V. Stanciu, Riccardo Spolaor, M. Conti, Cristiano Giuffrida
In recent years, simple password-based authentication systems have increasingly proven ineffective for many classes of real-world devices. As a result, many researchers have concentrated their efforts on the design of new biometric authentication systems. This trend has been further accelerated by the advent of mobile devices, which offer numerous sensors and capabilities to implement a variety of mobile biometric authentication systems. Along with the advances in biometric authentication, however, attacks have also become much more sophisticated and many biometric techniques have ultimately proven inadequate in face of advanced attackers in practice. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of sensor-enhanced keystroke dynamics, a recent mobile biometric authentication mechanism that combines a particularly rich set of features. In our analysis, we consider different types of attacks, with a focus on advanced attacks that draw from general population statistics. Such attacks have already been proven effective in drastically reducing the accuracy of many state-of-the-art biometric authentication systems. We implemented a statistical attack against sensor-enhanced keystroke dynamics and evaluated its impact on detection accuracy. On one hand, our results show that sensor-enhanced keystroke dynamics are generally robust against statistical attacks with a marginal equal-error rate impact (<0.14%). On the other hand, our results show that, surprisingly, keystroke timing features non-trivially weaken the security guarantees provided by sensor features alone. Our findings suggest that sensor dynamics may be a stronger biometric authentication mechanism against recently proposed practical attacks.
{"title":"On the Effectiveness of Sensor-enhanced Keystroke Dynamics Against Statistical Attacks","authors":"V. Stanciu, Riccardo Spolaor, M. Conti, Cristiano Giuffrida","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857748","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, simple password-based authentication systems have increasingly proven ineffective for many classes of real-world devices. As a result, many researchers have concentrated their efforts on the design of new biometric authentication systems. This trend has been further accelerated by the advent of mobile devices, which offer numerous sensors and capabilities to implement a variety of mobile biometric authentication systems. Along with the advances in biometric authentication, however, attacks have also become much more sophisticated and many biometric techniques have ultimately proven inadequate in face of advanced attackers in practice. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of sensor-enhanced keystroke dynamics, a recent mobile biometric authentication mechanism that combines a particularly rich set of features. In our analysis, we consider different types of attacks, with a focus on advanced attacks that draw from general population statistics. Such attacks have already been proven effective in drastically reducing the accuracy of many state-of-the-art biometric authentication systems. We implemented a statistical attack against sensor-enhanced keystroke dynamics and evaluated its impact on detection accuracy. On one hand, our results show that sensor-enhanced keystroke dynamics are generally robust against statistical attacks with a marginal equal-error rate impact (<0.14%). On the other hand, our results show that, surprisingly, keystroke timing features non-trivially weaken the security guarantees provided by sensor features alone. Our findings suggest that sensor dynamics may be a stronger biometric authentication mechanism against recently proposed practical attacks.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124845680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As cloud services have been firmly accepted by enterprises, the current challenge is how to share these resources among increasing number of cloud platforms. Currently, cloud platforms such as OpenStack, the de facto open-source platform for cloud Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), offer limited cross-cloud access capabilities in their federation APIs. In this paper, we present a fine-grained cross-cloud domain-trust model enabling resource sharing between domains across distinct homogeneous clouds. We further present a formalized description of core multi-cloud OpenStack access control (MC-OSAC) with proposed domain trust extension. We have implemented a proof of concept with extending OpenStack identity and federation services to support cross-cloud domain trust. Our approach does not introduce any authorization overhead within current OpenStack federation model.
{"title":"Multi Cloud IaaS with Domain Trust in OpenStack","authors":"N. Pustchi, Farhan Patwa, R. Sandhu","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857745","url":null,"abstract":"As cloud services have been firmly accepted by enterprises, the current challenge is how to share these resources among increasing number of cloud platforms. Currently, cloud platforms such as OpenStack, the de facto open-source platform for cloud Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), offer limited cross-cloud access capabilities in their federation APIs. In this paper, we present a fine-grained cross-cloud domain-trust model enabling resource sharing between domains across distinct homogeneous clouds. We further present a formalized description of core multi-cloud OpenStack access control (MC-OSAC) with proposed domain trust extension. We have implemented a proof of concept with extending OpenStack identity and federation services to support cross-cloud domain trust. Our approach does not introduce any authorization overhead within current OpenStack federation model.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121230473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In international military coalitions, situation awareness is achieved by gathering critical intel from different authorities. Authorities want to retain control over their data, as they are sensitive by nature, and, thus, usually employ their own authorization solutions to regulate access to them. In this paper, we highlight that harmonizing authorization solutions at the coalition level raises many challenges. We demonstrate how we address authorization challenges in the context of a scenario defined by military experts using a prototype implementation of SAFAX, an XACML-based architectural framework tailored to the development of authorization services for distributed systems.
{"title":"An Authorization Service for Collaborative Situation Awareness","authors":"A. Egner, Duc Luu, J. D. Hartog, Nicola Zannone","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857740","url":null,"abstract":"In international military coalitions, situation awareness is achieved by gathering critical intel from different authorities. Authorities want to retain control over their data, as they are sensitive by nature, and, thus, usually employ their own authorization solutions to regulate access to them. In this paper, we highlight that harmonizing authorization solutions at the coalition level raises many challenges. We demonstrate how we address authorization challenges in the context of a scenario defined by military experts using a prototype implementation of SAFAX, an XACML-based architectural framework tailored to the development of authorization services for distributed systems.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116546644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gustavo Grieco, G. Grinblat, Lucas C. Uzal, Sanjay Rawat, Josselin Feist, L. Mounier
With sustained growth of software complexity, finding security vulnerabilities in operating systems has become an important necessity. Nowadays, OS are shipped with thousands of binary executables. Unfortunately, methodologies and tools for an OS scale program testing within a limited time budget are still missing. In this paper we present an approach that uses lightweight static and dynamic features to predict if a test case is likely to contain a software vulnerability using machine learning techniques. To show the effectiveness of our approach, we set up a large experiment to detect easily exploitable memory corruptions using 1039 Debian programs obtained from its bug tracker, collected 138,308 unique execution traces and statically explored 76,083 different subsequences of function calls. We managed to predict with reasonable accuracy which programs contained dangerous memory corruptions. We also developed and implemented VDiscover, a tool that uses state-of-the-art Machine Learning techniques to predict vulnerabilities in test cases. Such tool will be released as open-source to encourage the research of vulnerability discovery at a large scale, together with VDiscovery, a public dataset that collects raw analyzed data.
{"title":"Toward Large-Scale Vulnerability Discovery using Machine Learning","authors":"Gustavo Grieco, G. Grinblat, Lucas C. Uzal, Sanjay Rawat, Josselin Feist, L. Mounier","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857720","url":null,"abstract":"With sustained growth of software complexity, finding security vulnerabilities in operating systems has become an important necessity. Nowadays, OS are shipped with thousands of binary executables. Unfortunately, methodologies and tools for an OS scale program testing within a limited time budget are still missing. In this paper we present an approach that uses lightweight static and dynamic features to predict if a test case is likely to contain a software vulnerability using machine learning techniques. To show the effectiveness of our approach, we set up a large experiment to detect easily exploitable memory corruptions using 1039 Debian programs obtained from its bug tracker, collected 138,308 unique execution traces and statically explored 76,083 different subsequences of function calls. We managed to predict with reasonable accuracy which programs contained dangerous memory corruptions. We also developed and implemented VDiscover, a tool that uses state-of-the-art Machine Learning techniques to predict vulnerabilities in test cases. Such tool will be released as open-source to encourage the research of vulnerability discovery at a large scale, together with VDiscovery, a public dataset that collects raw analyzed data.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127213822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nick Christoulakis, G. Christou, E. Athanasopoulos, S. Ioannidis
Control-flow hijacking is the principal method for code-reuse techniques like Return-oriented Programming (ROP) and Jump-oriented Programming (JOP). For defending against such attacks, the community has proposed Control-flow Integrity (CFI), a technique capable of preventing exploitation by verifying that every (indirect) control-flow transfer points to a legitimate address. Enabling CFI in real systems is not straightforward, since in many cases the actual Control-flow Graph (CFG) of a program can be only approximated. Even in the case that there is perfect knowledge of the CFG, ensuring that all return instructions will return to their actual call sites, without employing a shadow stack, is questionable. On the other hand, the community has expressed concerns related to significant overheads stemming from enabling a shadow stack. In this paper, we acknowledge the importance of a shadow stack for supporting and strengthening any CFI policy. In addition, we project that implementing a full-featured CFI-enabled Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) in actual hardware with an in-chip secure memory can be efficiently carried out and the prototype experiences negligible overheads. For supporting our case, we implement by modifying a SPARC SoC and evaluate the prototype on an FPGA board by running all SPECInt benchmarks instrumented with a fine-grained CFI policy. The evaluation shows that HCFI can effectively protect applications from code-reuse attacks, while adding less than 1% runtime overhead.
{"title":"HCFI: Hardware-enforced Control-Flow Integrity","authors":"Nick Christoulakis, G. Christou, E. Athanasopoulos, S. Ioannidis","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857722","url":null,"abstract":"Control-flow hijacking is the principal method for code-reuse techniques like Return-oriented Programming (ROP) and Jump-oriented Programming (JOP). For defending against such attacks, the community has proposed Control-flow Integrity (CFI), a technique capable of preventing exploitation by verifying that every (indirect) control-flow transfer points to a legitimate address. Enabling CFI in real systems is not straightforward, since in many cases the actual Control-flow Graph (CFG) of a program can be only approximated. Even in the case that there is perfect knowledge of the CFG, ensuring that all return instructions will return to their actual call sites, without employing a shadow stack, is questionable. On the other hand, the community has expressed concerns related to significant overheads stemming from enabling a shadow stack. In this paper, we acknowledge the importance of a shadow stack for supporting and strengthening any CFI policy. In addition, we project that implementing a full-featured CFI-enabled Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) in actual hardware with an in-chip secure memory can be efficiently carried out and the prototype experiences negligible overheads. For supporting our case, we implement by modifying a SPARC SoC and evaluate the prototype on an FPGA board by running all SPECInt benchmarks instrumented with a fine-grained CFI policy. The evaluation shows that HCFI can effectively protect applications from code-reuse attacks, while adding less than 1% runtime overhead.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126559048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When customers purchase a product or sign up for service from a company, they often are required to agree to a Privacy Policy or Terms of Service agreement. Many of these policies are lengthy, and a typical customer agrees to them without reading them carefully if at all. To address this problem, we have developed a prototype automatic text summarization system which is specifically designed for privacy policies. Our system generates a summary of a policy statement by identifying important sentences from the statement, categorizing these sentences by which of 5 "statement categories" the sentence addresses, and displaying to a user a list of the sentences which match each category. Our system incorporates keywords identified by a human domain expert and rules that were obtained by machine learning, and they are combined in an ensemble architecture. We have tested our system on a sample corpus of privacy statements, and preliminary results are promising.
{"title":"Automatic Summarization of Privacy Policies using Ensemble Learning","authors":"Noriko Tomuro, S. Lytinen, Kurt Hornsburg","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857741","url":null,"abstract":"When customers purchase a product or sign up for service from a company, they often are required to agree to a Privacy Policy or Terms of Service agreement. Many of these policies are lengthy, and a typical customer agrees to them without reading them carefully if at all. To address this problem, we have developed a prototype automatic text summarization system which is specifically designed for privacy policies. Our system generates a summary of a policy statement by identifying important sentences from the statement, categorizing these sentences by which of 5 \"statement categories\" the sentence addresses, and displaying to a user a list of the sentences which match each category. Our system incorporates keywords identified by a human domain expert and rules that were obtained by machine learning, and they are combined in an ensemble architecture. We have tested our system on a sample corpus of privacy statements, and preliminary results are promising.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129447754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eduard Marin, Dave Singelée, Bohan Yang, I. Verbauwhede, B. Preneel
This paper analyses the security and privacy properties of a widely used insulin pump and its peripherals. We eavesdrop the wireless channel using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software-based radios to intercept the messages sent between these devices; fully reverse-engineer the wireless communication protocol using a black-box approach; and document the message format and the protocol state-machine in use. The upshot is that no standard cryptographic mechanisms are applied and hence the system is shown to be completely vulnerable to replay and message injection attacks. Furthermore, sensitive patient health-related information is sent unencrypted over the wireless channel. Motivated by the results of our attacks, we study the feasibility of applying cryptography to protect the data transmitted over the air and prevent unauthorized access to the insulin pump. We present a solution based on AES in combination with an updated message format optimized for energy consumption. We implement our solution on a 16-bit micro-controller and evaluate its security properties and energy requirements. Finally, we discuss potential strategies for further reducing the energy consumption.
{"title":"On the Feasibility of Cryptography for a Wireless Insulin Pump System","authors":"Eduard Marin, Dave Singelée, Bohan Yang, I. Verbauwhede, B. Preneel","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857746","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the security and privacy properties of a widely used insulin pump and its peripherals. We eavesdrop the wireless channel using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software-based radios to intercept the messages sent between these devices; fully reverse-engineer the wireless communication protocol using a black-box approach; and document the message format and the protocol state-machine in use. The upshot is that no standard cryptographic mechanisms are applied and hence the system is shown to be completely vulnerable to replay and message injection attacks. Furthermore, sensitive patient health-related information is sent unencrypted over the wireless channel. Motivated by the results of our attacks, we study the feasibility of applying cryptography to protect the data transmitted over the air and prevent unauthorized access to the insulin pump. We present a solution based on AES in combination with an updated message format optimized for energy consumption. We implement our solution on a 16-bit micro-controller and evaluate its security properties and energy requirements. Finally, we discuss potential strategies for further reducing the energy consumption.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129866598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) was recently proposed as a general-purpose, application-layer access control paradigm, such that authorization decisions are based on the relationship between the access requestor and the resource owner. A first, large-scale implementation of ReBAC in an open-source medical records system was recently attempted by Rizvi et al. In this work, we extend the ReBAC model of Rizvi et al. to support fine-grained interoperability between the ReBAC model and legacy Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) models. This is achieved by the introduction of the notion of demarcations as well as an authorization-time constraint system. Also presented are the design of two authorization algorithms (one of which has an algorithmic structure akin to an SMT solver), their optimization via memoization, and the empirical evaluation of their performances.
{"title":"Interoperability of Relationship- and Role-Based Access Control","authors":"Syed Zain R. Rizvi, Philip W. L. Fong","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857706","url":null,"abstract":"Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) was recently proposed as a general-purpose, application-layer access control paradigm, such that authorization decisions are based on the relationship between the access requestor and the resource owner. A first, large-scale implementation of ReBAC in an open-source medical records system was recently attempted by Rizvi et al. In this work, we extend the ReBAC model of Rizvi et al. to support fine-grained interoperability between the ReBAC model and legacy Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) models. This is achieved by the introduction of the notion of demarcations as well as an authorization-time constraint system. Also presented are the design of two authorization algorithms (one of which has an algorithmic structure akin to an SMT solver), their optimization via memoization, and the empirical evaluation of their performances.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114176857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Awad A. Younis, Y. Malaiya, Charles Anderson, I. Ray
Not all vulnerabilities are equal. Some recent studies have shown that only a small fraction of vulnerabilities that have been reported has actually been exploited. Since finding and addressing potential vulnerabilities in a program can take considerable time and effort, recently effort has been made to identify code that is more likely to be vulnerable. This paper tries to identify the attributes of the code containing a vulnerability that makes the code more likely to be exploited. We examine 183 vulnerabilities from the National Vulnerability Database for Linux Kernel and Apache HTTP server. These include eighty-two vulnerabilities that have been found to have an exploit according to the Exploit Database. We characterize the vulnerable functions that have no exploit and the ones that have an exploit using eight metrics. The results show that the difference between a vulnerability that has no exploit and the one that has an exploit can potentially be characterized using the chosen software metrics. However, predicting exploitation of vulnerabilities is more complex than predicting just the presence of vulnerabilities and further research is needed using metrics that consider security domain knowledge for enhancing the predictability of vulnerability exploits.
{"title":"To Fear or Not to Fear That is the Question: Code Characteristics of a Vulnerable Functionwith an Existing Exploit","authors":"Awad A. Younis, Y. Malaiya, Charles Anderson, I. Ray","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857750","url":null,"abstract":"Not all vulnerabilities are equal. Some recent studies have shown that only a small fraction of vulnerabilities that have been reported has actually been exploited. Since finding and addressing potential vulnerabilities in a program can take considerable time and effort, recently effort has been made to identify code that is more likely to be vulnerable. This paper tries to identify the attributes of the code containing a vulnerability that makes the code more likely to be exploited. We examine 183 vulnerabilities from the National Vulnerability Database for Linux Kernel and Apache HTTP server. These include eighty-two vulnerabilities that have been found to have an exploit according to the Exploit Database. We characterize the vulnerable functions that have no exploit and the ones that have an exploit using eight metrics. The results show that the difference between a vulnerability that has no exploit and the one that has an exploit can potentially be characterized using the chosen software metrics. However, predicting exploitation of vulnerabilities is more complex than predicting just the presence of vulnerabilities and further research is needed using metrics that consider security domain knowledge for enhancing the predictability of vulnerability exploits.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128162729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ameni ben Fadhel, D. Bianculli, L. Briand, Benjamin Hourte
Among the various types of Role-based access control (RBAC) policies proposed in the literature, contextual policies take into account the user's location and the time at which she requests an access. The precise characterization of the context in such policies and the definition of an access decision procedure for them are non-trivial ntasks, since they have to take into account the various facets of the temporal and spatial expressions occurring in these policies. Existing approaches for modeling contextual policies do not support all the various spatio-temporal concepts and often do not provide an access decision procedure. In this paper, we propose a model-driven approach to representing and checking RBAC contextual policies. We introduce GemRBAC+CTX, an extension of a generalized conceptual model for RBAC, which contains all the concepts required to model contextual policies. We formalize these policies as constraints, using the Object Constraint Language (OCL), on the GemRBAC+CTX model, as a way to operationalize the access decision for user's requests using model-driven technologies. We show the application of GemRBAC+CTX to model the RBAC contextual policies of an application developed by HITEC Luxembourg, a provider of situational-aware information management systems for emergency scenarios. The use of GemRBAC+CTX has allowed the engineers of HITEC to define several new types of contextual policies, with a fine-grained, precise description of contexts. The preliminary experimental results show the feasibility of applying our model-driven approach for making access decisions in real systems.
{"title":"A Model-driven Approach to Representing and Checking RBAC Contextual Policies","authors":"Ameni ben Fadhel, D. Bianculli, L. Briand, Benjamin Hourte","doi":"10.1145/2857705.2857709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2857705.2857709","url":null,"abstract":"Among the various types of Role-based access control (RBAC) policies proposed in the literature, contextual policies take into account the user's location and the time at which she requests an access. The precise characterization of the context in such policies and the definition of an access decision procedure for them are non-trivial ntasks, since they have to take into account the various facets of the temporal and spatial expressions occurring in these policies. Existing approaches for modeling contextual policies do not support all the various spatio-temporal concepts and often do not provide an access decision procedure. In this paper, we propose a model-driven approach to representing and checking RBAC contextual policies. We introduce GemRBAC+CTX, an extension of a generalized conceptual model for RBAC, which contains all the concepts required to model contextual policies. We formalize these policies as constraints, using the Object Constraint Language (OCL), on the GemRBAC+CTX model, as a way to operationalize the access decision for user's requests using model-driven technologies. We show the application of GemRBAC+CTX to model the RBAC contextual policies of an application developed by HITEC Luxembourg, a provider of situational-aware information management systems for emergency scenarios. The use of GemRBAC+CTX has allowed the engineers of HITEC to define several new types of contextual policies, with a fine-grained, precise description of contexts. The preliminary experimental results show the feasibility of applying our model-driven approach for making access decisions in real systems.","PeriodicalId":377412,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131038972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：