Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00026
J. Crowe
The new natural law theorists, such as Germain Grisez, John Finnis and Joseph M Boyle, argue that intentional human action is oriented towards a plurality of basic goods.1 This focus on the role of the good in orienting action—and its subsequent implications for practical reason, politics and law—is a recurring and central theme of the natural law tradition. The basic goods, according to the new natural law theorists, render human action intelligible. The intelligibility of an action does not guarantee its reasonableness: that depends on whether the action is oriented towards the basic goods in a way that meets the requirements of practical rationality. However, an action that fails to be intelligible will fail to be reasonable, because it is not directed at any underlying good. The intelligibility of an action, on this view, is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for its reasonableness.
Germain Grisez、John Finnis和Joseph M Boyle等新自然法理论家认为，人类有意的行为是面向基本利益的多元化的关注善在指导行动中的作用及其对实践理性、政治和法律的后续影响，是自然法传统中反复出现的中心主题。根据新自然法理论家的观点，基本商品使人的行为变得可理解。行为的可理解性并不保证其合理性:这取决于该行为是否以符合实践理性要求的方式面向基本利益。然而，一个不能被理解的行为将不能是合理的，因为它不是针对任何潜在的利益。因此，根据这种观点，行为的可解性是其合理性的必要条件，但不是充分条件。
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Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00011
Anthony J. Lisska
{"title":"God, Aquinas, and natural law theory: the question of natural kinds","authors":"Anthony J. Lisska","doi":"10.4337/9781788110044.00011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044.00011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404952,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115987692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00010
R. Dougherty
{"title":"St. Augustine on natural law","authors":"R. Dougherty","doi":"10.4337/9781788110044.00010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044.00010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404952,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125787274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00006
J. Crowe, C. Lee
The term ‘natural law’ has historically led to a great deal of confusion. This is partly due to the ambiguity of the term ‘law’, which can be understood in at least two different senses, each of which plays a significant role in natural law thought. First, the use of the term ‘law’ in this context is sometimes taken to refer to the rule-like character of natural law standards.1 The idea that natural law represents a set of rules or commands analogous to positive law, but emanating from God rather than humans, is certainly an influential aspect of the natural law tradition. There is, however, a second and equally important sense of ‘law’ at play throughout the history of natural law thought. This is the sense of ‘law’ as a teleological notion. Natural law, on this conception, is best analogised not with positive legal enactments, but with the regularities captured in the ‘natural laws’ of physics or biology. Humans are governed by natural law in the sense that their actions are guided by certain normative ends; these ends are what are good for humans with the nature they have. The dialectic between these two conceptions of natural law can be seen historically in the long-running dispute between voluntarism and naturalism in meta-ethics.2 Roughly, voluntarists hold that whatever God wills is good, whereas naturalists hold that some things are inherently good by nature, and even God may not override those values. However, defenders of one or the other of these positions frequently recognise an interplay between them, rather than preferring one to the complete exclusion of the other.3 A voluntarist, then, may hold that God, although in principle capable of willing anything to be good, would in practice will those things to be good that are in accordance with nature. A naturalist, meanwhile, may hold that those things that are good by nature are so because of God’s wise and beneficent design; the constraints imposed on God’s will by these natural values, then, are ultimately self-enacted. The two conceptions of ‘natural law’ outlined above – law as command and law as teleology – are therefore far from mutually exclusive. They may converge to yield a coherent picture of the natural law outlook. There is a tendency in contemporary discussions of natural law – particularly by those not working within the tradition – to focus on the idea of natural law as divine command to the exclusion of its naturalistic aspect. This simplification has a number of unfortunate consequences. One is that it leads people to reject natural law because they are sceptical about God, whereas even leading theistic defenders of natural law such as Thomas Aquinas have emphasised that it primarily depends on natural human dispositions and intellect, rather than divine
{"title":"The natural law outlook","authors":"J. Crowe, C. Lee","doi":"10.4337/9781788110044.00006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044.00006","url":null,"abstract":"The term ‘natural law’ has historically led to a great deal of confusion. This is partly due to the ambiguity of the term ‘law’, which can be understood in at least two different senses, each of which plays a significant role in natural law thought. First, the use of the term ‘law’ in this context is sometimes taken to refer to the rule-like character of natural law standards.1 The idea that natural law represents a set of rules or commands analogous to positive law, but emanating from God rather than humans, is certainly an influential aspect of the natural law tradition. There is, however, a second and equally important sense of ‘law’ at play throughout the history of natural law thought. This is the sense of ‘law’ as a teleological notion. Natural law, on this conception, is best analogised not with positive legal enactments, but with the regularities captured in the ‘natural laws’ of physics or biology. Humans are governed by natural law in the sense that their actions are guided by certain normative ends; these ends are what are good for humans with the nature they have. The dialectic between these two conceptions of natural law can be seen historically in the long-running dispute between voluntarism and naturalism in meta-ethics.2 Roughly, voluntarists hold that whatever God wills is good, whereas naturalists hold that some things are inherently good by nature, and even God may not override those values. However, defenders of one or the other of these positions frequently recognise an interplay between them, rather than preferring one to the complete exclusion of the other.3 A voluntarist, then, may hold that God, although in principle capable of willing anything to be good, would in practice will those things to be good that are in accordance with nature. A naturalist, meanwhile, may hold that those things that are good by nature are so because of God’s wise and beneficent design; the constraints imposed on God’s will by these natural values, then, are ultimately self-enacted. The two conceptions of ‘natural law’ outlined above – law as command and law as teleology – are therefore far from mutually exclusive. They may converge to yield a coherent picture of the natural law outlook. There is a tendency in contemporary discussions of natural law – particularly by those not working within the tradition – to focus on the idea of natural law as divine command to the exclusion of its naturalistic aspect. This simplification has a number of unfortunate consequences. One is that it leads people to reject natural law because they are sceptical about God, whereas even leading theistic defenders of natural law such as Thomas Aquinas have emphasised that it primarily depends on natural human dispositions and intellect, rather than divine","PeriodicalId":404952,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131072302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00017
Norman P. Ho
{"title":"Natural law in Confucianism","authors":"Norman P. Ho","doi":"10.4337/9781788110044.00017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044.00017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404952,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory","volume":"2016 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114609449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00027
T. Murphy
{"title":"Natural law and natural justice: a Thomistic perspective","authors":"T. Murphy","doi":"10.4337/9781788110044.00027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044.00027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404952,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128666132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-05-02DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199362189.001.0001
V. Lloyd
Black Natural Law introduces and analyzes a “tradition” (Vincent Lloyd’s term throughout the text) of African American natural law reflection. In so doing, Lloyd dismantles stubborn boundaries between Christian ethics, black religion, and American religious history. Black Christian writers such as Frederick Douglass are often confined to the category of “history” and rarely elevated to esteemed intellectual disciplines such as “theology” and “ethics.” Lloyd reverses that tendency. Like Catherine Bell, Robert Orsi, Miguel De La Torre, and others, he makes us question the hierarchical dualism between thought and practice, and our habit of associating white Christianities with the former and nonwhite Christianities with the latter. This book is worth reading for that feature alone. But there are many other worthwhile arguments as well. In his surveys of Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. DuBois, Anna Julia Cooper, and Martin Luther King Jr., Lloyd identifies a coherent tradition of natural law reflection in African American Christianity that imagines a concentric series of laws, including God’s law, moral law, and civic law. The tradition emphasizes the image of God in all human beings and thus the “inherent value of human life” (22). Black natural law reflection is distinctive primarily because it is rooted in black experience. At its core, it is informed by experiences of oppression sponsored by the civic law. Critique of ideology (which Lloyd sometimes uses as a synonym for civic/worldly law) is at the heart of black natural law, as is the organizing of social movements as a practical outgrowth of that critique. Lloyd also shows that black natural law sets itself apart from its white/European counterparts by understanding reason and emotion as mutually informing: emotion does and indeed should inform reason in moral reflection. And because God privileges the oppressed, black natural law also emphasizes its own priority over white theological ethics. Through close readings of black theologians, Lloyd pulls all these features together and persuasively shows that there is a coherent tradition of black natural law thinking in American Christianity. This primary argument is clear and indispensable for scholars of either black theology or natural law (or both). Lloyd also makes a provocative historical argument: the tradition began to decline after the civil rights movement and is currently in a state of disarray. He writes that “elements of black natural law continued to be invoked in various
《黑人自然法》介绍并分析了非裔美国人自然法反思的“传统”(Vincent Lloyd贯穿全文的术语)。通过这样做，劳埃德拆除了基督教伦理、黑人宗教和美国宗教史之间顽固的界限。像弗雷德里克·道格拉斯这样的黑人基督教作家通常局限于“历史”的范畴，很少被提升到“神学”和“伦理学”等受人尊敬的知识学科。劳埃德扭转了这种趋势。像Catherine Bell, Robert Orsi, Miguel De La Torre等人一样，他让我们质疑思想和实践之间的等级二元论，以及我们将白人基督教与前者和非白人基督教与后者联系起来的习惯。这本书仅凭这一点就值得一读。但也有许多其他有价值的论点。在他对弗雷德里克·道格拉斯、W.E.B.杜波依斯、安娜·朱莉娅·库珀和马丁·路德·金的调查中，劳埃德发现了非裔美国人基督教中反映自然法的连贯传统，这种传统想象了一系列同心的法律，包括上帝的法律、道德法律和公民法律。传统强调上帝在所有人身上的形象，因此强调“人类生命的内在价值”(22)。黑人自然法反思之所以与众不同，主要是因为它根植于黑人的经历。在其核心，它是由公民法律赞助的压迫经验。意识形态批判(劳埃德有时将其用作公民法/世俗法的同义词)是黑人自然法的核心，社会运动的组织也是这种批判的实际产物。劳埃德还表明，通过理解理性和情感是相互通知的，黑人自然法则将自己与白人/欧洲同行区分开来:情感确实应该在道德反思中告知理性。因为上帝给予受压迫者特权，黑人的自然法也强调自己比白人的神学伦理更优先。通过对黑人神学家的仔细阅读，劳埃德将所有这些特征结合在一起，并令人信服地表明，在美国基督教中存在着黑人自然法思想的连贯传统。对于黑人神学或自然法(或两者兼而有之)的学者来说，这个主要论点是明确而不可或缺的。劳埃德还提出了一个具有挑衅性的历史论点:传统在民权运动后开始衰落，目前处于混乱状态。他写道"黑人自然法则的要素在各种
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00007
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00021
C. Carol
{"title":"Luce Irigaray on women and natural law","authors":"C. Carol","doi":"10.4337/9781788110044.00021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044.00021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404952,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122788595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4337/9781788110044.00029
B. Crawford
{"title":"Law and governance","authors":"B. Crawford","doi":"10.4337/9781788110044.00029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044.00029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404952,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122898065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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