This Article focuses on unifying fiduciary law in Civil Law and the Common Law systems. The problems that fiduciary law addresses are similar throughout history and in all societies. However, the legal systems which address these problems differ. While in the Common Law fiduciary law is founded on property law, in the Civil Law similar fiduciary principles are found in the category of contract. However, the reach and basis of contract law in each system differ. Common Law judges tend to strictly enforce the parties’ contract terms while Civil Law allows for far more judicial discretion to impose fairness principles on the parties’ contract terms. This Article offers a number of ways in which the two systems of law can coincide and concludes and suggests by-passing the differences between the two systems by focusing on the results reached in each and at the same time following the models of dual systems.
{"title":"Towards Universal Fiduciary Principles","authors":"Tamar Frankel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2009365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2009365","url":null,"abstract":"This Article focuses on unifying fiduciary law in Civil Law and the Common Law systems. The problems that fiduciary law addresses are similar throughout history and in all societies. However, the legal systems which address these problems differ. While in the Common Law fiduciary law is founded on property law, in the Civil Law similar fiduciary principles are found in the category of contract. However, the reach and basis of contract law in each system differ. Common Law judges tend to strictly enforce the parties’ contract terms while Civil Law allows for far more judicial discretion to impose fairness principles on the parties’ contract terms. This Article offers a number of ways in which the two systems of law can coincide and concludes and suggests by-passing the differences between the two systems by focusing on the results reached in each and at the same time following the models of dual systems.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114539548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs focuses on two issues: to what extent should investment bankers have fiduciary duties to investors? And should there be criminal liability for willful breach of these duties? The testimony concludes that these duties are the wrong tool for dealing with any problems that might exist in the investment banking industry. Fiduciary duties are an amorphous concept which courts and commentators have applied in many different forms to many different types of conduct. Applying these duties to investment bankers would cast a potentially wide net over not only bad conduct but also conduct that should be viewed as clearly legitimate. Moreover, even under a narrow view of these duties, they are inappropriate for most aspects of investment banking. These problems with fiduciary duties would be significantly exacerbated by imposing criminal liability for their breach.
{"title":"Fiduciary Duties of Investment Bankers: Senate Testimony – May 4, 2010","authors":"Larry E. Ribstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1661285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1661285","url":null,"abstract":"This testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs focuses on two issues: to what extent should investment bankers have fiduciary duties to investors? And should there be criminal liability for willful breach of these duties? The testimony concludes that these duties are the wrong tool for dealing with any problems that might exist in the investment banking industry. Fiduciary duties are an amorphous concept which courts and commentators have applied in many different forms to many different types of conduct. Applying these duties to investment bankers would cast a potentially wide net over not only bad conduct but also conduct that should be viewed as clearly legitimate. Moreover, even under a narrow view of these duties, they are inappropriate for most aspects of investment banking. These problems with fiduciary duties would be significantly exacerbated by imposing criminal liability for their breach.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121563719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers how broker dealers are confused to have fiduciary duties. It clears out the confusion as to why brokers and dealers cannot be fiduciaries and differentiates their duties with that of the Investment advisors. It (i) examines the historical duties of the brokers and dealers (ii) uses suitability theory to explain how the broker dealers take discretionary measures whether or not to make recommendations (iii) explains SEC's steps in clearing out confusion among investors. For most part it only concentrates on the historical and present scenario and explains why brokers and dealers do not prefer to be addressed as fiduciaries.
{"title":"Bomb Dropped, Box Broken; Hard Being a Fiduciary","authors":"R. S.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2256771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256771","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers how broker dealers are confused to have fiduciary duties. It clears out the confusion as to why brokers and dealers cannot be fiduciaries and differentiates their duties with that of the Investment advisors. It (i) examines the historical duties of the brokers and dealers (ii) uses suitability theory to explain how the broker dealers take discretionary measures whether or not to make recommendations (iii) explains SEC's steps in clearing out confusion among investors. For most part it only concentrates on the historical and present scenario and explains why brokers and dealers do not prefer to be addressed as fiduciaries.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129455794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The U.S. Forest Service and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) control large tracts of federal public lands. Management goals for these tracts are described as ‘‘multiple-use.’’ Some of the lands are forested, mountainous, contain wildlife or possess other scenic and recreational attributes and warrant the multiple-use designation; however, a significant portion, especially that under BLM control, contains little scenic, recreation or wildlife value, thus offering little multiple-use potential and non-pecuniary value. Inherent in the management of all federal lands is a defacto fiduciary responsibility to prudently and efficiently manage these assets. We develop a framework that measures present values of both quantitative and qualitative economic benefits and costs of federal public lands to assist managers and policy makers in determining future management policy. By applying this framework, federal public land policymakers may be aided in fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities.
{"title":"A Model for Federal Public Land Surface Rights Management","authors":"R. Spahr, Mark A. Sunderman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1489004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1489004","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. Forest Service and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) control large tracts of federal public lands. Management goals for these tracts are described as ‘‘multiple-use.’’ Some of the lands are forested, mountainous, contain wildlife or possess other scenic and recreational attributes and warrant the multiple-use designation; however, a significant portion, especially that under BLM control, contains little scenic, recreation or wildlife value, thus offering little multiple-use potential and non-pecuniary value. Inherent in the management of all federal lands is a defacto fiduciary responsibility to prudently and efficiently manage these assets. We develop a framework that measures present values of both quantitative and qualitative economic benefits and costs of federal public lands to assist managers and policy makers in determining future management policy. By applying this framework, federal public land policymakers may be aided in fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123888003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scandals involving nonprofit boards and conflicts of interest continue to receive considerable public attention. Last month, for example, Wyclef Jean’s Yele Haiti charity became the target of intense criticism after the charity disclosed that it had regularly transacted business with Jean and entities controlled by Jean and other directors. Although scandals caused by self-dealing undermine public confidence in the charitable sector, they continue to erupt. Why do charitable boards sanction transactions with insiders? This article argues that much of the blame lies with the law itself. Because fiduciary duty law is currently structured as a set of fuzzy standards, it facilitates groupthink. Groupthink occurs when directors place allegiance to fellow board members ahead of the nonprofit’s best interests, and it can undermine social norms that facilitate sound governance procedures. Groupthink blinds directors to conflicts of interest, and may also induce directors to refrain from adequately monitoring ongoing business relationships with board members. When groupthink occurs, boards can convince themselves that their conduct falls within the law’s murky limits. As a result, charitable assets are diverted from the charities’ intended beneficiaries and into directors’ pockets. Social norms against self-dealing are the primary tool for combating harmful groupthink. The law should be reformulated to support and reinforce fiduciary duties as social norms. Restructuring laws against self-dealing as a set of clear rules would give needed direction to confused boards and would entrench social norms against self-dealing. A flat prohibition on self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions would be the most effective way to ensure that fiduciaries place the best interests of the nonprofit ahead of self-interest. Short of that, clear directives requiring disclosure of conflicts, investigation of alternatives and proof that inside transactions are clearly below market would do much to counter the damaging impact of groupthink.
{"title":"The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance","authors":"Melanie B. Leslie","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1477553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1477553","url":null,"abstract":"Scandals involving nonprofit boards and conflicts of interest continue to receive considerable public attention. Last month, for example, Wyclef Jean’s Yele Haiti charity became the target of intense criticism after the charity disclosed that it had regularly transacted business with Jean and entities controlled by Jean and other directors. Although scandals caused by self-dealing undermine public confidence in the charitable sector, they continue to erupt. Why do charitable boards sanction transactions with insiders? This article argues that much of the blame lies with the law itself. Because fiduciary duty law is currently structured as a set of fuzzy standards, it facilitates groupthink. Groupthink occurs when directors place allegiance to fellow board members ahead of the nonprofit’s best interests, and it can undermine social norms that facilitate sound governance procedures. Groupthink blinds directors to conflicts of interest, and may also induce directors to refrain from adequately monitoring ongoing business relationships with board members. When groupthink occurs, boards can convince themselves that their conduct falls within the law’s murky limits. As a result, charitable assets are diverted from the charities’ intended beneficiaries and into directors’ pockets. Social norms against self-dealing are the primary tool for combating harmful groupthink. The law should be reformulated to support and reinforce fiduciary duties as social norms. Restructuring laws against self-dealing as a set of clear rules would give needed direction to confused boards and would entrench social norms against self-dealing. A flat prohibition on self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions would be the most effective way to ensure that fiduciaries place the best interests of the nonprofit ahead of self-interest. Short of that, clear directives requiring disclosure of conflicts, investigation of alternatives and proof that inside transactions are clearly below market would do much to counter the damaging impact of groupthink.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115373161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An analysis of the fiduciary duty standard for securities brokers as proposed by the Obama Administration. The paper compares the "sole interest" standard applicable to trustees with the "best interest" standard generally applicable to other fiduciaries. The paper recommends that the Securities and Exchange Commission be given flexibility to determine the fiduciary standard applicable to brokers.
{"title":"The Fiduciary Duty of Securities Brokers and Investment Advisers: Sole Interest or Best Interest? An Analysis of the Administration's Proposal","authors":"Melanie L. Fein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1646938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1646938","url":null,"abstract":"An analysis of the fiduciary duty standard for securities brokers as proposed by the Obama Administration. The paper compares the \"sole interest\" standard applicable to trustees with the \"best interest\" standard generally applicable to other fiduciaries. The paper recommends that the Securities and Exchange Commission be given flexibility to determine the fiduciary standard applicable to brokers.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130783118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Investment Company Act of 1940 states that the interests of shareholders are compromised when mutual funds are operated in the interest of fund managers. In this regard, one of the Act's major objectives is to ensure investors receive adequate and accurate information. For this reason, Congress, the SEC. individual funds, and the fund industry must focus on the goal of requiring and attaining normative transparency of disclosure. Normative transparency of disclosure is defined as the degree of mutual fund voluntary and proactive disclosure and also new and revised legal and regulatory disclosure required for shareholders to be able to make information efficient fund investment decisions. The attainment of normative transparency of disclosure requires major changes and prohibitions in current fund practices, laws, and regulation that are inconsistent with or contrary to this goal.If Congress and the SEC were to enact and require, respectively, laws and regulations requiring normative transparency of disclosure, these mandates would be all that should be required. While additional laws and regulatory disclosure are likely to be forthcoming, it is most unlikely that the political process will achieve normative transparency. However, the political obstacles are much more likely to be overcome if individual mutual funds and funds collectively work vigorously and proactively in cooperation with Congress and the SEC.Thus, the achievement of normative transparency of disclosure requires mutual fund managers and independent directors to work vigorously, proactively, and collectively to achieve this goal. However, it is also highly unlikely that these efforts will be collectively optimized as normatively transparent. Further, what is normative transparency of disclosure today will evolve over time as individual fund, fund industry, shareholder, and legal and regulatory conditions change. Thus, there is need to continually benchmark normative transparency in order to maintain normative and improve fund disclosure.The goal of normative transparency disclosure at the fund level requires stated prohibition of inappropriate fund and fund industry practices and actions, including those permitted by regulations, such as 12b-1 fees, soft dollars, and revenue sharing. Further, it requires supplementary disclosure of those regulations that currently provide incorrect accounting, incomplete, missing, misleading and perfunctory disclosure.To attain normative transparency of disclosure, mutual fund managers and independent directors must begin by voluntarily and collectively becoming vigorously proactive in serving and protecting shareholders. But, the initial move towards this goal, pending action by Congress, the SEC, fund managers and the fund industry, rests with proactively motivated independent directors empowered to pursue vigorously their fiduciary mandate of shareholder "watchdogs."
{"title":"Normative Transparency of Mutual Fund Disclosure","authors":"John A. Haslem","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1105501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1105501","url":null,"abstract":"The Investment Company Act of 1940 states that the interests of shareholders are compromised when mutual funds are operated in the interest of fund managers. In this regard, one of the Act's major objectives is to ensure investors receive adequate and accurate information. For this reason, Congress, the SEC. individual funds, and the fund industry must focus on the goal of requiring and attaining normative transparency of disclosure. Normative transparency of disclosure is defined as the degree of mutual fund voluntary and proactive disclosure and also new and revised legal and regulatory disclosure required for shareholders to be able to make information efficient fund investment decisions. The attainment of normative transparency of disclosure requires major changes and prohibitions in current fund practices, laws, and regulation that are inconsistent with or contrary to this goal.If Congress and the SEC were to enact and require, respectively, laws and regulations requiring normative transparency of disclosure, these mandates would be all that should be required. While additional laws and regulatory disclosure are likely to be forthcoming, it is most unlikely that the political process will achieve normative transparency. However, the political obstacles are much more likely to be overcome if individual mutual funds and funds collectively work vigorously and proactively in cooperation with Congress and the SEC.Thus, the achievement of normative transparency of disclosure requires mutual fund managers and independent directors to work vigorously, proactively, and collectively to achieve this goal. However, it is also highly unlikely that these efforts will be collectively optimized as normatively transparent. Further, what is normative transparency of disclosure today will evolve over time as individual fund, fund industry, shareholder, and legal and regulatory conditions change. Thus, there is need to continually benchmark normative transparency in order to maintain normative and improve fund disclosure.The goal of normative transparency disclosure at the fund level requires stated prohibition of inappropriate fund and fund industry practices and actions, including those permitted by regulations, such as 12b-1 fees, soft dollars, and revenue sharing. Further, it requires supplementary disclosure of those regulations that currently provide incorrect accounting, incomplete, missing, misleading and perfunctory disclosure.To attain normative transparency of disclosure, mutual fund managers and independent directors must begin by voluntarily and collectively becoming vigorously proactive in serving and protecting shareholders. But, the initial move towards this goal, pending action by Congress, the SEC, fund managers and the fund industry, rests with proactively motivated independent directors empowered to pursue vigorously their fiduciary mandate of shareholder \"watchdogs.\"","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132359652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Good governance is increasingly recognised as an important aspect of an efficient private pension system, enhancing investment performance and benefit security. Yet, despite regulatory and industry initiatives, governance weaknesses persist across OECD and non-OECD countries.This paper highlights the main governance challenges faced by policymakers (particularly with trust-based pension systems), and draws on recent policy initiatives to propose possible solutions to strengthen governance arrangements.
{"title":"Pension Fund Governance: Challenges and Potential Solutions","authors":"Juan Yermo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1217266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1217266","url":null,"abstract":"Good governance is increasingly recognised as an important aspect of an efficient private pension system, enhancing investment performance and benefit security. Yet, despite regulatory and industry initiatives, governance weaknesses persist across OECD and non-OECD countries.This paper highlights the main governance challenges faced by policymakers (particularly with trust-based pension systems), and draws on recent policy initiatives to propose possible solutions to strengthen governance arrangements.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126174432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Very few matters of social importance are more complex than the one before you today. This particular issue is not only about uncovering obscure dollars unscrupulously extracted from the account balances of America's workforce, but it is also about correcting the culture that has permitted the problem to thrive in the first place. This written testimony will explain what the culture is, why it exists, how it has evolved over time, how it violates basic economic principles, the integrity of rules of fiduciary prudence, the exclusive benefit rule under ERISA, and other common sense practices that are critical for delivery of expected results from employer defined contribution retirement plans.
{"title":"Congressional Testimony on Hidden Fees in 401(K) Plans","authors":"Matt Hutcheson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.968866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.968866","url":null,"abstract":"Very few matters of social importance are more complex than the one before you today. This particular issue is not only about uncovering obscure dollars unscrupulously extracted from the account balances of America's workforce, but it is also about correcting the culture that has permitted the problem to thrive in the first place. This written testimony will explain what the culture is, why it exists, how it has evolved over time, how it violates basic economic principles, the integrity of rules of fiduciary prudence, the exclusive benefit rule under ERISA, and other common sense practices that are critical for delivery of expected results from employer defined contribution retirement plans.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128739375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the different fiduciary and regulatory standards applicable to bank trust departments, securities brokers, and investment advisers and suggests guidelines for managing conflicts of interest in the wealth management business.
{"title":"Financial Institutions as Fiduciaries: Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Wealth Management Business","authors":"Melanie L. Fein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1646972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1646972","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the different fiduciary and regulatory standards applicable to bank trust departments, securities brokers, and investment advisers and suggests guidelines for managing conflicts of interest in the wealth management business.","PeriodicalId":376950,"journal":{"name":"Fiduciary Law eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133745826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：