This article is a review of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary’s (ENCJ) framework and vision of the independence, accountability, and transparency of the judiciaries in member states of the European Union. Its purpose is to aid ENCJ in the further development of its indicators of judicial independence and accountability. The focus of the article is on performance measurement and management (PMM) as seen, depending on one’s views, either as an instrument for strengthening judicial independence or, alternatively, an instrument for reigning in the power of the judiciary and threatening its independence. The article begins with a general discussion of judicial independence, accountability, and transparency as seen through the “lens” of PMM. It continues with a critical review and assessment of the conceptual framework of the ENCJ’s 22 indicators and 64 sub-indicators of judicial independence and accountability and identifies several shortcomings that decrease the utility of the framework. It urges a rethinking of the conceptual framework and proposes an alternative model – an input/output/outcome “logic model” --more amenable to understanding and improving indicators of judicial independence and accountability. It makes four recommendations aimed at a better alignment of ENCJ’s framework of indicators with principles and practices of modern PMM. The article concludes with a warning about troubling developments at a higher level of governance and politics that some see as a retreat from democracy and the rule of law in Europe and in many other parts of the world, one that poses an existential threat to the judiciary as a coequal partner in government.
{"title":"Viewing Judicial Independence and Accountability through the “Lens” of Performance Measurement and Management","authors":"I. Keilitz","doi":"10.18352/IJCA.280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/IJCA.280","url":null,"abstract":"This article is a review of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary’s (ENCJ) framework and vision of the independence, accountability, and transparency of the judiciaries in member states of the European Union. Its purpose is to aid ENCJ in the further development of its indicators of judicial independence and accountability. The focus of the article is on performance measurement and management (PMM) as seen, depending on one’s views, either as an instrument for strengthening judicial independence or, alternatively, an instrument for reigning in the power of the judiciary and threatening its independence. The article begins with a general discussion of judicial independence, accountability, and transparency as seen through the “lens” of PMM. It continues with a critical review and assessment of the conceptual framework of the ENCJ’s 22 indicators and 64 sub-indicators of judicial independence and accountability and identifies several shortcomings that decrease the utility of the framework. It urges a rethinking of the conceptual framework and proposes an alternative model – an input/output/outcome “logic model” --more amenable to understanding and improving indicators of judicial independence and accountability. It makes four recommendations aimed at a better alignment of ENCJ’s framework of indicators with principles and practices of modern PMM. The article concludes with a warning about troubling developments at a higher level of governance and politics that some see as a retreat from democracy and the rule of law in Europe and in many other parts of the world, one that poses an existential threat to the judiciary as a coequal partner in government.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47630117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We are grateful for the contribution of Stefan Voigt, Elaine Mak, David Kosař, Samuel Spac, Ingo Keilitz and Marco Fabri to this Special Issue. Their commentaries on the indicators for independence and accountability of the judiciary as developed for the ENCJ give many useful ideas for future development. The comments also reflect the different disciplinary backgrounds of the authors and point to the need to position the ENCJ approach within the diverse disciplines that engage in the analysis of judicial independence. It is obvious that the approaches of the commenters on the ENCJ study differ widely. In economics the approach focuses on measuring independence for inclusion as variable in econometric models about, for instance, economic growth or protection of property rights. More (de-facto) independence enhances economic performance, but how more independence is to be achieved is not addressed. From the perspective of performance management of organizations, independence is part of court performance for the clients and to some degree subservient to it. In a legal, descriptive approach, the situation in different countries is described in detail, also as a part of judicial culture. The ENCJ study only sets criteria for measuring judicial independence, and does not address performance measurement of courts and judges in general.
{"title":"Reaction on the comments on the ENCJ study on Method for Assessment of Judicial Independence and Accountability.","authors":"F. Dijk, P. Langbroek","doi":"10.18352/IJCA.283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/IJCA.283","url":null,"abstract":"We are grateful for the contribution of Stefan Voigt, Elaine Mak, David Kosař, Samuel Spac, Ingo Keilitz and Marco Fabri to this Special Issue. Their commentaries on the indicators for independence and accountability of the judiciary as developed for the ENCJ give many useful ideas for future development. The comments also reflect the different disciplinary backgrounds of the authors and point to the need to position the ENCJ approach within the diverse disciplines that engage in the analysis of judicial independence. It is obvious that the approaches of the commenters on the ENCJ study differ widely. In economics the approach focuses on measuring independence for inclusion as variable in econometric models about, for instance, economic growth or protection of property rights. More (de-facto) independence enhances economic performance, but how more independence is to be achieved is not addressed. From the perspective of performance management of organizations, independence is part of court performance for the clients and to some degree subservient to it. In a legal, descriptive approach, the situation in different countries is described in detail, also as a part of judicial culture. The ENCJ study only sets criteria for measuring judicial independence, and does not address performance measurement of courts and judges in general.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42331322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The method outlined in this paper consists of a systematic assessment of the level of independence achieved in practice by national judicial systems throughout Europe, for the purpose of improving the design of judicial arrangements. Accountability of the judiciary is assessed alongside independence as those two concepts are intricately linked. Judicial independence and accountability are both evaluated in relation to the judicial system as a whole, as well as in relation to individual judges. Judicial independence is considered both objectively and subjectively. Specific indicators have been identified for each of these assessments. The whole methodology was applied to the judicial systems of 23 countries in Europe. The main findings of this exercise are summarised in this paper, with the strengths and weaknesses of these judicial systems and the most acute risks to judicial independence identified below.
{"title":"A Method for Assessment of the Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary","authors":"F. Dijk, Geoffrey Vos","doi":"10.18352/ijca.276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/ijca.276","url":null,"abstract":"The method outlined in this paper consists of a systematic assessment of the level of independence achieved in practice by national judicial systems throughout Europe, for the purpose of improving the design of judicial arrangements. Accountability of the judiciary is assessed alongside independence as those two concepts are intricately linked. Judicial independence and accountability are both evaluated in relation to the judicial system as a whole, as well as in relation to individual judges. Judicial independence is considered both objectively and subjectively. Specific indicators have been identified for each of these assessments. The whole methodology was applied to the judicial systems of 23 countries in Europe. The main findings of this exercise are summarised in this paper, with the strengths and weaknesses of these judicial systems and the most acute risks to judicial independence identified below.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48122700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After a critical evaluation of the proposal by van Dijk and Vos to make judicial independence and accountability measurable, this paper discusses a number of basic methodological decisions that need to be made before meaningful indicators can be constructed. The paper then moves on to deplore the lack of knowledge regarding the effects of judicial councils and proposes that more research be carried out to reduce our knowledge deficit. It further describes the rising importance of prosecutors and the complete lack of indicators regarding prosecutorial accountability. It argues that producing indicators with regard to prosecutors could add a lot more value than yet another indicator on judicial independence.
{"title":"Innovate – Don’t Imitate! -ENCJ Research Should Focus on Research Gaps","authors":"S. Voigt","doi":"10.18352/ijca.279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/ijca.279","url":null,"abstract":"After a critical evaluation of the proposal by van Dijk and Vos to make judicial independence and accountability measurable, this paper discusses a number of basic methodological decisions that need to be made before meaningful indicators can be constructed. The paper then moves on to deplore the lack of knowledge regarding the effects of judicial councils and proposes that more research be carried out to reduce our knowledge deficit. It further describes the rising importance of prosecutors and the complete lack of indicators regarding prosecutorial accountability. It argues that producing indicators with regard to prosecutors could add a lot more value than yet another indicator on judicial independence.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43256132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article focuses on conceptual issues regarding the new methodology of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) for measuring judicial independence and accountability. First, we argue that the proposal mixes up several concepts – judicial independence, judicial accountability, transparency of the judiciary, and public trust in the judiciary – which should be treated separately. Second, the proposal relies too much on conceptions of independence developed by the judicial community. As a result, it treats judicial administration with higher levels of involvement of judges as inherently better without empirical evidence, and does not sufficiently distinguish between de iure and de facto judicial independence. Moreover, the ENCJ’s indicators of judicial accountability are underinclusive as well as overinclusive and do not correspond to the traditional understanding of the concept. Finally, we argue that the ENCJ has to accept the possibility that (at least some types of) judicial councils (at least in some jurisdictions) might negatively affect (at least some facets of) judicial independence and judicial accountability. As a result, the ENCJ must adjust the relevant indicators accordingly.
{"title":"Conceptualization(s) of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability by the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back","authors":"D. Kosař, Samuel Spáč","doi":"10.18352/IJCA.284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/IJCA.284","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on conceptual issues regarding the new methodology of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) for measuring judicial independence and accountability. First, we argue that the proposal mixes up several concepts – judicial independence, judicial accountability, transparency of the judiciary, and public trust in the judiciary – which should be treated separately. Second, the proposal relies too much on conceptions of independence developed by the judicial community. As a result, it treats judicial administration with higher levels of involvement of judges as inherently better without empirical evidence, and does not sufficiently distinguish between de iure and de facto judicial independence. Moreover, the ENCJ’s indicators of judicial accountability are underinclusive as well as overinclusive and do not correspond to the traditional understanding of the concept. Finally, we argue that the ENCJ has to accept the possibility that (at least some types of) judicial councils (at least in some jurisdictions) might negatively affect (at least some facets of) judicial independence and judicial accountability. As a result, the ENCJ must adjust the relevant indicators accordingly.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47321922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On May 11, 2018, Maria Lourdes Sereno was removed from office as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. She had been a vocal critic of controversial President Rodrigo Duterte, and he had labeled her as an “enemy.” While she was under legislative impeachment investigation, Duterte’s solicitor general filed a quo warranto petition in the Supreme Court to challenge her right to hold office. The Supreme Court responded to that petition by ordering her removal, which her supporters claimed was politically-motivated and possibly unconstitutional. The story of Chief Justice Sereno should give urgency to the need for us to consider the proposition that maintaining the rule of law can be difficult, and that attacks on judicial independence can pose a grave threat to democracy. The article presented here considers the impeachment of Chief Justice David Brock in the American state of New Hampshire in 2000, identifying the most significant institutional causes and consequences of an event that presented a crisis for the judiciary and the state. It offers a case study for the readers of this journal to reflect not only on the removal of Chief Justice Sereno, but also on the kinds of constitutional issues, such as judicial independence, judicial accountability, and separation of powers in any democracy, as arising from in conflicts between the judiciary and another branch of government.
{"title":"JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN A DEMOCRACY: Reflections on Impeachments in America and the Philippines*","authors":"David C. Steelman","doi":"10.18352/IJCA.260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/IJCA.260","url":null,"abstract":"On May 11, 2018, Maria Lourdes Sereno was removed from office as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. She had been a vocal critic of controversial President Rodrigo Duterte, and he had labeled her as an “enemy.” While she was under legislative impeachment investigation, Duterte’s solicitor general filed a quo warranto petition in the Supreme Court to challenge her right to hold office. The Supreme Court responded to that petition by ordering her removal, which her supporters claimed was politically-motivated and possibly unconstitutional. \u0000 \u0000The story of Chief Justice Sereno should give urgency to the need for us to consider the proposition that maintaining the rule of law can be difficult, and that attacks on judicial independence can pose a grave threat to democracy. \u0000 \u0000The article presented here considers the impeachment of Chief Justice David Brock in the American state of New Hampshire in 2000, identifying the most significant institutional causes and consequences of an event that presented a crisis for the judiciary and the state. It offers a case study for the readers of this journal to reflect not only on the removal of Chief Justice Sereno, but also on the kinds of constitutional issues, such as judicial independence, judicial accountability, and separation of powers in any democracy, as arising from in conflicts between the judiciary and another branch of government.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47649238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reviews The Impeachment of Chief Justice David Brock – Judicial Independence and Civic Populism, published in 2018 by Lexington Books, co-authored by John Cerullo and David C. Steelman. The book is an historic chronicle and analysis of events in the increasingly fractious relationship between the legislative and judicial powers of state government in the last four decades in the U.S. state of New Hampshire that culminated in an effort by the Senate Judiciary Committee to impeach Chief Justice David A. Brock. The narrative identifies, traces and documents the meandering sources of that effort against a national movement emphasizing enhanced institutional independence within state judicial systems by shedding the traditional constraints and controls over state courts exercised by elected bodies. Simultaneously, it scrutinizes growing resistance within populist pockets of the New Hampshire State Legislature in particular and the state’s population in general against the presumptive hubris of the state judiciary to arrogate unto itself far-reaching decision-making authority and to demonstrate in its internal affairs a clear disregard of and even contempt for basic canons of judicial ethics. These tendencies are viewed as particularly egregious in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as it migrates from adjudicating narrowly defined issues of law and fact on appeal to drafting judgments mandating, for example, broad public education funding initiatives grounded in its own views of what constitute fundamental human rights and the social policies that flow from them. Other misbehavior touching on judicial conduct prohibitions culminated in a variety of disciplinary proposals, including impeaching Chief Justice David Brock, and other initiatives seeking to rein in the excesses of the state judiciary.
{"title":"BOOK REVIEW: THE IMPEACHMENT OF CHIEF JUSTICE DAVID BROCK – JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND CIVIC POPULISM","authors":"M. Zimmer","doi":"10.18352/IJCA.261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/IJCA.261","url":null,"abstract":"This article reviews The Impeachment of Chief Justice David Brock – Judicial Independence and Civic Populism, published in 2018 by Lexington Books, co-authored by John Cerullo and David C. Steelman. The book is an historic chronicle and analysis of events in the increasingly fractious relationship between the legislative and judicial powers of state government in the last four decades in the U.S. state of New Hampshire that culminated in an effort by the Senate Judiciary Committee to impeach Chief Justice David A. Brock. The narrative identifies, traces and documents the meandering sources of that effort against a national movement emphasizing enhanced institutional independence within state judicial systems by shedding the traditional constraints and controls over state courts exercised by elected bodies. Simultaneously, it scrutinizes growing resistance within populist pockets of the New Hampshire State Legislature in particular and the state’s population in general against the presumptive hubris of the state judiciary to arrogate unto itself far-reaching decision-making authority and to demonstrate in its internal affairs a clear disregard of and even contempt for basic canons of judicial ethics. These tendencies are viewed as particularly egregious in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as it migrates from adjudicating narrowly defined issues of law and fact on appeal to drafting judgments mandating, for example, broad public education funding initiatives grounded in its own views of what constitute fundamental human rights and the social policies that flow from them. Other misbehavior touching on judicial conduct prohibitions culminated in a variety of disciplinary proposals, including impeaching Chief Justice David Brock, and other initiatives seeking to rein in the excesses of the state judiciary.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47299827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Performance of International Courts is a book edited by Theresa Squatrito, Oran Young, Geir Ulfstein, and Andreas Follesdal, and published by Cambridge University Press. These last decades, there have been an expansion of international courts and tribunals and an apparent variation in their performance. The contributors to this book raise several questions regarding how to conceptualize and measure international courts’ performance, what explains variation in their performance, and whether there are ways to improve their performance.
{"title":"THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS","authors":"Samira Allioui","doi":"10.18352/IJCA.266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/IJCA.266","url":null,"abstract":"The Performance of International Courts is a book edited by Theresa Squatrito, Oran Young, Geir Ulfstein, and Andreas Follesdal, and published by Cambridge University Press. These last decades, there have been an expansion of international courts and tribunals and an apparent variation in their performance. The contributors to this book raise several questions regarding how to conceptualize and measure international courts’ performance, what explains variation in their performance, and whether there are ways to improve their performance.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43299560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Vasconcelos, Eduardo Watanabe de Oliveira, Waldir Leôncio Netto
This article analyses the impact of attorneys on the outcome of judicial decisions in civil cases. We currently have little quantitative information about the effect of attorneys on the outcome of civil cases due to (i) the nonrandom pairing of attorneys and cases and (ii) the difficulty in accurately defining what a favorable decision in a civil case is. The Office of the Solicitor General of the Union in Brazil presents a unique research opportunity, since it assigns cases among its attorneys on a random basis and has standardized rules to record outcomes of civil cases. We analyzed the work performed by 386 Federal Attorneys and their impact on 30,821 judicial decisions. Significant win-rate differences among attorneys were detected in half of the 70 teams surveyed. The fact that attorneys achieve different outcomes, despite working in the same type of cases, indicates how judicial decisions can be affected by the work of an attorney in the civil area. No statistical correlation between attorney experience and outcome of civil cases was detected.
{"title":"THE IMPACT OF ATTORNEYS ON JUDICIAL DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM CIVIL CASES","authors":"C. Vasconcelos, Eduardo Watanabe de Oliveira, Waldir Leôncio Netto","doi":"10.18352/IJCA.244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/IJCA.244","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the impact of attorneys on the outcome of judicial decisions in civil cases. We currently have little quantitative information about the effect of attorneys on the outcome of civil cases due to (i) the nonrandom pairing of attorneys and cases and (ii) the difficulty in accurately defining what a favorable decision in a civil case is. The Office of the Solicitor General of the Union in Brazil presents a unique research opportunity, since it assigns cases among its attorneys on a random basis and has standardized rules to record outcomes of civil cases. We analyzed the work performed by 386 Federal Attorneys and their impact on 30,821 judicial decisions. Significant win-rate differences among attorneys were detected in half of the 70 teams surveyed. The fact that attorneys achieve different outcomes, despite working in the same type of cases, indicates how judicial decisions can be affected by the work of an attorney in the civil area. No statistical correlation between attorney experience and outcome of civil cases was detected.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48998736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article reveals the constitutional grounds of judicial independence within the context of recent constitutional reforms in the Republic of Armenia. It discusses the issues of cooperation of the judicial, executive and legislative powers in the frames of the new parliamentary form of government. In particular, the article discusses the issue of the role of the legislative body of the Republic of Armenia in formation of the judiciary. It also turns to the issues of the internal and external independence of the Supreme Judicial Council which is itself responsible for the independence of the judiciary and the appointment of judges. As a conclusion, the article outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the current and new constitutional regulations.
{"title":"CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A GUARANTEE FOR PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS). THE ARMENIAN EXPERIENCE","authors":"A. Hovhannisyan","doi":"10.18352/IJCA.254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/IJCA.254","url":null,"abstract":"The article reveals the constitutional grounds of judicial independence within the context of recent constitutional reforms in the Republic of Armenia. It discusses the issues of cooperation of the judicial, executive and legislative powers in the frames of the new parliamentary form of government. In particular, the article discusses the issue of the role of the legislative body of the Republic of Armenia in formation of the judiciary. It also turns to the issues of the internal and external independence of the Supreme Judicial Council which is itself responsible for the independence of the judiciary and the appointment of judges. As a conclusion, the article outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the current and new constitutional regulations.","PeriodicalId":37676,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for Court Administration","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47840084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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