Pub Date : 2021-11-16DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11030004
G. Moon, C. Schwarte
The article analyses the market-based approaches in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement with respect to their potential interaction with international trade law. It focuses on the international dimension of Article 6 and the tensions associated with international trading of mitigation outcomes (under paragraphs 2–3 of the Article) and emission-reduction units generated through the sustainable development mechanism (paragraphs 4–7). We find that while there are significant normative tensions and legal uncertainties in the relationship between the regimes, international cooperation across the two law- and policy-making arenas could also help to develop new approaches to aligning wto trade law with international climate objectives.
{"title":"The Paris Agreement’s Article 6 Market Mechanisms and wto Law","authors":"G. Moon, C. Schwarte","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11030004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11030004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The article analyses the market-based approaches in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement with respect to their potential interaction with international trade law. It focuses on the international dimension of Article 6 and the tensions associated with international trading of mitigation outcomes (under paragraphs 2–3 of the Article) and emission-reduction units generated through the sustainable development mechanism (paragraphs 4–7). We find that while there are significant normative tensions and legal uncertainties in the relationship between the regimes, international cooperation across the two law- and policy-making arenas could also help to develop new approaches to aligning wto trade law with international climate objectives.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47203727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-16DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11030001
D. A. A. Reisman
In the face of massive, unanticipated and even disjunctive changes, the balance of the respective interests of the state parties to existing treaties may no longer survive the changed—or changing—climate landscape. While, ideally, the co-contracting states to such treaties could mutually agree to terminate or revise their treaty obligations to accommodate such changes and redress the now imbalance of interests in the treaty, some scenarios are bound to be contentious. In such cases, is there any other procedure that can provide for an orderly and fair adjustment of treaties so as to avert a breakdown of the network of treaties and a destabilization of world order? This article proposes that the rebus sic stantibus doctrine may function as a stabilizing doctrine for maintaining and possibly adjusting treaty regimes in an orderly fashion. Unlike the doctrine of necessity or many explicit treaty carve-outs, such as the security exception of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus may allow for both an objective test and also one that must be pleaded before a third-party arbiter. For this reason, rebus operates within controlled limits. Rebus offers an international tribunal the opportunity to set out a fair termination or revision of a climate-impacted treaty. I trace the evolution of rebus as a stabilizing doctrine and illustrate the potentialities of its application to the climate crisis.
{"title":"Rebus sic stantibus as a Stabilizing Doctrine in the Climate Crisis","authors":"D. A. A. Reisman","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11030001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11030001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In the face of massive, unanticipated and even disjunctive changes, the balance of the respective interests of the state parties to existing treaties may no longer survive the changed—or changing—climate landscape. While, ideally, the co-contracting states to such treaties could mutually agree to terminate or revise their treaty obligations to accommodate such changes and redress the now imbalance of interests in the treaty, some scenarios are bound to be contentious. In such cases, is there any other procedure that can provide for an orderly and fair adjustment of treaties so as to avert a breakdown of the network of treaties and a destabilization of world order? This article proposes that the rebus sic stantibus doctrine may function as a stabilizing doctrine for maintaining and possibly adjusting treaty regimes in an orderly fashion. Unlike the doctrine of necessity or many explicit treaty carve-outs, such as the security exception of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus may allow for both an objective test and also one that must be pleaded before a third-party arbiter. For this reason, rebus operates within controlled limits. Rebus offers an international tribunal the opportunity to set out a fair termination or revision of a climate-impacted treaty. I trace the evolution of rebus as a stabilizing doctrine and illustrate the potentialities of its application to the climate crisis.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44339398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-16DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11030005
D. Rossati
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol generated about 4.3 billion Assigned Amount Units (aaus) and about 180 million Certified Emission Reductions (cers) for carry-over by Annex i states and potential use as ‘overachievements’ or offsets to discount emissions under ndcs. The second commitment period may generate additional carry-over units, and there is an estimated ‘dormant’ amount of about 4.6 billion cers that could be issued from ongoing cdm projects. To rely on these units risks upsetting the process of trust-building necessary to increase ambition under the Paris Agreement. This article questions the legality of carry-overs but finds that a textual interpretation of the current legal framework under both treaties leaves the matter unresolved. With a more refined legal interpretation, based on the principles of environmental integrity and sound accounting under the Paris Agreement, the article re-evaluates aaus and cers under the Agreement, by relying on insights from a social theory of value and the critical studies literature on the political economy of carbon markets. The conclusion is that aaus cannot be used under the ndc accounting framework, as their formal value of 1 Mt CO2 eq. under the Kyoto Protocol is considerably diminished under the Agreement. As for cers, their value depends on different social realities related to their issuance. States or the cma should adopt transparent criteria to select the cers that are worth transitioning pursuant to the Article 6.4 mechanism. The same conceptual framework of value-attribution can also inform the design and operation of the Article 6 mechanisms and their units in order to attain higher environmental integrity and sound accounting for ndcs.
{"title":"A Question of Value: On the Legality of Using Kyoto Protocol Units under the Paris Agreement","authors":"D. Rossati","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11030005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11030005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol generated about 4.3 billion Assigned Amount Units (aaus) and about 180 million Certified Emission Reductions (cers) for carry-over by Annex i states and potential use as ‘overachievements’ or offsets to discount emissions under ndcs. The second commitment period may generate additional carry-over units, and there is an estimated ‘dormant’ amount of about 4.6 billion cers that could be issued from ongoing cdm projects. To rely on these units risks upsetting the process of trust-building necessary to increase ambition under the Paris Agreement. This article questions the legality of carry-overs but finds that a textual interpretation of the current legal framework under both treaties leaves the matter unresolved. With a more refined legal interpretation, based on the principles of environmental integrity and sound accounting under the Paris Agreement, the article re-evaluates aaus and cers under the Agreement, by relying on insights from a social theory of value and the critical studies literature on the political economy of carbon markets. The conclusion is that aaus cannot be used under the ndc accounting framework, as their formal value of 1 Mt CO2 eq. under the Kyoto Protocol is considerably diminished under the Agreement. As for cers, their value depends on different social realities related to their issuance. States or the cma should adopt transparent criteria to select the cers that are worth transitioning pursuant to the Article 6.4 mechanism. The same conceptual framework of value-attribution can also inform the design and operation of the Article 6 mechanisms and their units in order to attain higher environmental integrity and sound accounting for ndcs.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43330178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-22DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11020003
Louisa Raitbaur
The German government adopted a coal exit law in 2020. The law enshrines a coal exit pathway through to 2038 and provides for significant compensation for coal companies. An accompanying structural-support law is to create new prospects for coal regions and workers. The development of the laws involved participation by the public, experts, interest groups, and the German states. Concerns about just transition and climate justice played an important role. The final laws were nevertheless met with a significant degree of dissatisfaction from stakeholders across the political spectrum, science, industry, and ngo s. Flaws in the participation process and deviation from expert recommendations have been raised as criticisms. The climate ambition, economic rationale, and social-justice effects of the laws have been contested. Repeal of the laws in any substantive way nevertheless seems unlikely.
{"title":"The New German Coal Laws: A Difficult Balancing Act","authors":"Louisa Raitbaur","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11020003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11020003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The German government adopted a coal exit law in 2020. The law enshrines a coal exit pathway through to 2038 and provides for significant compensation for coal companies. An accompanying structural-support law is to create new prospects for coal regions and workers. The development of the laws involved participation by the public, experts, interest groups, and the German states. Concerns about just transition and climate justice played an important role. The final laws were nevertheless met with a significant degree of dissatisfaction from stakeholders across the political spectrum, science, industry, and ngo s. Flaws in the participation process and deviation from expert recommendations have been raised as criticisms. The climate ambition, economic rationale, and social-justice effects of the laws have been contested. Repeal of the laws in any substantive way nevertheless seems unlikely.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45846263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-22DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11020001
Baine P. Kerr
Scholarship and practice before the European Court of Justice indicate that international organizations can unilaterally bind themselves under international law. This article evaluates whether the International Maritime Organization did so with its 2018 ‘Strategy’ to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from shipping. After first identifying the source of the imo’s mandate to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from shipping and its treaty obligations to do so, it finds that the imo has the institutional competence to unilaterally bind itself with respect to its function and purpose of regulating vessel-source pollution. It further finds that the imo imposed on itself an erga omnes obligation to mitigate climate change in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s global warming limitation goals. The article reflects on the implications of these findings for climate law and international law generally.
{"title":"Bridging the Climate and Maritime Legal Regimes: The imo’s 2018 Climate Strategy as an Erga Omnes Obligation","authors":"Baine P. Kerr","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11020001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11020001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Scholarship and practice before the European Court of Justice indicate that international organizations can unilaterally bind themselves under international law. This article evaluates whether the International Maritime Organization did so with its 2018 ‘Strategy’ to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from shipping. After first identifying the source of the imo’s mandate to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from shipping and its treaty obligations to do so, it finds that the imo has the institutional competence to unilaterally bind itself with respect to its function and purpose of regulating vessel-source pollution. It further finds that the imo imposed on itself an erga omnes obligation to mitigate climate change in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s global warming limitation goals. The article reflects on the implications of these findings for climate law and international law generally.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49663651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-22DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11020005
Andreas Hösli
The District Court of The Hague’s decision in the matter of Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell, issued in May 2021, is an unprecedented ruling, holding a fossil-fuel company accountable for its alleged contribution to climate change. The decision provides ample opportunity to discuss climate change litigation against corporations, and the legal responsibility of such actors in the climate context more broadly.
海牙地区法院于2021年5月就Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell一案做出了史无前例的裁决，要求一家化石燃料公司对其所谓的气候变化贡献负责。该决定提供了充分的机会来讨论针对公司的气候变化诉讼，以及这些行为者在更广泛的气候背景下的法律责任。
{"title":"Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell: A Tipping Point in Climate Change Litigation against Corporations?","authors":"Andreas Hösli","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11020005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11020005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The District Court of The Hague’s decision in the matter of Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell, issued in May 2021, is an unprecedented ruling, holding a fossil-fuel company accountable for its alleged contribution to climate change. The decision provides ample opportunity to discuss climate change litigation against corporations, and the legal responsibility of such actors in the climate context more broadly.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43969330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-22DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11020002
C. Schwarte
The European Union has long sought to play a leadership role in the international response to climate change. As part of the “European Green Deal”, it announced new wide-ranging plans to step up its ambition, and in December 2020 updated its mitigation target under the Paris Agreement to an at-least 55 per cent reduction by 2030 compared to the 1990 level. In this article, I provide a legal analysis of the new EU climate change policy as outlined in the European Commission’s Stepping Up Europe’s 2030 Climate Ambition (September 2020) in light of the Paris Agreement itself and other norms of international environmental law. I find that the European Union provides a degree of leadership in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, but that there are also areas of concern, in particular the missing notification of member states’ individual emission levels as part of a joint ndc under Article 4 of the Paris Agreement.
{"title":"EU Climate Policy under the Paris Agreement","authors":"C. Schwarte","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11020002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11020002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The European Union has long sought to play a leadership role in the international response to climate change. As part of the “European Green Deal”, it announced new wide-ranging plans to step up its ambition, and in December 2020 updated its mitigation target under the Paris Agreement to an at-least 55 per cent reduction by 2030 compared to the 1990 level. In this article, I provide a legal analysis of the new EU climate change policy as outlined in the European Commission’s Stepping Up Europe’s 2030 Climate Ambition (September 2020) in light of the Paris Agreement itself and other norms of international environmental law. I find that the European Union provides a degree of leadership in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, but that there are also areas of concern, in particular the missing notification of member states’ individual emission levels as part of a joint ndc under Article 4 of the Paris Agreement.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48112462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11010001
K. Bouwer
This article examines benefit-sharing in the context of climate finance. Both benefit-sharing and climate finance are complex, heterogeneous, and fast-developing fields, where the interaction of international human rights law and climate law can create both clarity and confusion. Benefit-sharing as a means for greater equity and fairness is increasingly used or included in materials on climate finance, despite lacking clear conceptualization in this context. The article does three things. First, it establishes benefit-sharing as an emerging obligation in human rights law and environmental law. Second, it explores how benefit-sharing appears in the climate regime, with a view to determining whether benefit-sharing has a distinct meaning in this context – and, if so, what it is. The article argues that both the meaning and the practice of benefit-sharing in climate finance are incoherent. Third, the article interrogates the possibilities and problems of adopting universalized norms of benefit-sharing in this context, and suggests some places where norms might be beneficial.
{"title":"Possibilities for Justice and Equity in Human Rights and Climate Law: Benefit-Sharing in Climate Finance","authors":"K. Bouwer","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11010001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11010001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article examines benefit-sharing in the context of climate finance. Both benefit-sharing and climate finance are complex, heterogeneous, and fast-developing fields, where the interaction of international human rights law and climate law can create both clarity and confusion. Benefit-sharing as a means for greater equity and fairness is increasingly used or included in materials on climate finance, despite lacking clear conceptualization in this context. The article does three things. First, it establishes benefit-sharing as an emerging obligation in human rights law and environmental law. Second, it explores how benefit-sharing appears in the climate regime, with a view to determining whether benefit-sharing has a distinct meaning in this context – and, if so, what it is. The article argues that both the meaning and the practice of benefit-sharing in climate finance are incoherent. Third, the article interrogates the possibilities and problems of adopting universalized norms of benefit-sharing in this context, and suggests some places where norms might be beneficial.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":"11 1","pages":"1-44"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44359204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11010002
Emilie Yliheljo
The article analyses the impact of the origins of emission units in transnational climate policy on market participants in the EU ets and the extension of financial-market regulation to the European carbon market. To assess the consequences of the public-private nature of emission units, a broad view of ownership is taken. Ownership is understood as the legal position of the holder of emission units, being an aggregate of elements of private law but also climate law and financial-market regulation. As a consequence, a picture emerges of a legal position variable in the personal, temporal, and spatial dimensions, following policy-design choices and the evolution of regulation of carbon markets. The ownership of emission units reflects the ongoing balancing of the different public-policy goals of the EU ets and differs from economic theories laying the foundations of emission trading. Due to the necessity for a proactive management of the scheme, regulatory intervention and risk have become inherent features of the ownership of the units, and the impact of changes will vary across different market participants.
{"title":"The Variable Nature of Ownership of Emission Units in the Intersection of Climate Law, Property Law, and the Regulation of Financial Markets","authors":"Emilie Yliheljo","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11010002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11010002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The article analyses the impact of the origins of emission units in transnational climate policy on market participants in the EU ets and the extension of financial-market regulation to the European carbon market. To assess the consequences of the public-private nature of emission units, a broad view of ownership is taken. Ownership is understood as the legal position of the holder of emission units, being an aggregate of elements of private law but also climate law and financial-market regulation. As a consequence, a picture emerges of a legal position variable in the personal, temporal, and spatial dimensions, following policy-design choices and the evolution of regulation of carbon markets. The ownership of emission units reflects the ongoing balancing of the different public-policy goals of the EU ets and differs from economic theories laying the foundations of emission trading. Due to the necessity for a proactive management of the scheme, regulatory intervention and risk have become inherent features of the ownership of the units, and the impact of changes will vary across different market participants.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":"11 1","pages":"45-75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45452650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1163/18786561-11010003
Tomáš Bruner
The UN Security Council has turned its attention to the link between climate change and security several times. Its members and other UN member states participating in discussions have remained divided over the Council’s engagement. Among vocal opponents are the bric countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This article examines the argumentation of these countries during seven UN Security Council meetings between 2007 and 2020. The bric countries often concede that climate change is a threat, but they strongly resist the idea that such a threat could be addressed by the Council. I use a Critical Legal Studies approach to analyse how the bric countries bolstered their key argumentation before the Council. I find that the bric countries exploited a ‘background rule’ concerning the unsc mandate and used it to reaffirm the limits on the Council’s action. They were thus able to avoid self-contradiction and strengthen their political position through a legal argument. This complemented other objections they raised against the Council’s involvement: its insufficient expertise, inefficient tools, and the inapplicability of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities to its decision-making.
{"title":"Changing Climate, Unchanged Mandate: bric Countries in the UN Security Council","authors":"Tomáš Bruner","doi":"10.1163/18786561-11010003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-11010003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The UN Security Council has turned its attention to the link between climate change and security several times. Its members and other UN member states participating in discussions have remained divided over the Council’s engagement. Among vocal opponents are the bric countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This article examines the argumentation of these countries during seven UN Security Council meetings between 2007 and 2020. The bric countries often concede that climate change is a threat, but they strongly resist the idea that such a threat could be addressed by the Council. I use a Critical Legal Studies approach to analyse how the bric countries bolstered their key argumentation before the Council. I find that the bric countries exploited a ‘background rule’ concerning the unsc mandate and used it to reaffirm the limits on the Council’s action. They were thus able to avoid self-contradiction and strengthen their political position through a legal argument. This complemented other objections they raised against the Council’s involvement: its insufficient expertise, inefficient tools, and the inapplicability of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities to its decision-making.","PeriodicalId":38485,"journal":{"name":"Climate Law","volume":"11 1","pages":"76-111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43212446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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