Computational models of visual processing aim to provide a compact, explanatory account of the complex neural processes that underlie visual perception and behavior. But what, if anything, do current modeling approaches say about how conscious visual experience arises from neural processing? Here, we introduce the reader to four commonly used models for understanding visual computations, neural activity, and behavior: signal detection theory, drift diffusion, probabilistic population codes, and sampling. In an attempt to bridge these modeling approaches with experimental and philosophical work on the neural basis of conscious visual perception, we lay out possible relationships between the components of the models and the contents of phenomenal visual experience. We find no unique relation between model components and phenomenal experience in any model; rather, there are multiple logically possible mappings from models to experience. Going forward, we suggest that there are scientific opportunities to develop models that predict and explain a variety of subjective reports and philosophical opportunities to consider what aspects of phenomenal experience are promising scientific targets.
{"title":"What do models of visual perception tell us about visual phenomenology?","authors":"Rachel N. Denison, N. Block, J. Samaha","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/7p8jg","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/7p8jg","url":null,"abstract":"Computational models of visual processing aim to provide a compact, explanatory account of the complex neural processes that underlie visual perception and behavior. But what, if anything, do current modeling approaches say about how conscious visual experience arises from neural processing? Here, we introduce the reader to four commonly used models for understanding visual computations, neural activity, and behavior: signal detection theory, drift diffusion, probabilistic population codes, and sampling. In an attempt to bridge these modeling approaches with experimental and philosophical work on the neural basis of conscious visual perception, we lay out possible relationships between the components of the models and the contents of phenomenal visual experience. We find no unique relation between model components and phenomenal experience in any model; rather, there are multiple logically possible mappings from models to experience. Going forward, we suggest that there are scientific opportunities to develop models that predict and explain a variety of subjective reports and philosophical opportunities to consider what aspects of phenomenal experience are promising scientific targets.","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131804873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Everett, Joshua August Skorburg, Jordan L. Livingston
In this chapter we critically review interdisciplinary work from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to shed light on perceptions of personal identity and selfhood. We review recent research that has addressed traditional philosophical questions about personal identity using empirical methods, focusing on the “moral self effect”: the finding that morality, more so than memory, is perceived to be at the core of personal identity. We raise and respond to a number of key questions and criticisms about this work. We begin by considering the operationalization of identity concepts in the empirical literature, before turning to explore the boundary conditions of “moral self effect” and how generalizable it is, and then reflecting on how this work might be connected more deeply with other neuroscience research shedding light on the self. Throughout, we highlight connections between classical themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, while also suggesting new directions for interdisciplinary collaboration.
{"title":"Me, My (Moral) Self, and I","authors":"J. Everett, Joshua August Skorburg, Jordan L. Livingston","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/af7u5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/af7u5","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter we critically review interdisciplinary work from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to shed light on perceptions of personal identity and selfhood. We review recent research that has addressed traditional philosophical questions about personal identity using empirical methods, focusing on the “moral self effect”: the finding that morality, more so than memory, is perceived to be at the core of personal identity. We raise and respond to a number of key questions and criticisms about this work. We begin by considering the operationalization of identity concepts in the empirical literature, before turning to explore the boundary conditions of “moral self effect” and how generalizable it is, and then reflecting on how this work might be connected more deeply with other neuroscience research shedding light on the self. Throughout, we highlight connections between classical themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, while also suggesting new directions for interdisciplinary collaboration.","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116185924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of moral judgment in adulthood and to some extent in childhood and adolescence. Combined with rigorous evidence from psychology and careful philosophical analysis, neuroscientific evidence can even help shed light on the extent of moral knowledge and on ways to promote healthy moral development.
{"title":"The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment: Empirical and Philosophical Developments","authors":"Joshua May, C. Workman, Hyemin Han, Julia Haas","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/89jcx","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/89jcx","url":null,"abstract":"We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of moral judgment in adulthood and to some extent in childhood and adolescence. Combined with rigorous evidence from psychology and careful philosophical analysis, neuroscientific evidence can even help shed light on the extent of moral knowledge and on ways to promote healthy moral development.","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133934536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does the brain give rise to consciousness? A common approach to addressing this question in neuroscience research involves analyzing differences in neural activity in experimental conditions where consciousness of a stimulus differs. However, unless careful measures are taken, conditions that differ in awareness typically also differ in perceptual task performance, e.g. stimulus detection and discrimination. A large body of research demonstrates that task performance and awareness can dissociate, indicating that they are separate mental processes with separate underlying mechanisms. Thus, task performance looms as a potential confound in consciousness science: computational and neural processes attributed to differences in consciousness may actually be better attributed to correlated but distinct differences in task performance. Here we present an extended exploration of the issue of task performance confounds in consciousness research. We describe the approach of performance matching (i.e. creating experimental conditions that yield identical task performance yet different levels of awareness) as a solution to the problem of performance confounds, and discuss why it is not appropriate to artificially match performance by post-hoc selection of trials (e.g. analyzing correct trials only). We review a growing literature demonstrating matched-performance / different-awareness effects using a variety of experimental designs and discuss signal detection theory models that can both explain extant results and guide the design of future research. Finally, we consider caveats and nuances for performance matching approaches and propose that future research could pool across multiple experimental designs with disjoint sets of confounds to triangulate on the confound-free neural substrates of consciousness.
{"title":"The Neural Substrates of Conscious Perception without Performance Confounds","authors":"Jorge Morales, Brian Odegaard, Brian Maniscalco","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/8zhy3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/8zhy3","url":null,"abstract":"How does the brain give rise to consciousness? A common approach to addressing this question in neuroscience research involves analyzing differences in neural activity in experimental conditions where consciousness of a stimulus differs. However, unless careful measures are taken, conditions that differ in awareness typically also differ in perceptual task performance, e.g. stimulus detection and discrimination. A large body of research demonstrates that task performance and awareness can dissociate, indicating that they are separate mental processes with separate underlying mechanisms. Thus, task performance looms as a potential confound in consciousness science: computational and neural processes attributed to differences in consciousness may actually be better attributed to correlated but distinct differences in task performance. Here we present an extended exploration of the issue of task performance confounds in consciousness research. We describe the approach of performance matching (i.e. creating experimental conditions that yield identical task performance yet different levels of awareness) as a solution to the problem of performance confounds, and discuss why it is not appropriate to artificially match performance by post-hoc selection of trials (e.g. analyzing correct trials only). We review a growing literature demonstrating matched-performance / different-awareness effects using a variety of experimental designs and discuss signal detection theory models that can both explain extant results and guide the design of future research. Finally, we consider caveats and nuances for performance matching approaches and propose that future research could pool across multiple experimental designs with disjoint sets of confounds to triangulate on the confound-free neural substrates of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131857161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0007
{"title":"I Did That! Biomarkers of Volitional and Free Agency","authors":"","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115942472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0006
F. Kaslow
{"title":"The Nature of Empathy","authors":"F. Kaslow","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124793185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0011
{"title":"Ethical Issues Raised by Recent Developments in Neuroscience: The Case of Optogenetics","authors":"","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129102168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0016
Sarah K. Robins, S. Aronowitz, A. Stolk
A common way to understand memory structures in the cognitive sciences is as a cognitive map . Cognitive maps are representational systems organized by dimensions shared with physical space. The appeal to these maps begins literally: as an account of how spatial information is represented and used to inform spatial navigation. Invocations of cognitive maps, however, are often more ambitious; cognitive maps are meant to scale up and provide the basis for our more sophisticated memory capacities. The extension is not meant to be metaphorical, but the way in which these richer mental structures are supposed to remain map-like is rarely made explicit. Here we investigate this missing link, asking How do cognitive maps represent non-spatial information? We begin with a survey of foundational work on spatial cognitive maps and then provide a comparative review of alternative, non-spatial representational structures. We then turn to several cutting-edge projects that are engaged in the task of scaling up cognitive maps so as to accommodate non-spatial information: first, on the spatial-isometric approach , encoding content that is non-spatial but in some sense isomorphic to spatial content; second, on the abstraction approach , encoding content that is an abstraction over first-order spatial information; and third, on the embedding approach , embedding non-spatial information within a spatial context, a prominent example being the Method-of-Loci. Putting these cases alongside one another reveals the variety of options available for building cognitive maps, and the distinctive limitations of each. We conclude by reflecting on where these results take us in terms of understanding the place of cognitive maps in memory.
{"title":"Memory Structure and Cognitive Maps","authors":"Sarah K. Robins, S. Aronowitz, A. Stolk","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"A common way to understand memory structures in the cognitive sciences is as a cognitive map . Cognitive maps are representational systems organized by dimensions shared with physical space. The appeal to these maps begins literally: as an account of how spatial information is represented and used to inform spatial navigation. Invocations of cognitive maps, however, are often more ambitious; cognitive maps are meant to scale up and provide the basis for our more sophisticated memory capacities. The extension is not meant to be metaphorical, but the way in which these richer mental structures are supposed to remain map-like is rarely made explicit. Here we investigate this missing link, asking How do cognitive maps represent non-spatial information? We begin with a survey of foundational work on spatial cognitive maps and then provide a comparative review of alternative, non-spatial representational structures. We then turn to several cutting-edge projects that are engaged in the task of scaling up cognitive maps so as to accommodate non-spatial information: first, on the spatial-isometric approach , encoding content that is non-spatial but in some sense isomorphic to spatial content; second, on the abstraction approach , encoding content that is an abstraction over first-order spatial information; and third, on the embedding approach , embedding non-spatial information within a spatial context, a prominent example being the Method-of-Loci. Putting these cases alongside one another reveals the variety of options available for building cognitive maps, and the distinctive limitations of each. We conclude by reflecting on where these results take us in terms of understanding the place of cognitive maps in memory.","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128998919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0013
{"title":"Touch and Other Somatosensory Senses","authors":"","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133513981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0018
Samuel Murray, Zachary C. Irving, Kristina Krasich
{"title":"The Scientific Study of Passive Thinking: Methods of Mind-Wandering Research","authors":"Samuel Murray, Zachary C. Irving, Kristina Krasich","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125582976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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