{"title":"Is Monetary Policy Symmetrical in Its Effect on Sectoral Output","authors":"S. Singh, D. Rao","doi":"10.22381/emfm13120181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm13120181","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":" ","pages":"11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49431420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"STUDENT UNREST: CULTURAL MARXIST UNDERPINNINGS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT","authors":"W. Block","doi":"10.22381/emfm13120183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm13120183","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":"13 1","pages":"63-83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47845593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Merger & Acquisition pricing utilises traditional financial models like Discount Cash flow analysis and industry multiples. These methods do not consider behaviour finance biases, for example, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This paper analyses merger & acquisition pricing using behavioural bias of risk aversion (acquiring company behavioural trait) and optimism (target company trait). It then extends the study to include loss aversion from prospect theory, differences in the way humans view gains and losses based on low or high probability based on cumulative prospect theory, and finally the certainty effect (where humans prefer certain outcome to probabilistic outcomes). All these factors have an impact on merger & acquisition pricing for potential deals as acquiring and target companies behave differently and such impacts are not considered by traditional finance models. Results show that as loss aversion reduces, the positive impact of risk taking and optimism behaviours improve. Also, probabilistic gains and losses can have a positive impact, but certainty has the greatest impact. Humans prefer certain outcomes and acquirers and target company behaviours are more effective in such conditions with increasing utility for both parties under such circumstances. However, in the multiple acquirer setting, competition between the acquirer significantly increases the utility, and the loss aversion co-efficient works in the opposite direction as the perceptive difference between gains and losses decreases.
并购定价采用传统的财务模型，如贴现现金流分析和行业倍数。这些方法没有考虑行为金融学的偏见，例如前景理论(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)。本文利用风险规避(收购公司行为特征)和乐观主义(目标公司特征)的行为偏差来分析并购定价。然后，它将研究扩展到包括来自前景理论的损失厌恶，基于累积前景理论的基于低概率或高概率的人类看待收益和损失的方式的差异，以及最后的确定性效应(人类更喜欢某些结果而不是概率结果)。所有这些因素都会对潜在交易的并购定价产生影响，因为收购方和目标公司的行为不同，而传统的金融模型没有考虑到这种影响。结果表明，随着损失厌恶情绪的降低，风险承担和乐观行为的积极影响有所提高。此外，概率收益和损失也会产生积极影响，但确定性的影响最大。人类偏好某些结果，在这种情况下，收购方和目标公司的行为更有效，双方的效用都在增加。然而，在多收购者环境下，收购者之间的竞争显著增加了效用，而损失厌恶协同效率则相反，因为收益和损失之间的感知差异减小了。
{"title":"Merger and Acquisition Pricing Using Agent Based Modelling","authors":"N. Agarwal, P. Kwan, David Paul","doi":"10.22381/emfm13120184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm13120184","url":null,"abstract":"Merger & Acquisition pricing utilises traditional financial models like Discount Cash flow analysis and industry multiples. These methods do not consider behaviour finance biases, for example, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This paper analyses merger & acquisition pricing using behavioural bias of risk aversion (acquiring company behavioural trait) and optimism (target company trait). It then extends the study to include loss aversion from prospect theory, differences in the way humans view gains and losses based on low or high probability based on cumulative prospect theory, and finally the certainty effect (where humans prefer certain outcome to probabilistic outcomes). All these factors have an impact on merger & acquisition pricing for potential deals as acquiring and target companies behave differently and such impacts are not considered by traditional finance models. Results show that as loss aversion reduces, the positive impact of risk taking and optimism behaviours improve. Also, probabilistic gains and losses can have a positive impact, but certainty has the greatest impact. Humans prefer certain outcomes and acquirers and target company behaviours are more effective in such conditions with increasing utility for both parties under such circumstances. However, in the multiple acquirer setting, competition between the acquirer significantly increases the utility, and the loss aversion co-efficient works in the opposite direction as the perceptive difference between gains and losses decreases.","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":"13 1","pages":"84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46471542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Economics of Criminal Deportation","authors":"Anca-Iulia Stoian, M. Drumea","doi":"10.22381/emfm12420174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm12420174","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":"12 1","pages":"83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41777017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparing Financial Systems around the World: Capital Markets, Legal Systems, and Governance Regimes","authors":"Félix Zogning","doi":"10.22381/emfm12420172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm12420172","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":"12 1","pages":"43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47896373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Imf's Financial Programming, Financialization, and Stagnant Corporate Investment in Korea after the Asian Financial Crisis","authors":"Hee-Young Shin","doi":"10.22381/emfm12420171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm12420171","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":"12 1","pages":"11-42"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42656434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Volatility in Agricultural Commodity and Oil Markets during Times of Crises","authors":"Lucía Morales, B. Andréosso‐O'callaghan","doi":"10.22381/emfm12420173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm12420173","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":"12 1","pages":"59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42264133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Popescu, Cristina Alpopi, Mihaela Comănescu, F. Ciurlău
1.IntroductionEuropean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)'s core countries adopted the single currency with their national collective-bargaining entities, which assigned agenda-setting and veto capacities to wage-setters in their export spheres. Labor market politics (Mihăilă and Mateescu, 2017) in the EMU's southern countries, because of their more combative and disunited character, have not been beneficial with regard to wage moderation and low inflation. With higher inflation rates, southern countries swiftly lost effectiveness in their real exchange rates, generating the constant and unsustainable increase of current account deficits compared with the North and the demand for global financing to cover their deficits. (Johnston, 2016)2.Financial and Monetary Stability throughout the Euro ZoneThe monetary union necessitates regulation and substantial cohesion among the members as illustrated by the strategies for "banking union" and "fiscal union" that call for significant political integration by consolidating the entities for democratic harmony and responsibility. The economic advance of the euro zone requires identifying a superior economic stability among the members (Popescu, 2016), wherein creditor economies employ the space applicable to them to maintain economic growth. Adjustment should be more balanced throughout the euro zone. Governments' choices on design, allocation, and resourcing (Pera, 2017a) of the entities set up the background for interinstitutional partnership. Adequate action with respect to the entities was hostage to the resolutions of the member economies that favored them. (Henning, 2017)3.Did Europe's Monetary Union Advantage Its Low-inflation Performers?The growing discrepancies between EMU's northern and southern countries that assisted in accelerating crisis exposure (Nica et al., 2016) within the latter may be grasped by how EMU brought about an asymmetrical arena between economies with wage-setting entities (Nica, 2017) adjusted to low inflation and ones lacking them. Within domestic labor markets, the supply of low national inflation via controlled wage growth is conditional on power dynamics between discordant sectoral concerns. The sheltered sphere's ineffectiveness in supplying wage moderation impacts inflation (Popescu and Bitoiu, 2017) and, via the real exchange rate, global price competitiveness. Inflation-averse central banks multiplied the economic penalties related to substantial wage agreements in sheltered spheres. The transfer of inflated wages onto prices should be neutralized by central banks through monetary tightening with the aim of curbing inflation developments. (Johnston, 2016) (Figures 1-4)4.How Monetary Union Altered Inflation Dynamics in Its Member-statesThe Greek fiscal position, the outcome of a patronage-based political system that cut down tax revenue and increased public spending, generated the euro crisis. …
1.介绍欧洲经济和货币联盟（EMU）的核心国家与其国家集体谈判实体采用了单一货币，该实体赋予其出口领域的工资制定者制定议程和否决权。欧洲货币联盟南部国家的劳动力市场政治（Mihăilă和Mateescu，2017），由于其更加好斗和不团结的特点，在工资温和和低通胀方面并不有利。随着通货膨胀率的上升，南方国家迅速失去了实际汇率的有效性，导致经常账户赤字与北方相比持续且不可持续地增加，并产生了对全球融资以弥补赤字的需求。（Johnston，2016）2.整个欧元区的金融和货币稳定货币联盟需要监管和成员之间的实质性凝聚力，如“银行联盟”和“财政联盟”的战略所示，这些战略呼吁通过巩固实体以实现民主和谐和负责来实现重大的政治一体化。欧元区的经济发展需要确定成员国之间优越的经济稳定性（Popescu，2016），其中债权经济体利用适用于它们的空间来维持经济增长。整个欧元区的调整应该更加平衡。政府对实体的设计、分配和资源的选择（Pera，2017a）为机构间伙伴关系奠定了背景。对这些实体采取适当行动受制于支持它们的成员经济体的决议。（Henning，2017）3.欧洲货币联盟对其低通胀表现者有利吗？欧洲货币联盟的北部和南部国家之间日益扩大的差异有助于加速后者内部的危机暴露（Nica et al.，2016），这可以通过欧洲货币联盟如何在有工资设定实体（Nica，2017）的经济体和没有工资设定实体的经济体之间形成不对称的舞台来理解。在国内劳动力市场中，通过控制工资增长来提供低通胀的国家是以不和谐的部门担忧之间的权力动态为条件的。庇护领域在提供工资适度方面的无效性影响了通货膨胀（Popescu和Bitoiu，2017），并通过实际汇率影响了全球价格竞争力。反对通货膨胀的央行在庇护领域加大了与大量工资协议相关的经济处罚力度。各国央行应通过货币紧缩来抵消通胀对物价的转移，以遏制通胀的发展。（Johnston，2016）（图1-4）4.货币联盟如何改变其成员国的通货膨胀动态希腊的财政状况，是基于赞助人的政治制度减少税收和增加公共支出的结果，引发了欧元危机…
{"title":"Through a Glass Darkly: The Political Foundations of Sustainable European Monetary Union","authors":"G. Popescu, Cristina Alpopi, Mihaela Comănescu, F. Ciurlău","doi":"10.22381/emfm12320175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm12320175","url":null,"abstract":"1.IntroductionEuropean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)'s core countries adopted the single currency with their national collective-bargaining entities, which assigned agenda-setting and veto capacities to wage-setters in their export spheres. Labor market politics (Mihăilă and Mateescu, 2017) in the EMU's southern countries, because of their more combative and disunited character, have not been beneficial with regard to wage moderation and low inflation. With higher inflation rates, southern countries swiftly lost effectiveness in their real exchange rates, generating the constant and unsustainable increase of current account deficits compared with the North and the demand for global financing to cover their deficits. (Johnston, 2016)2.Financial and Monetary Stability throughout the Euro ZoneThe monetary union necessitates regulation and substantial cohesion among the members as illustrated by the strategies for \"banking union\" and \"fiscal union\" that call for significant political integration by consolidating the entities for democratic harmony and responsibility. The economic advance of the euro zone requires identifying a superior economic stability among the members (Popescu, 2016), wherein creditor economies employ the space applicable to them to maintain economic growth. Adjustment should be more balanced throughout the euro zone. Governments' choices on design, allocation, and resourcing (Pera, 2017a) of the entities set up the background for interinstitutional partnership. Adequate action with respect to the entities was hostage to the resolutions of the member economies that favored them. (Henning, 2017)3.Did Europe's Monetary Union Advantage Its Low-inflation Performers?The growing discrepancies between EMU's northern and southern countries that assisted in accelerating crisis exposure (Nica et al., 2016) within the latter may be grasped by how EMU brought about an asymmetrical arena between economies with wage-setting entities (Nica, 2017) adjusted to low inflation and ones lacking them. Within domestic labor markets, the supply of low national inflation via controlled wage growth is conditional on power dynamics between discordant sectoral concerns. The sheltered sphere's ineffectiveness in supplying wage moderation impacts inflation (Popescu and Bitoiu, 2017) and, via the real exchange rate, global price competitiveness. Inflation-averse central banks multiplied the economic penalties related to substantial wage agreements in sheltered spheres. The transfer of inflated wages onto prices should be neutralized by central banks through monetary tightening with the aim of curbing inflation developments. (Johnston, 2016) (Figures 1-4)4.How Monetary Union Altered Inflation Dynamics in Its Member-statesThe Greek fiscal position, the outcome of a patronage-based political system that cut down tax revenue and increased public spending, generated the euro crisis. …","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":"12 1","pages":"70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41491808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1.IntroductionEconomics is an effective tool for the investigation of corruption. Societies vary in the manner they construe and convey egocentricity. Endemic corruption implies a persistent deficiency (Fabre, 2017) in tapping egotism for well-founded and productive aims. The exemplary case for the social value of egotism is the conventional competitive market where self-centeredness is transposed into productive undertakings (Popescu and Ciurlău, 2016) that generate efficient resource utilization. The vilest case is war, i.e. a pernicious conflict over prosperity that culminates in devastating the resource base that activated the dispute originally. Public sector corruption weakens developmental and distributional objectives and is incompatible with democratic and republican values. (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016)2.The Institutional Economics of Public Sector Reform and CorruptionAn anemic or oppressive state stimulates corruption: the degree of corruption makes reform problematic and subverts public confidence in government entities, generating a chain reaction. A significant degree of corruption signals that something is wrong (Ionescu, 2016a) with the state's core entities and determinants, indicating a commitment to structural reform. Assessment should clarify how corruption functions in certain domains and to determine how it weakens public policies. Reform schemes may buckle down corruption where it has the most unfavorable consequences and where marginal benefits are significant relative to marginal expenses. Corruption takes place at the junction of situation-specific determinants, society-wide entities, and personal ethics. The consequences of corruption impact governmental cohesion and the cogency of government spending. In appraising regulatory corruption, the essential parameters are the features of the legal regime (Nica, 2016a) and the strength of the bureaucracy. An economy may be maintained in a corruption stratagem where corruption intensifies and hinders proper business investment. Corruption confines growth and suppresses confidence in government, whereas low growth and skepticism of the state invigorate and substantiate corruption. On the contrary, low corruption facilitates growth, and significant growth generates a societal demand (Popescu et al., 2016) to curtail corruption even further. Corruption may give rise to disorganizations and imbalances, being inferior to legally constituted payment schemes. Reforms may cut down the determinants for bribery and raise the risks of involving in corruption, the objective being an enhancement in the long-term efficiency, integrity, and validity of the state. The price mechanism may, as bribery, destabilize the authority and performance of government. (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016)3.The Impact of Corruption onthe Link between Government Spending and Economic GrowthCorruption is likely to generate lower growth, hindering both private and government investment spending (Nica, 2016b
1.引言经济学是调查腐败的有效工具。社会对自我中心的理解和传达方式各不相同。地方性腐败意味着在利用利己主义实现有根据和有成效的目标方面存在持续的缺陷（Fabre，2017）。利己主义社会价值的典型案例是传统的竞争市场，在这种市场中，自我中心被转化为生产性事业（Popescu和Ciurlău，2016），从而产生有效的资源利用。最恶劣的情况是战争，即一场关于繁荣的恶性冲突，最终摧毁了最初引发争端的资源基础。公共部门腐败削弱了发展和分配目标，与民主和共和价值观格格不入。（Rose Ackerman和Palifka，2016）2.公共部门改革和腐败的制度经济学贫血或压迫性国家刺激腐败：腐败程度使改革成为问题，颠覆公众对政府实体的信心，产生连锁反应。严重的腐败表明国家的核心实体和决定因素出了问题（Ionescu，2016a），表明国家致力于结构性改革。评估应澄清腐败在某些领域的作用，并确定它如何削弱公共政策。改革方案可能会打击腐败，因为腐败会产生最不利的后果，而且边际收益相对于边际支出来说意义重大。腐败发生在特定情况的决定因素、全社会实体和个人道德的结合点。腐败的后果影响政府的凝聚力和政府支出的说服力。在评估监管腐败时，基本参数是法律制度的特征（尼卡，2016a）和官僚机构的实力。一个经济体可以维持在腐败战略中，腐败加剧并阻碍适当的商业投资。腐败限制了经济增长，抑制了人们对政府的信心，而低增长和对国家的怀疑则助长和证实了腐败。相反，低腐败促进了增长，而显著的增长产生了进一步遏制腐败的社会需求（Popescu et al.，2016）。腐败可能会导致组织混乱和失衡，比不上合法制定的支付计划。改革可能会减少贿赂的决定因素，增加参与腐败的风险，目标是提高国家的长期效率、廉正和有效性。价格机制可能会像贿赂一样破坏政府的权威和绩效。（Rose Ackerman和Palifka，2016）3.腐败对政府支出和经济增长之间联系的影响腐败可能会降低增长，阻碍私人和政府投资支出（Nica，2016b），并抑制公共服务的绩效。政府投资支出提高了经济增长，带来了巨大的军事负担，而目前的（非资本）政府支出降低了国内生产总值（GDP）的增长，腐败产生了不利影响。助长腐败使军事负担对增长率的不利影响更加相关，这表明打击腐败往往会直接提高总体经济绩效（Popescu et al.，2017），并对减少军事负担的不利影响产生间接影响…
{"title":"Government Effectiveness in Controlling Corruption: What's New?","authors":"Luminița Ionescu","doi":"10.22381/emfm12320176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm12320176","url":null,"abstract":"1.IntroductionEconomics is an effective tool for the investigation of corruption. Societies vary in the manner they construe and convey egocentricity. Endemic corruption implies a persistent deficiency (Fabre, 2017) in tapping egotism for well-founded and productive aims. The exemplary case for the social value of egotism is the conventional competitive market where self-centeredness is transposed into productive undertakings (Popescu and Ciurlău, 2016) that generate efficient resource utilization. The vilest case is war, i.e. a pernicious conflict over prosperity that culminates in devastating the resource base that activated the dispute originally. Public sector corruption weakens developmental and distributional objectives and is incompatible with democratic and republican values. (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016)2.The Institutional Economics of Public Sector Reform and CorruptionAn anemic or oppressive state stimulates corruption: the degree of corruption makes reform problematic and subverts public confidence in government entities, generating a chain reaction. A significant degree of corruption signals that something is wrong (Ionescu, 2016a) with the state's core entities and determinants, indicating a commitment to structural reform. Assessment should clarify how corruption functions in certain domains and to determine how it weakens public policies. Reform schemes may buckle down corruption where it has the most unfavorable consequences and where marginal benefits are significant relative to marginal expenses. Corruption takes place at the junction of situation-specific determinants, society-wide entities, and personal ethics. The consequences of corruption impact governmental cohesion and the cogency of government spending. In appraising regulatory corruption, the essential parameters are the features of the legal regime (Nica, 2016a) and the strength of the bureaucracy. An economy may be maintained in a corruption stratagem where corruption intensifies and hinders proper business investment. Corruption confines growth and suppresses confidence in government, whereas low growth and skepticism of the state invigorate and substantiate corruption. On the contrary, low corruption facilitates growth, and significant growth generates a societal demand (Popescu et al., 2016) to curtail corruption even further. Corruption may give rise to disorganizations and imbalances, being inferior to legally constituted payment schemes. Reforms may cut down the determinants for bribery and raise the risks of involving in corruption, the objective being an enhancement in the long-term efficiency, integrity, and validity of the state. The price mechanism may, as bribery, destabilize the authority and performance of government. (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016)3.The Impact of Corruption onthe Link between Government Spending and Economic GrowthCorruption is likely to generate lower growth, hindering both private and government investment spending (Nica, 2016b","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":"12 1","pages":"76-81"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42809559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Double Features and Exhibition Programming Choices by Drive-In Movie Theatres","authors":"M. Fox","doi":"10.22381/emfm12320171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22381/emfm12320171","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37224,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Management, and Financial Markets","volume":" ","pages":"11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46446549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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