programs. It is somewhat more plausible that the IRS could tax revenues from Division I college athletics under the UBIT, although even that course of action would have to scale considerable legal hurdles. Moreover, even if the IRS applied the UBIT to big-time athletic revenues, this course of action likely would end up largely a "paper tiger" because the evidence suggests that virtually none of these programs would have taxable net income in the tax accounting sense after applying appropriate cost accounting. Of course, the law can be changed; Congress could certainly attach particular conditions to tax exemption for the NCAA or universities conducting Division I basketball and football programs if it desired. The second part of this article, therefore, examines the tax policy issues raised by college athletics, particularly whether these programs fit within a theoretical paradigm that demands they be exempt from taxation, or whether instead big-time college athletics should be considered a sui generis exception to general tax policy. The reason this is important is that if major college football and basketball do not fit in any standard theoretical paradigm for exemption, then we should forthrightly recognize that continuing tax-favored treatment for these activities is an "exception" to general tax policy - much like a local community abating property taxes to induce a business to locate there. Such a conclusion, in turn, means that Congress could consider attaching special conditions to continuing tax exemption for the NCAA and universities engaged in big-time athletics without worrying about any damage to established tax policy or principles - in other words, this is the "hook" reformers can use to press their case. While the exact scope of these special conditions should be debated by experts in college athletics, I note in the final section of the article that there are precedents in tax law for (1) attaching conditions on the use of proceeds from an exempt activity (e.g., a requirement that big-time athletic revenues be used to subsidize other charitable outputs, such as increased athletic opportunities in non-revenue sports or for women); (2) expenditure limits such as caps on coaching salaries, and (3) expanded disclosure via a schedule to Form 990, similar to the new Schedule H for hospitals, that would require both the NCAA and universities with athletic programs to provide more information regarding their programs and the academic progress of student-athletes.
{"title":"The NCAA, Tax Exemption and College Athletics","authors":"J. Colombo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1336727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1336727","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, it will explain the concepts of federal tax-exemption law as they apply to the NCAA and to the universities operating Division I football and basketball programs. As the article indicates, current law makes it virtually impossible for the IRS to withdraw exemption either from the NCAA or universities operating major athletic programs. It is somewhat more plausible that the IRS could tax revenues from Division I college athletics under the UBIT, although even that course of action would have to scale considerable legal hurdles. Moreover, even if the IRS applied the UBIT to big-time athletic revenues, this course of action likely would end up largely a \"paper tiger\" because the evidence suggests that virtually none of these programs would have taxable net income in the tax accounting sense after applying appropriate cost accounting. Of course, the law can be changed; Congress could certainly attach particular conditions to tax exemption for the NCAA or universities conducting Division I basketball and football programs if it desired. The second part of this article, therefore, examines the tax policy issues raised by college athletics, particularly whether these programs fit within a theoretical paradigm that demands they be exempt from taxation, or whether instead big-time college athletics should be considered a sui generis exception to general tax policy. The reason this is important is that if major college football and basketball do not fit in any standard theoretical paradigm for exemption, then we should forthrightly recognize that continuing tax-favored treatment for these activities is an \"exception\" to general tax policy - much like a local community abating property taxes to induce a business to locate there. Such a conclusion, in turn, means that Congress could consider attaching special conditions to continuing tax exemption for the NCAA and universities engaged in big-time athletics without worrying about any damage to established tax policy or principles - in other words, this is the \"hook\" reformers can use to press their case. While the exact scope of these special conditions should be debated by experts in college athletics, I note in the final section of the article that there are precedents in tax law for (1) attaching conditions on the use of proceeds from an exempt activity (e.g., a requirement that big-time athletic revenues be used to subsidize other charitable outputs, such as increased athletic opportunities in non-revenue sports or for women); (2) expenditure limits such as caps on coaching salaries, and (3) expanded disclosure via a schedule to Form 990, similar to the new Schedule H for hospitals, that would require both the NCAA and universities with athletic programs to provide more information regarding their programs and the academic progress of student-athletes.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129895742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The need for specific inquiry into rural domestic violence is pressing because rural survivors face barriers to legal and economic access, assistance, and development that are compounded by their isolated physical location. However, there is a paucity of legal discourse addressing the issue of rural domestic violence. In particular, it is important to consider law enforcement response to domestic violence calls because police officers often serve as the gateway to the legal community through first-response action. This Article, which was the first focus-group based study of survivors' perceptions of law enforcement response to domestic violence in the rural Midwest, points out the disparity between law and action in rural Illinois as detailed by the survivor narratives. The survivors participating in focus groups detailed ineffective police responses to domestic violence calls. The gap between law and practice is expounded by interposing the legal obligations provided by Illinois statute with the narratives of police inaction and failure to arrest. Then, a method of strengthening police responses to domestic violence calls in rural areas is proposed in order to address the issues presented in the survivor narratives. The proposal includes the use of detailed first response forms that will encourage officers to engage in risk assessment techniques in order to better gage whether an arrest is warranted in response to a domestic violence call. Additionally, the form will serve as a reminder of statutorily mandated duties imposed on law enforcement officers. Through the use of these methods, rural officers can respond more effectively to domestic violence calls and better serve rural survivors of domestic abuse.
{"title":"Failure to Arrest: A Pilot Study of Police Response to Domestic Violence in Rural Illinois","authors":"S. Benson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1327990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1327990","url":null,"abstract":"The need for specific inquiry into rural domestic violence is pressing because rural survivors face barriers to legal and economic access, assistance, and development that are compounded by their isolated physical location. However, there is a paucity of legal discourse addressing the issue of rural domestic violence. In particular, it is important to consider law enforcement response to domestic violence calls because police officers often serve as the gateway to the legal community through first-response action. This Article, which was the first focus-group based study of survivors' perceptions of law enforcement response to domestic violence in the rural Midwest, points out the disparity between law and action in rural Illinois as detailed by the survivor narratives. The survivors participating in focus groups detailed ineffective police responses to domestic violence calls. The gap between law and practice is expounded by interposing the legal obligations provided by Illinois statute with the narratives of police inaction and failure to arrest. Then, a method of strengthening police responses to domestic violence calls in rural areas is proposed in order to address the issues presented in the survivor narratives. The proposal includes the use of detailed first response forms that will encourage officers to engage in risk assessment techniques in order to better gage whether an arrest is warranted in response to a domestic violence call. Additionally, the form will serve as a reminder of statutorily mandated duties imposed on law enforcement officers. Through the use of these methods, rural officers can respond more effectively to domestic violence calls and better serve rural survivors of domestic abuse.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124165657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Different models of judicial decision making highlight particular goals. Traditional legal theory posits that in making decisions judges strive to reach the correct legal decision as dictated by precedent. Attitudinal and strategic models focuses on the ways in which judges further their preferred policies. The managerial model emphasizes the increasing caseload pressures that judges at all levels face. Each model accurately captures some of what every judge does some of the time, but a sophisticated understanding of judicial decision making should explicitly incorporate the notion that judges simultaneously attempt to further numerous, disparate, and often conflicting, objectives. We offer a preliminary account of a more psychologically plausible account of judicial cognition and motivation, based on principles of goal management in a constraint satisfaction network.
{"title":"Multiple Constraint Satisfaction in Judging","authors":"J. Robbennolt, R. MacCoun, J. Darley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1133184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133184","url":null,"abstract":"Different models of judicial decision making highlight particular goals. Traditional legal theory posits that in making decisions judges strive to reach the correct legal decision as dictated by precedent. Attitudinal and strategic models focuses on the ways in which judges further their preferred policies. The managerial model emphasizes the increasing caseload pressures that judges at all levels face. Each model accurately captures some of what every judge does some of the time, but a sophisticated understanding of judicial decision making should explicitly incorporate the notion that judges simultaneously attempt to further numerous, disparate, and often conflicting, objectives. We offer a preliminary account of a more psychologically plausible account of judicial cognition and motivation, based on principles of goal management in a constraint satisfaction network.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133159930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jonathan H. Grenier, Mark E. Peecher, M. D. Piercey
Individuals judge audit quality, in part, based on adverse outcome information. Assuming that individuals over-rely on outcomes, prior accounting research attempts to improve their judgments by reducing their reliance on outcome information. Logically, however, individuals could either over-rely on outcomes ("outcome bias") or under-rely on outcomes ("reverse outcome bias"). Peecher and Piercey (2008) provide theory and empirical findings that individuals harshly exhibit outcome bias when the Bayesian probability of negligence is below 40% (e.g., a range that would include frivolous lawsuits), but that individuals also leniently exhibit reverse outcome bias when the Bayesian probability of negligence is above 40% (e.g., above key legal thresholds such as "preponderance of the evidence"). Using Support Theory, we predict and find that, by reducing reliance on outcomes, most interventions from prior literature reduce outcome bias for the lower range of Bayesian probabilities but exacerbate reverse outcome bias for the higher range of Bayesian probabilities. Using Cumulative Prospect Theory, we also design a new intervention that, if implemented early during the evaluators' judgment process, successfully reduces both forms of bias. By doing so, we contribute to the accounting literature on de-biasing auditor negligence judgments and to the accounting literature on outcome effects.
{"title":"Judging Auditor Negligence: De-Biasing Interventions, Outcome Bias, and Reverse Outcome Bias","authors":"Jonathan H. Grenier, Mark E. Peecher, M. D. Piercey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1015523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1015523","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals judge audit quality, in part, based on adverse outcome information. Assuming that individuals over-rely on outcomes, prior accounting research attempts to improve their judgments by reducing their reliance on outcome information. Logically, however, individuals could either over-rely on outcomes (\"outcome bias\") or under-rely on outcomes (\"reverse outcome bias\"). Peecher and Piercey (2008) provide theory and empirical findings that individuals harshly exhibit outcome bias when the Bayesian probability of negligence is below 40% (e.g., a range that would include frivolous lawsuits), but that individuals also leniently exhibit reverse outcome bias when the Bayesian probability of negligence is above 40% (e.g., above key legal thresholds such as \"preponderance of the evidence\"). Using Support Theory, we predict and find that, by reducing reliance on outcomes, most interventions from prior literature reduce outcome bias for the lower range of Bayesian probabilities but exacerbate reverse outcome bias for the higher range of Bayesian probabilities. Using Cumulative Prospect Theory, we also design a new intervention that, if implemented early during the evaluators' judgment process, successfully reduces both forms of bias. By doing so, we contribute to the accounting literature on de-biasing auditor negligence judgments and to the accounting literature on outcome effects.","PeriodicalId":365193,"journal":{"name":"University of Illinois College of Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133327466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}