Pub Date : 2012-12-01DOI: 10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412648
Pascal Schöttle, Stefan Korff, Rainer Böhme
Weighted stego-image (WS) steganalysis is the state of the art for estimating LSB replacement steganography in spatial domain images. However, the most powerful WS variants designed against random uniform embedding perform poorly against content-adaptive steganography. As a remedy, we propose a novel variant of WS which is specialized in detecting small payloads hidden exclusively in the least detectable spots of a cover, benchmark its performance against known methods, and experimentally investigate the influence of the choice of the adaptivity criterion, i. e., the function that identifies supposedly secure spots in a heterogeneous cover. We find that adaptivity criteria which are hard to recover from the stego image alone provide stronger security against our specialized WS method.
{"title":"Weighted stego-image steganalysis for naive content-adaptive embedding","authors":"Pascal Schöttle, Stefan Korff, Rainer Böhme","doi":"10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412648","url":null,"abstract":"Weighted stego-image (WS) steganalysis is the state of the art for estimating LSB replacement steganography in spatial domain images. However, the most powerful WS variants designed against random uniform embedding perform poorly against content-adaptive steganography. As a remedy, we propose a novel variant of WS which is specialized in detecting small payloads hidden exclusively in the least detectable spots of a cover, benchmark its performance against known methods, and experimentally investigate the influence of the choice of the adaptivity criterion, i. e., the function that identifies supposedly secure spots in a heterogeneous cover. We find that adaptivity criteria which are hard to recover from the stego image alone provide stronger security against our specialized WS method.","PeriodicalId":396789,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124907483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-28DOI: 10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412656
Thijs Laarhoven, Jan-Jaap Oosterwijk, J. Doumen
We give a generic divide-and-conquer approach for constructing collusion-resistant probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing schemes with larger alphabets from schemes with smaller alphabets. This construction offers a linear tradeoff between the alphabet size and the codelength. In particular, we show that applying our results to the binary dynamic Tardos scheme of Laarhoven et al. leads to schemes that are shorter by a factor equal to half the alphabet size. Asymptotically, these codelengths correspond, up to a constant factor, to the fingerprinting capacity for static probabilistic schemes. This gives a hierarchy of probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing schemes, and bridges the gap between the low bandwidth, high codelength scheme of Laarhoven et al. and the high bandwidth, low codelength scheme of Fiat and Tassa.
{"title":"Dynamic traitor tracing for arbitrary alphabets: Divide and conquer","authors":"Thijs Laarhoven, Jan-Jaap Oosterwijk, J. Doumen","doi":"10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412656","url":null,"abstract":"We give a generic divide-and-conquer approach for constructing collusion-resistant probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing schemes with larger alphabets from schemes with smaller alphabets. This construction offers a linear tradeoff between the alphabet size and the codelength. In particular, we show that applying our results to the binary dynamic Tardos scheme of Laarhoven et al. leads to schemes that are shorter by a factor equal to half the alphabet size. Asymptotically, these codelengths correspond, up to a constant factor, to the fingerprinting capacity for static probabilistic schemes. This gives a hierarchy of probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing schemes, and bridges the gap between the low bandwidth, high codelength scheme of Laarhoven et al. and the high bandwidth, low codelength scheme of Fiat and Tassa.","PeriodicalId":396789,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123395899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412622
Gabriel Hospodar, Roel Maes, I. Verbauwhede
Arbiter Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as efficient hardware security primitives for generating device-unique authentication responses and cryptographic keys. However, the assumed possibility of modeling their underlying challenge-response behavior causes uncertainty about their actual applicability. In this work, we apply well-known machine learning techniques on challenge-response pairs (CRPs) from 64-stage Arbiter PUFs realized in 65nm CMOS, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of such modeling attacks on a modern silicon implementation. We show that a 90%-accurate model can be built from a training set of merely 500 CRPs, and that 5000 CRPs are sufficient to perfectly model the PUFs. To study the implications of these attacks, there is need for a new methodology to assess the security of PUFs suffering from modeling. We propose such a methodology and apply it to our machine learning results, yielding strict bounds on the usability of Arbiter PUFs. We conclude that plain 64-stage Arbiter PUFs are not secure for challenge-response authentication, and the number of extractable secret key bits is limited to at most 600.
{"title":"Machine learning attacks on 65nm Arbiter PUFs: Accurate modeling poses strict bounds on usability","authors":"Gabriel Hospodar, Roel Maes, I. Verbauwhede","doi":"10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412622","url":null,"abstract":"Arbiter Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as efficient hardware security primitives for generating device-unique authentication responses and cryptographic keys. However, the assumed possibility of modeling their underlying challenge-response behavior causes uncertainty about their actual applicability. In this work, we apply well-known machine learning techniques on challenge-response pairs (CRPs) from 64-stage Arbiter PUFs realized in 65nm CMOS, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of such modeling attacks on a modern silicon implementation. We show that a 90%-accurate model can be built from a training set of merely 500 CRPs, and that 5000 CRPs are sufficient to perfectly model the PUFs. To study the implications of these attacks, there is need for a new methodology to assess the security of PUFs suffering from modeling. We propose such a methodology and apply it to our machine learning results, yielding strict bounds on the usability of Arbiter PUFs. We conclude that plain 64-stage Arbiter PUFs are not secure for challenge-response authentication, and the number of extractable secret key bits is limited to at most 600.","PeriodicalId":396789,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124445914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412635
F. Pérez-González, C. Troncoso
Deployed high-latency anonymous communication systems conceal communication patterns using pool mixes as building blocks. These mixes are known to be vulnerable to Disclosure Attacks that uncover persistent relationships between users. In this paper we study the performance of the Least Squares Disclosure Attack (LSDA), an approach to disclosure rooted in Maximum Likelihood parameter estimation that recovers user profiles with greater accuracy than previous work. We derive analytical expressions that characterize the profiling error of the LSDA with respect to the system parameters for a threshold binomial pool mix and validate them empirically. Moreover, we show that our approach is easily adaptable to attack diverse pool mixing strategies.
{"title":"A Least Squares approach to user profiling in pool mix-based anonymous communication systems","authors":"F. Pérez-González, C. Troncoso","doi":"10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412635","url":null,"abstract":"Deployed high-latency anonymous communication systems conceal communication patterns using pool mixes as building blocks. These mixes are known to be vulnerable to Disclosure Attacks that uncover persistent relationships between users. In this paper we study the performance of the Least Squares Disclosure Attack (LSDA), an approach to disclosure rooted in Maximum Likelihood parameter estimation that recovers user profiles with greater accuracy than previous work. We derive analytical expressions that characterize the profiling error of the LSDA with respect to the system parameters for a threshold binomial pool mix and validate them empirically. Moreover, we show that our approach is easily adaptable to attack diverse pool mixing strategies.","PeriodicalId":396789,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130263362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412624
T. Veugen
When processing signals in the encrypted domain, homomorphic encryption can be used to enable linear operations on encrypted data. Comparison of encrypted data however requires an additional protocol between the parties and will be relatively expensive. A well-known and frequently used comparison protocol is by Damgard, Geisler and Kroigaard. We present two ways of improving this comparison protocol. Firstly, we reduce the computational effort of one party by roughly 50%. Secondly, we show how to achieve perfect security towards the other party without additional costs, whereas the original version with encrypted inputs only achieved statistical security. An additional advantage is that larger inputs are allowed.
{"title":"Improving the DGK comparison protocol","authors":"T. Veugen","doi":"10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412624","url":null,"abstract":"When processing signals in the encrypted domain, homomorphic encryption can be used to enable linear operations on encrypted data. Comparison of encrypted data however requires an additional protocol between the parties and will be relatively expensive. A well-known and frequently used comparison protocol is by Damgard, Geisler and Kroigaard. We present two ways of improving this comparison protocol. Firstly, we reduce the computational effort of one party by roughly 50%. Secondly, we show how to achieve perfect security towards the other party without additional costs, whereas the original version with encrypted inputs only achieved statistical security. An additional advantage is that larger inputs are allowed.","PeriodicalId":396789,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116548005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412663
Yupeng Liu, A. Petropulu
A wireless network with one source, one destination, one eavesdropper and multiple decode-and-forward (DF) relays is considered. A two-slot cooperative relaying scheme is proposed that targets at maximizing the secrecy rate. In the first slot, the source transmits the information bearing signal, and at the same time, it cooperates with the destination in jamming the eavesdropper without creating interference at the relay. In the second slot, one optimally selected relay retransmits the decoded source signal, and at the same time, it cooperates with the source to jam the eavesdropper without creating interference at the destination. For the beamforming, no eavesdropper channel information is required. Optimal relay selection and also optimal power allocation among the first/second slot data signal and jamming noise are proposed. It is shown that the system secrecy rate of the proposed scheme scales with the total system power, P0 and the number of available relays, K, according to log2(1 + P0/8 log K) - 1.6252bps.
{"title":"Destination assisted cooperative jamming for wireless physical layer security","authors":"Yupeng Liu, A. Petropulu","doi":"10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS.2012.6412663","url":null,"abstract":"A wireless network with one source, one destination, one eavesdropper and multiple decode-and-forward (DF) relays is considered. A two-slot cooperative relaying scheme is proposed that targets at maximizing the secrecy rate. In the first slot, the source transmits the information bearing signal, and at the same time, it cooperates with the destination in jamming the eavesdropper without creating interference at the relay. In the second slot, one optimally selected relay retransmits the decoded source signal, and at the same time, it cooperates with the source to jam the eavesdropper without creating interference at the destination. For the beamforming, no eavesdropper channel information is required. Optimal relay selection and also optimal power allocation among the first/second slot data signal and jamming noise are proposed. It is shown that the system secrecy rate of the proposed scheme scales with the total system power, P0 and the number of available relays, K, according to log2(1 + P0/8 log K) - 1.6252bps.","PeriodicalId":396789,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121496974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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