Harvard Education Press, 2013, $29.95; 296 pages. By Richard Colvin Reading this account of Alan Bersin's successful, by the test scores, but highly contentious time as school superintendent in San Diego, 1998-2005, I could not help but think back to an account of another successful superintendency, that of Pat Forgione in the Austin, Texas, public schools, related in Larry Cuban's book As Good As it Gets (see "Lessons from a Reformer," book reviews, Fall 2010). The challenges were similar: substantial gaps between black and Latino and white and Asian schoolchildren, school systems in disarray, and school boards looking for strong leadership. The remedies that the new leaders proposed and implemented were also similar: bringing in the best consultants, introducing new curricula, removing and replacing the principals of poorly performing schools, adding math and reading coaches, requiring summer staff training, bringing in charter school organizers to manage the worst-performing schools. Yet San Diego became notorious for the fierce resistance of its teachers union, abetted by school board members, to any and all efforts at change, whereas there is hardly any reference to the role of the unions in Cuban's account of Austin. Cuban, writing in 2010 of Forgione's success there, notes, "his performance matched that of big-city superintendents ... such as Carl Cohn of Long Beach, California, Beverly Hall in Atlanta, and Tom Payzant in Boston." Bersin is striking for his absence from this list: Carl Cohn, who succeeded him in San Diego, did not last two years, apparently driven out by the atmosphere of incessant and poisonous conflict that prevailed even after Bersin left. Bersin was one of that group of reforming superintendents who were being brought in at the time from outside the world of education to manage big-city systems, the most prominent being Joel Klein in New York City. School boards and mayors thought these leaders could do what those professionalized in the world of education could not. Bersin, Colvin tells us, the son of "Russian immigrants" (better described as Eastern European Jews) in Brooklyn, had "benefited from a rigorous public school education" (though there is no mention of his attending one of New York City's examination high schools); gone on to Harvard, Oxford (as a Rhodes Scholar, in the same class as Bill Clinton), and Yale Law School; and enjoyed a successful legal career culminating in service as the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of California. Clearly, only his desire for further challenging and serious public service could have led him to consider the superintendency of the troubled San Diego public schools, the eighth-largest school district in the United States. Two members of the five-member school board, strong supporters of the teachers union, were doubtful about him, though Bersin was a Democrat and should have been considered sympathetic to unions. Bersin jumped into the job with remarkable vigor. Month
哈佛教育出版社，2013年，29.95美元;296页。读到艾伦·贝尔辛(Alan Bersin) 1998年至2005年在圣地亚哥(San Diego)担任校长期间的成功经历，我不禁回想起另一个成功的校长经历，那就是德克萨斯州奥斯汀(Austin)公立学校的帕特·福格内(Pat fogone)，拉里·库班(Larry Cuban)的《尽到最好》(as Good as it Gets)一书中提到的(见《改革者的教训》，书评，2010年秋季)。挑战是相似的:黑人和拉丁裔、白人和亚裔学生之间存在巨大差距，学校系统混乱，学校董事会需要强有力的领导。新领导人提出并实施的补救措施也很相似:引进最好的顾问，引入新课程，撤换表现不佳学校的校长，增加数学和阅读教练，要求暑期员工培训，聘请特许学校组织者来管理表现最差的学校。然而，圣地亚哥因其教师工会在学校董事会成员的怂恿下对任何和所有改革努力的激烈抵制而臭名昭著，而在库班对奥斯汀的描述中，几乎没有提到工会的作用。2010年，库班在谈到福莫内在那里的成功时写道:“他的表现堪比大城市的校长……比如加州长滩的卡尔·科恩、亚特兰大的贝弗利·霍尔和波士顿的汤姆·佩赞特。”贝尔辛在这份名单上的缺席令人震惊:接替他在圣地亚哥的卡尔·科恩(Carl Cohn)任职不到两年，显然是被贝尔辛离开后持续不断、充满敌意的冲突氛围所驱离的。伯辛是一群改革督学中的一员他们当时从教育领域之外被请来管理大城市的教育系统，其中最著名的是纽约的乔尔·克莱因。学校董事会和市长们认为，这些领导者可以做到那些在教育界专业人士做不到的事情。科尔文告诉我们，伯尔辛是布鲁克林“俄罗斯移民”(更确切地说，是东欧犹太人)的儿子，他“受益于严格的公立学校教育”(尽管书中没有提到他曾就读于纽约市的一所考试高中);后来去了哈佛大学、牛津大学(作为罗德学者，和比尔·克林顿同班)和耶鲁大学法学院;并拥有成功的法律生涯，最终担任加州南区联邦检察官。显然，只有他对进一步挑战和严肃的公共服务的渴望，才会促使他考虑对陷入困境的圣地亚哥公立学校(美国第八大学区)进行监管。学校董事会的五名成员中有两名是教师工会的坚定支持者，他们对他表示怀疑，尽管贝尔辛是民主党人，应该被认为是同情工会的。贝尔辛以非凡的精力投入了这项工作。在上任前几个月，他花了很长时间自学城市学区管理的问题和前景。他“请了一位顾问来规划各个地区办事处及其职责....为了对抗(伴随他的任命而来的)本能的警惕，贝尔辛尽他所能向每个人保证，学生的成绩、良好的教学和公平是他最关心的....(他)成立了一个过渡委员会，其中包括教师工会、非教学雇员工会的负责人……管理员……以及家长和族裔社区的代表。”过渡委员会的主要兴趣似乎是表达不满，而且只开了一次会。他采访了该地区的20位最高领导人，收到了许多主动和主动的信息，反映了他所说的“一种深深的悲伤，一种令人不安的宿命论的根源”。他飞到马萨诸塞州的剑桥市，向哈佛大学教育研究生院(Harvard Graduate School of Education)的教员们进行咨询，并了解到托尼·阿尔瓦拉多(Tony Alvarado)的情况。托尼·阿尔瓦拉多是前纽约市学校校长，也是曼哈顿东区第四学区的负责人，他在这个以少数族裔学生为主的学区提高学生成绩方面取得了显著的成功。…
{"title":"Tilting at Windmills: School Reform, San Diego, and America's Race to Renew Public Education","authors":"N. Glazer","doi":"10.5860/choice.51-2205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.51-2205","url":null,"abstract":"Harvard Education Press, 2013, $29.95; 296 pages. By Richard Colvin Reading this account of Alan Bersin's successful, by the test scores, but highly contentious time as school superintendent in San Diego, 1998-2005, I could not help but think back to an account of another successful superintendency, that of Pat Forgione in the Austin, Texas, public schools, related in Larry Cuban's book As Good As it Gets (see \"Lessons from a Reformer,\" book reviews, Fall 2010). The challenges were similar: substantial gaps between black and Latino and white and Asian schoolchildren, school systems in disarray, and school boards looking for strong leadership. The remedies that the new leaders proposed and implemented were also similar: bringing in the best consultants, introducing new curricula, removing and replacing the principals of poorly performing schools, adding math and reading coaches, requiring summer staff training, bringing in charter school organizers to manage the worst-performing schools. Yet San Diego became notorious for the fierce resistance of its teachers union, abetted by school board members, to any and all efforts at change, whereas there is hardly any reference to the role of the unions in Cuban's account of Austin. Cuban, writing in 2010 of Forgione's success there, notes, \"his performance matched that of big-city superintendents ... such as Carl Cohn of Long Beach, California, Beverly Hall in Atlanta, and Tom Payzant in Boston.\" Bersin is striking for his absence from this list: Carl Cohn, who succeeded him in San Diego, did not last two years, apparently driven out by the atmosphere of incessant and poisonous conflict that prevailed even after Bersin left. Bersin was one of that group of reforming superintendents who were being brought in at the time from outside the world of education to manage big-city systems, the most prominent being Joel Klein in New York City. School boards and mayors thought these leaders could do what those professionalized in the world of education could not. Bersin, Colvin tells us, the son of \"Russian immigrants\" (better described as Eastern European Jews) in Brooklyn, had \"benefited from a rigorous public school education\" (though there is no mention of his attending one of New York City's examination high schools); gone on to Harvard, Oxford (as a Rhodes Scholar, in the same class as Bill Clinton), and Yale Law School; and enjoyed a successful legal career culminating in service as the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of California. Clearly, only his desire for further challenging and serious public service could have led him to consider the superintendency of the troubled San Diego public schools, the eighth-largest school district in the United States. Two members of the five-member school board, strong supporters of the teachers union, were doubtful about him, though Bersin was a Democrat and should have been considered sympathetic to unions. Bersin jumped into the job with remarkable vigor. Month","PeriodicalId":38945,"journal":{"name":"Education Next","volume":"68 1","pages":"92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74833274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Harvard Education Press, 2013, $29.95; 243 pages. By Larry Cuban Reviewed by Mark Bauerlein One of the abiding features of education reform in the United States, including the continuing saga of Common Core, is an unfortunate reality Larry Cuban addresses in his latest book (his sixth since 2009). It is the vast, multilayered distance from one end of a reform effort to the other. At the beginning, we find governors and mayors, foundations and advocacy groups that propose changes in funding, governance, and curriculum. At the end lies what actually transpires in classrooms: the things students study, the assignments they complete, where they sit and the teacher stands, and other factors that make up on-the-ground instruction. In between, a complex and unreliable process of policy formulation, adoption, and implementation unfolds. An idea arises, say, digital learning, that attracts researchers and educators, then thrills a politician and a donor, which then yields a 1:1 laptop program, which calls for the purchase of hardware, software, and curricular materials, which requires training for teachers and a support team of tech experts ... before the crucial engagement of teacher, student, and laptop happens in class. Cuban monitored one such initiative in a Bay Area high school during 1998-99 and 2008-10. Charting the history of the school, conducting interviews, and observing classes, Cuban found that * in both periods, student and faculty populations changed significantly, drawing energy away from technology matters * test scores fell below state and national averages, pressuring staff to orient instruction to test-taking skills (California put the school on Probation in 2004.) * the 1990s principal spearheading the initiative left just as it was blossoming (The school had four different principals from 1998 to 2010.) * teachers themselves varied in their commitment, some using technology all the time, others sparingly * every year, costs of maintaining equipment went up, while funding was inconsistent. The fits and starts explain one conclusion Cuban submitted to the school: "Connections between student achievement and teacher and student use of laptops are, at best, indirect and, at worst, nonexistent." The idea was sound (digital technology can enhance learning), initial funding was generous (federal and state grants, Silicon Valley donors), and school leaders were enthusiastic. But when the technology finally made it to the classroom, integration was an inconsistent activity. Even when teachers adopted the tools, they largely maintained customary pedagogical styles. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The case illustrates Cuban's subtitle, "Change Without Reform." Big ideas and well-backed programs end up affecting instruction barely at all, particularly the teacher-centered approach, which Cuban singles out as especially hard to dislodge (though he holds back from insisting on child-centered tactics as clearly superior). Reforms are debated in public and
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Voucher programs and their supporters have had a tough last few years. The Florida Supreme Court declared vouchers in that state unconstitutional in 2006. Three years later, the Arizona Supreme Court did the same. In 2007, voters in Utah handed a resounding defeat to a voucher program there. In 2009, the U.S. Congress refused to continue funding the federal voucher program in Washington, D.C., effectively killing the program in the nation's capital. The Louisiana legislature stood apart from this trend and in the summer of 2008 passed Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence, the state's first voucher program, specifically for New Orleans, In the fall, 870 students in kindergarten through 3rd grade whose families earned less than two and a half times the federal poverty level and who would otherwise attend some of the worst schools in the city received vouchers worth up to $6,000 to attend private schools of their choice. In the second year, 2009-10, the maximum voucher amount rose to more than $7,000. The number of students receiving vouchers increased to 1,324. Thirty-one private schools, most of How vouchers came to the Big Easy them parochial, in Orleans Parish and neighboring Jefferson Parish serve these students. As was the case before Hurricane Katrina (see "Hope after Katrina," feature, Fall 2006), private schools educate about one-third of the students in Orleans Parish (see Figure 1). How did the Louisiana legislature pass this proposal when so many other states were rejecting similar programs? At first glance the question may not seem particularly interesting. After all, Louisiana is seen as the perennial exception to the general rule of American political culture. The state's most famous political personality and a uniquely Louisianan character, Huey P. Long, once described himself as sui generis, one of a kind. The moniker is as fitting to the land of Long as to the man himself. On top of that, Hurricane Katrina brought unprecedented physical destruction, demographic shifts, and economic impacts that reshaped state and local politics as well. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In fact, passage of House Bill 1347, which established the Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program, depended on many factors, only some of which can be traced to Hurricane Katrina. The legislative success of the program was more a political story than a fluke of geography or history. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] "In a way we've never done before" Policy innovation comes slowly along (he muddy banks of the Mississippi River. Frequently, it seems only an external catalyst (federal civil-rights enforcement, international fluctuations in the price of oil, or floodwaters) can spur new approaches to the social and economic challenges that have long faced New Orleans. The city's Old World persona has frustrated the reformer at least as much as it has intrigued the tourist. School governance is no exception. Prior to Hurricane Katrina. The Orleans Parish School Bo
代金券项目和他们的支持者在过去几年里过得很艰难。2006年，佛罗里达州最高法院宣布该州的代金券违宪。三年后，亚利桑那州最高法院也做出了同样的决定。2007年，犹他州的选民彻底否决了当地的代金券计划。2009年，美国国会拒绝继续为华盛顿特区的联邦教育券项目提供资金，实际上扼杀了这个在美国首都推行的项目。路易斯安那州的立法机关在这一趋势中脱颖而出，在2008年夏天通过了教育卓越学生奖学金，这是该州第一个专门针对新奥尔良的代金券计划。在秋天，870名从幼儿园到三年级的学生，他们的家庭收入不到联邦贫困水平的2.5倍，否则他们将进入该市一些最差的学校，他们获得了价值高达6000美元的代金券，可以进入他们选择的私立学校。第二年，2009-10年度，最高代金券金额上升到7000多美元。接受教育券的学生人数增加到1324人。在奥尔良教区和邻近的杰斐逊教区，有31所私立学校为这些学生提供教育。就像卡特里娜飓风之前的情况一样(见“卡特里娜过后的希望”专题，2006年秋季)，私立学校教育了奥尔良教区大约三分之一的学生(见图1)。当许多其他州拒绝类似的计划时，路易斯安那州的立法机构是如何通过这项提案的?乍一看，这个问题似乎不是特别有趣。毕竟，路易斯安那州一直被视为美国政治文化普遍规律的例外。该州最著名的政治人物和独特的路易斯安那人休伊·p·朗(Huey P. Long)曾形容自己是独一无二的。这个绰号既适合他本人，也适合他的国度。最重要的是，卡特里娜飓风带来了前所未有的物质破坏、人口变化和经济影响，重塑了州和地方政治。事实上，众议院1347号法案的通过，即设立优秀教育学生奖学金计划，依赖于许多因素，其中只有一部分可以追溯到卡特里娜飓风。该计划的立法成功与其说是地理或历史上的侥幸，不如说是一个政治故事。“以一种我们从未做过的方式”，政策创新沿着泥泞的密西西比河岸边缓慢而来。通常情况下，似乎只有外部的催化剂(联邦民权的执行，国际油价的波动，或者洪水)才能激发新的方法来解决新奥尔良长期面临的社会和经济挑战。这座城市的旧世界形象让这位改革者感到沮丧，至少和它吸引游客的程度一样。学校治理也不例外。在卡特里娜飓风之前。奥尔良教区学校董事会(OPSB)是该州政治上最强大的董事会。它管理着最大的学区、最多的学生和最多的预算。它雇佣的教师和员工比其他任何地区都多，是给州政府官员打电话和写信的现成资源。它的边界与路易斯安那州众议院的15个席位和参议院的7个席位重叠，代表了大约15%的立法机构，远远超过其他任何学区。新奥尔良也是该州最强大的教师工会——新奥尔良教师联合会(UTNO)的所在地。在20世纪70年代，它是南方腹地第一个(也是路易斯安那州唯一一个)赢得集体谈判权的教师工会。行动中的选择(图1)2008-09年，新奥尔良超过三分之二的学生就读于私立学校或特许学校。私立34% RSD和BESE(州)特许24% OPSB(地区)特许14% RSD(州)传统23% OPSB(地区)传统5%资料来源:大新奥尔良社区数据中心(私立学校注册，2008年10月);新奥尔良新建学校，2008-09学年注:表格由饼状图制成。…
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{"title":"The Human Capital Century.","authors":"C. Goldin","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvjf9x5x.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjf9x5x.4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38945,"journal":{"name":"Education Next","volume":"18 1","pages":"73-78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72666871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This morning I visited Wikipedia, typed the date, 12 August, into the search box, and looked for events that I could write about for Physics Today's Facebook page. Today happens to be Erwin Schrodinger's birthday, so I picked him.
{"title":"The Philadelphia Experiment.","authors":"J. Mathews","doi":"10.1063/pt.5.010005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1063/pt.5.010005","url":null,"abstract":"This morning I visited Wikipedia, typed the date, 12 August, into the search box, and looked for events that I could write about for Physics Today's Facebook page. Today happens to be Erwin Schrodinger's birthday, so I picked him.","PeriodicalId":38945,"journal":{"name":"Education Next","volume":"146 5 1","pages":"51-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83093025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-06-22DOI: 10.4135/9781452229805.n83
Jay P. Greene
LIKE THE MAKERS OF HOT DOGS, PSYCHOMETRICIANS, economists, and other testing experts know too well what goes into the creation of achievement tests. Their intimate knowledge of the technical difficulties involved in measuring student achievement makes a number of these testing experts some of the most vocal (and persuasive) opponents of testing. But the flaws in techniques like value-added assessment do not automatically lead to the conclusion that those techniques shouldn't be used to hold educators accountable. Testing may be imperfect, but the alternative--the old system, which allowed us to know very little about the performance of educators--is far, far worse. To be sure, many of the technical criticisms of value-added testing are correct. It's true that there is more random error in measuring gains in test scores than in measuring the level of test scores. It's true that there is some uncertainty as to whether gains in one area of the test scale are equal to gains at another point in the test scale. And it's true that factors besides the quality of the schools can influence the gains that students achieve. But, on balance, these downsides hardly outweigh the benefits to be reaped from being able to measure and reward productivity in education. Consider what is likely to continue to happen in education without high-stakes value-added assessment. Unless productivity is measured, however imperfectly, it is not possible to reward teachers, administrators, and schools that contribute most to student learning. If we do nor reward productivity, we are unlikely to encourage it. If we do not encourage it, we should not expect more of it. In fact, this is precisely what has been happening in U.S. education during the past few decades. Between 1961 and 2000, spending on education tripled after adjusting for inflation, from $2,360 to $7,086 per pupil. During that time, student performance, as measured by scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and high-school graduation rates, has remained basically unchanged. Whenever spending triples without any significant improvement in outcomes, there is a serious productivity crisis. Yet U.S. public schools just keep chugging along, resisting serious attempts at reform. Meanwhile, private firms in the United States have been able to achieve steady gains in productivity because the discipline of competition has forced them to adopt systems for measuring and rewarding productivity. Firms that fail to measure and reward productivity lose out to their competitors who do. Moreover, the systems that private companies use to measure and reward productivity are far from flawless. In fact, the challenge of measuring productivity in the private sector is often as great as or greater than in education. Imagine a soft-drink company that wishes to measure and reward the productivity of its sales force. The company might determine bonuses (and even decisions on layoffs) based on its salespeople's succe
{"title":"The Business Model.","authors":"Jay P. Greene","doi":"10.4135/9781452229805.n83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452229805.n83","url":null,"abstract":"LIKE THE MAKERS OF HOT DOGS, PSYCHOMETRICIANS, economists, and other testing experts know too well what goes into the creation of achievement tests. Their intimate knowledge of the technical difficulties involved in measuring student achievement makes a number of these testing experts some of the most vocal (and persuasive) opponents of testing. But the flaws in techniques like value-added assessment do not automatically lead to the conclusion that those techniques shouldn't be used to hold educators accountable. Testing may be imperfect, but the alternative--the old system, which allowed us to know very little about the performance of educators--is far, far worse. To be sure, many of the technical criticisms of value-added testing are correct. It's true that there is more random error in measuring gains in test scores than in measuring the level of test scores. It's true that there is some uncertainty as to whether gains in one area of the test scale are equal to gains at another point in the test scale. And it's true that factors besides the quality of the schools can influence the gains that students achieve. But, on balance, these downsides hardly outweigh the benefits to be reaped from being able to measure and reward productivity in education. Consider what is likely to continue to happen in education without high-stakes value-added assessment. Unless productivity is measured, however imperfectly, it is not possible to reward teachers, administrators, and schools that contribute most to student learning. If we do nor reward productivity, we are unlikely to encourage it. If we do not encourage it, we should not expect more of it. In fact, this is precisely what has been happening in U.S. education during the past few decades. Between 1961 and 2000, spending on education tripled after adjusting for inflation, from $2,360 to $7,086 per pupil. During that time, student performance, as measured by scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and high-school graduation rates, has remained basically unchanged. Whenever spending triples without any significant improvement in outcomes, there is a serious productivity crisis. Yet U.S. public schools just keep chugging along, resisting serious attempts at reform. Meanwhile, private firms in the United States have been able to achieve steady gains in productivity because the discipline of competition has forced them to adopt systems for measuring and rewarding productivity. Firms that fail to measure and reward productivity lose out to their competitors who do. Moreover, the systems that private companies use to measure and reward productivity are far from flawless. In fact, the challenge of measuring productivity in the private sector is often as great as or greater than in education. Imagine a soft-drink company that wishes to measure and reward the productivity of its sales force. The company might determine bonuses (and even decisions on layoffs) based on its salespeople's succe","PeriodicalId":38945,"journal":{"name":"Education Next","volume":"40 1","pages":"20-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76168503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-03-22DOI: 10.4324/9780203938690.CH7.9
Frederick M. Hess
Picture Gerard, a 28-year-old business consultant who majored in economics at Williams College and graduated with a 3.7 GPA. Gerard has been working for a consulting firm in Stamford, Connecticut, but is looking for a new, more fulfilling position. He has demonstrated strong interpersonal skills and work habits. In addition, though he didn't major in math, he aced several calculus courses in college. Yet if Gerard were to apply through normal channels to teach math at a junior high school in the Hartford public school system, his application wouldn't even be considered. Why? Because he isn't a certified teacher. Why shouldn't principal or a faculty hiring committee in the Hartford schools even be allowed to look at Gerard's application, to judge his qualifications against those of other candidates? The assumption undergirding the contemporary approach to teacher certification is that public school hiring personnel are either unable or unwilling to gauge the quality of applicants. Our response has been to embrace a bureaucratic solution that handcuffs the capable and incapable alike and supposedly keeps weak teachers out of the classroom. As a result, having discouraged or turned away Gerard and hundreds like him, many large school systems resort to last-minute fill-ins who reach on emergency certificates. This is not to suggest, even for a moment, that candidates with "real world" experience or high GPAs are necessarily qualified or equipped to become teachers or that professional preparation for teachers is unimportant. It is only to say that some potential applicants might be more effective teachers than the alternatives that are currently available to public schools. The central premise underlying teacher certification is that--no matter what their qualifications are--anyone who has not completed the specified training is unsuited to enter a classroom and must be prohibited from applying for a job. Presumably, the danger is that; in a moment of weakness, a school official otherwise will mistakenly hire such an applicant rather than an appropriately trained teacher. It is essential to remember what we often seem to forget, which is that allowing someone to apply for a job is not the same as guaranteeing him employment. Making applicants eligible for a position simply permits an employer to hire them in the event that they are deemed superior to the existing alternatives. The argument against certification is not that unconventional applicants will be good teachers; it is only that they might be. If one believes this, case-by-case judgments are clearly more appropriate than an inflexible bureaucratic rule. Imagine if colleges and universities refused to hire anyone who lacked a Ph.D. They would lose the talents and insights of "lay practitioners" like poet Maya Angelou, journalist William Raspberry, or former public officials such as Alan Simpson, Julian Bond, and Al Gore. The artists and writers in residence" at dozens of public universities wo
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