The information processors in a decentralized computing system must trust each other enough to be mutually supportive, yet they must also protect themselves to maintain autonomy. In a decentralized system, data security is especially important because the effects of compromise or sabotage can be so wide-ranging. The trusted function is an ad hoc solution to a problem with present data security models. This "consistency" problem, never previously addressed in a formal manner, is aggravated in the decentralized processing setting. The paper examines the consistency problem and proposes an addition to existing security models to address the problem. Using the model, the impact of the trusted function on secure, decentralized-processing system design is assessed.
{"title":"The Trusted Function in Secure Decenralized Processing","authors":"P. T. Withington","doi":"10.1109/SP.1980.10013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1980.10013","url":null,"abstract":"The information processors in a decentralized computing system must trust each other enough to be mutually supportive, yet they must also protect themselves to maintain autonomy. In a decentralized system, data security is especially important because the effects of compromise or sabotage can be so wide-ranging. The trusted function is an ad hoc solution to a problem with present data security models. This \"consistency\" problem, never previously addressed in a formal manner, is aggravated in the decentralized processing setting. The paper examines the consistency problem and proposes an addition to existing security models to address the problem. Using the model, the impact of the trusted function on secure, decentralized-processing system design is assessed.","PeriodicalId":372320,"journal":{"name":"1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1980-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132417634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we present a scheme for distributing a key to n users in such a way as to require at least k of them (k < n) to be present to construct the original key. The scheme has the property that up to k - 1 defections can be tolerated. It can be implemented simply and efficiently.
{"title":"Protecting Shared Cryptographic Keys","authors":"G. Davida, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton","doi":"10.1109/SP.1980.10011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1980.10011","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a scheme for distributing a key to n users in such a way as to require at least k of them (k < n) to be present to construct the original key. The scheme has the property that up to k - 1 defections can be tolerated. It can be implemented simply and efficiently.","PeriodicalId":372320,"journal":{"name":"1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"191 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1980-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116137120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A formal model of multilevel security systems is presented. We examine weaknesses of current security flow analysis mechanisms. A concept of expression flows is introduced, which allows us to use various techniques to certify systems that cannot be certified using current flow analysis techniques. We provide a method for generating static authorization requirements for systems in which authorization functions are only partially specified. We also attack the problem of using dynamic authorization functions for system certification.
{"title":"On Security Flow Analysis in Computer Systems (Preliminary Report)","authors":"Lishing Liu","doi":"10.1109/SP.1980.10001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1980.10001","url":null,"abstract":"A formal model of multilevel security systems is presented. We examine weaknesses of current security flow analysis mechanisms. A concept of expression flows is introduced, which allows us to use various techniques to certify systems that cannot be certified using current flow analysis techniques. We provide a method for generating static authorization requirements for systems in which authorization functions are only partially specified. We also attack the problem of using dynamic authorization functions for system certification.","PeriodicalId":372320,"journal":{"name":"1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"176 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1980-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120962002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The functions of secrecy, identification of the transmitter and of authentication of messages, and combinations of these, are in principle all achievable using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptosystems. Since secure communications depend on authenticated data exchanges between and/or authenticated actions by some of the parties to the communication, the fundamentals of authentication using symmetric or asymmetric techniques are developed. The surprising conclusion is that they differ only in the secure exchanges required to achieve further secure communications. The problem of authenticating a public-key directory is discussed in the light of these findings.
{"title":"Secure Communications in the Presence of Pervasive Deceit","authors":"G. J. Simmons","doi":"10.1109/SP.1980.10003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1980.10003","url":null,"abstract":"The functions of secrecy, identification of the transmitter and of authentication of messages, and combinations of these, are in principle all achievable using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptosystems. Since secure communications depend on authenticated data exchanges between and/or authenticated actions by some of the parties to the communication, the fundamentals of authentication using symmetric or asymmetric techniques are developed. The surprising conclusion is that they differ only in the secure exchanges required to achieve further secure communications. The problem of authenticating a public-key directory is discussed in the light of these findings.","PeriodicalId":372320,"journal":{"name":"1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1980-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125817877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Four methods for generating and distributing shared group encryption keys in a cryptographic system are described. All four methods can be used to implement secure broadcasts among groups of users in computer networks. Two methods use n secret keys to construct a master key for 2n -1 keys.
{"title":"The Master Key Problem","authors":"D. Denning, F. Schneider","doi":"10.1109/SP.1980.10009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1980.10009","url":null,"abstract":"Four methods for generating and distributing shared group encryption keys in a cryptographic system are described. All four methods can be used to implement secure broadcasts among groups of users in computer networks. Two methods use n secret keys to construct a master key for 2n -1 keys.","PeriodicalId":372320,"journal":{"name":"1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1980-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132233156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
New Cryptographic protocols which take full advantage of the unique properties of public key cryptosystems are now evolving. Several protocols for public key distribution and for digital signatures are briefly compared with each other and with the conventional alternative.
{"title":"Protocols for Public Key Cryptosystems","authors":"R. Merkle","doi":"10.1109/SP.1980.10006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1980.10006","url":null,"abstract":"New Cryptographic protocols which take full advantage of the unique properties of public key cryptosystems are now evolving. Several protocols for public key distribution and for digital signatures are briefly compared with each other and with the conventional alternative.","PeriodicalId":372320,"journal":{"name":"1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1980-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125735974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 1978, Merkle and Hellman introduced a knapsack-based public-key cryptosystem, which received widespread attention. The two major open problems concerning this cryptosystem are: (i) Security: How difficult are the Merkle-Hellman knapsacks? (ii) Efficiency: Can the huge key size be reduced? In this paper we analyze the cryptographic security of knapsack problems with small keys, develop a new (non-enumerative)type of algorithm for solving them, and use the algorithm to show that under certain assumptions it is as difficult to find the hidden trapdoors in Merkle-Hellman knapsacks as it is to solve general knapsack problems.
{"title":"The Cryptographic Security of Compact Knapsacks (Preliminary Report)","authors":"A. Shamir","doi":"10.1109/SP.1980.10005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1980.10005","url":null,"abstract":"In 1978, Merkle and Hellman introduced a knapsack-based public-key cryptosystem, which received widespread attention. The two major open problems concerning this cryptosystem are: (i) Security: How difficult are the Merkle-Hellman knapsacks? (ii) Efficiency: Can the huge key size be reduced? In this paper we analyze the cryptographic security of knapsack problems with small keys, develop a new (non-enumerative)type of algorithm for solving them, and use the algorithm to show that under certain assumptions it is as difficult to find the hidden trapdoors in Merkle-Hellman knapsacks as it is to solve general knapsack problems.","PeriodicalId":372320,"journal":{"name":"1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1980-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130434796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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