At the heart of _Social Justice Fallacies_ is a refutation of the verdicts of Progressives on the moral status of inequalities between the races, sexes and classes, on their own grounds. Following from this is a criticism of the state interventions proposed to correct these inequalities. Sowell considers three themes throughout the book to make his case, these being, the unchosen background of people, the different tastes of people, and, the responses which people make to Progressive policies to “fix” inequalities. By showing how a majority of the inequality between groups is due to these three factors, he defeats the central idea of the social justice movement, namely, ‘disparities are evidence or proof of the effects of such human vices as exploitation and discrimination’ (2). This is a good book grounded in plenty of empirical evidence and solid arguments. This review summarizes its three themes, outlines its secondary concerns, and offers minor criticism towards the end.
{"title":"Book Review: Social Justice Fallacies","authors":"Charles Amos","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010176","url":null,"abstract":"At the heart of _Social Justice Fallacies_ is a refutation of the verdicts of Progressives on the moral status of inequalities between the races, sexes and classes, on their own grounds. Following from this is a criticism of the state interventions proposed to correct these inequalities. Sowell considers three themes throughout the book to make his case, these being, the unchosen background of people, the different tastes of people, and, the responses which people make to Progressive policies to “fix” inequalities. By showing how a majority of the inequality between groups is due to these three factors, he defeats the central idea of the social justice movement, namely, ‘disparities are evidence or proof of the effects of such human vices as exploitation and discrimination’ (2). This is a good book grounded in plenty of empirical evidence and solid arguments. This review summarizes its three themes, outlines its secondary concerns, and offers minor criticism towards the end.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"110 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140445491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There seems to be an unappreciated point of contention in the Austrian literature regarding the socialist economic calculation problem beyond the Mises–Hayek “dehomogenization” debate. This tension concerns the essence of socialism and the economic calculation problem: while some authors (e.g., Mises and Hayek) employ the classical definition of socialism as a socioeconomic system characterized by the collective ownership of the means of production, others (e.g., Hoppe and Huerta de Soto) define it as a system of institutionalized aggression. Moreover, the latter see aggression as the essential feature of socialism’s economic failure. In this article, we argue that this conception is a novelty unconnected to Mises’s views and that aggression should not be regarded as the essential problem of socialism. We illustrate our point with a thought experiment comparing the system we might call “voluntary socialism” with genuine capitalism. Finally, we review some historical examples of voluntary socialist communities and compare them to the ideal of pure voluntary socialism.
{"title":"Socialism: A Property or Aggression Problem?","authors":"DA Megger, Marcos Benjamín-Gonzalo","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010175","url":null,"abstract":"There seems to be an unappreciated point of contention in the Austrian literature regarding the socialist economic calculation problem beyond the Mises–Hayek “dehomogenization” debate. This tension concerns the essence of socialism and the economic calculation problem: while some authors (e.g., Mises and Hayek) employ the classical definition of socialism as a socioeconomic system characterized by the collective ownership of the means of production, others (e.g., Hoppe and Huerta de Soto) define it as a system of institutionalized aggression. Moreover, the latter see aggression as the essential feature of socialism’s economic failure. In this article, we argue that this conception is a novelty unconnected to Mises’s views and that aggression should not be regarded as the essential problem of socialism. We illustrate our point with a thought experiment comparing the system we might call “voluntary socialism” with genuine capitalism. Finally, we review some historical examples of voluntary socialist communities and compare them to the ideal of pure voluntary socialism.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"25 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139780207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There seems to be an unappreciated point of contention in the Austrian literature regarding the socialist economic calculation problem beyond the Mises–Hayek “dehomogenization” debate. This tension concerns the essence of socialism and the economic calculation problem: while some authors (e.g., Mises and Hayek) employ the classical definition of socialism as a socioeconomic system characterized by the collective ownership of the means of production, others (e.g., Hoppe and Huerta de Soto) define it as a system of institutionalized aggression. Moreover, the latter see aggression as the essential feature of socialism’s economic failure. In this article, we argue that this conception is a novelty unconnected to Mises’s views and that aggression should not be regarded as the essential problem of socialism. We illustrate our point with a thought experiment comparing the system we might call “voluntary socialism” with genuine capitalism. Finally, we review some historical examples of voluntary socialist communities and compare them to the ideal of pure voluntary socialism.
{"title":"Socialism: A Property or Aggression Problem?","authors":"DA Megger, Marcos Benjamín-Gonzalo","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010175","url":null,"abstract":"There seems to be an unappreciated point of contention in the Austrian literature regarding the socialist economic calculation problem beyond the Mises–Hayek “dehomogenization” debate. This tension concerns the essence of socialism and the economic calculation problem: while some authors (e.g., Mises and Hayek) employ the classical definition of socialism as a socioeconomic system characterized by the collective ownership of the means of production, others (e.g., Hoppe and Huerta de Soto) define it as a system of institutionalized aggression. Moreover, the latter see aggression as the essential feature of socialism’s economic failure. In this article, we argue that this conception is a novelty unconnected to Mises’s views and that aggression should not be regarded as the essential problem of socialism. We illustrate our point with a thought experiment comparing the system we might call “voluntary socialism” with genuine capitalism. Finally, we review some historical examples of voluntary socialist communities and compare them to the ideal of pure voluntary socialism.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"36 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139840026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2013, Engelhardt (2013) calculated that the combined power of the top five hundred supercomputers would take approximately 10.5 quintillion years to compute the distribution of eighty thousand heterogeneous goods among six billion consumers, posing a serious practical challenge to the implementation of computerized central planning. Allin Cottrell (2021) calls into question Engelhardt’s assertion, noting that the algorithm used by Engelhardt not only scales poorly but is not even valid for the problem Engelhardt posed. Cottrell offers an iterative algorithm that a one-petaflop machine could use to solve the distribution problem in about five minutes. We correct errors in both Engelhardt and Cottrell, and we offer a way to incorporate production into the problem. The result: modern supercomputers are still not powerful enough to solve central planning’s computation problem.
{"title":"Revisiting the Computation Problem","authors":"Paul Cwik, Lucas Engelhardt","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010173","url":null,"abstract":"In 2013, Engelhardt (2013) calculated that the combined power of the top five hundred supercomputers would take approximately 10.5 quintillion years to compute the distribution of eighty thousand heterogeneous goods among six billion consumers, posing a serious practical challenge to the implementation of computerized central planning. Allin Cottrell (2021) calls into question Engelhardt’s assertion, noting that the algorithm used by Engelhardt not only scales poorly but is not even valid for the problem Engelhardt posed. Cottrell offers an iterative algorithm that a one-petaflop machine could use to solve the distribution problem in about five minutes. We correct errors in both Engelhardt and Cottrell, and we offer a way to incorporate production into the problem. The result: modern supercomputers are still not powerful enough to solve central planning’s computation problem.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"76 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139851148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Newman (2016), I argued that the Federal Reserve’s monetary expansion in 1919 generated an inflationary boom that forced it to raise interest rates, thereby precipitating a sharp contraction in 1920. Recovery began because businesses cut nominal wages, and this occurred before the Fed’s 1921–22 easing reached the economy. In contrast, Borazan (2023) attributes the boom to government spending and speculative inventory investment and the recovery to an “administrative decree” about the return to expansionary monetary policy, among other contributors. This reply argues, first, that Borazan’s analysis ignores the role of the Fed’s expansionary policy in causing the boom and the resultant inflation. Second, I show the inapplicability of Borazan’s administrative decree and revisit the importance of market-based wage cuts in generating the recovery.
{"title":"Defending the Austrian Interpretation of the 1920-21 Depression: Reply to Borazan","authors":"Patrick Newman","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010174","url":null,"abstract":"In Newman (2016), I argued that the Federal Reserve’s monetary expansion in 1919 generated an inflationary boom that forced it to raise interest rates, thereby precipitating a sharp contraction in 1920. Recovery began because businesses cut nominal wages, and this occurred before the Fed’s 1921–22 easing reached the economy. In contrast, Borazan (2023) attributes the boom to government spending and speculative inventory investment and the recovery to an “administrative decree” about the return to expansionary monetary policy, among other contributors. This reply argues, first, that Borazan’s analysis ignores the role of the Fed’s expansionary policy in causing the boom and the resultant inflation. Second, I show the inapplicability of Borazan’s administrative decree and revisit the importance of market-based wage cuts in generating the recovery.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"79 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139793902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2013, Engelhardt (2013) calculated that the combined power of the top five hundred supercomputers would take approximately 10.5 quintillion years to compute the distribution of eighty thousand heterogeneous goods among six billion consumers, posing a serious practical challenge to the implementation of computerized central planning. Allin Cottrell (2021) calls into question Engelhardt’s assertion, noting that the algorithm used by Engelhardt not only scales poorly but is not even valid for the problem Engelhardt posed. Cottrell offers an iterative algorithm that a one-petaflop machine could use to solve the distribution problem in about five minutes. We correct errors in both Engelhardt and Cottrell, and we offer a way to incorporate production into the problem. The result: modern supercomputers are still not powerful enough to solve central planning’s computation problem.
{"title":"Revisiting the Computation Problem","authors":"Paul Cwik, Lucas Engelhardt","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010173","url":null,"abstract":"In 2013, Engelhardt (2013) calculated that the combined power of the top five hundred supercomputers would take approximately 10.5 quintillion years to compute the distribution of eighty thousand heterogeneous goods among six billion consumers, posing a serious practical challenge to the implementation of computerized central planning. Allin Cottrell (2021) calls into question Engelhardt’s assertion, noting that the algorithm used by Engelhardt not only scales poorly but is not even valid for the problem Engelhardt posed. Cottrell offers an iterative algorithm that a one-petaflop machine could use to solve the distribution problem in about five minutes. We correct errors in both Engelhardt and Cottrell, and we offer a way to incorporate production into the problem. The result: modern supercomputers are still not powerful enough to solve central planning’s computation problem.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":" 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139791314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Newman (2016), I argued that the Federal Reserve’s monetary expansion in 1919 generated an inflationary boom that forced it to raise interest rates, thereby precipitating a sharp contraction in 1920. Recovery began because businesses cut nominal wages, and this occurred before the Fed’s 1921–22 easing reached the economy. In contrast, Borazan (2023) attributes the boom to government spending and speculative inventory investment and the recovery to an “administrative decree” about the return to expansionary monetary policy, among other contributors. This reply argues, first, that Borazan’s analysis ignores the role of the Fed’s expansionary policy in causing the boom and the resultant inflation. Second, I show the inapplicability of Borazan’s administrative decree and revisit the importance of market-based wage cuts in generating the recovery.
{"title":"Defending the Austrian Interpretation of the 1920-21 Depression: Reply to Borazan","authors":"Patrick Newman","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010174","url":null,"abstract":"In Newman (2016), I argued that the Federal Reserve’s monetary expansion in 1919 generated an inflationary boom that forced it to raise interest rates, thereby precipitating a sharp contraction in 1920. Recovery began because businesses cut nominal wages, and this occurred before the Fed’s 1921–22 easing reached the economy. In contrast, Borazan (2023) attributes the boom to government spending and speculative inventory investment and the recovery to an “administrative decree” about the return to expansionary monetary policy, among other contributors. This reply argues, first, that Borazan’s analysis ignores the role of the Fed’s expansionary policy in causing the boom and the resultant inflation. Second, I show the inapplicability of Borazan’s administrative decree and revisit the importance of market-based wage cuts in generating the recovery.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"68 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139853594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A basic proposition of modern economics is the so-called price premium proposed by Irving Fisher (1907, 1922, 1930): the nominal rate of interest is composed of the real rate and a price, or inflation, premium that reflects the change in the value of money. Murray Rothbard offered a critique of Fisher’s interest theory, arguing that the price premium is largely nonexistent and proposing in its stead a terms-of-trade premium (Rothbard 2009). In the present article, we argue that Rothbard’s critique is fundamentally correct. Fisher’s price premium is an incoherent concept that does not correctly reflect monetary and financial reality. Instead we combine Rothbard’s terms-of-trade component with Mises’s (1953, 1998) understanding of inflation and interest to suggest a Mises-Rothbard premium based on the Cantillon effect as the correct understanding of the relation between money and interest. This approach allows us to explain the experience of persistently low interest rates over recent decades as a result of money creation.
{"title":"The Myth of the Price Premium","authors":"Kristoffer Hansen","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010171","url":null,"abstract":"A basic proposition of modern economics is the so-called price premium proposed by Irving Fisher (1907, 1922, 1930): the nominal rate of interest is composed of the real rate and a price, or inflation, premium that reflects the change in the value of money. Murray Rothbard offered a critique of Fisher’s interest theory, arguing that the price premium is largely nonexistent and proposing in its stead a terms-of-trade premium (Rothbard 2009). In the present article, we argue that Rothbard’s critique is fundamentally correct. Fisher’s price premium is an incoherent concept that does not correctly reflect monetary and financial reality. Instead we combine Rothbard’s terms-of-trade component with Mises’s (1953, 1998) understanding of inflation and interest to suggest a Mises-Rothbard premium based on the Cantillon effect as the correct understanding of the relation between money and interest. This approach allows us to explain the experience of persistently low interest rates over recent decades as a result of money creation.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"21 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139882218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A basic proposition of modern economics is the so-called price premium proposed by Irving Fisher (1907, 1922, 1930): the nominal rate of interest is composed of the real rate and a price, or inflation, premium that reflects the change in the value of money. Murray Rothbard offered a critique of Fisher’s interest theory, arguing that the price premium is largely nonexistent and proposing in its stead a terms-of-trade premium (Rothbard 2009). In the present article, we argue that Rothbard’s critique is fundamentally correct. Fisher’s price premium is an incoherent concept that does not correctly reflect monetary and financial reality. Instead we combine Rothbard’s terms-of-trade component with Mises’s (1953, 1998) understanding of inflation and interest to suggest a Mises-Rothbard premium based on the Cantillon effect as the correct understanding of the relation between money and interest. This approach allows us to explain the experience of persistently low interest rates over recent decades as a result of money creation.
{"title":"The Myth of the Price Premium","authors":"Kristoffer Hansen","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010171","url":null,"abstract":"A basic proposition of modern economics is the so-called price premium proposed by Irving Fisher (1907, 1922, 1930): the nominal rate of interest is composed of the real rate and a price, or inflation, premium that reflects the change in the value of money. Murray Rothbard offered a critique of Fisher’s interest theory, arguing that the price premium is largely nonexistent and proposing in its stead a terms-of-trade premium (Rothbard 2009). In the present article, we argue that Rothbard’s critique is fundamentally correct. Fisher’s price premium is an incoherent concept that does not correctly reflect monetary and financial reality. Instead we combine Rothbard’s terms-of-trade component with Mises’s (1953, 1998) understanding of inflation and interest to suggest a Mises-Rothbard premium based on the Cantillon effect as the correct understanding of the relation between money and interest. This approach allows us to explain the experience of persistently low interest rates over recent decades as a result of money creation.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"25 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139822089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates the veracity of three claims made by current and former government officials in the context of the 2023 debt-ceiling debates: it would be unconstitutional to enforce the debt ceiling; the U.S. government has never defaulted; and there are no measures that could be taken to avoid a government default except raising the debt limit. None of these claims is true.
{"title":"Common Fallacies in the 2023 Debt-Ceiling Debates","authors":"Paul Kupiec, Alex Pollock","doi":"10.35297/qjae.010169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35297/qjae.010169","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the veracity of three claims made by current and former government officials in the context of the 2023 debt-ceiling debates: it would be unconstitutional to enforce the debt ceiling; the U.S. government has never defaulted; and there are no measures that could be taken to avoid a government default except raising the debt limit. None of these claims is true.","PeriodicalId":39988,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics","volume":"22 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139258121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：